劉黎兒：台灣人睡在23萬顆核彈上/ 腐敗醜聞重創韓國核能產業: 韓國人對核電站的安全隱患視而不見，許最終會付出慘重的代價

 劉黎兒：台灣人睡在23萬顆核彈上

依廣島原子彈份量計算
〔記者李欣芳／台北報導〕核四安全問題引發各界高度關注，旅日作家劉黎兒昨發出警語，指日本專家擔心繼日本福島核災後，台灣最可能發生核災；她並以「台灣人你睡在二十三萬顆核彈上」形容核能的危險性，擔心台灣今天不廢核，未來若發生嚴重核災，會廢掉台灣！
劉黎兒表示，她是以廣島原子彈的份量來算，台灣核一到核三廠有近一萬六千束燃料棒，相當二十三萬顆原子彈的輻射量；且核電廠持續運作，一天一個原子爐就燒出三到四顆廣島原子彈份量的輻射物質，台灣有六個爐，一天不廢核，一天就多燒出二十顆廣島原子彈的核廢料。
民進黨主席蘇貞昌擔任董事長的超越基金會，昨邀劉黎兒以「原來核災離我們這麼近─高危險核電環境下的自保之道」為題發表演講，劉在演講及受訪時，做以上表示。
蘇貞昌的太太詹秀齡表示，家人與孩子的安全是最重要的，她希望藉由劉黎兒親身的觀察經驗，思考台灣需不需要核能。
劉黎兒表示，日本在三一一大地震後，國際間就不斷對台灣的核能安全提出警告，更何況核四本身的問題很多，包括台電施工與監工等問題，這樣的核四，台灣當然不能用；她批說，馬政府對核能的說法充滿謊言，且還不斷拿謊言欺騙民眾。
劉黎兒說，廢核是不分藍綠，核四的安全問題攸關台灣人的身家性命，不早一點廢核，她擔心下一代沒有未來。

 

 

腐敗醜聞重創韓國核能產業

CHOE SANG-HUN 2013年08月06日

Jeon Heon-Kyun/European Pressphoto Agency

位於韓國蔚山的一座在建的核電廠。韓國23座核電廠中，有13所安裝了問題部件。

韓國首爾——資源匱乏的韓國和日本一樣，長期依靠核電提供廉價的電力。在核電的幫助下，這兩個國家構築起了經濟奇蹟。多年來，核電滿足了韓國三分之一的電力需求，這與日本在2011年福島核災難發生之前的水平相似。

現在，一樁醜聞在韓國愈演愈烈，其中涉及賄賂，以及在測試 核電站的關鍵設備時弄虛作假。這樁醜聞突顯了韓國和日本之間的另一個相似之處：專家表示，兩國的核計劃都因一種串通一氣、弄虛作假的文化而遭到破壞，這種 文化破壞了核計劃的安全性。連續數周披露出的情節顯示了韓國核電公司、供應商和測試公司之間的密切關係，這一醜聞致使韓國總理把該行業比作黑手黨。

• 檢視大圖
  Jean Chung for The New York Times
  周五，首爾市的公務員用風扇應對電力短缺。核反應堆的關閉已經觸發了一場節能運動。

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此次醜聞始於今年4月的一次匿名舉報，接到舉報後官方展開 了調查。檢方已經起訴一家測試公司的部分管理人員，罪名是在測試核電廠零部件時弄虛作假。檢方還對一家設計核電廠的國有公司的管理人員提起了指控，罪名是 收受測試公司管理層的賄賂，作為條件他們要接受不達標的零部件。

更糟的是，調查人員發現，韓國23座核電廠中，有14座安 裝了質量有問題的部件。韓國已經臨時關閉了其中的三個反應堆，因為這些核電廠中使用的問題部件相當重要。隨着調查人員為了查實是否有更多測試結果是偽造 的，開始艱難地審核過去十年里提交的12萬份測試證明，可能會有更多的反應堆被關閉。

還有一點進一步表明了這些問題的覆蓋範圍可能有多大，那就是檢方近日突擊搜查了另外30家供應商的辦公室，這些供應商也涉嫌提供附有偽造證書的零部件，檢方還說，他們將調查其他測試公司。

首爾大學(Seoul National University)核工程學教授徐鈞烈(Kune Y. Suh)說，「到目前為止，揭露出來的情況可能只是冰山一角。」

隨着新醜聞一次次揭露出來，韓國人已經變得更加不安，在此之前他們和日本人一樣，慢慢相信了國家領導人對核安全的安慰之詞。安全是最大的擔憂，可是醜聞也引發了經濟憂慮。在經濟增長放緩的時刻，政府在高調地推進自己的計劃，那就是成為國外核電站的主要建設者。

​​徐鈞烈教授說，醜聞「使政府很難繼續宣稱，可以廉價地建設可靠的核電廠」。

韓國人說，他們已經開始因為這個行業的罪惡而吃苦頭了。三座反應堆的關閉，再加上另外三座反應堆因定期維護而停產，已迫使韓國領導人在悶熱的酷暑中，下令開展全國性的節能運動。在大學校園裡，學生們紛紛逃離圖書館，奔向更加涼爽的網吧，大型企業也都把空調的風力調小了。

