2011年9月29日 星期四

國慶枉斷魂!—從江國慶案看台灣的轉型不正義」座談會

轉型正義週訊 No.155(2011/9/29)

*活動:本會與其他民間團體將於10/8(六)早上,舉行船過水無痕國慶枉斷魂從江國慶案台灣的轉型不正義座談會歡迎參加。

*補償基金會 還要延續?(吳乃德、葉虹靈)
說明:為了回應吳敦義院長日前在政治受難者紀念儀式上,提出可能將補償基金會延長的說法,本會撰文投書媒體,表達民間觀點。本文刊登於9/24中國時報)

上周末吳敦義院長在參加政治受難者追思儀式時,表示將再度延長受難者申請補償的期限;並期許「戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判案件補償基金會」繼續努力。我們固應努力讓所有受難者獲得補償,但這項工作是否交由該基金會繼續承擔,很值得社會討論。

依據《補償條例》規定,申請補償期限在去年底截止,基金會將於明年三月結束運作。過去一年多,基金會不斷邀請受難者向政府要求延長補償申請,並將基金會轉型為常設單位。基金會工作人員熱切期待繼續承擔這項工作或許是為公義。政治受難者追求正義決心值得尊敬。國民黨在威權時期的人權記錄,則讓其今日難以拒絕這項崇高訴求。可是,讓基金會延長工作,真的是從事補償工作最好的方式嗎?

基金會希望延長工作的主要理由是,尚有三千八百多名受難者未提出申請。然而在延長其任務之前,我們須先評估未來可能的成果。補償工作已經進行十二年。台灣幅員小、城鄉差距不大、資訊普及流通迅速政治受難者也有數個團體維持聯繫。為何這些人從未提出申請?未來尋得這些人的可能性有多大?我們也應先了解:聘有廿六名專職人員的基金會近年來透過戶政與健保系統協尋的成功率有多高?唯有如此,我們才能判斷,每年繼續花費六千多萬的人事行政費用是否合理。

然而,以基金會的運作方式,我們實缺乏足夠資訊以判斷延長是否必要。該份三千多名未申請的受難者名單,在申請截止的前三天才於網站上公告。九月中,基金會網站的最新消息仍停留在今年一月未更新。歷任董監事的名單、工作人員的專業背景、每季工作績效等,都付之闕如。更重要的是,基金會長年所累積的資料和研究案,也不對社會開放。

對受難者的補償,是台灣在轉型正義上的唯一成就。補償基金會也是台灣唯一負責轉型正義的官方單位。它雖然只負責補償,可是累積的資料和補助的研究成果,都是追尋歷史真相的重要基礎;追尋歷史真相則是轉型正義的重要任務之一。基金會長久以來以「資料只能作為補償用途」為由,拒絕提供外界使用。然而,雖然其補助的研究案與補償作業無關,計畫主持人卻可以使用這些資料。

也就是說,基金會以國家資源所累積的資料,只對少數學者開放。這不但對其他學者和民間文史工作者不公平,也是台灣社會的損失。公家資源和資料的壟斷,不是民主社會該有的現象。台灣民主化至今已逾二十年,威權時期的歷史真相猶未明朗並非沒有原因。日前郝柏村先生對受難者省籍背景和受難原因的誤解,反映了社會對歷史真相的缺乏了解。

而有幸獲得基金會資助的學者,則多與該基金會董事重疊。基金會對「利益迴避」的基本倫理,似乎毫不在意。而研究成果不對外開放,則違反基本學術倫理:所有使用公家資源研究,都須開放讓學術社群評價,也和社會分享成果。基金會過去的表現,與未來可能之成效的評估,應成為支持其延續的唯一考慮。如果未來可以追尋得到的未申請者數目不多,或許可以考慮由其他官方單位分擔這項工作。

行公義,仍然需要盡心和負責。阿根廷著名的人權團體「五月廣場的母親」, 由政治受難者的母親組成,她們在威權時代反抗軍政府獨裁統治而獲舉世敬重。近來形象卻大為受損,有前財務長涉嫌挪用政府捐款之弊案,也有聘用人員為總統助選等爭議。該國的司法與社會並因不擔心被稱「政治迫害」而袖手旁觀。政府決延續「補償基金會」之前,或許應該舉行公聽會,了解基金會運作和工作績效,也聆聽民間社會的聲音?(吳乃德為台灣民間真相與和解促進會監事、葉虹靈為執行長)

柬特別法庭將細審紅色高棉領導人

柬埔寨法院特別法庭上週表示,將按照逐項罪行來審判在19751979年間統治柬埔寨的這個極端毛主義運動的四位年邁的前領導人。這個決定意味著法庭將對被告進行一系列更小的審判,而不是一次漫長和複雜艱難的審判。

聯合國支持成立的法庭做出的決定,意味著將把針對這四人的複雜多項指控,分解成不同的部分。這四人分別被指控犯有種族滅絕、違反人道罪、戰爭罪以及其它一系列違反柬埔寨法律的罪行。現在會進行的是一系列更小的審判,在這些審判中會對這四人提出具體的指控,和這些指控有關的證據將被庭審。法庭首先將開始審理有關違反人道罪的犯罪指控。

*
分項審理為了及時讓正義得到伸張*
法庭發言人奧爾森表示,這意味著法庭將隨著審理的進度作出判決,而不是等到多年的審理結束後再做出一次性的判決。奧爾森表示,努力及時讓正義得到伸張,將確保受害者的利益,同時保證被指控者能夠獲得迅速審判的權利。他說,其它的國際特別法庭對類似複雜程度案件的審理,可能耗費長達10年的時間,才做出一項判決。

監督特別法庭的民間團體「開放社會正義倡議」組織的克萊爾·達菲解釋了這個決定的重要意義。她說:「這本質上意味著我們明年會看到進行非常集中和高密度的審判,預計在第一階段審判的1218個月裡,會做出一次判決。」

*
紅色高棉前領導人案件複雜異常*
聯合國支持下的這個法庭已經多次表示,對紅色高棉前領導人進行審理的「2號案件」將是自從在紐倫堡對納粹進行審判以來最複雜的案件。受審的四人是農謝,他曾經是已故紅色高棉領導人波爾布特(Pol Pot)的副手;喬森潘,他曾經是紅色高棉政權的國家元首;前紅色高棉外長英薩利以及前紅色高棉社會事務部長英蒂利。

四人都否認針對他們的指控。這其中最年輕的被告也已經79歲,審判時間拖得越長,這些人的健康問題干擾審判進行的可能性就越大。

達菲表示,這已經成為法庭考慮的當務之急。在其它特別法庭,曾有年邁被告在審判結果出爐之前就死亡的情況。這其中最著名的例子就是前塞爾維亞領導人米洛塞維奇。他2006年在前南斯拉夫國際刑事法庭受審期間去世。

達菲說:「我們看到不少例子,先是對這件投入了大量人力物力,經年累月進行審理期間,年邁的老人或病患被告死亡的例子。特別法庭做出決定的其中一個主因,就是要避免這種情況再次發生。

*
法庭的決定沒有讓所有人滿意*
不是所有人都對上週的決定感到滿意。第一批審理將從違反人道罪開始著手進行,但是這將不包括那些基於宗教原因進行迫害的罪行。

審判的第一部分也不進行戰爭罪或者種族滅絕罪指控的審理。種族滅絕罪在柬埔寨人看來,主要是指紅色高棉殺害信仰伊斯蘭教的佔族人以及越南族裔。所有這些指控只有在第一階段審判結束後,才會受理。

這不是完美的做法,但是法庭沒有什麼選擇。這些被告當中一些已經生病,所有的被告都很年老,時間在流逝,法庭伸張正義的時間所剩不多。

*更多轉型正義相關資訊,請上本會網站www.taiwantrc.org

2011年9月28日 星期三

郝龍彬市長合法爛/ Gardens by the Bay (新加坡)


獲300億暴利 郝龍斌被控圖利郭台強

今天出刊《壹週刊》報導,正崴集團及中影公司董事長郭台強投資電影《賽德克.巴萊》及《翻滾吧!阿 信》,票房創佳績,傳出國民黨賤賣中影文化城給郭台強,台北市政府涉嫌協助變更用地,預計每坪土地價值可望暴增至300萬元,是取得成本的15倍,因此預 估整體將獲300億元暴利。

台北市政府否認圖利郭台強,市長郝龍斌雖與郭台強見過面,但未涉及圖利情事;市府對中影文化城變更為文創園區,將依華山文創專區模式嚴格禁建住宅,只准發展文創等項目,但該變更仍需市府及內政部都委會審議才會定案。



***


這是網路惡毒:
郝龍彬被美國有線電視新聞評議網稱為『世界最爛市長』(請轉帖)
但 我郝龍彬的每季出國姊妹市考察度假是議會賞賜的呀.....


**** 新加坡不是這玩藝的創始者 (美國等才是) 但它把台北花博的煙火式比下了:

Gardens by the Bay

- [ 翻譯這個網頁 ]
21 Feb 2011 – Gardens by the Bay International Design Competition - Defining Singapore as the world's premier tropical Garden City.

印度新希望/The ever-expanding middle class in developing countries


The ever-expanding middle class in developing countries

THE past four years have seen a sharp contrast between recession-hit rich countries and buoyant emerging giants. Estimates from the Asian and African Development Banks, using a rather broad definition of middle class as living on $2-20 a day, confirm the picture. On this measurement, which includes many people who are only just above the poverty line, a third of Africans and three-quarters of Latin Americans were middle class in 2008. Meanwhile, the evidence that this progress will bring political demands that will reshape the developing world is mounting.




