As the United States dropped its atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, 1.6 million Soviet troops launched a surprise attack on the Japanese army occupying eastern Asia. Within days, Emperor Hirohito's million-man army in the region had collapsed.
It was a momentous turn on the Pacific battleground of World War II, yet one that would be largely eclipsed in the history books by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the same week 65 years ago. But in recent years some historians have argued that the Soviet action served as effectively as — or possibly more than — the A-bombs in ending the war.
Now a new history by a professor at University of California, Santa Barbara seeks to reinforce that view, arguing that fear of Soviet invasion persuaded the Japanese to opt for surrender to the Americans, who they believed would treat them more generously than the Soviets.
Japan's forces in northeast Asia first tangled with the Russians in 1939 when the Japanese army tried to invade Mongolia. Their crushing defeat at the battle of Khalkin Gol induced Tokyo to sign a neutrality pact that kept the USSR out of the Pacific war.
Tokyo turned its focus to confronting U.S., British and Dutch forces instead, which led to the Pearl Harbor attack on Dec. 7, 1941.
But following the German surrender on May 8, 1945, and having suffered a string of defeats in the Philippines, Okinawa and Iwo Jima, Japan turned to Moscow to mediate an end to the Pacific war.
However, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had already secretly promised Washington and London that he would attack Japan within three months of Germany's defeat. He thus ignored Tokyo's plea, and mobilized more than a million troops along Manchuria's border.
Operation August Storm was launched Aug. 9, 1945, as the Nagasaki bomb was dropped, and would claim the lives of 84,000 Japanese and 12,000 Soviet soldiers in two weeks of fighting. The Soviets ended up just 50 kilometers (30 miles) from Japan's main northern island, Hokkaido.
"The Soviet entry into the war played a much greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation," said Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, whose recently published "Racing the Enemy" examines the conclusion of the Pacific war and is based on recently declassified Soviet archives as well as U.S. and Japanese documents..
"The emperor and the peace party (within the government) hastened to end the war expecting that the Americans would deal with Japan more generously than the Soviets," Hasegawa, a Russian-speaking American scholar, said in an interview.
Despite the death toll from the atomic bombings — 140,000 in Hiroshima, 80,000 in Nagasaki the Imperial Military Command believed it could hold out against an Allied invasion if it retained control of Manchuria and Korea, which provided Japan with the resources for war, according to Hasegawa and Terry Charman, a historian of World War II at London's Imperial War Museum.
"The Soviet attack changed all that," Charman said. "The leadership in Tokyo realized they had no hope now, and in that sense August Storm did have a greater effect on the Japanese decision to surrender than the dropping of the A-bombs."
In the U.S., the bombings are still widely seen as a decision of last resort against an enemy that appeared determined to fight to the death. President Harry S. Truman and U.S. military leaders believed an invasion of Japan would cost hundreds of thousands of American lives.
American historian Richard B. Frank has argued that as terrible as the atomic bombs were, they saved hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and millions of Japanese troops and civilians who would have perished if the conflict had gone on until 1946.
"In the famous words of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, (the bombs) were the 'least abhorrent choice' of a dreadful array of option facing American leaders," he said in an interview. "Alternatives to the atomic bombs carried no guarantee as to when they would end the war and carried a far higher price in human death and suffering."
Frank, who is writing a three-volume history of the Pacific war, said he continued to disagree with Hasegawa on the relative importance of the Soviet intervention and the A-bombs in forcing the surrender decision.
But he said they agreed that ultimate responsibility for what happened lay with Japan's government and Hirohito, who had decided in June to draft almost the entire population, men and most women, to fight to the death.
"Since no provision had been made to place these people in uniform, invading Allied troops would have not been able to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, effectively turning each village in Japan into a military target," Frank said.
The impact of the lightning Soviet advance comes through in the words of Japan's wartime prime minister, Kantaro Suzuki, urging his cabinet to surrender.
He is quoted in Hasegawa's book as saying, "If we miss (the chance) today, the Soviet Union will take not only Manchuria, Korea and Sakhalin, but also Hokkaido. We must end the war while we can deal with the United States."
V-J Day, the day Japan ceased fighting, came on Aug. 15 (Aug. 14 in the U.S.), and Japan's formal surrender followed on Sept. 2.
Dominic Lieven, a professor of Russian government at the London School of Economics, said anti-Soviet sentiment in the West tended to minimize Soviet military achievements.
Also, "very few Anglo-Americans saw the Soviet offensive in the Far East with their own eyes, and Soviet archives were not open to Western historians subsequently," he said.
More surprising, even in Russia the campaign was largely ignored. Although the scale of the Soviet victory was unprecedented, 12,000 dead against Japan hardly compared with the life-and-death struggle against Nazi Germany, in which 27 million Soviets died.
"The importance of the operation was huge," said retired Gen. Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, who took part in the 1945 campaign. "By entering the war with militarist Japan ... the Soviet Union precipitated the end of World War II."
Lekic is based in Brussels. Associated Press writer Vladimir Isachenkov in Moscow contributed to this report.
