Asian Banks Learned From Past Sins

關

於如何讓全球銀行系統更安全的新論戰令很多人焦慮不已﹐這頗具諷刺意味。不過亞洲放貸機構總體上沒什麼可擔憂的。

在金融危機前奏階段﹐一些銀行積累了太多債務﹐風險敞口過高。經過眾多由納稅人出資的救助之後﹐監管機構和政治家們將注意力轉向如何防止這種災難重演。

名為巴塞爾III（Basel 3）的新的銀行資本結構全球標準草案是這方面的第一個重大嘗試。總體上﹐該草案要求銀行持有更多股權資本﹐並保持更高的流動性。奧巴馬政府還提出要對在美國運營的大型商業銀行設限﹐不得從事重大自營交易以及擁有對沖基金或私募股權基金。

因得到美聯儲(Fed)前主席沃爾克(Paul Volcker)支持而得名的沃爾克法則(Volcker rule)面臨共和黨人的反對和不確定的未來。巴塞爾III也仍有可能出現變化。但它們已經引發了憂慮。

野村控股(Nomura Holdings)策略師舒爾特(Paul Schulte)說﹐事實上﹐美國和英國未來兩年信貸可能下滑。面臨更為嚴格的巴塞爾III資本要求的銀行可貸資金更少﹐可能導致危險的信貸收縮。他說﹐在病人脫離重症監護之前根本就談不上復原。

亞洲的銀行則顯然沒有這方面的擔憂。亞洲大多數銀行資本狀況良好。它們對於批發融資的依賴度也較低。批發融資即通過所謂的銀行間拆借市場從其他放貸機構借貸。

它們的業務線很簡單：吸納存款、發放貸款。或許還會發行信用卡和擴大貿易信貸。不過它們沒有太多衍生產品或是自營交易。

就算沃爾克法則以某種方式應用於它們身上﹐大多數亞洲銀行也永遠不會違反規則。

花旗環球金融(Citigroup Global Markets)銀行業分析師何德亮(Simon Ho)說﹐亞洲的問題顯然比西方少得多。

亞洲當前的太平無事要多虧其一團混亂的過去。由於亞洲多家銀行不顧一切地放貸﹐1997-98年金融危機來襲時許多銀行都被推到了懸崖邊緣。在隨後的十幾年時間里﹐這些銀行大幅降低了自身債務水平﹐監管機構也更好地對它們實施了監管。

亞洲一些地區的情形沒那麼樂觀﹐特別是日本﹐巴塞爾III對日本放貸機構普遍持有的A類公司債券的處理辦法決定了它在日本尤其不受歡迎。

何德亮指出﹐台灣和馬來西亞也可能出現問題﹐另外還有韓國﹐部分原因在於其對批發融資的依賴──不過如果看看花旗依據預計的巴塞爾III平均第一級資本比率﹐它們比歐洲或英國的狀況還是要好一些。

十 年前堆積如山的壞帳導致中國政府對其幾家最大銀行展開大規模救助﹐隨後大力推動慎重監管﹐力度之大出人意料。當然﹐信貸增長偶爾會失控﹐去年就是如此﹐因 政府下令放貸以支撐經濟。這些銀行的次級債水平令一些人擔憂。不過中國銀行業監管機構不久前敦促一些放貸機構籌集更多股權資本﹐雖然它們的資本充足率以國 際標準衡量已經算高的了。這一舉措有可能是為了給壞賬水平的升高和未來的貸款增長提供緩沖﹐不過也是因為中國監管機構寧願小心為上。

舒爾特說﹐中國希望其資本充足率在全球最高之列。

2010年02月08日11:44

Asian Banks Learned From Past Sins

Peter Stein

New debates over ways to make the global banking system a safer place are, ironically, making a lot of people nervous. But Asia's lenders are one group warranting remarkably little concern.

In the lead-up to the financial crisis, certain banks piled on too much debt and exposed themselves to excessive risk. Multiple taxpayer-funded bailouts later, regulators and politicians are turning their attention to how they can prevent the fiasco from recurring.

A draft proposal of new global standards for banking capitalization known as Basel 3 is the first serious stab at this task. Generally, it will require banks to hold more equity capital and maintain greater liquidity. There also is the Obama administration's proposal to restrict large commercial banks with a U.S. presence from engaging in significant proprietary trading and owning hedge funds or private-equity funds.

The Volcker rule, so called because of its support from former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, faces opposition from Republicans and an uncertain future. And Basel 3 rules still could go through some changes. But already they are provoking anxiety.

As it is, the U.S. and U.K. are likely to experience a decline in credit in the next two years, says Paul Shulte, a strategist at Nomura Holdings. Banks facing tighter Basel 3 capital requirements will have even less money to lend, potentially causing a dangerous contraction. 'You can't talk about rehabilitation until the patient is out of intensive care,' he says.

Asian banks are remarkably free from such concerns. Most are well capitalized. And they are less dependent on wholesale funding -- that is, borrowing from other lenders through what is called the interbank market.

Their business lines are very simple: They take deposits and make loans. Maybe they issue credit cards and extend trade credit. They don't issue many derivatives or trade much for their own account.

Most would never fall afoul of the Volcker rule if it somehow applied to them.

'The problems in Asia are obviously a lot less than in the Western world,' says Simon Ho, a banking analyst at Citigroup Global Markets.

Asia's present virtue owes much to a sinful past. Reckless lending by Asian banks drove many to the brink when the 1997-98 financial crisis hit. In the dozen years since then, they have sharply reduced their debt levels, and regulators have gotten better at keeping them in line.

The picture in some parts of Asia is less rosy, notably Japan, where Basel 3 would be particularly unwelcome because of how it treats single-A-rated corporate bonds commonly held by the country's lenders.

Taiwan and Malaysia are potential problem markets, Mr. Ho notes, and possibly South Korea, in part for its reliance on wholesale funding -- though all three still compare favorably with Europe or the U.K. if you look at Citigroup's projected average Tier 1 ratios under Basel 3.

China, where mountains of bad loans a decade ago led to a massive government bailout of its biggest banks, has become surprisingly aggressive at prudential regulation. To be sure, credit growth occasionally gets out of hand, as it did last year under government orders to prop up the economy. And the banks' levels of subordinated debt, a less-favored form of capital, worry some. Still, China's banking watchdog recently pushed some lenders to raise more equity capital, even though their current capital-adequacy ratios are high by global standards. That probably is to provide a buffer for a rise in bad-loan levels and future loan growth, but it also is because China's regulator prefers to be cautious.

China wants its capital-adequacy ratios 'to be among highest in the world,' Mr. Shulte says.