2007/12
最後的訓練課程可議
不過整體可知印度的前景不差
尤其是種姓制--文中與一般書說法不太同--可以改善


閱讀全文
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WSJ
經濟騰飛托起印度新希望

2007年12月03日16:34



獨立以來﹐社會主義、貧困和以出身決定社會地位的印度教種姓制度一
直是印度社會的主要特徵。如今﹐隨著經濟的高速增長﹐成百上千萬的印度人正在奔向祖輩們難以企及的理想:那就是比父輩過得更好﹐並為子女創造出更好的生活。

39歲的Sanjaya Sharma說﹐“如果是十年前﹐我的兒子就會接我的班。
”他在新德里亞穆納河(Yamuna)岸邊的火葬場工作。在那裡﹐露天火葬用的柴堆矗立在大約100個水泥平台上。Sharma的工作就是保證屍體完全火化。此外﹐如果死者的子女不能出席﹐將由他負責按照神聖的印度教儀式﹐用棍子刺穿死者的頭骨。Sharma的父親也是做這個工作的﹐作為印度社會最為卑賤的工作之一﹐這種工作每天的工資只有200盧比﹐約合5美元。

已是五個孩子父親的Sharma說﹐“我不希望孩子們走我的老路
。我希望他們進入商界、接受教育、獲得受人尊敬的職位、學習電腦並自食其力。”Sharma和妻子督促家裡最大的孩子、14歲的Khushboo取得好成績。Khushboo說﹐她希望能在孟買的私營企業中找到一份好工作﹐或是去美國。

印度人──其中有許多來自下層社會──感受到的這種新契機也正是這
個泱泱大國經濟再度覺醒對社會產生的最為深遠的影響之一。

印度經濟的平均增速在過去四年達到了約8.6%﹐如果這一速度得以保持﹐那麼印度國民的平均收入將在十年間增長一
倍。印度公司正在吞食著西方的競爭對手﹐與此同時﹐印度的專業人才也認識到了國內更廣闊的發展空間﹐紛紛回國創業。而貧窮的印度人也正從農村湧向城市﹐尋求新的工作機會和更好的生活。

印度社會科學研究理事會(Indian Council of Social Science Research)主席安德烈•博特利(Andre Beteille)說﹐人們有了心理上的突破。73歲的安德烈在印
度1947年脫離英國獲得獨立後不久就開始研究印度社會。“印度人口中的很大一部分群體認為﹐他們和其他民族相比並不遜色。”

從人口統計學方面來看﹐有證據表明﹐印度經濟的繁榮局面還將繼續
。印度約三分之一的人口都不滿15歲。10月份世界銀行(World Bank)的報告指出﹐未來五年﹐印度將在全球勞動力人口增長中佔到近25%。與之相比﹐中國的人口卻在快速老齡化﹐世界銀行9月份發佈的另一份報告顯示﹐中國勞動力人口將從2000年佔總人口的67%降至2050年的57%。

經濟合作與發展組織(The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)最近表示﹐按購買力平價計算
﹐印度在2006年成為全球第三大經濟體﹐僅次於美國和中國。所謂購買力平價﹐是指根據不同國家商品價格水平計算出來的貨幣之間的等值係數。

印度重新煥發的活力和這片古老土地的悲慘一面形成了鮮明對比
。約佔印度人口70%的農民中仍有許多生活在貧困之中。營養不良、嬰兒夭折和其他兒童疾患十分普遍﹐這種情況在農村尤為嚴重﹐原因在於印度幾屆政府在醫療保健方面投入不足﹐而且許多面向貧苦人民的公共和救濟資金都被腐敗蠶食了。

此外﹐印度也不是第一次感受到這種樂觀情緒了。在贏得獨立之後
﹐印度領導人認為﹐作為一個寬容、非宗教的民主國家﹐印度有能力獲得全新而獨特的地位﹐尤其是在國家政策向經濟發展傾斜的情況下。從那以後﹐印度的穩定與同年獲得獨立的鄰國巴基斯坦的動盪局面形成了反差。不過印度經濟的表現在獨立後的幾十年里乏善可陳﹐以至於這種速度被戲謔為“印度式增長。”

印度也曾出現過短暫的經濟快速增長。上世紀90年代中期
﹐印度經歷過三年這樣的時期﹐不過隨著亞洲金融危機的爆發﹐這一繁榮局面也終結了。

儘管如此﹐當時的情況與時下印度大部分地區正在發生的變化並沒有多
少可比性──今天發生的一切正在改變著人們的生活方式和追求。印度國內的旅遊公司正為人數創新高的觀光客應接不暇。而在洗衣機、乾洗機和微波爐製造商IFB Industries Ltd.的廣告中﹐面帶笑容的年輕女士正注視著筆記本電腦上的數據表。廣告語是﹐“想著家務事?讓IFB解放你吧。”

和僅僅幾年前相比﹐如今印度年輕人擁有的機會要多得多
﹐早已超越了信息技術和呼叫中心的行業界限。而脫離國有制樊籬的全新行業為年輕一代提供了更為多樣化的選擇。

22歲的Sunil Ji Bhat說﹐“在我的圈子裡﹐你要麼從事工程﹐要麼從事製藥。
”他屬於克什米爾的“潘迪特”﹐也就是來自穆斯林克什米爾地區婆羅門中的一支。在古老但仍頗有影響的等級制度里﹐婆羅門是最高等級﹐依次向下分別是武士、商人和農民。“現在﹐新事物不斷湧現:保險、新聞業、酒店管理等等﹐而年輕人對這些新領域很感興趣。”

在1990年針對印度教教徒的大規模暴亂中﹐Bhat一家和許多人
一起被從克什米爾驅逐出來。他們在位於查謨和克什米爾邦南部的查謨難民營居住下來。曾經富足的一家人自此定居在那裡﹐在大多數時間里﹐他們一家都要擠在一個帳篷中。

從10歲開始﹐Bhat就希望成為一名新聞主播。當時
﹐一家人只能收看到一個國營電視頻道。他說﹐“我的父母十分擔心。他們認為播報新聞的人一定是通過關係得到這份工作的”。

Bhat目前在新德里印度大眾傳媒學院(Indian Institute of Mass Communication)攻讀碩士學位﹐而他的父母已經逐漸認識到﹐兒子可能會在電視業有所發展。眼下﹐印度共有200多個電視頻道﹐還有70多個在等待政府審批。Bhat經常提醒他的父母說﹐出現在一個頗受歡迎有線新聞頻道中的一名主播也是克什米爾的“潘迪特”。

這種變化在種姓制度的最底層可能掀起更大的波瀾。21歲的V.P. Gomathi在印度南部泰米爾納德邦(Tamil Nadu)的一個小山村長大﹐來自“達利特”家庭。所謂“達利特
”就是從前的“賤民”﹐位於印度教種姓制度的最底層﹐其地位是如此之低以至於被排除在了等級系統之外。

Gomathi的父親是個酒鬼。她的母親14歲結婚
﹐從未接受過教育。不過母親意識到了學習的重要性﹐於是她和其他家庭成員全力支持Gomathi接受良好的教育。

Gomathi先是進入了一所私立教會高中﹐後來又到大學就讀
。她說﹐“我媽媽認為﹐女兒不應該再面對這樣的處境。”如今﹐Gomathi正在孟買的塔塔社會科學院(Tata Institute of Social Sciences)攻讀社會服務的碩士學位。

Gomathi說﹐因為自己取得的成功﹐她在家鄉面臨人們的指責
。村民們說﹐“如果她接受高等教育﹐那麼我們就給她找不到新郎倌了。”不過她的成績也促使村里其他人認真看待教育。

正如Gomathi的經歷一樣﹐新的進步大多是在印度城市里出現的
。與之相比﹐印度的大部分農村地區卻不容樂觀﹐那裡不僅無緣於經濟增長﹐而且隨著窮人的不斷增多﹐還有可能走向繁榮的反面。

新德里市場調查公司IIMS Dataworks一項新的研究發現﹐2004年﹐83
%的印度農村勞動力年收入低於61,125盧比﹐約合1,540美元。到了2007年年中﹐18至59歲之間的農村勞動力人口中低收入人群所佔的比例增加到了86.4%。而印度城市地區低收入勞動力卻從三年前佔勞動力人口的79.5%下降到了73.2%。

農業改革毫無生氣﹐以至近些年來印度的農業經濟較整體經濟的發展速
度要緩慢得多。

上屆政府由奉行印度教民族主義的人民黨領導﹐它在2004年大選中
落敗的部分原因就在於其競選口號“印度大放光芒”(India Shining)在許多人──尤其是印度農民看來空洞無物。而目前由曼莫漢•辛格(Manmohan Singh)任總理的國大黨政府依靠的是脆弱的執政聯盟﹐它在進行有望使更多人分享經濟增長成果方面的變革也一直顯得步履蹣跚。

確保印度經濟持續增長的關鍵變革之一就是改革問題纏身的公共教育體
系。印度的許多教師經常缺課﹐原因是學校難以解雇這些教師﹐而且他們進行私人輔導能賺得更多的錢。世界銀行的數據顯示﹐在25歲以上的印度人中﹐只有17%接受過中等教育。

如果政府希望發揮年輕人口眾多的優勢﹐而不希望因為教育落後背上更
大的就業包袱﹐那麼教育改革就極為關鍵。改革對於滿足印度本國居民更高的要求和願望也十分必要﹐因為即便是最貧困的印度人現在也將教育視為擺脫貧窮的金鑰匙。

印度政府、經濟學家和商界領袖們都已經意識到了提高教育水平─
─尤其是基礎教育和中等教育的必要性。不過許多人對政府的努力已失去了信心。這促使外界呼籲私營領域在促進私立學校建設方面承擔更大的責任﹐即便是在偏遠落後地區也是如此。

