美國應早日與台灣發展正常化關係；America’s Taiwan-China Hocus Pocus By GARY SCHMITT
許銘洲/編譯 2015-11-30 01:00美國企業研究所（American Enterprise Institute , AEI）戰略安全研究部主任，加里·施密特（GARY SCHMITT），10月間於美國《華爾街日報》（WSJ）發表一篇名為「美國的中台關係魔術戲法」（America’s Taiwan-China Hocus Pocus），日本《雅虎新聞》也在11月29日轉譯該篇專文，內容批評指出，美國承認「一個中國」，根本是毫無實質作用的「顯著虛偽」，其目的只是為防守冷戰時代來自蘇聯所發動的側翼攻擊；然而，這個假想敵蘇聯早就不復存在了；更何況，中國根本不會因為美國附和其「一個中國」主張，轉而將美國視為結盟國（譯註：反之，中俄早就形成聯手態勢，伺機挑戰美國）。
America’s Taiwan-China Hocus Pocus
The U.S. ‘cut loose the shackles of the past’ with Cuba, but keeps its Taiwan policy rigid as ever.
GARY SCHMITTOct. 19, 2015 1:05 p.m. ET
When President Obama announced last year that the United States would normalize relations with Cuba, he said doing so would “cut loose the shackles of the past.” No longer would the U.S. be bound by the vestiges of a strategic era long past. In moving beyond a “rigid policy” that was “rooted in events that took place before most of us were born,” Washington and Havana would be writing a “new chapter” in bilateral relations not only between the two countries but also for the region as a whole.
Whatever the merits of Mr. Obama’s decision with respect to Cuba, it would seem his logic should apply equally, if not more so, to a democratic partner on the other side of the globe: Taiwan.
Taiwan, a self-governing, economically vibrant, strategically important country, has been denied recognition as a sovereign state by the U.S. based on the diplomatic hocus pocus that there is only “one China” and that upholding such a charade was necessary to flank the now nonexistent Soviet Union.
President Barack Obama and Tsai Ing-wen, a candidate in Taiwan’s January presidential election. The election will test Washington’s long-standing China policy. PHOTO: EARL GIBSON III/GETTY IMAGES
PHOTO: PICHI CHUANG/REUTERS
Of course, the real reason for this diplomatic kabuki was that when the U.S. began to open up relations with Beijing, both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China claimed sovereignty over the island of Taiwan and the mainland of China—in spite of the fact that the PRC’s rule was restricted to the latter and the ROC’s writ extended no farther than Taiwan and a few small islands.
Taiwan no longer claims or has any hope of governing anything but the islands. This is particularly true of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Party members are very clear about their belief that Taiwan is not part of China, a view supported by polls that consistently show only a very small percentage of Taiwanese think of themselves as Chinese for civic purposes. As with Italian-Americans or Irish-Americans, being ethnically Chinese doesn’t mean one wants to live in, or be ruled by, the country of your ancestors.
This isn’t a matter that’s likely to go away, and it will likely become more pressing in the months ahead. Polls in Taiwan point to a victory by the DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, in January’s presidential election, and a possible DPP majority in the elections for the national legislature. These elections come on the heels of last year’s local and municipal elections in which the other major party, the Nationalists, who are much more sympathetic to the idea of “one China,” suffered their worst-ever defeat.
Ms. Tsai and the DPP leadership have made it clear that they don’t intend to roil the cross-Strait waters by pushing for a dramatic change in the status quo. But China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013 told a Taiwanese government interlocutor that, when it comes to fulfilling Beijing’s “one China” goal of uniting the island with the mainland, “these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” Mr. Xi’s more assertive Chinese nationalism will rest uneasily with the new leadership in Taipei.
The coming election in Taiwan will be a test of whether Beijing is truly a rising power of the modern, benign sort—as it so often claims—or more akin to the rising, not-so-benign, powers of the 19th century. It will also be a test for Washington.
Relations with Beijing remain important. But anyone looking at a map of East Asia must recognize the strategic centrality of Taiwan. To its immediate north lies Japan. To its south, the Philippines. Both are allies with which the U.S. has security treaties. Taiwan’s surrounding waters are vital military and commercial sea lanes. Allowing China to bully democratic Taiwan into global isolation, or giving the leadership in Beijing the sense that it has leverage over U.S. policies toward the island, would create more instability, not less.
The U.S. can reverse this dynamic. It can start by inviting Taiwan’s military to participate in joint and multilateral exercises; by expanding the transfer of defense articles Taiwan needs; by allowing for more frequent and substantive visits by cabinet members from both countries; by sponsoring a more substantive role for Taiwan in international bodies; and by endorsing Taiwan’s bid to become a signatory to the Trans-Pacific Partnership once the trade pact is up and running.
In short, the U.S. should aim to normalize relations as much as possible, overturning the self-imposed strictures on relations that are required neither by domestic nor international law. Bringing democratic Taiwan in from the cold is as important as Washington’s opening to Cuba—arguably far more so.
Mr. Schmitt is director of the American Enterprise Institute’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies.