Image Credit: J. Michael Cole for The Diplomat
Was Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement Successful?
The Sunflower Movement’s unprecedented occupation of Taiwan’s legislature in March and April this year made the headlines for a month, a feat almost unheard of in the island’s all-too-impatient media. It was the subject of heated debate on TV talk shows. It even became the object of attention overseas after supporters launched their own small protests. For a while, it looked like the occupation would change the face of politics, perhaps even dislodge President Ma Ying-jeou from his all-powerful position as chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Then the occupation ended, the headlines turned their sights toward new developments, and it looked like things had returned to their original state, the movement fated to little more than a mere footnote in the nation’s political history. Or was it?
I recently had the pleasure of speaking at a conference on Taiwan’s social movements at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). The main argument of my talk was that small but persistent guerrilla-type protest groups had been more successful than larger movements with mass appeal, such as Citizen 1985. Over the next two days, my use of the term successful often came back to haunt me. Academics, being what they are, wanted — and rightly so — a proper definition.
A narrow characterization of success in that context would be whether the government was forced, as a result of social mobilization, to slow down, modify, or abandon certain policies. A wider definition would be whether activism had managed to keep an issue alive and to turn it into a subject of debate — in other words, education as a component of success. Other aspects of success which refined themselves in my mind as I tried to provide an articulate response to my academic counterparts included the sustainability of activism over the long term, its unpredictability, and the amount of attention that activists received from the authorities, including law enforcement.
Having offered this platter of definitions, I remained convinced that my main argument that small groups such as the Black Island Nation Youth Alliance had been for the most part successful, whereas Citizen 1985, having mostly faded into oblivion, was overall a failure. Although both groups had not managed to force the government to change its policies (on the cross-strait services trade agreement with China and abuse in the military, respectively), Black Island and the dozens of other organizations that eventually coalesced into the Sunflower Movement had nevertheless succeeded in turning the CSSTA and the failing government mechanisms that alimented the controversy into a national (in fact international) issue.
Let’s explore this in further detail, first by turning to what the Sunflowers didn’t achieve. For now, it looks like the Ma administration intends to pass the CSSTA in its original format, and there are doubts as to whether Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s intervention to defuse the crisis, which came with a promise to implement a proper review mechanism, will be honored by the government. Also in question is whether the split within the KMT that was ostensibly forming during the occupation is durable; for a brief period of time, it looked like Ma would be forced to step down as party chairman, which would have ensured his near-complete neutralization for the remainder of his second (and last) term in office. Ma eventually dodged that bullet and remains ensconced as party chair, and is thus still able to exert great influence on both the legislative and executive branches of government. A mutiny in the KMT would have constituted a major success for the Sunflowers. That did not materialize, but who knows what the long-term implications of that momentary cleft will be.
Let us now turn to the successes. There is no doubt that the Sunflower Movement has reanimated civil societyin Taiwan, which had grown dangerously pessimistic and disorganized over the years. The genie appears to be out of the bottle for good, and activism will likely be a fact of life in Taiwanese politics for years to come. Furthermore, under the Sunflower umbrella groups that had fought each other finally learned to cooperate by transcending their differences and fighting for a common cause. Often unsaid is the fact that the Sunflower Movement constituted far more than students; as many as 54 civic organizations and NGOs took part in the occupation, which points to the heterogeneous nature of the opposition to the CSSTA. Besides bringing civil society together, the Sunflowers also gave renewed hope to people who had given up on Taiwan. The previous month I was in Houston to give a talk at the Asia Society, which was attended by a large contingent of Taiwanese Americans. Time and again after my speech, they told me how inspired they were thanks to the Sunflowers. The change could not have been more obvious, and now they all wanted to know what they could do and how they could be useful to Taiwan’s mobilized youth.
Another sign of success was the fact that the Sunflower Movement and social groups in general became the focus of several academic conferences all over the world. Even at conferences that were not about social movements, the subject of the Sunflowers inevitably crept into the conversation, as happened during a closed-door conference at Nottingham University a few days after the one at SOAS. For skeptics or supporters, the Sunflower Movement was a hot topic, and it was recognized that its impact would very likely outlive its presence on the front pages of Taiwan’s newspapers.