另一方面﹐印度聯邦政府正計劃大規模擴大高等教育機構的數量
﹐包括哪些屬於重點學校印度技術學院(Indian Institutes of Technology)和印度管理學院(Indian Institutes of Management)的學校網絡﹐而這些學校在印度的地位相當於美國的常春籐聯盟。

印度能否讓更多國民在物質和社會地位上取得進步將在很大程度上決定
著印度的今天能否在歷史上被視為一個變革性時期﹐從而與美國藍領工人在上世紀四、五十年代大規模進入中產階級這樣的變革期相提並論。這也將有助於縮小縱橫交錯在這個性情乖戾、層級眾多的國家裡在宗教、種姓等級、南方與北方、城市與鄉村、發展與生存間的種種分歧。

有人說﹐穩定和凝聚力或許可以幫助新崛起的印度通過將民主和繁榮結
合起來在世界舞台上為一個動盪不安的地區樹立榜樣。而民主和繁榮正是這個地區所缺少的。

印度政府機構計劃委員會(Planning Commission)副主席蒙特克•辛格•阿盧瓦利亞
(Montek Singh Ahluwalia)說﹐“我們認為﹐如果擁有11億人口的印度繁榮富強﹐那麼世界也將成為一個更為安寧的所在。如果民主在印度不能發揮作用﹐那麼我認為民主也沒有未來可言。”這家機構在制定印度經濟政策方面發揮著重要作用。

追求改變人生的夢想在印度還是個全新的概念﹐即便對於那些20多歲
的年輕人這個概念也顯得有些難以理解。在不久前的一個週一﹐Home Town家具連鎖店的25名雇員在新德里北部的培訓機構里聚集一堂。他們的平均年齡在22歲左右﹐大多沒有接受過高等教育。

這個名為Gurukool的項目是公司為了激勵員工追求更好生活而
設計的﹐目的是使員工在工作中更為自信﹐並認識到開創事業的價值。

在第一天的一輪訓練中﹐這些員工拿到幾大張紙和筆
﹐要求他們畫上或寫出能代表他們理想的事物。在隨後的30分鐘里﹐這些參與者不知如何下筆。圍坐在一個桌子前的年輕人互相抄襲著各自的答案﹐拙劣地描繪著腦海中的美妙場景。

在五天的課程中﹐他們觀看了迪士尼的《小飛象》(Dumbo)
﹐這個故事告訴人們如何將自己的侷限變成機會。他們還進行了樹立自信心的訓練﹐目的是幫助他們認識到自己在生活中需要什麼﹐以及如何達到目標。

Home Town的所有者Home Solutions Retail Ltd.學習發展部門的負責人Azhar Sohail說﹐“突然之間﹐他們意識到了自己沒有發揮出來的潛能
。在培訓的五天結束後﹐他們滿懷信心地走出了大門。”

Paul Beckett / Krishna Pokharel / Eric Bellman

2011年9月27日 星期二

怒吼吧 完全執政

Uriel Sinai/Getty Images
Scorning Voting, Protests Surge Globally

Protesters around the world have something in common: wariness, even contempt, toward traditional politicians and the democratic political process they preside over.



QUOTATION OF THE DAY
"Our parents are grateful because they're voting. We're the first generation to say that voting is worthless."
MARTA SOLANAS, 27, on Spaniards who spent decades under Franco.


不加強對美關係,就無法保護台灣人民

蘋論:弱化對美關係危險又愚蠢

很多年來,台灣國、民兩黨的兩岸政策,都附和民調大多數人支持的「維持現狀」選項。可是分分秒秒都在變化的宇宙,有現狀這回事嗎?我們抓不住現狀,但放在長久的脈絡裡,倒是可以看出現狀往哪個方向變遷。

真的能維持現狀嗎

陸委會昨公布民調顯示,主張「廣義維持 現狀」的民眾佔87.2%。但現狀可以維持嗎?二戰前英國首相張伯倫,姑息納粹德國的擴張,總想以談判(如慕尼黑會議)阻止德國的野心,維持和平現狀。但 當德國強大到鄰國無力抗拒時,和平現狀立即粉碎。所以,現狀只是最終倒向某一方的過程與過渡。如果台海現狀可以維持,請問李登輝執政時兩岸的現狀與此刻的 現狀相同嗎?當然不同。如果我們真的維持了現狀,就應該相同。台灣最明顯現狀不同在於我們行動自由的空間與時間持續受到侵蝕。


大戰略的目標是如何使我方的行動更自由,並使對方的行動更不自由,幾乎是零和遊戲。台灣行動自由越來越受限,指的是台灣越來越不能自由選擇自己的未來。美國兩岸問題學者沙特上周四說,三項因素擠壓了台灣的自由空間:中國崛起的經濟與軍事實力、台灣本身的弱化,以及美國對台灣支持的降低。在這情況下,台灣想保有不變的自由空間的「現狀」,是不可能且錯誤的觀念。

馬不重視對美遊說

台灣以前是在美國的軌道上運行,但現在已逐漸受到中國恆星日益強大的引力吸引,而轉軌繞行到中國的軌道。現在想要反轉,已無可能。


其 實,還有一項原因:就是馬政府刻意放鬆對美國的遊說工作,當作對北京的表態。這不但危險,而且愚蠢。兩蔣時代多麼重視對美遊說,無論國會、行政當局、輿 論、學界、智庫乃至地方政府(如採購團),無一遺漏。李、扁執政時,對美遊說也從未稍歇。但馬執政後,竟如沙特所說:「台灣政府過去幾年是亞洲國家中,對 華府遊說最為消極者。」馬是無意還是故意?放在「終極統一」的脈絡看,當然是故意。台灣過去在美國朝野辛苦建立的友誼關係,遭馬刻意毀棄,真可惜啊!



台灣對美遊說的中斷,在華府已造成困惑,並降低了台灣的影響力。友台的國會議員越來越少,也減少來台訪問,因為我們對美的國會遊說工作已大不如前。不加強對美關係,就無法保護台灣人民,也誘惑中國對台更為霸道與野蠻。

意在中國/ 意在日本/Google to build data centers in Singapore, HK, Taiwan


Google to build data centers in Singapore, HK, Taiwan


(Reuters) - Google Inc said on Wednesday that it will begin building data centers in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, which will be operational within 1-2 years once construction begins.

Investment in the data centers in Hong Kong and Taiwan would exceed $100 million each, the Internet search company said in a statement. It did not give a figure for the Singapore center.

Google added that it would hire up to 20 staff at the Hong Kong and Taiwan centers.




日本與菲律賓加強安全合作 意在中國
 日本和菲律賓正在探討多種途徑﹐以加強兩國的軍事和安全合作﹐目的是在抗衡中國在區內的影響。兩國均與中國有領土爭端且不斷深化。
觀點﹕日本對華外交樂觀論的終結



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台灣國債佔GDP45%逾公債法債限/government debt and budget balances

審計長︰若依國際標準計算 台灣國債佔GDP45%逾公債法債限

〔記者施曉光/台北報導〕馬政府一再強調台灣國債狀況良好,但繼學者、「反貧困聯盟」質疑國家債務將「破表」後,監察院審計長林慶隆昨天在立法院答詢時明確警示,如果按照國際標準計算,台灣債務將達GDP的四十五%,超出公債法債限。

林慶隆列席立院院會報告九十九年度中央政府總決算審核報告及其他特別決算審核報告等案審核經過並備詢。

自償性債務未計入

國 民黨立委賴士葆詢問林慶隆,國債狀況嚴不嚴重?林慶隆指出,台灣國內債務金額近五兆元,平均每位國民要揹負二十萬元債務,雖未超過公債法規定,仍在GDP 四十%以內,但現行計算方式與國際標準不同,沒有把非營業基金的自償性債務計入,如果一併計算,大約還要再加四、五千億元債務,這樣就會達到GDP四十 五%。

賴士葆趕緊幫馬政府說話,強調歐美國家每年財政赤字佔GDP十%,反觀台灣不到二%,「我們應該還有舉債空間」,此時,林慶隆微調口徑說,雖然國債金額大,但還在財務規律中。

不過,國民黨立委黃義交質詢時,一反賴士葆的立場強調,根據學者統計,採國際標準來計算,台灣國債已超標,要求林慶隆扮「黑臉」。

中央地方債共13兆

林慶隆回應,我國公債法確實沒有和國際接軌,雖政府編列債務預算符合規定,但若採計國際標準,債務佔GDP比例還要增加好幾趴,許多潛藏性債務過去行政機關都不揭露,在審計部要求下才揭露,中央、地方共計高達十三兆元。明年決算時可以把國際標準也納入審核評估。

此 外,民進黨政府時期的新聞局,在九十六年曾以宣導入聯公投、整體施政傳播專案等名義要求各部會分攤經費,為此立法院曾決議要求各部會追回總計近兩億元的違 法動支經費,審計部決算時也將相關支用經費列於各部會應保留數,但至今已近四年,各部會沒有依立院決議向新聞局追回,成為呆帳,保留期限又將在今年底屆 滿。

林慶隆面對立委質詢時表示,監察院曾督促審計部要求各機關依法繳回,雖然各機關都有表述理由,但還是要持續追討。

立委詢問,依照「決算法」規定,這些應付保留數將在今年底屆滿保留期限,到時候該怎麼辦?林慶隆說,還是可以列帳,就像一些保留款還可以繼續列下去,並非法定上一定要做帳務註銷處理,「可以斟酌」。


---了解一下

自償性計畫債務舉借及控管要點 - 國立臺灣大學

host.cc.ntu.edu.tw/sec/all_law/3/3-71.html - 頁庫存檔 - 封鎖 host.cc.ntu.edu.tw 的所有結果
國立臺灣大學自償性計畫債務舉借及控管要點. 經民國95年6月13日第2436次行政會議通過. 一、為健全本校進行自償性計畫之財務管理,依本校校務基金自籌收入收 ...