Copyright © 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
蘇聯歷史學家重新思考的關鍵作用，在日本戰敗
通過斯洛博丹萊基奇（美聯社） - 10小時前
由於美國放棄了原子彈在廣島和長崎在1945年8月，160萬蘇聯軍隊發動了突然襲擊日軍佔領的東部地區。幾天之內，日本天皇裕仁的百萬人的軍隊在該地區已經崩潰。
這是一個重大打開太平洋二戰戰場，但一，將在很大程度上掩蓋了在歷史書是由原子彈落在廣島和長崎在同一個星期65年前。但近年來一些歷史學家認為，蘇聯的行動有效地擔任 - 或有可能超過 - 在A炸彈在結束戰爭。
現在，一個新的歷史由一名教授在加州大學聖巴巴拉旨在強化這一觀點，認為擔心蘇聯入侵說服日本人選擇向美國人投降，誰相信他們會更慷慨地對待他們比蘇聯。
日本的軍隊在東北亞第一糾纏與俄羅斯在1939年時，日本軍隊試圖入侵蒙古。他們在戰鬥中慘敗的Khalkin戈爾致東京簽署了中立條約，保持了蘇聯從太平洋戰爭。
東京轉向主要面對美國，英國和荷蘭的部隊代替，這導致了珍珠港襲擊 1941年12月7日。
但隨著 5月8日德國投降，1945年和遭受失敗的字符串，在菲律賓，沖繩和硫黃島，日本轉向莫斯科調解結束太平洋戰爭。
然而，蘇聯領導人約瑟夫斯大林已經秘密地答應華盛頓和倫敦，他將在三個月內襲擊日本，德國戰敗。因此，他忽略了東京的呼籲，並動員超過一百萬軍隊沿滿洲邊境。
八月風暴行動發起了1945年8月9日，由於長崎原子彈被取消，並要求日本的生命，84000和12000蘇聯士兵在兩個星期的戰鬥。蘇聯最終僅 50公里（30英里）從日本的主要島嶼北部的北海道。
“蘇聯加入戰爭中發揮了更大的作用比原子彈在誘導日本投降，因為它粉碎任何希望日方能夠終止戰爭，通過莫斯科的調解，說：”剛長谷川，其最近出版的“賽車敵人”檢查結論太平洋戰爭，是根據最近解密的蘇聯檔案，以及美國和日本的文件..
“皇帝與和平黨（在政府）趕緊結束戰爭，美國人希望將處理與日本比蘇聯更慷慨，”長谷川，一個講俄語的美國學者，在接受採訪時說。
儘管死亡人數從原子彈爆炸 - 140,000在廣島，長崎的80,000帝國軍區相信能頂住一盟軍入侵，如果它保留控制滿洲，韓國，日本提供的資源戰爭，根據長谷川查曼和特里，歷史學家第二次世界大戰在倫敦的帝國戰爭博物館。
“蘇聯襲擊改變了這一切，”查曼說。 “在東京的領導意識到他們現在已經沒有希望，在這個意義上八月風暴確實有更大的影響，日本決定投降比下降了A -炸彈。”
在美國，爆炸案仍然被廣泛視為最後決定對一個敵人似乎決心戰鬥到死。杜魯門總統和美國軍方領導人認為日本的入侵將花費數十萬的美國人的生命。
美國歷史學家理查德弗蘭克認為，由於可怕的原子炸彈，他們節省數十萬數百萬的美國士兵和日本士兵和平民喪生，如果誰就會有衝突了，直到1946年。
“在名言的戰爭部長亨利史汀生（炸彈）是'最可惡的選擇對一個可怕的數組美國領導人面臨的選擇，”他在接受採訪時說。 “替代原子彈進行沒有保證，他們將何時結束戰爭，進行了高得多的價格在人類死亡和痛苦。”
坦率地說，誰是寫三卷歷史的太平洋戰爭，他說他不同意繼續與長谷川的相對重要性蘇聯的干預和A -炸彈迫使投降的決定。
但他說，他們一致認為，最終的責任所發生的事情在於日本政府和裕仁，誰已決定在6月起草幾乎全部人口，大多數男人和婦女，戰鬥到死。
“既然沒有規定的地方，已取得這些人穿著制服，將入侵的盟軍部隊沒有能夠區分戰鬥人員從非戰鬥員，切實把每個村莊在日本成為一個軍事目標，”弗蘭克說。
雷電的衝擊是通過在蘇聯前進的話，日本戰時首相鈴木貫太郎，要求他的內閣投降。
他引述長谷川的書說，“如果我們錯過（機會）今天，蘇聯將不僅滿洲，朝鮮和庫頁島，而且北海道。我們必須結束戰爭，而我們可以處理美國。 “
南軍日，這一天日本停止戰鬥，已於 8月15日（8月14日在美國），和日本的正式投降後的9月2日。
多米尼克列文，俄羅斯政府一位教授在倫敦經濟學院，說反蘇情緒在西方往往以減少蘇聯的軍事成就。
此外，“極少數盎格魯美國人看到了蘇聯在遠東的進攻用自己的眼睛，和蘇聯的檔案不開放給西方歷史學家後來，”他說。
更令人驚訝的，甚至在俄羅斯的活動，主要是忽略。雖然規模蘇聯的勝利是空前的，很難對日本12,000死比生命的生死鬥爭納粹德國，其中2700萬蘇聯人死亡。
“行動的重要性是巨大的，說：”退役將軍 Makhmut Gareyev，俄羅斯總統軍事科學院，誰參加了1945年的運動。他說：“進入日本軍國主義的戰爭，...蘇聯加速了第二次世界大戰的結束。”
萊基奇是基於在布魯塞爾舉行。美聯社作家弗拉基米爾伊薩琴科夫在莫斯科促成了這一報告。
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