It also became clear in the weeks following the occupation that the Sunflower Movement’s impact had extended beyond Taiwan and served as an inspiration for other protest groups. Activists in Hong Kong and Macau used symbols and rhetoric similar to the Sunflowers; it’s unlikely that this was an accident. In fact, since then, there have been growing exchanges between Taiwanese activists and those involved in Occupy Central, which has compelled Hong Kong authorities, ostensibly pressured by Beijing, to deny entry to some Taiwanese activists, including Chen Wei-ting. There is good reason to believe that the successes of the Sunflower Movement have reinvigorated likeminded organizations in the two special administrative regions, if not in China proper.
Consequently, another success of the Sunflower Movement is its ability to inject itself into politics across the Taiwan Strait, thus forcing Beijing to take social forces into consideration as it adjusts its policies. Above all, the Sunflower Movement was able to communicate, almost viscerally, the widespread opposition within Taiwan to Beijing’s stillborn “one country, two systems” formula, opposition that, while it existed in the past, had never truly succeeded in finding its voice. The message was loud and clear, and Beijing heard it. (What it does with this information is an entirely different question, and in many ways its reaction to Occupy Central in Hong Kong will be an indicator of its future approach to the even more formidable Taiwan challenge.)
One last, albeit more subtle, success for the Sunflowers was the movement’s ability to bring out the worst in the KMT, which in some incidents highlighted the party’s inability to fully dispense with its authoritarian past. By doing so, the activists revealed to the world the true nature of the party, which in many ways has come to resemble more the party under Chiang Ching-kuo than the one under Lee Teng-hui or even that during Ma’s first term. In one particular incident, both the government and the KMT acted with stunning lack of propriety by lecturing an international human rights organization about how they should regard the Sunflower Movement, prompting an indignant response that will go down in the annals of diplomatic reprimands. The many reports of improper attempts by representative offices overseas to contact supporters of the Sunflower Movement — in some cases “invitations to have tea” — also didn’t fly too well with the mature democracies in which those incidents are said to have occurred. That Taiwanese diplomats resorted to such desperate measures is a sign that Taipei was panicking; Taipei’s panic was, in many ways, a measure of the Sunflowers’ success. And sadly for Ma, foreign governments and international organizations took notice. The same can be said of the government’s unwillingness, or inability, to deal with the growing role of pro-unification gangsters, led by the Bamboo Union’s Chang An-le (“White Wolf”), in politics, as was made all too clear during the recent visit to Taiwan by China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Zhang Zhijun, where peaceful protesters were physically assaulted by thugs while police looked on.
Of course the Ma government could survive the Sunflower and forge ahead as if nothing had happened, but it will do so at an increasing cost to its image and credibility, as mobilized society will not go away. In order to counter the now-freed genie of activism, Taipei will have to use more drastic measures — riot police, the courts, and propaganda among them — to counter protesters. Such escalation would, in turn, further damage its chances at the year-end seven-in-one elections and, more importantly, the presidential and legislative elections in 2016.
What remains to be seen is whether the Sunflower Movement’s many, albeit incomplete, successes will translate into policy. So far, there is little sign that the activists who led the occupation understand the necessity to bridge the chasm that separates contestation from politics. For many, all political institutions are corrupt and therefore cannot be trusted. Consequently, there is no assurance that high discontent with Ma’s KMT will translate into votes for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is also regarded as part of the problem and is now being accused of taking over the KMT’s seat as the latter fills that of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This anger at government institutions has furthermore translated into a refusal to enter politics. The few who understand that true change will only occur if ideas are implemented by political enablers — that is, legislators and officials — in other words, those who have decided that the next step is to enter politics, have been accused of something akin to treason.
Whether they change the KMT from the inside, join the DPP to reinvigorate it or start their own political party, activists will eventually have to accept the reality that they cannot remain eternal rebels. At some point they will have to dirty their hands and jump in. The Sunflower Movement has scored many successes — impressive successes in the fact of extraordinary odds — but all those will be meaningless if this wave of nationalism isn’t channeled properly. The greatest success of the Sunflowers, and the most desirable one, would be its ability to convince young, idealistic individuals that a life in politics is not only desirable, but a calling, a sacrifice that must be made for the sake of the island they call home.
As the Canadian intellectual and, for a brief period, politician Michael Ignatieff wrote in his magnificent book Fire and Ashes, “There is so much wrong with democratic politics today … that is easy to forget what is right about the democratic ideal.” The Sunflowers fought for that ideal, but as long as they stay out of politics, they will only fight half of the battle. True success, the object of our present discussion, requires that the entire battle be fought, and won.
中譯：William Tsai
報導原文："Was Taiwan's Sunflower Movement Successful?"