***

New forecasts for the government debt and budget balances of rich countries

AS THE euro area’s sovereign-debt crisis has gone from bad to worse, financial tensions now pose a grave threat not just to the European economy but beyond. Yet there is no simple gauge that explains why investors fret about some euro-zone economies while keeping faith with others that retain their own currencies. Judged by its towering gross sovereign-debt burden and its primary budget deficit (ie, excluding interest payments), as shown in IMF figures published on September 21st, Japan should be in the firing line. Instead its government continues to be able to borrow at extraordinarily low interest rates. One reason is that very little of the debt is held by foreign investors. Another is that, unusually, the government has big offsetting financial assets that bring down net debt to a more manageable 130% of GDP. Despite a relatively small primary deficit projected for this year, Greece is peculiarly vulnerable because of the scale of its indebtedness and the fact that so big a chunk of it is held abroad, a characteristic also shared by Ireland and Portugal, the two other bailed-out countries. As important, in joining the single currency, these economies lost the ability to reduce debt by inflation and to spur growth and competitiveness through devaluation. That makes investors fear that the only way to relieve oppressive debt burdens is through default.



2011年9月26日 星期一

"中國難以接受自由媒體"IPI)

"中國難以接受自由媒體"

《新蘇黎士報》報導在台北召開的國際新聞協會年會,認為國際報導可以部分平衡深受控制和審查的中國官方報導,但是由於官方今年強化了控制,外國記者在中國的處境變得艱難。此外,中國官方也越來越懂得通過媒體在國際上施加影響。


9月25日,國際新聞協會(IPI)在台北召開第60屆世界年會。這個組織成立於1950年,總部設在奧地利首都維也納,旨在維護新聞自由和言論自由。 《新蘇黎士報》(9月25日)報導說這次年會的主題是"亞洲媒體世紀",討論的重點是兩岸關係、中國的發展以及作為記者在朝鮮和對朝鮮報導的困難。

中國箝制媒體是主要議題

該報寫道:"中國審查條件的明顯強化成為會議討論的主要議題。許多報告人雖然強調,本國和國際報導的長期作用在中國是對遭到嚴格審查及控制的官方報導的糾正,比如在環境災難、嚴重事故或者對民眾極其重要的食品安全領域的過錯方面。

"然而,從國際新聞協會的角度來看,涉及到工作條件、新聞審查、國家監控和個人曝光方面,記者和媒體代表在中國的處境困難絲毫不減甚至於不可想像。這一點在2011年很明顯,中國官方面對中東的起義,也通過壓制記者和博主,將類似發展在中國發生的念頭窒息在萌芽狀態。"

報導指出,"在中國,尤其是西方的媒體代表依然經常被當作間諜或者帝國主義利益的代表而遭到詆毀。然而,記者也間接地處於壓力之下,感受到中國無論是作為被投資國還是作為投資者都在迅速增長的經濟意義。

"儘管西方媒體代表否認在歐洲或美國受到公司甚或國家機構的直接影響,但是,同時也有國際記者覺察到,必須一再面對某些巧妙的誘惑,要他們鑑於中國的巨大的經濟自由去美化中國的專制制度。"

該報接著寫道:"反過來中國作為全球投資者,自己也比以往對友善的報導更加感興趣,並且懂得在英語環境中加強媒體報導。此外,許多中國國家記者的經濟命運也直接與中國的國民經濟增長成果連在一起。

中國媒體不再是一個整體

"一位參加討論的發言人也正確地指出,透過西方的視野,中國依然被視作一個一成不變的整體,然而,事實上在媒體自由程度方面,中國也幾經具有相當多的層次了。比如,要是在北京舉辦一個有關坦誠報導的嘉賓講壇討論會,上海或香港的出席者就會感到無聊了。"

這篇報導還指出,"中國官方依然難以接受自由媒體這個題目,自然表現在這個事實上:國際記者協會邀請中國的媒體代表和官方代表出席在台灣的大會,儘管台灣與大陸只有咫尺之遙,可是沒有成功。"



編譯:林泉

責編:邱璧輝

以上內容摘譯自其它媒體,不代表德國之聲觀點

2011年9月24日 星期六

只要中共一天不排除對台動武 美國軍售就是必須的


INTERVIEW/ James Steinberg: U.S. Leadership restored in 10 years after 9/11

BY YOICHI KATO NATIONAL SECURITY CORRESPONDENT 朝日新聞 中共領土野心的眾怒

2011/09/24


photoJames Steinberg answers questions at his home in New York (Yoichi Kato)

Ten years following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the once-damaged U.S. leadership in the world has been restored and strengthened, said James Steinberg, former deputy secretary of state of the United States, in an exclusive interview with The Asahi Shimbun.

Through the war on terrorism under the Bush administration, he pointed out, the legitimacy of U.S. leadership was damaged due to their unilateral action of imposing democracy by force. The Obama administration, in which Steinberg was deeply involved with from the very beginning, re-established cooperative relationships with other nations.

"That's the single most important achievement of the Obama administration," said Steinberg, now dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University in New York.

In dealing with a rising China, Steinberg also emphasized the need for cooperation among regional countries, saying, "It is up to all of us to create an environment in which China is more likely to choose a benign course."

"It is time to make a decision one way or other," he said on the sense of urgency regarding the relocation plan of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa. He urged Japan to move forward with the current agreement to relocate the facility within Okinawa, but added, "If it's not going to happen, (it is time) to look at what the choices are."

Excerpts of the interview are as follows:

Question: It has been 10 years since 9/11. Is the United States safer now?

Steinberg: I can say undoubtedly that we're better prepared, better focused, better resourced, better organized to defend against terrorist attacks. But it's hard to say that makes us "safe," because there are so many ways that a determined terrorist could cause harm. I think the place where we've been most successful is focusing on the core organization that was threatening to the United States. Undoubtedly the capacity of al-Qaida to harm the United States has been diminished.

Q: What was wrong with the way the Bush administration responded?

A: I think that part of being safer is having strong support from others to deal with the problem of terrorism. So, I think that many of the measures that the Bush administration took, which were taken without regard to the respective review of partners, pose new kinds of risks for the United States--not only in dealing with terrorism but also in terms of dealing with the other threats.

Q: Like what?

A: Well, by taking actions unilaterally, by appearing to want to unilaterally change the face of governments in the Middle East, this sort of promoting democracy through force or trying to impose it, I think, led people to question the sincerity and motives of the United States.

Q: The situation in Afghanistan still does not look so good.

A: I think that, despite the efforts that you see, like the attack on Kabul the other day, that one shouldn't underestimate the fact that in many parts of Afghanistan the Taliban has been pushed back, that their capacity has been limited, that people are turning away from the Taliban and seeing that as a negative force.

Q: All is all is the global war on terrorism a failure?

A: It's not a black or white thing. I think there have been important successes. I think that, clearly, the capacity of the al-Qaida leadership has been greatly diminished, the stature has been undermined.

And the "Arab spring" has made clear that most of the people in the Arab and Muslim world don't want the kind of vision that al-Qaida offers. They want a more tolerant society.

So, I think that, in kind of a macro strategic sense, this has been a bad decade for those kinds of radical forces. But there still remain individuals who are dangerous. You have to be eternally vigilant. This is not a war in which the other side will surrender.

Q: What was the thought behind changing the basic approach from the Bush administration?

A: One of the signature features of the Obama administration has been the conviction that, on all of the big challenges that we face, like terrorism, climate change, or the economic problem, no country, no matter how powerful, can solve them itself. If we want to be successful, we have to gain the support and cooperation of others. So, we need partners who share our interests and are willing to work with us. I think, in that sense, you can see it across the board, whether it's dealing with Iran, North Korea, or counter-terrorism, that we are in a much better place now.

I think our bona fides as a cooperative actor have been established, so countries are more comfortable working with us. I think that's--at a fundamental level--the single most important achievement of the Obama administration.

Q: How has the world changed since 9/11?

A: I think there are two big trends that are shaping our policy.

The one is the fact that most of the direct threats to security now are not coming from states; they're coming from non-state actors or from an intersection between man and natural phenomena. And I think that makes the conduct of foreign policy and national security very difficult, because it is a much more amorphous set of challenges.

That is an important reality especially as the tools of destruction, whether they're cyber, or bio or radiological, are increasingly available to non-state actors. That creates an especially dangerous environment.

The second is the changing balance of influential states in the world, with the rise of these emerging powers, China, obviously one, but India and Brazil and some of the other ones right behind them, like Turkey and Indonesia, create a more multi-dimensional international system, even in the world of nation-states.

Q: How has the U.S. leadership changed?

A: On balance, I think American leadership has been strengthened in the sense that our legitimacy as a leader has been restored. I think that it has always been true that the ultimate strength of U.S. leadership has come from the force of our ideas rather than our arms, and that people follow us not because they're compelled to do so because we are a powerful country, but because they want to because they share our views and interests.

I think that the big challenge now is to make sure that we are strong enough at home to be able to execute on that leadership and sustain it.

Q: Are you talking about the economy?

A: Largely about the economy, but also infrastructure, education, all of the things that give us the strength for generations to come.

Q: But, in that sense, isn't the United States weaker at home?

