美學者：中國反台獨 就是反民主
中國國防白皮書：全力圍堵台獨
〔駐 美特派員曹郁芬／華府三月三十一日報導〕華府智庫「國際評估和戰略中心」的軍事專家費學禮，在一場「台灣的中國策略」研討會上指出，中國二○一○年國防白 皮書中指台獨勢力是解放軍首要敵人，要全力圍堵，所謂的「台獨勢力」指的就是台灣的民主，民主對中國共產黨的威脅大於一切。白皮書顯示，中國願意冒險一戰 以統一台灣。
中國前天發布二○一○年國防白皮書，除批評台獨分裂勢力及其分裂活動仍是兩岸關係和平發展的最大障礙和威脅外，另指出，兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實探討；可適時就軍事問題進行接觸交流，探討建立軍事安全互信機制問題。
美軍事專家：中為統一不惜開戰
費學禮在「哈德遜中心」這場研討會表示，中國解放軍在白皮書中用許多篇幅談兩岸關係在馬政府之下的進展，但也明確表示，兩岸應進入政治談判以達成和平協議，中國要統一台灣的欲望更清楚了。
費學禮強調，雖然近年中國的策略是收攏台灣人心以避免衝突，但這份白皮書顯示，中國願意冒險一戰以統一台灣，為了維持獨裁體制，中國更願意以武力方式改變其戰略環境。
來自澳洲、目前在「哈德遜中心」擔任訪問學者的李約翰則在研討會表示，馬政府一方面希望從中國獲得經濟利益，一方面希望透過兩岸交往以軟化中國對台政策，以維持台灣既有的生活方式，他對這個政策能否奏效不表樂觀。
馬藉傾中軟化對岸 學者不看好
李 約翰說，一是解放軍要實際拿下台灣以突破第一島鏈的政策從未改變；二是中國的政經政策對於居住在城市的菁英階級有利，這些人是既得利益者，不但對中國現階 段實行民主沒興趣，也支持對台政策強硬；第三是中國領導人的對台政策為共識決，要改變中國根深柢固的對台統一政策不容易。李約翰表示，台灣的民調一直穩定 支持維持現狀，因此台灣必須讓美國及亞洲鄰邦了解，兩岸的和解與整合，並沒有解決兩岸在政治上的根本歧見。
針對中國在國防白皮書中提出兩岸軍事交流和軍事互信的建立，蘭德公司研究員柯瑞杰表示，中國領導人過去已提出過類似概念，事實上是台灣方面有顧慮，不願與中方建立軍事互信機制。
另外，美國國務院亞太助卿坎貝爾今天在眾院國際關係委員會亞太小組作證時則表示，美國在未來會鼓勵台海兩岸進行更多的對話和交流，但也會鼓勵兩岸降低軍事緊張和部署，美國過去和未來都會實踐在台灣關係法之下的責任。
坎貝爾在國會指出，美國的對台政策有一貫性，正如國務卿希拉蕊所言，美國對台海兩岸更多的對話和經濟交流感到鼓舞，兩岸去年所完成的歷史性ＥＣＦＡ就是明證，美國會繼續遵守在三公報和台灣關係法基礎上的一個中國政策。
坎貝爾指出，美國對中國的政策是基於現實，聚焦於成果，並忠於美國的原則和利益。因此，美國追求一個正面、合作以及全面性的對中關係。
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意見: 為什麼台灣會被中國併吞
Why Taiwan Will Fail
Taipei has a plan to make a virtue out of the necessity of greater integration. But Beijing will demand reunification and time is on its side.
By JOHN LEE
Last weekend, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs was quick to attribute the country's continued double-digit growth in industrial production to the cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that came into force at the beginning of the year. However, while ECFA is an economic boon for the country, it accelerates trends that will lead to the island losing its sovereignty.
ECFA is the most significant pillar of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou's program of enhanced engagement with the mainland. The deal is important because China has indicated that it will not stand in the way of Taiwan signing free trade deals with other countries in the region—something Beijing has so far successfully blocked. It is also heavily tilted in favor of the Taiwanese economy.
For example, Taiwan is able to export 539 categories of goods to China tariff-free, while Taiwan will remove tariffs on only 260 types of products. Taiwanese investors will have privileged access to important sectors such as banking on the mainland.
However, Taipei knows this deal is all about politics. Whereas Chinese sabre-rattling in the mid-1990s ultimately achieved very little politically, this is about enmeshing the two economies in such a way that Taiwan's future is tied to China's.
And like the Chinese grand strategy of easing America out of Asia, the Chinese ideal is always to win without fighting. Even before ECFA, China gave preferential treatment to Taiwanese businesses and college students. As far as China is concerned, the largesse of ECFA is one more step in proving to the Taiwanese people and population that there is nothing to fear and everything to gain when it comes to future mainland proposals for reunification.
Greater economic and social integration with the mainland is inevitable. But Taipei's decision to accelerate integration is not an unthinking one. There is a plan.
Taiwanese are well aware that the mainland's apparent largesse is an act of economic seduction designed to accelerate eventual reunification on Beijing's terms. But Taipei believes increased integration can lead to a different endgame—one that will strengthen the prospect of Taiwanese preserving their democratic way of life.
During a recent conference in Taipei discussing the implications of ECFA, a senior Taiwanese official put it to me this way: When ECFA really kicks in, the numbers of mainlanders entering Taiwan will be in the millions every year. These millions of mainland elites will stay in hotels with uncensored news reports. They will read newspapers in fearless disagreement with the government and surf an uncensored Internet. In short, millions of mainland Chinese tourists and businesspeople will go home having experienced the Taiwanese way of life.
So by accelerating integration Taiwan is trying to make a virtue out of necessity. China is gaining in political leverage, military power and economic influence. If Taiwan cannot change momentum, it can at least try to change elite attitudes in the mainland, and this might ultimately soften Beijing's policies towards Taiwan.
The desperate hope is that social and economic elites in China will more likely persuade political elites to preserve the Taiwanese way of political governance and economic life—whether through an indefinite extension of the status quo or a meaningful settlement using the China-Hong Kong model. But there are three reasons why Taipei's strategy is unlikely to succeed.
First, gaining physical and not just de jure or symbolic control of Taiwan is an essential element of Beijing's and the People's Liberation Army's strategy to break free of the constraints of the first island chain. Symbolic rather than actual control over Taiwan will not be enough.
Second, mainland urban and social elites support the Chinese Communist Party and its authoritarian system simply because they are the primary beneficiaries. Chinese elites have been shaped by the CCP's version of modern history—a narrative of victimhood and the belief that China's time to redress these are fast arriving. As the primary beneficiaries of the system, they underestimate the P.R.C.'s weaknesses such as inequality and corruption, and they mostly see the P.R.C.'s strengths.
Not surprisingly then, Chinese elites tend to be the most enthusiastic advocates of a muscular mainland foreign policy, especially when it comes to Taiwan. It seems unlikely that time spent in Taiwan will change this mindset.
Third, China is no longer ruled by a charismatic leader like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping but relies on a consensus model of decision-making, especially during a crisis. Unconditionally getting Taiwan back is deeply ingrained in the political culture, meaning that the default position on Taiwan is an uncompromising one.
None of this is to deny that Taipei faces a diabolical predicament. Greater economic integration is probably inevitable and that momentum is on the mainland's side. True, Taiwan feels confident that its people enjoy a superior system of government and free enterprise. But this does not mean that Beijing will allow it to persist.
Mr. Lee is a research fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and the Hudson Institute in Washington. He is author of "Will China Fail?" (CIS, 2007).
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