我以前在某外商服務，他們都會要求台灣和外國駐台的幹部，參加美國在台協會舉辦的"了解美國"與"了解台灣"課程。我認為這種文化歷史等基礎的了解，是很重要的。他們也會出錢，讓外派人員學習當地的語言。
我希望台商的外派幹部，都應該學習當地的語言和文化。
Hanching Chung 當然。我寫錯了，我參加的是、美國外橋協會"在"美國俱樂部"辦的"美國文化入門"。
所以我昨晚建議朋友從 亞洲史 之認識出發；
建議讀讀"亞洲史兩書： A History of Asia /East Asia: tradition and transformation, " 前一本書第601頁有些說明；越南與中國南方民族更近，不過一直有獨立身份意識.....受中國影響偏上層和政治.....他們和東南亞文化互動密切......http://hcbooks.blogspot.tw/2007/10/blog-post_144.html
hcbooks.blogspot.com
Lesson for Taiwan Firms After Vietnam’s Anti-Chinese Riots: Go Local
- Smoke billowing from a Taiwanese furniture factory in Binh Duong.
- Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Earlier this month, Taiwanese manufacturers became collateral damage when an anti-China protest sparked by Beijing’s placement of an oil rig in a part of the South China Sea in which Vietnam also claims ownership resulted in the destruction of scores of foreign-owned plants. Taiwanese manufacturers suffered the heaviest blow. According to the island’s government, more than 200 Taiwanese factories were damaged and at least 18 were set on fire.
While the underpinning cause of the riots is still under investigation, one theory is that the rioters may have mistaken Taiwanese factories as Chinese ones. Others suspect that Vietnamese workers at the Taiwanese plants may have been angry with their managers, many of whom are Chinese.
For many analysts, the take-home message for the damaged firms isn’t to beef up security or do more to distinguish themselves from the their Chinese counterparts; rather, they should create an atmosphere of collective responsibility by localizing their management team, said Winston Yu, chairman of accounting and consulting firm KPMG Taiwan.
Since around 2000, a number of Taiwanese companies have moved their operations from China to Vietnam as Chinese wages rise. And while the firms brought job opportunities for Vietnamese workers, many also brought their management staff from China.
The Chinese staff at the Taiwanese factories in Vietnam are far fewer in number but have greater authority and much higher pay compared with the Vietnamese workers.
According to James Wang, country manager of Ernst and Young Taiwan, a Vietnamese supervisor or department manager in a Taiwanese-owned factory makes $500 a month on average, while local, low-level staff earn around $150-$200 a month. A Chinese manager at the same plant who assumes a more senior role, makes $1,300-$1,500, compared with around $2,000 for a Taiwanese manager.
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Because the geopolitical tensions are expected to linger and leaving isn’t in the cards, to minimize tension inside the company Taiwanese companies should restructure their operation style, starting with becoming more localized, he said.
The benefits of localization goes beyond cost-saving, it also “creates a sense of stewardship and fosters synergy among the local hires,” said Mr. Yu.
Feng Tay Group, a major Taiwanese shoe maker whose clients include Nike, Bauer and Clarks, said it believes its efforts to localize staff helped its plant in Binh Duong—where two other Taiwanese factories were burned down—to escape rioters’ wrath. Feng Tay’s plant has one Vietnamese general manger, several Vietnamese supervisors, and no Chinese staff.
“Localization has been a top priority for us because we believe it’s a way to boost morale among the local workers,” said Amy Chen, the company’s spokeswoman. “Besides, they are usually quite good at their jobs.
– Jenny W. Hsu. Follow her on Twitter @jen1113
Vietnam's fury at China's expansionism can be traced to a troubled history
China's energy needs and a weak Asean bloc are fuelling its aggressive pursuit of oil off the disputed Paracel Islands
Protesters holding
Vietnamese flags try to push down a factory gate in Bien Hoa, Dong Nai
province, amid anti-China demonstrations. Photo: AFP/Getty
China's provocative decision to station a $1bn (£600m) deep-sea oil drilling rig in disputed waters 120 miles off Vietnam
– well within Hanoi's 200-mile exclusive economic zone, in clear breach
of a 2011 bilateral maritime pact and in defiance of regional and
international agreements – can be explained, though not justified, in
several ways.