太陽花運動在今年三、四月破天荒地佔領台灣的立法院（註1），也佔領了各大媒體的頭條長達一個月，這在島國三分鐘熱度的媒體生態裡簡直是前所未聞的成就。它是電視談話性節目激辯的話題，甚至在運動聲援者各自組織起小型抗議之後，它也成為海外矚目的焦點（註2）。佔領立院行動似乎一度有可能改變政治的面貌，也許甚至還能把馬英九從獨攬大權的中國國民黨黨主席位置上拉下來；然後，佔領告一段落，媒體頭條再次轉向新的事物，一切似乎又回到原點（註3），這場運動注定不過是台灣政治史的一個小小註腳。真是這樣嗎？
筆者最近有幸在倫敦大學亞非學院（SOAS）的一場台灣社會運動研討會上致詞。而我發言的主要論點，則是不屈不撓的小型游擊隊式抗爭團體，比起公民1985之類參與人數更多，規模更龐大的運動更加成功。接下來兩天，我用的「成功」這個詞一再糾纏著我；與會學者們基於研究性格，理所當然地要我提出一個適當的定義。
而在這個脈絡下，狹義的「成功」指的是執政當局是否由於社會動員抗爭而被迫延緩、調整甚至放棄某些政策：更廣泛的定義則是指運動能否讓一個議題保持新鮮，讓它成為各界爭論的話題，換言之，教育作用也是成功的一部份。在我試著向學界的對造們提出一個清楚明白的回答時，心中同時琢磨著的其他成功面向，還包括運動在長時間內的持續發展能力、運動的不可預測性，以及運動者們獲得執政當局，包括執法機關注意的程度。
雖然提出了這麼包羅萬象的定義，但我仍然確信我的主要論點沒錯，也就是黑色島國青年陣線這樣的小團體多半是成功的，而幾乎已銷聲匿跡的公民1985行動，整體來說則是失敗的。儘管這兩者都無法迫使執政當局在海峽兩岸服務貿易協議（CSSTA），以及軍隊凌虐官兵的問題上改變政策，黑島青和其他許多聯手促成太陽花運動的團體，畢竟成功地讓服貿協議，連同讓服貿爭議變本加厲的政府失能問題，成為全國矚目（甚至是全球關注）的課題。
讓我們再探討的深入一點，首先來看看太陽花運動無法做到的部分。就目前看來，馬英九政權顯然還是想要一字不改地通過服貿協議，至於立法院長王金平居中協調排解糾紛，承諾建立適當監督機制的表態能否獲得當局尊重，也令人懷疑。同樣令人懷疑的還有佔領立院期間表面化的國民黨內部分裂會不會持續下去，在一段為時不久的期間裡，這似乎有可能迫使馬英九辭去黨主席，使他在接下來的第二任總統任期裡變得完全無足輕重。但馬終究是躲過了致命一擊，確保了黨主席的地位，從而能夠繼續對行政、立法部門施加強大的影響力。國民黨內部的反抗將為太陽花運動者帶來巨大的成功，當然這尚未發生，但誰又知道暫時的裂痕會產生甚麼長遠的後果？
然後我們再回頭看看成功的部分。毋庸置疑，太陽花運動鼓舞了近年來悲觀、散亂到了危險地步的台灣公民社會（註4）；精靈看來是永遠離開了瓶子，社運行動在未來幾年裡很可能會是台灣政治的既成事實。不僅如此，在太陽花運動的旗幟下，過去互相鬥爭的團體終於學會超克歧見，為了共同目標而並肩作戰。通常不被提起的一個事實是，太陽花運動遠遠不只有學生參與：多達54個公民團體及非政府組織都加入了佔領行動，這說明了反服貿運動的異質性。不只是把公民社會團結在一起，太陽花運動還為早已放棄台灣的人再次帶來希望。上個月我在休士頓對亞洲協會（Asia Society）演說，聽眾有一大部分是台裔美國人。他們一次又一次在我的演講結束後告訴我，太陽花運動者是如何感動了他們。再也沒有比這更明確的轉變了，如今他們都想知道他們還能做些甚麼，要怎樣才最能幫助動員起來的台灣青年。
成功的另一個跡象則是，太陽花運動以至於整個台灣社運界，成為全球各地好幾場學術研討會的主題。即使在主題與社會運動無關的研討會上，關於太陽花運動者的話題也不可避免地滲入對話之中，就像在亞非學院研討會幾天之後，諾丁罕大學另一場不對外開放的研討會上發生的那樣。不論對於質疑者還是支持者，太陽花運動都是熱門話題，眾人也都承認這場運動的影響很可能會比它在台灣報紙頭版上的壽命維持得更久。
佔領結束後的幾星期內，也可以清楚看到太陽花運動的影響已擴及台灣之外，同時啟發了其他抗爭團體。香港和澳門的抗爭者運用了近似於太陽花運動的符號和論述，這絕非巧合。實際上，在那之後，台灣運動者和佔領中環運動者的交流更為頻繁，迫使香港政府以北京施壓為理由拒絕某些台灣運動者入境（註5），包括陳為廷（註6）。有充分的理由相信，太陽花運動的成功即使還沒對中國內地產生影響，也已振奮了港澳兩個中國特別行政區理念相同的團體。
