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每年此時是各專家權威預測來年情況的時候，我預測2010年是中國的天下，但場面恐怕不是很好看。 與中國相關的最大問題，其實是氣候變遷，但這裡我想把焦點放在匯率政策上。 中國已成為金融和貿易強權，但舉止不像其他經濟大國，而是依循重商主義政策，蓄意讓貿易順差維持在高點。在舉世都不景氣的今日，這個政策講白一點就是種掠奪的行為。 人民幣不像美元、歐元或日圓可自由波動，而是限制在大約人民幣6.8元兌1美元的官定區間。在這種匯率水準下，中國製造業享有很大的成本優勢，自然產生龐大的貿易盈餘。 在正常情況下，這些盈餘帶來的美元，會推升人民幣的價值，除非民間投資人反其道而行。如今投資人多要進入中國市場，而非退出，只是中國政府限制資本流入，自己卻大買美元，累積出至少2兆美元的外匯存底。 此政策對以出口為導向的中國國營企業有利，對中國消費者則沒那麼好。但對我們其他人而言呢？ 過去中國所累積的外匯存底，多用以投資美國公債，可說讓我們享受到低利率的好處，雖也導致房市泡沫。但如今便宜資金在全世界泛濫，四處尋覓停靠站。短期利率接近零，長期利率稍高一點，但那也只是因為投資人預期零利率政策有一天會結束；中國收購美債並沒有改變什麼情況。 貿易順差會耗盡現在全球經濟最需要的需求；我粗略估計，中國的重商主義未來幾年可能會讓美國失去大約140萬個工作。 中國拒絕承認這個問題。最近國務院總理溫家寶駁斥其他國家的埋怨，辯稱各國一方面要人民幣升值，一方面卻採取各種保護主義的措施。其他國家確實祭出（溫和的）保護措施，但這正是因為中國不讓人民幣升值。 我常聽到兩個不要挑戰中國政策的理由，但毫無道理可言。 首先，有人聲稱不要對抗中國是怕他們大賣美元，搞垮美國經濟。這個說法錯得一塌糊塗，因為中國如果這麼做，不但自己會蒙受鉅額損失，更重大的問題在於中國的重商主義殺傷力如此之大，代表中國的財務槓桿少得可憐。 我再度強調，如今全球充斥便宜資金，所以如果中國要開始賣美元，美國利率沒有理由大幅上揚。美元或許會貶值，但這對美國的競爭力和就業只有好處而非壞處。所以如果中國真的拋售美元，我們還應該寄上感謝函。 其次，有人認為保護主義無論如何都不是好事。如果你也相信，代表經濟學這門課可能拜錯老師，因為失業率高且政府無法恢復全面就業時，一般規則就不適用。 已故諾貝爾經濟學獎得主薩繆森（Paul Samuelson）曾說，未達充分就業時，所有卸下重商主義面具後的論點，都站得住腳，也就是補貼出口的國家，實際上都是從別國竊得工作。 薩繆森還指出，持續操縱匯率會為自由貿易製造真正的問題。而最好的解決辦法就是讓匯率回到常軌，但這是中國不願見到的事情。 中國重商主義造成的問題愈來愈大，而受害者若挑起貿易衝突，也不會再有更大的損失。 在此呼籲中國政府重新思考，否則他們抱怨的保護主義，現在還算輕微，未來可能引發更嚴重的問題。 （作者Paul Krugman是紐約時報專欄作家／廖玉玲譯） |
Chinese New Year
It’s the season when pundits traditionally make predictions about the year ahead. Mine concerns international economics: I predict that 2010 will be the year of China. And not in a good way.
Paul Krugman
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Actually, the biggest problems with China involve climate change. But today I want to focus on currency policy.
China has become a major financial and trade power. But it doesn’t act like other big economies. Instead, it follows a mercantilist policy, keeping its trade surplus artificially high. And in today’s depressed world, that policy is, to put it bluntly, predatory.
Here’s how it works: Unlike the dollar, the euro or the yen, whose values fluctuate freely, China’s currency is pegged by official policy at about 6.8 yuan to the dollar. At this exchange rate, Chinese manufacturing has a large cost advantage over its rivals, leading to huge trade surpluses.
Under normal circumstances, the inflow of dollars from those surpluses would push up the value of China’s currency, unless it was offset by private investors heading the other way. And private investors are trying to get into China, not out of it. But China’s government restricts capital inflows, even as it buys up dollars and parks them abroad, adding to a $2 trillion-plus hoard of foreign exchange reserves.
This policy is good for China’s export-oriented state-industrial complex, not so good for Chinese consumers. But what about the rest of us?
In the past, China’s accumulation of foreign reserves, many of which were invested in American bonds, was arguably doing us a favor by keeping interest rates low — although what we did with those low interest rates was mainly to inflate a housing bubble. But right now the world is awash in cheap money, looking for someplace to go. Short-term interest rates are close to zero; long-term interest rates are higher, but only because investors expect the zero-rate policy to end some day. China’s bond purchases make little or no difference.
Meanwhile, that trade surplus drains much-needed demand away from a depressed world economy. My back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that for the next couple of years Chinese mercantilism may end up reducing U.S. employment by around 1.4 million jobs.
The Chinese refuse to acknowledge the problem. Recently Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, dismissed foreign complaints: “On one hand, you are asking for the yuan to appreciate, and on the other hand, you are taking all kinds of protectionist measures.” Indeed: other countries are taking (modest) protectionist measures precisely because China refuses to let its currency rise. And more such measures are entirely appropriate.
Or are they? I usually hear two reasons for not confronting China over its policies. Neither holds water.
First, there’s the claim that we can’t confront the Chinese because they would wreak havoc with the U.S. economy by dumping their hoard of dollars. This is all wrong, and not just because in so doing the Chinese would inflict large losses on themselves. The larger point is that the same forces that make Chinese mercantilism so damaging right now also mean that China has little or no financial leverage.
Again, right now the world is awash in cheap money. So if China were to start selling dollars, there’s no reason to think it would significantly raise U.S. interest rates. It would probably weaken the dollar against other currencies — but that would be good, not bad, for U.S. competitiveness and employment. So if the Chinese do dump dollars, we should send them a thank-you note.
Second, there’s the claim that protectionism is always a bad thing, in any circumstances. If that’s what you believe, however, you learned Econ 101 from the wrong people — because when unemployment is high and the government can’t restore full employment, the usual rules don’t apply.
Let me quote from a classic paper by the late Paul Samuelson, who more or less created modern economics: “With employment less than full ... all the debunked mercantilistic arguments” — that is, claims that nations who subsidize their exports effectively steal jobs from other countries — “turn out to be valid.” He then went on to argue that persistently misaligned exchange rates create “genuine problems for free-trade apologetics.” The best answer to these problems is getting exchange rates back to where they ought to be. But that’s exactly what China is refusing to let happen.
The bottom line is that Chinese mercantilism is a growing problem, and the victims of that mercantilism have little to lose from a trade confrontation. So I’d urge China’s government to reconsider its stubbornness. Otherwise, the very mild protectionism it’s currently complaining about will be the start of something much bigger.
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