The most prosaic explanation is that China's state-owned National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the rig's owner, is keen to develop sources of oil and gas for the country's energy-hungry economy that do not depend on exploration agreements with western oil companies.
China regards the Paracel Islands, near the drilling site, as its sovereign territory. It takes a similar view of 90% of the 1.35m sq mile (3.5m sq km) South China Sea. The fact that nobody else agrees does not seem to bother Beijing.
"Large deep-water drilling rigs are our mobile national territory," said Wang Yilin, CNOOC's chairman, in 2012.
At the other end of the spectrum, China's move can be seen as a direct rebuff to Barack Obama, who recently completed a four-country Asia "reassurance tour" designed to strengthen regional alliances as part of his administration's so-called "tilt" to Asia.
In Tokyo, the US president warned China against forcibly pressing its maritime claims, following Beijing's unilateral declaration last autumn of an air exclusion zone over Japanese-controlled islands in the East China Sea. Obama offered specific security guarantees to Tokyo and stepped up US military co-operation with the Philippines, which is embroiled in similar disputes.
Obama denied his intention was the "containment" of China. Whatever the truth, China plainly is not ready to be contained. Its response to his strictures was to send a flotilla of 80 ships to escort the oil rig. When Vietnamese vessels challenged them, they were rammed and fired upon with water cannon.
China's action may alternatively be viewed as a warning to the 10-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), with which it has repeatedly failed to agree a long-awaited, legally binding code of conduct on maritime disputes. China is also in effect ignoring the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
In response to Beijing's growing assertiveness, Asean member states such as Indonesia and Malaysia have been upgrading their weapons arsenals and pursuing new defensive alliances both within the bloc and with the US and Australia.
"South-east Asian states are working to enhance their so-called 'anti-access/area-denial' capabilities. Vietnam [for example] has ordered six Kilo-class submarines," said an analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Singapore and Thailand have also joined this mini-arms race.
All the same, China's scare tactics appear to be working. Last weekend's Asean summit in Burma failed to agree on language criticising China for the final communiqué. An earlier, separate statement called only for "self-restraint" in the South China Sea without mentioning China or Vietnam by name.
This disarray reflects ongoing disagreements within Asean on how to handle an overbearing, militarily superior neighbour that is also their biggest trading and investment partner.
The current China-Vietnam confrontation can also be seen as the by-product of a troubled past. That both countries are in effect one-party, Communist-run states, and that China supported Hanoi during the Vietnam war may give a misleading impression of their overall historical relationship.
In truth, there is no love lost between the two. Vietnam was repeatedly invaded and occupied by imperial China for hundreds of years. The first Vietnamese nationalists defined their cause in relation to the threat posed by Beijing. After Vietnam's reunification in 1975, strains quickly emerged and the two countries went to war briefly in 1979. China again occupied the north while the Soviet Union backed the Vietnamese.
More recently, Vietnam's lurch into Beijing-style communist-capitalism has been accompanied by deliberate attempts to mend fences with the arch-capitalists of the US. George W Bush visited in 2006, following in Bill Clinton's footsteps. Bilateral trade has grown rapidly in recent years, as has a tentative security relationship.
The US remains wary of closer ties, however, maintaining that Vietnam must first improve its human rights record. The fact that John Kerry, the US secretary of state, and Chuck Hagel, the defence secretary, are both Vietnam war veterans may also be a factor.
This caution may be discarded if China continues to menace Vietnam and others in the region. Less than one year ago Li Keqiang, the Chinese premier, signed agreements with Vietnam on trade, infrastructure and maritime security, including recommitting China to a 2011 bilateral pact to manage peaceably their differences in the South China sea.