於是，太陽花運動的另一項成就，在於它能將自己注入海峽對岸的政治中，迫使北京將台灣社會力量納入政策考量，進而作出調整（註7）。最重要的是，太陽花運動能夠近乎發自內心地將台灣內部對北京當局早已胎死腹中的「一國兩制」架構的普遍反對串聯起來，這樣的反對聲音早已存在，但從來沒能找到有力的發聲管道。如今傳達出來的訊息清楚明確，北京當局也聽見了。（它如何因應這樣的訊息則另當別論，從許多方面看來，北京如何回應香港的佔領中環運動（註8），將是它未來如何對應台灣方面更激烈挑戰的一項指標。）
太陽花運動者最後一項更加微妙的成就，則是這場運動將國民黨最惡劣的一面刺激出來的能力，這在某些例子裡完全彰顯出該黨無法和它專制極權的過往歷史一刀兩斷。運動者由此向全世界揭露了國民黨真正的本質，它在許多方面上更像是蔣經國領導下的國民黨，而非李登輝領導的，甚至也不像馬英九第一任期裡的國民黨。在其中一次事件中，中華民國政府和國民黨都以令人瞠目結舌的無禮態度，教訓一個國際人權組織應當如何看待太陽花運動，所引來的嚴厲駁斥足以在外交譴責紀錄上留下一筆。駐外代表處官員以不恰當的手法聯絡太陽花運動的聲援者，有時甚至「邀請喝茶」的許多報導，在這些事件據傳發生的成熟民主社會裡也無法得到好評。台灣駐外官員不擇手段一至於此，正說明了台北當局陷入恐慌；而在許多方面，台北當局的恐慌也正是太陽花運動成就的尺度所在。對馬英九而言很悲哀的是，外國政府和國際組織全都看在眼裡，而這也同樣適用於台灣政府不願或無能因應竹聯幫「白狼」張安樂領導下的促統幫派（註9）政治影響力持續擴張的現況，而這樣的現況在中國國務院台灣事務辦公室主任張志軍最近訪問台灣的行程中（註10）再明確不過：和平抗爭者被幫派分子動手毆打（註11），警察卻坐視不管。
馬政權當然能夠撐過太陽花運動，並且若無其事地繼續前進，但繼續前進必定要讓它賠上更多形象和可信度，因為動員起來的社會絕不會放過它。為了對抗被釋放出來的社運精靈，台北當局勢必得動用更多激烈的手段對付運動者，像是鎮暴警察、司法追訴，以及文宣攻勢；但局勢如此節節升高，反過來又會對它在年底七合一選舉，甚至2016年總統和國會大選的勝算造成更大損害。
至於太陽花運動這許多並不完整的成就，能不能進一步轉換成為政策，則仍然有待觀察。截至目前為止，將論爭與政治行為切割開來的斷裂必須彌合的重要性，領導佔領行動的運動者們幾乎還不太能理解。對許多運動者來說，一切政治體制都是腐敗而不可信任的，於是對馬英九的國民黨持續高漲的不滿，也絕不必然轉為對在野黨民進黨的支持，因為民進黨也被看作是問題的一部份，如今更被指責為在國民黨向中國共產黨靠攏的同時，民進黨也在國民黨化。這種對政治體制的憤恨，更進一步轉化為完全拒絕參與政治；能夠理解真正的轉變只能透過政治上的促成者（political enabler），也就是國會議員和政府官員實踐理念才能完成的極少數人，換言之，就是決定以投入政壇做為下一步的那些人，則被說成是近乎背叛運動。
無論運動者是要從內部改變國民黨，加入民進黨以重振在野力量，還是自組政黨，他們終究要接受這樣的現實：他們不可能永遠都是反抗者。一旦時候到了，他們總得把手弄髒，自己跳進政治圈。太陽花運動獲得了許多成就，這些成就在巨大的不利條件下更令人刮目相看，但這波國族認同浪潮若不因勢利導，終將歸於泡影。太陽花運動更大也最理想的成就，將是說服充滿抱負的青年人，政治生活不只是值得追求的，更是為了島國家園必要承擔的犧牲與召喚。
正如一度從政的加拿大學者Michael Ignatieff在他的名著《火與灰燼》中（註12）寫下的這段話：「今天的民主政治中有太多錯誤........因此讓我們輕易忘記了民主理念的正確之處。」太陽花運動者們是為了民主理念而奮戰的，但只要他們仍然置身政治之外，他們就只把仗打了一半；要實現本文宗旨所在的真正成功，就非得把整場戰爭都打完，並且打贏不可。
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（註1）J. Michael Cole, "Sunflowers end Occupation of Taiwan's Legislation", the Diplomat (2014/4/11)
