北京整肅薄熙來，但不想傷及左派
黃安偉, 儲百亮 2013年08月21日
ChinaFotoPress, via Getty Images
北京——在北京一棟辦公大樓的六樓，有一家名為「烏有之鄉」的書店，店裡凌亂地擺放着有關全球左派的各種物品：既有《毛澤東的成功之路》、《馬克思主義的遺產》這樣的大部頭書籍，也有印着切·格瓦拉(Che Guevara)形象的帆布書包。
然而，這家書店缺少了它最重要的產物：一個讓中國左派發表
意見的網站。「它還是關着的。」在該店工作的一名女子說。這個網站狂熱支持前中共官員薄熙來，因此在2012年4月被中國官員強迫關閉；主政中國西南城市
重慶的四年中，薄熙來曾援引毛派言論來吸引人氣和支持。該書店架設了一個新網站，主要是用來賣書和發表不會招惹麻煩的評論。
面臨貪污、受賄及濫用職權指控的薄熙來將在本周四受審，中國領導人也正在小心翼翼地把握微妙的平衡。一方面，他們力圖把薄熙來作為罪犯來示眾，令他最熱烈的支持者們噤聲。另一方面，他們又希望避免抹黑他擁護的左派政策，避免疏遠重要的革命家族。
這種如履薄冰的狀態赤裸裸地暴露了一個事實，即便是在從毛
澤東時代轉向經濟改革和開放近35年之後，中共仍然需要維持該黨原生意識形態在中國政治生活中的誇張位置。正如薄熙來事件所示，意識形態仍然是中國政客用
來爭取人氣和合法性的最基本源泉。一些政治分析人士說，中國現任領導人習近平強調學習毛澤東思想和馬克思主義的重要性，並在黨政官員中推行老一套的「群眾
路線」整風運動，這跟薄熙來的做法如出一轍。
這些分析人士及薄熙來的一些左派盟友指出，他受到的指控主
要涉及他職業生涯早期的財務舞弊活動，即收受賄賂和公款私用，跟他主政重慶期間倡導的爭議性政策沒有任何實質聯繫。薄熙來2008年到重慶上任，2012
年3月因一宗涉及他妻子和一名英國商人之死的謀殺醜聞落馬，任職期間，他以復興社會主義的名義推行了一系列政策，包括修建廉租房，鼓勵群眾高唱頌揚共產黨
的「紅歌」，以及被自由派譴責為侵犯人權的「打黑」行動。
「人們相信薄熙來，是因為他舉起了毛澤東的大旗，」中國政法大學教授楊帆說，「如果不舉起毛澤東的大旗，你就是無名小卒。誰會相信你？」楊帆是「烏有之鄉」網站的創始人之一。
楊帆補充說，習近平「大量使用毛澤東的詞句，更甚於薄熙來」。
然而，鑒於審判即將到來，中共正在加緊控制薄熙來的左派支持者。一些人已被拘留，另一些人則被禁止公開發言。六月下旬，前大學教員王錚曾前往重慶，幫助當地支持者尋找開脫薄熙來罪責的證據。一份發佈在網上的第一人稱文章稱，她被迫飛回北京，被關押在北京郊區。
對「薄派」異見者的擔心並非杞人憂天。狂熱的左派堅稱，薄
熙來遭到起訴的根源是個人積怨。上周日，「紅色故鄉」網站轉載了中共發佈薄熙來審判日期的消息，報道標題的第一個詞是「悲劇！」左派評論員繼續把這個案件
形容為一個陰謀。去年，左派散發了一份不尋常的網上請願書，呼籲彈劾薄熙來的政敵，時任總理的溫家寶。這份請願書獲得了1600多個簽名。
最近，一群毛派人士復興了該運動，更新版的請願書據說得到了3000個簽名。
中國的極左派人數較少，但卻是黨允許範圍內的政治風潮當中的一個具有影響力的部分。對於黨來說，視馬克思和毛澤東為守護神的堅定效忠派是可以放出來對付自由派聲音的看門狗。
但是，隨着黨遵循的政策創造出巨大的貧富差距和一個擁有巨