A: I think our financial position was, clearly, better at the end of the Clinton administration than it is today.

So, I do think we have some work to do, and it's critical that we do it. It's not just debt, but it's the lack of a kind of sustainable strategy over the long term, I think, and the lack of a strong enough political consensus to take the steps that we need to work on. And, I think that is the single biggest challenge, whether we can rise above the partisan debates around these issues and find a common path forward.

I would not underestimate the strength of the U.S. position right now. We have a lot of natural strengths. There's still nobody in a position to assume the leadership. Nobody is looking to see China or India or Russia supplant the United States as playing this global leadership role.

Q: "Strategic Reassurance" was the new vision that you created for managing the relationship with China. But President Obama did not mention it when he visited China in the fall of 2009. Was it rejected by the White House?

A: No, not at all. Ultimately, the United States and China chose building strategic trust, as a formula. The point of "Strategic Reassurance" is to build mutual strategic trust. So, I actually believe, in its own way, that the basic concept that I advocated has now been enshrined in a formal characterization of the relationship. I feel very encouraged.

If you want the purest example of how I believe, frankly, that the idea was fully accepted, is the establishment of the U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) in May. And we would talk about these areas that I identified as the areas that would create mistrust.

Q: Did you intend to replace the "Responsible Stakeholder" concept from the Bush administration?

A: I think it's a different perspective, yes. I mean, I don't know whether it's to "replace" it, but I think that the problem with the "Stakeholder" idea was that it didn't focus on the bilateral dynamic. It is important that China act like a responsible stakeholder, but what's more critical is to deal with these sources of mistrust.

An element of building trust is to act as a responsible stakeholder, but part of it is to address the specific concerns that the United States and others have about China's behavior. My concern was if you look at China's military modernization, if you look at some of its other practices, its engagement with others, that that created doubts in other people's minds. So, that goes beyond being a responsible stakeholder; it means addressing the concerns and anxieties.

Q: But, did China "get it?"

A: They "get" the idea. Whether they "get" whether they're prepared to do what's necessary, I think, is still an open question.

Q: Next, about "core interests." The New York Times reported in April 2010 that when you visited China in March that year, Chinese officials used this term for the first time to explain their position on the South China Sea issue.

A: I think what's clear is that, although they take the South China Sea very critically, there's no clear decision by the Chinese leadership that it falls into the same category that Taiwan and Tibet do, for example. I didn't come away from our visit there as a decision that they were now defining the South China Sea as a core interest.

Q: When President Obama visited China in November 2009, the joint statement included this now-famous passage: "The two sides agreed that respecting each other's core interests is extremely important" for the U.S.-China relations.

A: Exactly. Because, I think, it is recognizing -- it's taking the other side seriously. And, again, this goes back to my point about "Strategic Reassurance." That is why I actually feel quite positive about how that's been adopted. Respecting each other's core interests; that's what "Strategic Reassurance" is all about. But even if you recognize what one country defines as a core interest, it doesn't mean you have to agree. But you have to understand that this is serious, from the other country's point of view, and as best as one can, consistent with one's own interests and one's own values, that one should try to respect them.

Q: There are some views that this inclusion of "core interests" in the joint statement gave China a wrong idea that they got a free hand on core interests. That eventually led to their assertive and even aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.

A: No, I don't buy that at all, because it was very clear what the discussion of core interests was, at the time of the joint statement. And it certainly did not include the South China Sea. Whatever reason they took, whatever actions they took on the South China Sea, it's not because of that joint statement.

Q: Then why was "core interests" taken out of the next U.S.-China joint statement in January 2011, when China's President Hu Jintao visited the United States?

A: I wasn't part of the negotiations. My understanding, from secondhand in the negotiations, is that the Chinese weren't particularly interested in pursuing that formula.

Q: Six months before in July 2010, Secretary of State (Hillary) Clinton attended an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi and articulated that the United States has a "national interest" in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Why?

A: Well, I think we--it was important for us to make clear that--although we had no territorial claims in the South China Sea, we had important interests, and so we were a legitimate part of that discussion. I think there's no doubt that China was seeking to exclude the United States from discussions of issues of the South China Sea.

Q: Even now?

A: Yes and no. It's mixed. But, and so we, clearly, felt the need to make it very explicit that, just because we didn't have any territorial claims didn't mean that we didn't have any interests and indeed we have very important interests.

Q: But two months after that statement, the Senkaku incident happened between Japan and China. And China came out against Japan very strongly, including the de facto export ban on rare earth. How did you take this action of China?

A: Well, I think the most important action that we took is to reiterate our position on the Senkakus, and the fact that it came under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. I think that was a very strong signal of our perspective on this issue and, again, the importance of a core principle for us, which is that territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully.

Q: Do you think China misread the situation and overplayed their hand?

A: I think there was a period of time in which China was pushing the envelope on these territorial issues, and I think that's why it was important that we, along with our friends and allies in the region, made clear that we have important interests, and we were going to defend them.

And, I think China has come to realize that they had not a very good year, that they lost credibility with countries that were bordering them, and that they created suspicions.

Q: What are the ultimate strategic objectives or intentions of China? Do you think, eventually, they are trying to replace the United States as a global hegemony?

A: That's both unknowable and an unanswerable question, because the people who will make that decision are not even leaders today. It's a strategic game. What they will do depends on what others do. So, it's up to all of us, the United States, Japan, all of our partners, to create an environment in which China is more likely to choose a benign course, than one that threatens our interests.

Q: How should the South China Sea issue be solved?

A: There are plenty of win-win solutions to the South China Sea issues. I think, if everybody goes into it in good faith, there are plenty of ways for it to be resolved, and there are plenty of ways, even, to resolve the territorial disputes, through arbitration, through -- all of these tools are available. And what China needs to understand, is that there are plenty of ways that it can legitimately pursue its interests, without appearing to use its military power and its economic position to impose a solution.

Q: Recently Japan has had a number of rather short-lived prime ministers. Some say that this is not limited to individual failure of each prime minister, but a failure of Japanese political system as a while. The Japanese political system cannot produce effective leadership. Do you agree with this view?

A: I'd put it differently. I think it's less a question of the quality of the leaders, but a more systemic one, which is the way in which the political system has evolved. It would be better to have better, rather than worse, leaders, but more important is a kind of a system that can produce clear political choices, through elections, that then lead to sustained governance.

And, it's -- both because of the institutional, political, history of Japan, and the nature of the parliamentary system, it's very difficult to have that kind of stability. So, I agree it's an institutional problem, but I don't think it's an institutional problem that it can't produce strong leaders.

Japan has had strong leaders in the past. What Japan hasn't done is to create a political process in which voters are given real choices, they make those choices, that government has a mandate to act on them, irrespective of who the prime minister is, and then they then go forward. I think that's really the nature of the underlying problem in Japan.

Q: But, given the current situation of the political leadership, isn't Japan less reliable an ally for the United States?

A: It's less a question of reliability, but I do think it is a question about how active Japan can be as a partner. Japan is reliable, but it's not able to be as active on a global stage, because of these internal preoccupations. And I think we would welcome that Japan play a more active partnership role with the United States, not just in East Asia but around the world, in dealing with the big challenges.

Q: What did you think of the eight months that the Hatoyama administration spent to review the Roadmap Agreement on the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa? It must have been frustrating.

A: Well, no. I think there was quite a fair amount of willingness in the U.S. government to accept this as the price of the evolution of the Japanese political system.

Q: You didn't think it was a waste?

A: You can't call it a waste. If this were part of strengthening the overall political system in Japan, it would be an acceptable cost.

Q: What do you think both governments should do now with this Futenma relocation issue?

A: Well, I think the agreement was a good one and it should be implemented. But I think that we owe it to ourselves to be honest about whether we're going to do it or not, because the uncertainty is not good for anybody. And I think there are both important issues about the bilateral relationship and our security relationship, but also about the long-term force posture of the United States in East Asia.

And there's a danger that, by failing to resolve this, we risk the overall footprint of the United States in East Asia. So, again, the first best choice, implement the agreement. It was negotiated precisely in response to concerns, on the Japanese side, among the Okinawans, about Futenma and the issues there. But I think it's time to make a decision one way or the other, and if it's not going to happen, to look at what the choices are.

Q: If that agreement were not implemented, the credibility of the alliance could be damaged. Or would it be still manageable?

A: I think it's manageable, but I think that it will be important to come to some alternative resolution, that reflects an understanding about why the first decision was made, and what the basis will be for it for the long-term present.

Q: The tsunami, earthquake and the nuclear accident in Japan. Did the way the Japanese government handled those problems change your views on Japan in any way?

A: No, it didn't, and I think there's a lot of debate about this, but I think the Japanese people have to decide for themselves how well the government handled it. And I think what was important for us is that from the first moments we recognized how important this event was to Japan, and how important our engagement would be toward the bilateral relationship.

And I think, despite the challenges and the difficulties, that one of the positive features that came out of this is I think it was a really -- a reinforcement that this relationship is more than about enemies and strategic threats. And I feel quite good about the fact that the United States was ready, with whatever technical resources and people and the way in which our military was engaged, to really demonstrate how committed we are to this relationship.

Q: North Korea. The situation has not shown any progress lately. Your assessment?

A: You are right, it hasn't moved forward. But I think that the good news is that there is a growing recognition among Chinese leaders about the nature of this problem, and a declining willingness to excuse the North Koreans for their behavior.

I think that it's very hard to know what the internal time calculations are of the North Koreans, whether they believe that reaching some kind of understanding and some kind of positive movement before 2012 is in their interest as a way of solidifying what they have identified as an important year, or whether they now are in a position where they just want to wait it out and see what happens elsewhere.

