A New Cold War, China Won't Cut Its Cyberspying. Chinese Buoys Focus of Latest Dispute Over Contested Islands

 

A New Cold War, in Cyberspace, Tests U.S. Ties to China

By DAVID E. SANGER

The Obama administration is weighing how directly to confront China over hacking as it escalates demands that Beijing halt the state-sponsored attacks.

 

日本稱中國在爭議島嶼附近放浮標

MARTIN FACKLER 報道 2013年02月23日

東京——一位日本政府發言人周五稱，日本要求中國政府解釋，中國船隻為什麼在東海一系列有爭議島嶼附近戰略性地安放幾個浮標。
日本內閣官房長官、政府發言人菅義偉(Yoshihide Suga)對記者說，這些來自國家海洋局（一個與海岸警衛隊性質相似的機構）的船隻，上周在這些島嶼附近中國控制的水域中放置了這些浮標，日本稱這些島嶼 為尖閣諸島，中國稱之為釣魚島。這些無人居住的島嶼幾十年來一直由日本控制，但中國和台灣對這些島嶼都宣布擁有主權。

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Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

圖為位於東海的中日爭議島嶼，中國稱之為釣魚島，日本稱之為尖閣諸島。

日本媒體報道，這些浮標可能是用來追蹤日本在這些無人居住島嶼附近的潛艇，中日雙方的船隻在這片水域中相互追逐已有數月。如果真是這樣，布置這些浮 標可能意味着中日僵局進一步升級。這次僵局一開始只是海岸警衛隊和其他非軍隊船隻的對峙，但最近開始捲入了武裝力量更大的海軍船隻。
去年9月份，在日本政府宣布從私人擁有者手中購買五個島嶼中的三座以來，關於這些島嶼的緊張局勢突然爆發，引發中國出現街頭暴力抗議。作為回應，中國政府幾乎每天都向這個日本宣稱主權的水域派出海洋管理船隻和其他非軍事船隻。
本月早些時候，緊張狀況似乎有所升級，日本稱一艘中國海軍護衛艦曾短暫地用導彈指揮雷達瞄準過一艘日本軍艦。中國否認曾這樣做。
菅義偉沒有說這些浮標被放置在距離這些島嶼多遠的地方。他說，它們位於由中方控制的無爭議水域，但2月17日曾被放置在距離屬於日本控制水域邊界約300米以內的地方。
他說，日本政府曾要求中國對此作出解釋，這些浮標也可能是用來追蹤洋流或者天氣情況的。然而，日本防衛大臣小野寺五典(Itsunori Onodera)告訴記者，這些浮標可能會被用來追蹤附近的船隻。
關於島嶼的新一輪爭吵發生時，韓國也在批評日本政府最近的行為，日本為強調其對另一系列島嶼宣稱的主權，派高官參加了島嶼上的一次紀念活動，韓國對這些島嶼宣稱擁有主權。韓國外交部在一份聲明中說，“我們強烈抗議日本政府派官員參加這種不正當活動的決定。”

翻譯：張亮亮

 

Chinese Buoys Focus of Latest Dispute Over Contested Islands

By MARTIN FACKLER February 23, 2013 

 

TOKYO – Japan has asked the Chinese government to explain why Chinese ships have strategically placed several buoys in the East China Sea near a group of disputed islands, a Japanese government spokesman said Friday.
The spokesman, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, told reporters that ships from China’s State Oceanic Administration, which is similar to the coast guard, had placed the buoys last week in Chinese-controlled waters near the islands, known as the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in Chinese. The uninhabited islands have been controlled by Japan for decades, but are claimed by China and also Taiwan.

Japanese media reported the buoys might be used to track Japanese submarines in waters around the uninhabited islands, where Japanese and Chinese ships have chased each other in recent months. If so, their placement could represent another step in an ominous escalation in the standoff, which began with coast guard and other non-military ships, but has recently begun to involve more heavily armed navy ships.
Tensions over the islands flared up in September, after the Japanese government announced that it would buy three of the five islands from their private owner, setting off violent street protests in China. The Chinese government responded by sending oceanic administration and other non-military ships into Japanese-claimed waters on almost a daily basis.
Earlier this month, tensions seemed to rise when Japan said that a Chinese navy frigate had briefly used a missile-directing radar to make a target of a Japanese military ship. China has denied doing that.
Mr. Suga did not say how far the buoys were located from the islands. He said they were in undisputed waters controlled by China, but had been placed on Feb. 17 less than 1,000 feet from the edge of Japanese-controlled waters.
He said his government had asked China for an explanation, saying it was also possible that the buoys were being used to track ocean currents or weather. However, the Japanese defense minister, Itsunori Onodera, told reporters that the buoys may be used to track nearby vessels.
The sparring over the islands came as South Korea criticized Japan for sending a top government official to ceremonies highlighting Japan’s claim to another set of islands, which are claimed by South Korea. In a statement, the South Korean foreign ministry said, "We strongly protest the Japanese government’s decision to send a government official to such an unjustifiable event."