（註2）Shannon Tiezzi, "Taiwan's 'Sunflower Movement' Goes Global", the Diplomat (2014/4/2)
（註3）Dingding Chen（陳定定）, "Why Taiwan's Sunflower Movement Will Fail", the Diplomat (2014/4/8)
（註4）J. Michael Cole, "Say Goodbye to 'Peaceful Unification'", the Diplomat (2014/4/1)
（註5）J. Michael Cole, "Sunflower Leaders Denied Entry into Hong Kong", Thinking Taiwan (2014/6/25)
（註6）「聲援七一 陳為廷闖香港遭遣返」，《蘋果日報》2014/6/30
（註7）Shannon Tiezzi, "China Showcases Gentler Approach to Taiwan", The Diplomat (2014/6/28)
（註8）"Alliance for True Democracy proposal wins Occupy Central poll as nearly 800,000 Hongkongers vote", South China Morning Post（南華早報）, 2014/6/29
（註9）J. Michael Cole, "The Return of Gangster Politics in Taiwan", the Diplomat (2014/2/26)
（註10）Shannon Tiezzi, "Sunflower Movement Hangs Over Chinese Official's Trip to Taiwan", the Diplomat (2014/6/25)
（註11）「張志軍寶島行 統獨兩派火爆開打」，《華視新聞》2014/6/25
（註12）Michael Ignatieff, Fire and Ashes: Success and Failure in Politics (Random House, 2013)
太陽花學運 改變兩岸關係發展
為期24天的太陽花學運，對美中台三方都有一定影響力。資料照片
為期24天的太陽花學運，不僅對台灣社會的衝擊與反思仍在持續，更讓國際看見台灣年輕人對於政治的影響力。
根據《自由時報》報導，美、中雙邊涉台決策官員與學者，日前在紐約舉行一場閉門會議。會中認為太陽花學運，改變了馬總統就任後所維持的兩岸和平，更凸顯了台灣藍綠矛盾；同時也認為學生占領立法院，是受到立法院長王金平暗助，為了就是別讓服貿協議不要那麼快通過。
代表中國與會的官員也在會中指出，太陽花學運讓兩岸關係複雜化，也讓他們了解到兩岸的政治談判不可能在2016前進行；美方則是在太陽花學運上了解到，他們應該要強化對台經濟自主的支持，讓台灣人民有信心持續發展了兩岸關係。
(葉國吏／綜合報導)
鍾庭耀：香港人值得驕傲的事情
【 全文：http://bit.ly/1lpD1FR 】
港大民研計劃總監鍾庭耀公佈，剔除一萬多票重覆投票後，和平佔中全民投票共有787,767人投票。
鍾庭耀指出，政府安排的正式選舉投票，資源是今次的100倍。民間用有限的資源，得到近80萬香港人參與，是香港人值得驕傲的事情。
鍾 庭 耀對投票結果感到「非常安慰 」，認為「秩序井然 」，形容香港人共同創造歷史。 他希望各方欣賞及珍惜這種文化，不要輸打贏要 。
鍾庭耀宣佈，不包括尚在點算的六千多張紙張選票，真普聨方案得票33萬1千多票，得票率42.1%，學界方案得票30萬2千餘票，得票率38.4%。至於人民力量方案，得票8萬1千多票，得票率10.4%。
第一條問題只有7萬棄權票，連同不選擇，共佔約9%，即逾9成人分別支持三個都有公民提名元素的政改方案。
至於第二條問題，88%支持立法會否決不符國際標準的政改方案。
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