朴槿惠(Park Geun-hye)總統關閉了她在總統官邸的空調，即使在她接待外國客人時也不例外，包括Facebook的首席執行官馬克·扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)。一些商家也把這些困難當成了賺錢的機會，他們銷售用特殊面料製成的「冰涼絲巾」，在浸水之後，這種圍巾能讓佩戴者保持數小時的涼 爽。不過，領導人的以身作則和商家的創意都未能制止來自民眾的牢騷聲，也沒緩解眾人對核電行業的憤怒。

首爾漢陽大學(Hanyang University )核工程學教授金勇修（Kim Yong-soo，音譯）說，「這不是一個簡單的疏忽或錯誤；這是故意的造假，這些造假者本應確保核電部件的可靠性。這對我們的核電產業的免疫系統提出了嚴重的質疑。」

儘管當前開展的調查有很多情況尚不清楚，但專家表示他們了解的足夠多，可以明確指出醜聞的深層原因：這個產業甚至比日本的更加高度集中，對於主要參與者之間的關係也監管不力。

在日本，少數幾家公用事業公司負責供應核電，但韓國卻僅有 一家：國有企業韓國電力公司(Korea Electric Power Corporation)，簡稱韓電(Kepco)。該公司的一家子公司，韓國水力原子能公司（Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power，簡稱韓水原），運營着所有電廠，這些電廠由另一家子公司，韓國電力技術公司(Kepco Engineering & Construction)設計。後者還負責檢查供應商提供的零部件，審核供應商提交的由測試公司出具的安全證書。

向韓國國會提交的行業數據顯示，多年以來，這兩家子公司的退休高層要麼在零部件供應商和測試企業中供職，要麼在其中投資。

在一個尊重個人關係經常被認為比遵守規章更重要的文化里， 供應鏈參與者之間的界限並非涇渭分明，這就產生了政府官員和產業專家所說的「根深蒂固的腐敗鏈」。他們表示，這些團體之間重要的校友或同鄉關係進一步鞏固 了相互勾結的聯繫。除此之外，還有賄賂的誘惑，在韓國，許多行業的供應商和買家都會用賄賂來疏通關係。

「在過去30年里，我國原子能工業變得越來越像是一個封閉 的群體，強調其處理核材料的專業性，所允許的監管和干預極少，」韓國政府的產業通商資源部(Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy)在最近向議員做的一份報告中表示。「這滋生了大量的腐敗，培育了一個不透明的體系，養成了一種驕傲自滿的商業做法。」

在當前的醜聞中，韓水原官員被指命令韓電技術公司忽略測試 企業世韓完全工程供應公司(Saehan Total Engineering Provider Company)發出的虛假證明。測試公司的最高層管理人員和投資者中，包括韓電技術的現任或前任員工及其家庭成員。（過去幾天我們曾多次向該公司致電要 求發表評論，但該公司總機一直無人應答。）

面對公眾的憤怒，政府解僱了韓電這兩家子公司的負責人。政府還承諾頒佈新法律並加緊監管，禁止這兩家子公司的退休人員在供應商或測試機構任職。

反對黨在原子能安全委員會(Nuclear Safety and Security Commission)控制着幾個席位。最近反對黨在這個監管機構中新增了兩名核電批評人士，但許多人擔憂，這些變動，以及其他承諾實施的變動並不充分。 原子能安全委員會是核能產業的最高監管機構，長期以來都被人批評與產業界關係過於親密。

在去年的醜聞之後，政府承諾，零部件供應商如被發現偽造文 件，將在未來10年里禁止再次投標。然而在2月，韓水原只對這樣的供應商進行了六個月的處罰。反核人士表示，需要對監管體製做出更根本的變革，他們指出， 政府所屬的監管部門之一，韓國原子能安全技術院(Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety)有60%的預算來自韓水原。

一些人的觀點則更進一步，表示要讓普通韓國人改變預期，才能發生真正的轉變。

他們表示，韓國建設核電產業的初衷是該國工業需要廉價的電力，這就促使韓電快速建造電廠，並以低廉成本進行運營。

「韓國人揮霍廉價的電力，對核電站的安全隱患視而不見，」 韓國環境運動聯盟(Korean Federation for Environmental Movement)的一名領導人楊李媛瑩（Yang Lee Won-young，音譯）表示。「他們或許最終會付出慘重的代價。」

翻譯：王童鶴、張薇

Scandal in South Korea Over Nuclear Revelations

By CHOE SANG-HUN August 06, 2013

 

SEOUL, South Korea — Like Japan, resource-poor South Korea has long relied on nuclear power to provide the cheap electricity that helped build its miracle economy. For years, it met one-third of its electricity needs with nuclear power, similar to Japan’s level of dependence before the 2011 disaster at its Fukushima plant.

Now, a snowballing scandal in South Korea about bribery and faked safety tests for critical plant equipment has highlighted yet another similarity: experts say both countries’ nuclear programs suffer from a culture of collusion that has undermined their safety. Weeks of revelations about the close ties between South Korea’s nuclear power companies, their suppliers and testing companies have led the prime minister to liken the industry to a mafia.