大財富的精英階層，很多左派人士開始莫名其妙地把薄熙來當成了一座燈塔，儘管他穿着昂貴的西裝，在國外有商界朋友，他的兒子也在英國和美國的精英學校就
讀。備受敬仰的「中共八老」曾在毛澤東和鄧小平時代輔佐黨的領導，作為其中一位的兒子，他想擠進核心機構政治局常委會，於是就把重慶作為櫥窗，展示其同時
實現市場繁榮和社會主義平等的政策。
中國的許多極左派人士把他當成一個潛在盟友；他也就着手為自己打造新形象，吸引左派記者、作家和知識分子到他的封地來頌揚「重慶模式」，並與他一起唱紅歌。（他們視而不見，薄熙來的朝聖者之中還有資本主義的堅定捍衛者亨利·基辛格[Henry Kissinger]，後者在一次聯歡晚會上盛讚了薄熙來。）
「薄熙來的重慶模式顯示出，當前的系統可以用來恢復黨和人民之間的關係，」強硬左派的知識分子領袖、北京教師張宏良說。「重慶人過去常說，『共產黨已經回來了。』」
張宏良說，在薄熙來倒台之後，一些左派人士轉而反對黨領導層。「尤其明顯的是，許多原先支持習近平的人開始抱怨他，」他說。
「由於薄熙來事件的爆發，整個左翼亂作一團，」他補充說。他還提到了「一個巨大分裂」，分裂雙方是那些譴責黨的人，以及包括他自己在內的一些試圖從內部影響黨的人。
強硬反對黨領導層的人當中包括韓德強，他是烏有之鄉的另一名創始人和北京航空航天大學的副教授。
「這是一個不公正的案件，指控都是憑空捏造，或者是從其他地方轉嫁來的，」他說。
他說，跟其他人一樣，他也注意到，習近平及其黨領導層同僚
在11月掌權後披上了薄熙來的新毛派斗篷。「中國已經走上了沒有薄熙來本人的薄熙來之路，」韓德強說。「公共標語上宣傳的與薄熙來在重慶所做的事情一致。
但問題在於，沒有薄熙來的薄熙來之路缺乏實質。這條路脆弱而虛偽。」
本周，習近平發表講話，強調了馬克思主義的持續重要性。但他似乎也試圖加強一致性。
「宣傳思想工作就是要鞏固馬克思主義在意識形態領域的指導地位，」據新華社周二的報道，習近平如是告訴與會的宣傳官員。「鞏固全黨全國人民團結奮鬥的共同思想基礎。」
政治分析人士及前雜誌主編李偉東指出，黨領導層將很難說服韓德強之類的左派批評者，很難讓後者相信這次審判並不是政治鬥爭的高潮。「他們需要薄熙來在電視上自己直接認罪並道歉，」李偉東說。「不然的話，左派更容易找到口實，說這不過是一場騙局。」
黃安偉(Edward Wong)自北京報道。儲百亮(Chris Buckley)自香港，安思喬(Jonathan Ansfield)自北京對本文有報道貢獻。Patrick Zuo對本文有研究貢獻。翻譯：土土、林蒙克
Bo Xilai’s trial
Pacifying the Maoists
The party will try to make Bo Xilai's crimes and conviction look as colourless as possible
|
By CHRIS BUCKLEY
A document released to Communist Party cadres enumerated what it
called subversive social currents, including Western-inspired notions of
human rights, that must be fought.