The deals were supposedly part of a charm offensive by China's new leadership to woo Asean countries. This seems forgotten now, as old enmities and present-day ambitions create new grounds for confrontation.
The most prosaic explanation is that China's state-owned National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the rig's owner, is keen to develop sources of oil and gas for the country's energy-hungry economy that do not depend on exploration agreements with western oil companies.
China regards the Paracel Islands, near the drilling site, as its sovereign territory. It takes a similar view of 90% of the 1.35m sq mile (3.5m sq km) South China Sea. The fact that nobody else agrees does not seem to bother Beijing.
"Large deep-water drilling rigs are our mobile national territory," said Wang Yilin, CNOOC's chairman, in 2012.
At the other end of the spectrum, China's move can be seen as a direct rebuff to Barack Obama, who recently completed a four-country Asia "reassurance tour" designed to strengthen regional alliances as part of his administration's so-called "tilt" to Asia.
In Tokyo, the US president warned China against forcibly pressing its maritime claims, following Beijing's unilateral declaration last autumn of an air exclusion zone over Japanese-controlled islands in the East China Sea. Obama offered specific security guarantees to Tokyo and stepped up US military co-operation with the Philippines, which is embroiled in similar disputes.
Obama denied his intention was the "containment" of China. Whatever the truth, China plainly is not ready to be contained. Its response to his strictures was to send a flotilla of 80 ships to escort the oil rig. When Vietnamese vessels challenged them, they were rammed and fired upon with water cannon.
China's action may alternatively be viewed as a warning to the 10-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), with which it has repeatedly failed to agree a long-awaited, legally binding code of conduct on maritime disputes. China is also in effect ignoring the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
In response to Beijing's growing assertiveness, Asean member states such as Indonesia and Malaysia have been upgrading their weapons arsenals and pursuing new defensive alliances both within the bloc and with the US and Australia.
"South-east Asian states are working to enhance their so-called 'anti-access/area-denial' capabilities. Vietnam [for example] has ordered six Kilo-class submarines," said an analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Singapore and Thailand have also joined this mini-arms race.
All the same, China's scare tactics appear to be working. Last weekend's Asean summit in Burma failed to agree on language criticising China for the final communiqué. An earlier, separate statement called only for "self-restraint" in the South China Sea without mentioning China or Vietnam by name.
This disarray reflects ongoing disagreements within Asean on how to handle an overbearing, militarily superior neighbour that is also their biggest trading and investment partner.
The current China-Vietnam confrontation can also be seen as the by-product of a troubled past. That both countries are in effect one-party, Communist-run states, and that China supported Hanoi during the Vietnam war may give a misleading impression of their overall historical relationship.
In truth, there is no love lost between the two. Vietnam was repeatedly invaded and occupied by imperial China for hundreds of years. The first Vietnamese nationalists defined their cause in relation to the threat posed by Beijing. After Vietnam's reunification in 1975, strains quickly emerged and the two countries went to war briefly in 1979. China again occupied the north while the Soviet Union backed the Vietnamese.
More recently, Vietnam's lurch into Beijing-style communist-capitalism has been accompanied by deliberate attempts to mend fences with the arch-capitalists of the US. George W Bush visited in 2006, following in Bill Clinton's footsteps. Bilateral trade has grown rapidly in recent years, as has a tentative security relationship.
The US remains wary of closer ties, however, maintaining that Vietnam must first improve its human rights record. The fact that John Kerry, the US secretary of state, and Chuck Hagel, the defence secretary, are both Vietnam war veterans may also be a factor.
This caution may be discarded if China continues to menace Vietnam and others in the region. Less than one year ago Li Keqiang, the Chinese premier, signed agreements with Vietnam on trade, infrastructure and maritime security, including recommitting China to a 2011 bilateral pact to manage peaceably their differences in the South China sea.
The deals were supposedly part of a charm offensive by China's new leadership to woo Asean countries. This seems forgotten now, as old enmities and present-day ambitions create new grounds for confrontation.
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