The scandal started after an anonymous tip in April prompted an official investigation. Prosecutors have indicted some officials at a testing company on charges of faking safety tests on parts for the plants. Some officials at the state-financed company that designs nuclear power plants were also indicted on charges of taking bribes from testing company officials in return for accepting those substandard parts.

Worse yet, investigators discovered that the questionable components are installed in 14 of South Korea’s 23 nuclear power plants. The country has already shuttered three of those reactors temporarily because the questionable parts used there were important, and more closings could follow as investigators wade through more than 120,000 test certificates filed over the past decade to see if more may have been falsified.

In a further indication of the possible breadth of the problems, prosecutors recently raided the offices of 30 more suppliers suspected of also providing parts with faked quality certificates and said they would investigate other testing companies.

“What has been revealed so far may be the tip of an iceberg,” said Kune Y. Suh, a professor of nuclear engineering at Seoul National University.

With each new revelation, South Koreans — who, like the Japanese, had grown to believe their leaders’ soothing claims about nuclear safety — have become more jittery. Safety is the biggest concern, but the scandals have also caused economic worries. At a time of slowing growth, the government had loudly promoted its plans to become a major builder of nuclear power plants abroad.

The scandal, Professor Suh said, “makes it difficult to continue claiming to build reliable nuclear power plants cheaply.”

South Koreans say they are already suffering for the industry’s sins. The closing of the three reactors, in addition to another three offline for scheduled maintenance, has led the country’s leaders to order a nationwide energy-saving campaign in the middle of a particularly muggy summer. At university campuses, students have deserted the libraries for cooler Internet cafes, and major corporations have turned down air-conditioning.

President Park Geun-hye has kept off her own air-conditioning even when she hosted foreign guests, including Mark Zuckerberg, the chief executive of Facebook. And some entrepreneurs have capitalized on the troubles, selling “cool scarves” made of a special fabric that, after being dipped in water, keeps wearers cool for hours. But the modeling and creativity have not stopped the grousing, or alleviated anger at the industry.

“This is not a simple negligence or mistake; this is a deliberate fabrication by those who were supposed to safeguard the reliability of parts,” said Kim Yong-soo, a professor of nuclear engineering at Hanyang University in Seoul. “It raises serious questions about the immune system of our nuclear power industry.”

Although much remains unclear with the investigations under way, experts say they know enough to pinpoint the underlying cause of the scandal: an industry that is even more highly centralized than Japan’s, with poor oversight on the relations among the major players.

While Japan has a small number of utilities that provide nuclear power, South Korea has just one: the state-run Korea Electric Power Corporation, or Kepco. One of its subsidiaries, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, runs all the plants. Another, Kepco Engineering & Construction, designs them and is tasked with inspecting parts from suppliers and vetting the safety certificates they include from testing companies.

Over the years, senior retirees from the two subsidiaries have found jobs with parts suppliers and testing companies or invested in them, according to industry data submitted to the National Assembly.

In a culture where honoring personal ties is often considered more important than following regulations, the porous borders among the members of the supply chain resulted in what government officials and industry experts call an “entrenched chain of corruption.” Important school and hometown connections among the groups further cemented the collusive links, they said. And then there is the lure of bribery, which has often lubricated relationships between South Korean parts suppliers and their buyers in various industries.

“In the past 30 years, our nuclear energy industry has become an increasingly closed community that emphasized its specialty in dealing with nuclear materials and yet allowed little oversight and intervention,” the government’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said in a recent report to lawmakers. “It spawned a litany of corruption, an opaque system and a business practice replete with complacency.”

In the current scandal, Korea Hydro officials are accused of ordering Kepco E & C to ignore faked certificates from the testing firm Saehan Total Engineering Provider Company. The testing company’s top officials and investors included current and former employees from Kepco E & C or their family members. (Although the company was called for comment several times in recent days, no one picked up the main line.)

Amid a public uproar, the government fired the heads of both the Kepco subsidiaries. It also promised to enact new laws and tighten regulations to ban retirees from the two subsidiaries from getting jobs at suppliers and test agencies.

Political opposition parties, which control some seats on the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission — the top nuclear watchdog, which has long been criticized as being too cozy with the industry — recently added two critics of nuclear power to the regulatory group. But many worry the changes, and promised changes, will not be enough.

After last year’s scandal, the government had vowed to keep parts suppliers found to have falsified documents from bidding again for 10 years. But in February, Korea Hydro imposed only a six-month penalty for such suppliers. And nuclear opponents say that more fundamental changes are needed in the regulatory system, pointing out that one of the government’s main regulating arms, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, gets 60 percent of its annual budget from Korea Hydro.

Some go further, saying ordinary South Koreans will have to change their own expectations before real change can occur.

The nuclear industry, they say, was built around the notion that South Korea’s industries needed inexpensive power, leading Kepco to build plants quickly and operate them cheaply.

“South Koreans have guzzled cheap electricity while turning a blind eye to the safety concerns of their nuclear power plants,” said Yang Lee Won-young, a leader at the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement. “They may end up paying dearly.”