翻譯：林蒙克、土土
中央秘密文件視憲政與人權為威脅
儲百亮 2013年08月20日
Jason Lee/Reuters
對腐敗的不滿及自由派要求政治改革的呼聲可能使共產黨的地位變得岌岌可危，內部消息顯示習近平總書記對此十分擔憂。
香港——中共幹部聚集在中國各地的會議大廳里，聆聽高層領導發出一個嚴肅的秘密警告。他們獲悉，如果黨不能根除中國社會的七大顛覆性潛流，權力就可能旁落。
前述七大危險列在一份名為「9號文件」的備忘錄中，該文件
明確無誤地得到了中國新的最高領導人習近平的首肯。七大危險以「西方憲政民主」為首，其他則包括對人權「普世價值」的宣揚，諸如媒體獨立和公民社會之類的
西式概念，熱衷於市場化的「新自由主義」，以及針對慘痛黨史的「虛無主義」批評。
習近平已經在準備進行一些改革，以使中國經濟迎接更強大的
市場力量，與此同時，他也在通過「群眾路線」強化黨的權威，力度超過了中共例行的紀律整頓活動。本次對中共幹部發出的內部警告，表明了與習近平在公眾面前
的自信外表相伴的種種擔心：經濟放緩，人們對腐敗的公憤，急切期待政治改革的自由派發起了種種挑戰，這些都容易對中共構成威脅。
「西方敵對勢力和國內異見者還在不斷向意識形態領域滲透。」9號文件稱。這個序號是中共中央辦公廳今年4月印發該文件時定下的。該文件沒有公開發布，但《紐約時報》看到了一個版本，並從四名接近中共高級官員的消息人士那裡證實了它的真實性，其中包括黨報的一名編輯。
該文件稱，一黨專政的反對者「為了挑起公眾對黨和政府的不滿，已經在揭露官員資產，利用互聯網來打擊腐敗、反對媒體控制以及其他敏感問題上挑起了事端。」
這些警告沒有做無用功。自從文件下發之後，中共的報刊和網
站一直在強烈批判近年來不屬「犯規」之列的憲政和公民社會觀念。官員們加大了工作力度，防止公眾看到互聯網上的批評意見。兩位知名的權益倡導人士在過去數
周內相繼被拘留，他們的支持者稱這是對「維權運動」一記重擊。在習近平前任胡錦濤執政時期，「維權運動」就已經遭到圍攻。
習近平的強硬路線令中國的自由派感到失望，一些自由派曾把
他的上台視為漫長停滯之後的一個契機，有望推動政治變革。結果，習近平的上台卻標誌着中共轉向更為保守的傳統左派立場：他開展「整風」運動來保證紀律嚴
明，顯然還試圖捍衛毛澤東的政治遺產，例子之一是他參觀了一處歷史遺址，20世紀50年代，毛澤東曾在那裡親自進行一次改造中共的嘗試。
習近平的指示已經在全國各地通過一系列強制性學習班進行了傳達，比如，南部省份湖南的一個地方政府網站就講到了這樣的一個學習班。
「宣揚西方憲政民主是在企圖否定黨的領導，」湖南衡陽市市委宣傳部副部長成新平在一個礦業官員會議上說。他還說，人權倡導者希望「最終形成政治對抗力量」。
這場運動給習近平帶來一些風險，因為他承認，正在放緩的中國經濟需要更能推助市場的新動力，而這種動力只能通過放寬政府管制來獲得。
中國的政治圈子密不透風，其中卻常常存在爭端，支持深化西
式經濟變革的成員往往跟那些推動法治、促進政治制度開放的人結為盟友，傳統派卻支持國家加大對經濟和政治生活的雙重控制。分析人士說，習近平從兩個敵對陣
營中各取一點的做法，最終可能會讓他自己的議程在黨內紛爭中陷入泥沼。
對憲政的批判引發了自由派知識分子乃至一些溫和派前任官員的失望與反對。與此同時，這場運動也讓中共正統觀念的左派捍衛者感到振奮，他們中的很多人都尖銳反對市場化的改革，儘管習近平和總理李克強都曾表示，這樣的改革確有必要。
隨之而來的裂痕出奇公開。上海師範大學歷史學教授蕭功秦說，這種分裂有可能變大，把習近平拖垮。蕭功秦支持由中共引導的漸進改革，是這一派當中的知名人士。
「現在，左派感到非常振奮，心花怒放，但自由派感到非常氣
餒和不滿。」蕭教授說。他還說，他自己大體贊同習近平的目標。「這樣的分化非常嚴重，因為這嚴重傷害了廣大中產階級以及溫和的改革派，即企業家和知識分
子。」蕭教授說。「這種局面存在失控的可能，那樣一來，就不利於中央領導層強調的政治穩定了。」