I don't know the answer to that and I think we have to continue to test it. There remains a path open for them, and I don't think it's foreclosed at this point.

Q: Do you think the Six Party Talks should be resumed?

A: Not without a clear indication about what the North Koreans are prepared to do and a serious set of steps in advance of that, that demonstrates some seriousness of purpose. I don't think just talking for talking sake is in anybody's interest.



*****The Economist 兩篇

America’s arms sales to Taiwan

Delicate dance

America balances old commitments with new priorities

A BEIJING newspaper recently declared that America and China “risk misinterpreting each other and forcing an unexpected showdown”. Fearful of this, America has trodden warily in its consideration of how to improve Taiwan’s ageing fleet of fighter jets. Its decision, announced in Washington on September 21st, is a compromise that will avert an immediate showdown but leave Taiwan feeling hardly any more secure.

The deal is to upgrade Taiwan’s 145 F-16 A/B jets at a cost of $5.9 billion. The island will not, at least for the time being, get the 66 new F-16 C/D fighters that it (and some American legislators) had wanted. American officials, anxious to placate China, Taiwan and politicians at home, have been spinning this decision in ways aimed at satisfying all three parties.

To the Chinese, it is being presented as a step short of what officials in Beijing say is a dangerous red line. For the Taiwanese, and American congressmen, the message is that upgraded A/Bs are much the same as C/Ds anyway, and that Taiwan will get more advanced fighters than it had asked for, at a lower cost. (Texans hoping for thousands of extra jobs building new C/Ds at Lockheed Martin’s F-16 production lines in their state will still be disappointed.) Taiwan’s 20-year-old F-16s make up more than a third of its fighters. Some 60 other jets are Vietnam-war era F-5s mainly used for training, and hardly fit for that—another two F-5s crashed on September 13th, the latest in a string of such incidents.

The Chinese have ranted in response, as they do over every American arms sale to Taiwan. But the Americans are hoping that China’s longer-term reaction this time will be somewhat more restrained. A sale of brand new F-16s would have been difficult for the Chinese government to ignore. It has long been peeved by America’s perceived failure to live up to its 1982 commitment to cut weapons sales to the island. Part of that accord required both countries to “create conditions conducive” to achieving a “final settlement” of the arms issue—hardly fulfilled, American officials say, by China’s military build-up on the coast facing Taiwan. After the original sale of F-16s to Taiwan in 1992, a furious China sold medium-range missiles to Pakistan, snubbing American efforts to curb their spread in unstable regions. The sale of $6.4 billion- worth of American arms to Taiwan in January 2010 caused China to cut off military ties for months. Military-to-military relations are likely to be affected again this time but, many analysts say, less severely.

For President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan, the outcome will be little surprise and no great blow. In recent years, rapid improvements in China’s fighter fleet have eroded the island’s long-held belief that it could dominate the skies over the Taiwan Strait. Against China’s 300-400 Russian-designed SU-27 and SU-30 fighters, even 66 new F-16s would probably have been too little to reverse the trend. And China’s increasingly accurate missiles (more than 1,000 of them pointing at Taiwan) could damage Taiwan’s air bases, making it difficult for the island even to deploy its fighter jets.

Since taking office in 2008, Mr Ma has worked hard to improve cross-strait ties. China wants him to win another term in the next presidential election in January, but that could constrain China’s options. Global Times, a Beijing newspaper, said on September 17th that China used to seek revenge on America after arms sales to Taiwan. This time, it said, “it should also include Taipei, as Beijing has more leverage on the island”. But the article was referring to the possibility of America selling new F-16s. It is unlikely that the Communist Party would want to restrict the cross-strait economic interaction that Mr Ma has championed, since it believes such links give it increased influence over the island. Punishing Taiwan economically would play into the hands of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is far more suspicious of China and the benefits of open trade with it.

The DPP will try to convince voters that America’s rejection of any sale of new F-16s is a sign that Mr Ma’s efforts to strengthen ties with America (as well as with China) have not worked. The announcement comes at an awkward time for Mr Ma, who is in a tight contest in the presidential race against the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen, a former head of cross-strait affairs, who takes a softer line on China than many in her party. Mr Ma’s prospects were dealt a potential blow on September 20th by the decision of James Soong, a former heavyweight in Mr Ma’s own party, the Kuomintang (KMT), to run against him, potentially splitting the KMT vote.

Some politicians in America are showing their support for Mr Ma. An unidentified senior official in Washington, quoted in the Financial Times, said a few days before the F-16 deal that Ms Tsai’s China policy could threaten cross-strait stability. The motives of this official have been hotly debated in Taiwan, with some suggesting the remarks were aimed at soothing China before the announcement.

America’s coolness towards the previous Taiwanese president, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP (now in jail for corruption), helped to persuade officials in Beijing that despite the arms sales, America was no backer of the DPP’s more militant wing. Encouraged by Mr Chen, DPP hardliners want to move closer towards outright independence. America is prepared to risk approaching red lines on arms sales. But it has little doubt that a formal separation from China by Taiwan could mean war.



---

The United States and Taiwan

Dim sum for China

Why America should not walk away from Taiwan

EVER since the Nationalist KMT, the losing side in the Chinese civil war, fled to Taiwan in 1949, China’s Communist rulers have reserved the right to take back by force what they see as a renegade province. When America broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979 and recognised China instead, Congress passed a law obliging the administration to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” to guard against a hostile mainland.

That support seems to be wobbling. This week Barack Obama agreed to refurbish Taiwan’s ageing fleet of F-16 fighter jets (see article), but Chinese objections made the deal less advantageous than it would have been. Meanwhile, a small but influential chorus of academics and policymakers is arguing that these should be America’s last arms sales to Taiwan.

What has changed to justify this shift? Little in Taiwan itself. These days the country is a thriving democracy, worthier of support than the dictatorship it was when American backing was rock solid. Nor does Taiwan look better able to defend itself. The main shift in the military balance across the Taiwan Strait in recent years has been a massive one in China’s favour. More than 1,000 missiles on its eastern seaboard now point at Taiwan, and China’s navy and air force have hugely expanded. Refitting the old F-16s is a token gesture, and China knows it.

Turning a paler shade of green

Two main arguments are made in America to justify abandoning Taiwan. The first is that its ally is now a strategic liability. Under the “blue” (KMT) president, Ma Ying-jeou, cross-straits relations are better than they have ever been. But the “green” opposition is more nationalistic. The fear is that one day Taiwan will make a formal declaration of independence. China says it will respond to that with force. Some in America fret that in backing Taiwan, the United States risks being dragged into conflict, even nuclear war.

How realistic is that fear? Under the previous green president, Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s relations with both China and America plumbed new lows. Mr Chen’s successor as leader of the greens, Tsai Ing-wen, is running against Mr Ma in the presidential election in January. But she is a lot more moderate than Mr Chen, and the provocateurs who want to declare formal independence are mainly old and fading. Younger green politicians may be nationalistic, but they seem more pragmatic and understand the imperative of American support.

The second argument is that, even if it never came to war, Taiwan would still be an obstacle to better Sino-American relations. Give China what it wants, runs this line of thinking, and it will co-operate more on a host of issues ranging from nuclear proliferation to climate change. Rather than provoking China by arming Taiwan and patrolling the seas, it would be better to placate it, and throw it the morsel of Taiwan.

But to walk away from Taiwan would in effect mean ceding to China the terms of unification. Over the long run, that will not improve Sino-American relations. Five thousand years of Chinese diplomatic history suggest it is more likely to respect a strong state than a weak and vacillating one. Appeasement would also probably increase China’s appetite for regional domination. Its “core interests” in the area seem to be growing. To Chinese military planners, Taiwan is a potential base from which to push out into the Pacific. At minimum, that would unsettle Japan to the north and the Philippines to the south.

Strong American backing for Taiwan has served the region well so far. It has improved, rather than damaged, cross-straits relations, for Mr Ma would never have felt able to open up to China without it, and it has been the foundation for half a century of peace and security throughout East Asia (see Banyan). To abandon Taiwan now would bring out the worst in China, and lead the region’s democracies to worry that America might be willing to let them swing too. That is why, as long as China insists on the right to use force in Taiwan, America should continue to support the island.