今年年初，促使中共發起意識形態反攻的壓力在中國南部城市廣州的街頭得到了體現。這裡的《南方周末》的工作人員進行了示威，因為一名宣傳官員重寫了一篇頌揚憲政的社論，原文稱國家和黨的權力應當受到防止權力濫用並保護公民權利的最高法律的制約。
歷史學家蕭功秦說，圍繞該報的對抗和要求官員公開財富的運動提醒了領導人，刺激他們發佈了「9號文件」。實際上，根據中國東部港口城市連雲港的一個共產黨網站上刊載的一篇講話稿，高級中央宣傳官員曾開會討論報紙抗議等問題，稱之為顛覆黨的陰謀。
「美國領導的西方反華勢力一個接一個地參與進來，並和國內的異見分子相勾結，以所謂新聞自由和憲政民主之名對我們進行誹謗攻擊，」連雲港市宣傳官員張光東援引中央宣傳官員會議的結論說。「他們試圖瓦解我們的政治制度，這就是一個典型例子，」他指的是該報的抗議。
但分析人士稱，習近平及其同事的尷尬處境來自他們自己抬高
的民眾期望，而非外國陰謀。要求共產黨官員透露其家庭財富的民間活動人士援引了習近平自己的誓言，即結束官員腐敗，建設一個更加坦誠的政府。同樣，倡導以
法治限制黨的權力的學者和律師也引用了習近平尊重中國憲法的承諾。
事實證明，對於黨領導人來說，即便是這些相對慎重的活動也
過了頭，因為他們小心提防着任何可能會膨脹為直接反對的挑戰。北京的前雜誌主編、政治評論員李偉東（音譯）說，「9號文件」由中央領導層的行政中樞中共中
央辦公廳頒佈，這樣的做法需要得到習近平和其他高層領導人的批准。
「毫無疑問，該文件得到了習近平的直接支持，」李偉東說。「肯定得到了他的批准，反映了他的整體觀點。」
自從這份文件發佈以來，宣傳正統思想的運動已經促使黨內刊物發表了大量評論和文章。其中許多都援引了近年在官方出版物中已屬少見的關於階級鬥爭的毛派修辭。有些人說，憲政和類似的想法是西方顛覆活動的工具，曾促成前蘇聯解體，對中國也構成了類似威脅。
「憲政只屬於資本主義，」人民日報海外版的一篇評論文章稱。憲政是「信息戰和心理戰的一件武器，美國壟斷資本主義巨頭及其中國走狗用它來顛覆中國的社會主義制度，」該報的另一篇評論文章稱。
不過，一些分析人士稱，受到鼓舞的左派人士可能會對習近平的政府造成麻煩。習近平已經表示，在今年秋天的一次黨的會議上，他希望支持能夠令市場競爭和私人企業在經濟中起到更大作用的政策。然而，黨內的馬克思主義堅定分子對這類提議十分警惕。
薄熙來是一名有個人魅力的左派官員，觀念相對自由的官員和知識分子本希望去年對薄熙來的罷免將有助於他們的事業。但他們的希望已經破滅。薄熙來將在周四受審。
曾與習近平會見的改革派前政府官員胡德平最近發表了一篇關於左傾趨勢的公開警告。在他家人運營的用來紀念他父親胡耀邦的網站上，胡德平說，「什麼是改革的底線？」胡耀邦曾在20世紀80年代領導實施放寬政治和經濟管制的政策。
習近平將在今年晚些時候面臨另一次意識形態測試，屆時共產黨將慶祝毛澤東誕辰120周年。慶祝活動的規模尚未公布。但根據湖南省湘潭市政府網站的說法，毛澤東的故鄉湘潭正斥資10億美元來為該活動修繕紀念場所和設施。
「你必須紀念他，而且，因為他已經去世，你只能說他的好話，不能說壞話，」歷史學家蕭功秦在談到毛澤東紀念日時說。「這就像是在給左派火上澆油。」
儲百亮(Chris Buckley)是《紐約時報》記者。安思喬(Jonathan Ansfield)自北京對本文有報道貢獻。翻譯：林蒙克、土土
China’s New Leadership Takes Hard Line in Secret Memo
August 20, 2013
HONG KONG — Communist Party cadres have filled
meeting halls around China to hear a somber, secretive warning issued by
senior leaders. Power could escape their grip, they are being told,
unless the party eradicates seven subversive currents coursing through
Chinese society.
These seven perils were
enumerated in a memo referred to as Document No. 9 that bears the
unmistakable imprimatur of Xi Jinping, China’s new top leader. The first
was “Western constitutional democracy”; others included promoting
“universal values” of human rights, Western-inspired notions of media
independence and civil society, ardently pro-market “neo-liberalism,”
and “nihilist” criticisms of the party’s traumatic past.
Even as Mr. Xi has sought to ready some reforms to
expose China’s economy to stronger market forces, he has undertaken a
“mass line” campaign to enforce party authority that goes beyond the
party’s periodic calls for discipline. The internal warnings to cadres
show that Mr. Xi’s confident public face has been accompanied by fears
that the party is vulnerable to an economic slowdown, public anger about
corruption and challenges from liberals impatient for political change.
“Western forces hostile to
China and dissidents within the country are still constantly
infiltrating the ideological sphere,” says Document No. 9, the number
given to it by the central party office that issued it in April. It has
not been openly published, but a version was shown to The New York Times
and was verified by four sources close to senior officials, including
an editor with a party newspaper.
Opponents of one-party
rule, it says, “have stirred up trouble about disclosing officials’
assets, using the Internet to fight corruption, media controls and other
sensitive topics, to provoke discontent with the party and government.”
The warnings were not idle.
Since the circular was issued, party-run publications and Web sites
have vehemently denounced constitutionalism and civil society, notions
that were not considered off limits in recent years. Officials have
intensified efforts to block access to critical views on the Internet.
Two prominent rights advocates have been detained in the past few weeks,
in what their supporters have called a blow to the “rights defense
movement,” which was already beleaguered under Mr. Xi’s predecessor, Hu
Jintao.
Mr. Xi’s hard line has
disappointed Chinese liberals, some of whom once hailed his rise to
power as an opportunity to push for political change after a long period
of stagnation. Instead, Mr. Xi has signaled a shift to a more
conservative, traditional leftist stance with his “rectification”
campaign to ensure discipline and conspicuous attempts to defend the
legacy of Mao Zedong. That has included a visit to a historic site where
Mao undertook one of his own attempts to remake the ruling party in the
1950s.
Mr. Xi’s edicts have been
disseminated in a series of compulsory study sessions across the
country, like one in the southern province of Hunan that was recounted
on a local government Web site.
“Promotion of Western
constitutional democracy is an attempt to negate the party’s
leadership,” Cheng Xinping, a deputy head of propaganda for Hengyang, a
city in Hunan, told a gathering of mining industry officials. Human
rights advocates, he continued, want “ultimately to form a force for
political confrontation.”
The campaign carries some
risks for Mr. Xi, who has acknowledged that the slowing economy needs
new, more market-driven momentum that can come only from a relaxation of
state influence.
In China’s tight but often
contentious political circles, proponents of deeper Western-style
economic changes are often allied with those pushing for rule of law and
a more open political system, while traditionalists favor greater state
control of both economic and political life. Mr. Xi’s cherry picking of
approaches from each of the rival camps, analysts say, could end up
miring his own agenda in intraparty squabbling.
Condemnations of
constitutional government have prompted dismayed opposition from liberal
intellectuals and even some moderate-minded former officials. The
campaign has also exhilarated leftist defenders of party orthodoxy, many
of whom pointedly oppose the sort of market reforms that Mr. Xi and
Prime Minister Li Keqiang have said are needed.
The consequent rifts are
unusually open, and they could widen and bog down Mr. Xi, said Xiao
Gongqin, a professor of history at Shanghai Normal University who is
also a prominent proponent of gradual, party-guided reform.
“Now the leftists feel very
excited and elated, while the liberals feel very discouraged and
discontented,” said Professor Xiao, who said he was generally
sympathetic to Mr. Xi’s aims. “The ramifications are very serious,
because this seriously hurts the broad middle class and moderate
reformers — entrepreneurs and intellectuals,” said Professor Xiao. “It’s
possible that this situation will get out of control, and that won’t
help the political stability that the central leadership stresses.”