2011年9月23日 星期五

中國城鄉收入差距世界第一/韓國維權人士在中國使館前示威


韓國維權人士在中國使館前示威
首爾韓國維權人士周 (9月22日)在中國駐韓使館前舉行示威活動,要求北京停止將朝鮮難民遣送回國。據法新社報導,包括多名已獲韓國公民身份的朝鮮人在內的約30人在中國使館前聚集,呼喊"停止遣返!"和"保護朝鮮難民!"等口號。一些示威標語上寫著:"中國不負責任,幫助兇手";"作為聯合國安理會成員的中國應尊重國際法"。組織者方面稱,全球13個國家的24個城市同時舉行抗議活動,其中包括加拿大、日本、澳大利亞和英國。美國一名維權人士在一份電子信中寫道,中國對國際社會關於停止強行遣返朝鮮難民的呼籲置之不理,發動國際抗議是必要的。多年來,每年都有大量朝鮮人逃亡,其中多數人首先進入中國。雖然難民將受到重罰,北京當局仍將他們遣返回朝鮮。根據與朝鮮達成的協議,北京將逃亡者視為經濟難民,而非得到聯合國承認的政治難民。


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新聞報導 | 2011.09.22
中國城鄉收入差距世界第一


近日中國社會科學院最新報告顯示,中國大陸城鄉收入差距比為3.23比1。對比世界其他國家,中國成為世界上城鄉收入差距最大的國家之一。中國農村問題專家認為,城鄉二元製結構為根本性原因。


近日,中國社科院城市發展與環境研究所發布最新報告,其中中國大陸城市和農村收入的比例為3.23比1,對比國際勞工組織在2005年公佈的數據,絕大多數國家的城鄉人均收入比都小於1.6,目前中國城鄉之比的數據遠遠高出了其他國家,成為世界上城鄉收入差距最大的國家之一。

根本原因在於中國的城鄉二元分割體制

德國之聲就此採訪了北京晏陽初平民教育發展中心總幹事、中國人民大學鄉村建設中心副秘書長邱建生,他認為目前中國城鄉收入差距的實際情況應該遠遠比社科院公佈的數字還要嚴重,如果社科院的研究中將城鄉的福利也列入總收入的範疇,這個比例將更加懸殊。

談及原因,邱建生直指中國的城鄉二元製體制為城鄉收入差距巨大的根本原因,而農村人如果完成社會學意義上的向上流動會非常的困難:"城鄉二元製的城鄉結構,這是根本的原因,現在整個中國基本發展的現狀就是'窮人很窮、富人易富',僅從教育相比較,現在的高校農村人的比例越來越低,比如人民大學的商學院及好的經濟類高校,基本沒有農村生源,都是縣級城市以上的學生,這就是一個表現,農村的人就會越來越沒有機會,這也是未來繼續城鄉更加不平衡的原因。"

中國獨立學者、九鼎公共事務研究所研究員秋風在接受德國之聲採訪也認為目前的這個數據會比實際更低,他也認同根本原因在於中國的城鄉二元體制:"中國從五十年代起就實行城鄉二元分割的體制,這個體制的影響其實體現在社會的各個方面,城鄉居民本質是不平等的,當然收入差距就會很大。城鄉不平等不僅是收入,也體現在所有方面。" In this photo taken Monday, Feb. 1, 2010, a farmer walks past a garbage dump site near a village in Hefei, in central China's Anhui province. (AP Photo) ** CHINA OUT **中國安徽一個農村

改變城鄉不平等需要改變根本性制度

邱建生認為農村對整個中國的發展非常重要,要破解現在​​城鄉不平衡現狀,應該從社會公平、公正的角度來製定更好的社會財富分配機制等:"農村不是一個可以隨意拋棄的地方,中國社會的基礎還是農村,從長遠來看,中國再怎樣城市化,甚至達到70%的城市化水平,農村人口還是佔很大的比例。"

秋風也認為如果改變城鄉收入懸殊現狀,將是一個浩大的社會工程:"如果要改變起來要涉及現有的諸多製度,有些是根本性的製度,比如說戶籍制度、土地制度、公用財政的基本規則、包括人大代表的選舉等,幾乎所有的方面都需要改變。

德國:實現農村與城市生活等值

目前,德國城市化水平高達90%,但形成了城鄉統籌、分佈合理、均衡發展的模式。 1950年,德國賽德爾基金會開始倡導"城鄉等值化"試驗。該試驗的核心理念是,通過土地整理、村莊革新等方式,實際農村與城市生活雖不同,但是等值。其後德國各州政府開始助推"城鄉等值化"理念,1965年,巴伐利亞州制定了《城鄉空間發展規劃》,將"城鄉等值化"確定為區域空間發展和國土規劃的戰略目標,從法律上明確了這一理念。該目標要求城鄉居民具有同等的生活、工作及交通條件,保證土地資源的合理利用,保護水、 空氣、土壤等自然資源。

而早在1955年,德國政府就制定了《農業法》,允許土地自由買賣和出租,從而盤活土地資本。 1967年德國製定了《合作社法》,1970年以來,德國的大多數農業合作社走上了相互聯合之路,形成更大的合作組織,最後發展成為地區性的合作聯盟,甚至是國際性的合作聯盟。德國村鎮在升級第一產業的同時,也有序地推進二、三產業的發展。德國村鎮在一系列的措施下變得很富裕,二戰後大量向城市湧入的狀況不再持續,城鄉差距自然就縮小了。

美國著名城市學家劉易斯·芒福德曾指出,"城與鄉承載著同等重要的價值並需要有機結合在一起,通過土地整理、產業升級等方式,實現農村與城市生活的等值,才是縮小城鄉分化最有效的途徑之一。"

作者:吳雨

責編:李魚



新闻报道 | 2011.09.22

中国城乡收入差距世界第一

近日中国社会科学院最新报告显示,中国大陆城乡收入差距比为3.23比1。对比世界其他国家,中国成为世界上城乡收入差距最大的国家之一。中国农村问题专家认为,城乡二元制结构为根本性原因。

近日,中国社科院城市发展与环境研究所发布最新报告,其中中国大陆城市和农村收入的比例为3.23比1,对比国际劳工组织在2005年公布 的数据,绝大多数国家的城乡人均收入比都小于1.6,目前中国城乡之比的数据远远高出了其他国家,成为世界上城乡收入差距最大的国家之一。

根本原因在于中国的城乡二元分割体制

德国之声就此采访了北京晏阳初平民教育发展中心总干事、中国人民大学乡村建设中心副秘书长邱建生,他认为目前中国城乡收入差距的实际情况应该远远比社科院公布的数字还要严重,如果社科院的研究中将城乡的福利也列入总收入的范畴,这个比例将更加悬殊。

谈及原因,邱建生直指中国的城乡二元制体制为城乡收入差距巨大的根本原因,而农村人如果完成社会学意义上的向上流动会非常的困难:"城乡二元制的城 乡结构,这是根本的原因,现在整个中国基本发展的现状就是'穷人很穷、富人易富',仅从教育相比较,现在的高校农村人的比例越来越低,比如人民大学的商学 院及好的经济类高校,基本没有农村生源,都是县级城市以上的学生,这就是一个表现,农村的人就会越来越没有机会,这也是未来继续城乡更加不平衡的原因。"

中国独立学者、九鼎公共事务研究所研究员秋风在接受德国之声采访也认为目前的这个数据会比实际更低,他也认同根本原因在于中国的城乡二元体制:"中 国从五十年代起就实行城乡二元分割的体制,这个体制的影响其实体现在社会的各个方面,城乡居民本质是不平等的,当然收入差距就会很大。城乡不平等不仅是收 入,也体现在所有方面。"In this photo taken Monday, Feb. 1, 2010, a farmer walks past a garbage dump site near a village in Hefei, in central China's Anhui province. (AP Photo) ** CHINA OUT **中国安徽一个农村

改变城乡不平等需要改变根本性制度

邱建生认为农村对整个中国的发展非常重要,要破解现在城乡不平衡现状,应该从社会公平、公正的角度来制定更好的社会财富分配机制等:"农村不是一个 可以随意抛弃的地方,中国社会的基础还是农村,从长远来看,中国再怎样城市化,甚至达到70%的城市化水平,农村人口还是占很大的比例。"

秋风也认为如果改变城乡收入悬殊现状,将是一个浩大的社会工程:"如果要改变起来要涉及现有的诸多制度,有些是根本性的制度,比如说户籍制度、土地制度、公用财政的基本规则、包括人大代表的选举等,几乎所有的方面都需要改变。

德国:实现农村与城市生活等值

目前,德国城市化水平高达90%,但形成了城乡统筹、分布合理、均衡发展的模式。1950年,德国赛德尔基金会开始倡导"城乡等值化"试验。该试验 的核心理念是,通过土地整理、村庄革新等方式,实际农村与城市生活虽不同,但是等值。其后德国各州政府开始助推"城乡等值化"理念,1965年,巴伐利亚 州制定了《城乡空间发展规划》,将"城乡等值化"确 定为区域空间发展和国土规划的战略目标,从法律上明确了这一理念。该目标要求城乡居民具有同等的生活、工作及交通条件,保证土地资源的合理利用,保护水、 空气、土壤等自然资源。

而早在1955年,德国政府就制定了《农业法》,允许土地自由买卖和出租,从而盘活土地资本。1967年德国制定了《合作社法》,1970年以来, 德国的大多数农业合作社走上了相互联合之路,形成更大的合作组织,最后发展成为地区性的合作联盟,甚至是国际性的合作联盟。德国村镇在升级第一产业的同 时,也有序地推进二、三产业的发展。德国村镇在一系列的措施下变得很富裕,二战后大量向城市涌入的状况不再持续,城乡差距自然就缩小了。

美国著名城市学家刘易斯·芒福德曾指出,"城与乡承载着同等重要的价值并需要有机结合在一起,通过土地整理、产业升级等方式,实现农村与城市生活的等值,才是缩小城乡分化最有效的途径之一。"

作者:吴雨

责编:李鱼

Asia-Pacific (BBC)

23 September 2011 Last updated at 15:33 GMT

Riot in China city over land salePeople gathered outside the Lufeng government office on 23 September 2011

Protests continue in a city in southern China over allegations that party officials sold off farmland, after two days of reported rioting.


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溫州列車/阿富汗刺殺/ 上海關閉大部分電池廠

上海關閉大部分電池廠
上海據法新社報導,因環境保護原因,中國有關當局關閉了大都市上海的大多數電池生產廠家。據當地環保機構週五(9月23日)稱,總共17家電池廠中已有14家停止生產,其中包括一家美國所屬的企業,該廠停產至今年年底。英文《上海日報》援引官方提供的數字報導說,血液中鉛含量超標的兒童數量已從上週的25人增至32人,其中15人在醫院治療。這些孩子的家均位於有關工廠的附近。在連續30年迅速工業化進程後,中國國內一再發生重金屬污染醜聞。


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Suspicion as Chinese Await Crash Report

A government panel is expected to release a report on the high-speed train crash but survivors have already reached their own conclusions.



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Assassination Deals Blow to Afghanistan Peace Process

A suicide bomber’s attack on Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former president and the leader of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, may prove devastating to talks with the Taliban.



特使頭巾藏炸彈刺殺拉巴尼
2011-09-21 14:43:00

阿富汗高級和平委員會主席、前總統拉巴尼昨晚在位於首都喀布爾的宅邸遭自殺式爆炸襲擊身亡,時年73歲。

據英國《衛報》報道,拉巴尼的遇害使阿富汗和平進程陷入危機。拉巴尼是阿富汗高級和平委員會主席,也是備受尊重的宗教學者。

英國《衛報》引述拉巴尼的助手說,兩名兇手是塔利班特使,稱代表「基達人民立法會」(塔利班管理機構)有重要信息傳達。當拉巴尼進入房間時,其中一人上前緊緊擁抱他並將手放在他胸前。

喀布爾警察局刑事調查科主任查希爾說,事發時,拉巴尼在宅邸內與兩名塔利班「談判代表」會面。「今天晚上,兩名男子代表塔利班與拉巴尼談判,其中一人把爆炸物藏在頭巾內,」查希爾說,「他靠近拉巴尼,引爆炸藥。」

「拉巴尼殉難,包括拉巴尼的助手馬蘇姆.斯塔尼克扎伊在內,其他四人受傷。」

反對派主要領導人阿卜杜拉則說,拉巴尼遇刺證明叛亂分子想根除那些在塔利班存在之前就在阿富汗頗具影響力的政治人物。

2011年9月22日 星期四

印尼的崛起

"印尼中產階級的崛起" 今周刊 No. 761 2011/7/25-31 翻譯 東洋經濟 pp.154-56

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荷蘭法院判決政府需為1947年屠殺案負責

荷蘭一個地方法院日前裁定政府應該為1947年在印尼發生的一起屠殺案負責,但賠償金額等細節未定。

這件發生在1947年的案子,起因於荷蘭軍隊攻擊西爪哇一處村莊巴隆薩利(Balongsari,當年名為Rawaged)。村中絕大部分男性遭到射殺。根據民間調查,當年有431人被殺害,而1969年一份荷蘭官方委員會的統計是150人。

1945
年日本投降後,印尼宣佈獨立,但原殖民國荷蘭不願意放棄荷屬東印度,發動了大規模的軍事行動。聯合國調查將這些殺戮認定為「有計畫且冷血」的行動。根據統計,1947-49年的衝突中,超過15萬印尼人喪生。

2008
年,當年的一名倖存者與七名遭射殺者的寡婦,在2008年向荷蘭政府提起訴訟。在大屠殺中幾乎失去所有男丁的巴隆薩利之後經濟崩潰,一直生活在貧窮當中。 原告律師說,這些失去丈夫、兒子與兄弟的受害者,事隔多年才提出告訴是因為,先前這些貧困的人們沒有管道獲知相關資訊。她們身無分文,無力負擔訴訟費用, 而且其中許多人是文盲,勢必得有人代表她們發聲。

2008年法院以此案已經超過法律追溯期,駁回原告控訴。經過上訴後,日前出爐的法院判決認為,本案沒有追溯期限制的問題,因為這些人是戰爭罪的受害者。不過,荷蘭政府仍有可能繼續上訴。

荷蘭官方多年來從未對本案正式道歉,僅在2009年表示願意捐獻85萬歐元給巴隆薩利村,但並非以賠償的名義,而僅是要提供當地基礎建設資金,例如興建學校與醫院等。但這筆錢至今仍扣留在印尼內政部手上,村民們沒有得到任何相關撫卹或得到幫助。

*更多轉型正義相關資訊,請上本會網站www.taiwantrc.org

2011年9月21日 星期三

溫柔 災難 革命 詩 同情

POINT OF VIEW / Genichiro Takahashi: 'Softness' is key to thought-provoking message

SPECIAL TO THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

2011/09/21


photoGenichiro Takahashi (Photo by Atsushi Takanami)

I had my eureka moment the other day when I saw the cover of the August issue of "Neppu" (Hot wind), a booklet published by Studio Ghibli, an animation film studio co-founded by director Hayao Miyazaki.

The cover showed Miyazaki doing a one-man street demonstration near his studio in the western Tokyo suburb of Higashi Koganei. He is wearing an apron, and a signboard hangs from his neck. The signboard says, "NO! Genpatsu (nuclear power generation)."

I just said a one-man demonstration, but actually he's not alone. Walking behind him are a woman and a man, the former carrying an umbrella and the latter accompanied by a dog on a leash and his right hand holding a signboard that says, "Stop."

Except for the signboards, the trio (plus the dog) could just as well be enjoying a leisurely stroll in the neighborhood.

The scene somehow reminded me of the popular "Mito Komon" TV samurai drama series, in which the protagonist, Komon-sama, is always accompanied by his two loyal sidekicks, Suke-san and Kaku-san.

Just ahead of the trio is a man on a bicycle coming their way. The expression on his face seems to say, "Huh? This goofball is the Hayao Miyazaki?! Well, I never."

The picture was so funny, and I loved it. And it made me think.

It was funny and yet profoundly thought-provoking because of its "softness." By "softness" here, I mean you can read just about anything into this picture and react to it in any number of ways. For instance, you might be simply impressed by Miyazaki's determination to oppose nuclear power generation. Or, you might sense the loneliness of someone who has chosen to crusade for a cause, and remind yourself that no crusade should be divorced from your day-to-day life. You might also realize, with a sigh, that there is something sadly comical about someone who wears his social conscience on his sleeve.

What made Miyazaki take to the streets? The reason must be that he had something he felt he had to tell people. But you've got to bear in mind that just saying what you think won't get you anywhere. It's vital that you give your audience "space" to thoroughly ponder your message. And that "space" is what makes the message "soft."

I was still feeling the impact of the "Neppu" cover picture when I picked up the September issue of Bungei Shunju magazine and read the policies of three candidates for president of the Democratic Party of Japan--Yoshihiko Noda, Sumio Mabuchi and Banri Kaieda who went misty-eyed over a disagreement he had with then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan.

I was totally disappointed with their writings. They bored me to tears. Each man had his own way of saying things, but what they said was all the same.

On the government's nuclear policy, for instance, they said it was going to be difficult to keep promoting nuclear energy after the Fukushima disaster, but various economic considerations rendered any hasty decommissioning of existing nuclear reactors impossible. As for tax hikes, they are necessary given the current fiscal plight, they argued, but this is still not the right time to increase taxes.

Simply put, all three candidates were being "pragmatic." But their "pragmatism" was obviously predicated on maintaining the status quo.

Haven't they learned anything from what our country has experienced over the last six months? Or perhaps they don't really have any message they want to communicate to the public. If they did, they would have at least tried to do a better job of it, wouldn't they?

By the way, I've always wondered if it's a requirement for prime ministerial hopefuls to contribute policy commentaries to Bungei Shunju. I don't know how this custom came to be, but I can sort of understand this must be the "pragmatic" thing to do.

And in the same issue that featured the three prime ministerial candidates' commentaries, the magazine also ran the article about the Akutagawa literature prize sponsored by the magazine. As a writer, I couldn't help rolling my eyes. It was like being told, "See, this is what being an 'Establishment' insider is all about."

A recent issue of Kanagawa Daigaku Hyoron, an academic magazine published by Kanagawa University, introduced three poems as part of its "Jasmine Revolution" special. The poems and their bibliographical notes gave me a lot to think about. Each poem should be called "a poem from Tahrir Square" for providing a first-hand account of what transpired at this iconic revolutionary landmark. What surprised me was all these poems were first introduced on television, and then went viral on YouTube and blogs.

Not only in the Arab world but also around the globe, poetry was losing its centuries-old social function, but the revolution revived the value of verse. According to Kaoru Yamamoto, who translated the poems and compiled their bibliographical notes, the poems captured the hearts of people "in Egypt where rampant corruption and hypocrisy in all segments of society had eroded the credibility of words, and people were starving for words they could believe." If that is the case in Egypt, I cannot but worry about our country as well.

Ryoichi Wago, a poet living in Fukushima Prefecture, recently tweeted a poem about the March 11 disaster and created quite a sensation. Novelist Hiromi Kawakami rewrote her earlier work to depict the horror of the Fukushima disaster and published it in Gunzo magazine. Cartoonists Moto Hagio and Kotobuki Shiriagari pulled no punches in their starkly graphic portrayal of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

What is common to their works is that none of the creators even bothered to seek perfection in their writings and drawings. They all had a message they felt compelled to communicate, and for that they were forced to go against the "established" rules in their respective fields--or at least that was how I saw it. And what these four people had to face couldn't be unique to "creative" fields of work alone.

Lastly, I would like to touch on a column by Kiichi Fujiwara about the Japanese insensitivity to the Chinese train disaster in July. "The Japanese were visibly satisfied, saying that this sort of accident couldn't happen in Japan," Fujiwara wrote. "But few Japanese mourned the Chinese dead--victims of a railway service that takes human lives lightly. Few Japanese felt the pain of this tragedy as their own." Underlying this insensitivity is the deep-seated Japanese prejudice and hostility against China (and other countries). I would like to address this ugly aspect of our society at a later date.

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Genichiro Takahashi is a professor of contemporary literature at Meiji Gakuin University. He plans to publish "Koisuru Genpatsu" (Nuclear power station in love), his most recent novel that deals with nuclear power generation. Takahashi collaborated with Tatsuru Uchida in selecting stories that were published recently as "Uso Mitai na Honto no Hanashi" (Unbelievable true stories).