The pressures that prompted
the party’s ideological counteroffensive spilled onto the streets of
Guangzhou, a city in southern China, early this year. Staff members at
the Southern Weekend newspaper there protested
after a propaganda official rewrote an editorial celebrating
constitutionalism — the idea that state and party power should be
subject to a supreme law that prevents abuses and protects citizens’
rights.
The confrontation at the
newspaper and campaign demanding that officials disclose their wealth
alarmed leaders and helped galvanize them into issuing Document No. 9,
said Professor Xiao, the historian. Indeed, senior central propaganda
officials met to discuss the newspaper protest, among other issues, and
called it a plot to subvert the party, according to a speech on a party
Web site of Lianyungang, a port city in eastern China.
“Western anti-China forces
led by the United States have joined in one after the other, and
colluded with dissidents within the country to make slanderous attacks
on us in the name of so-called press freedom and constitutional
democracy,” said Zhang Guangdong, a propaganda official in Lianyungang,
citing the conclusions from the meeting of central propaganda officials.
“They are trying to break through our political system, and this was a
classic example,” he said of the newspaper protest.
But Mr. Xi and his
colleagues were victims of expectations that they themselves encouraged,
rather than a foreign conspiracy, said analysts. The citizen-activists
demanding that party officials reveal their family wealth cited Mr. Xi’s
own vows to end official corruption and deliver more candid government.
Likewise, scholars and lawyers who have campaigned for limiting party
power under the rule of law have also invoked Mr. Xi’s promise to honor
China’s constitution.
Even these relatively
measured campaigns proved too much for party leaders, who are wary of
any challenges that could swell into outright opposition. Document No. 9
was issued by the Central Committee General Office, the administrative
engine room of the central leadership, and required the approval of Mr.
Xi and other top leaders, said Li Weidong, a political commentator and
former magazine editor in Beijing.
“There’s no doubt then it
had direct endorsement from Xi Jinping,” said Mr. Li. “It’s certainly
had his approval and reflects his general views.”
Since the document was
issued, the campaign for ideological orthodoxy has prompted a torrent of
commentary and articles in party-run periodicals. Many of them have
invoked Maoist rhetoric of class war rarely seen in official
publications in recent years. Some have said that constitutionalism and
similar ideas were tools of Western subversion that helped topple the
former Soviet Union — and that a similar threat faces China.
“Constitutionalism belongs
only to capitalism,” said one commentary in the overseas edition of the
People’s Daily. Constitutionalism “is a weapon for information and
psychological warfare used by the magnates of American monopoly
capitalism and their proxies in China to subvert China’s socialist
system,” said another commentary in the paper.
But leftists, feeling
emboldened, could create trouble for Mr. Xi’s government, some analysts
said. Mr. Xi has indicated that he wants a party meeting in the fall to
endorse policies that would give market competition and private
businesses a bigger role in the economy — and Marxist stalwarts in the
party are deeply wary of such proposals.
Relatively liberal
officials and intellectuals hoped the ousting last year of Bo Xilai, a
charismatic politician who favored leftist policies, would help their
cause. But they have been disappointed. Mr. Bo goes on trial on
Thursday.
Hu Deping, a reform-minded
former government official who has met Mr. Xi, recently issued a public
warning about the leftward drift. “Just what is the bottom-line for
reform?” Mr. Hu said on a Web site run by his family to commemorate his
father, Hu Yaobang, a leader of political and economic relaxation in the
1980s.
Mr. Xi will face another
ideological test later in the year, when the Communist Party celebrates
the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth. The scale of those celebrations
has not been announced. But Xiangtan, the area in Hunan Province that
encompasses Mao’s hometown, is spending $1 billion to spruce up
commemorative sites and facilities for the occasion, according to the
Xiangtan government Web site.
“You have to commemorate
him, and because he’s already passed away, you can only speak well of
him, not ill,” Professor Xiao, the historian, said of Mao’s anniversary.
“That’s like pouring petrol on the leftists’ fire.”
Jonathan Ansfield contributed reporting from Beijing.
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