 

 

 

China Won't Cut Its Cyberspying

By GREG AUSTIN February 21, 2013

LONDON — President Obama registered his serious concern in the State of the Union address over cyberespionage by what he called “our enemies.” His remarks on Feb. 12 came two days after leaks from a U.S. intelligence estimate named China — again — as the most serious menace in the cyberdomain.

Some Obama advisers have recommended harsh action to send a clear signal to China to change its ways. But even if the Americans retaliate, China is unlikely to respond as they might hope. The spying will continue and probably intensify regardless of what the United States does.

One of the two main complaints against China’s espionage is that organizations, both private and governmental, are stealing design secrets from Western corporations on a massive scale.

Such theft of intellectual property rights (I.P.R.) is contrary to China’s domestic law and international treaty commitments in place for more than a decade. Recent efforts by China to honor its commitments have been substantial considering that it had no such laws for most of its history. But there is a joke in China that its courts are where American corporations go to lose I.P.R. cases.

Bilateral cooperation on cyberespionage against each other by the United States and China more or less exhausts itself at this rather unsatisfactory point.

It is the second main complaint — very distinct from I.P.R. theft — that gives a clearer picture of what is at stake for China in this escalating diplomatic confrontation about cyberthreats. This is the charge that China is actively penetrating critical information infrastructure in the United States with hostile strategic intent.

The Obama administration asserts that China, using cyberprobes of various kinds, is occupying certain positions inside the information networks of some critical U.S. infrastructure so that it can interfere with it if a military confrontation over Taiwan became imminent.

To planners in China, such activity would be seen as no different from the sort of contingency planning and cyberoperations the United States undertakes toward Chinese military and infrastructure targets. Chinese military analysts and leaders have been studying the United States’ use of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure ever since unconfirmed reports surfaced of U.S. attacks in 1999 against Serbia’s electricity supply and telephone system.

China’s view is also colored by the leadership’s heavy dependence for political stability on the intelligence services and armed forces, the main perpetrators of the espionage.
Yet there is disbelief in China that the United States would expect it to make a principled rejection of military cyberespionage. The Chinese would argue that the United States is doing it, and so should China. There is commitment in China to the idea that in terms of military preparedness in the Information Age, a country has to be able to use cyberassets, if it can, to disable adversary infrastructure on which a military campaign might depend. Last November, the Chinese leadership announced it would hasten the development of information technology for military purposes.

Military advisers in China have an easy case to make. Why should China abandon its nonlethal, contingency operations related to possible cyberattacks on critical infrastructure where the United States itself now is vigorously pursuing offensive cyberoptions?
The United States, they will say, is the principal architect of a direct and unlawful sabotage attack on the critical infrastructure of Iran in peacetime through Stuxnet. Internal assessments in China paint its cyberwar capability (as opposed to its information siphoning) relative to that of the United States as basic versus advanced. This assessment is shared by some former senior U.S. military officials.

Chinese military planners believe that they would only launch a cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of an imminent large scale military clash with the United States over Taiwan. While Americans cannot have equal confidence, and their concern is legitimate, it is the Chinese perception that shapes China’s responses.

The American case is not helped by its blurring of the two distinct complaints: I.P.R. theft and national security threats. This confusion comes about because some in the United States have assessed that China has an explicit policy of eroding American national economic power through large-scale cyberespionage. This is presented as a form of economic warfare — an argument that many American analysts dispute.
It is true that China has a policy of using any means available — including covert intelligence collection — to improve its own technology and, through that, its economic power. After all, it has to get around U.S. high-technology export bans in place for China. But Chinese officials say — and most foreign economists agree — that China has a huge vested interest in the stability and vitality of the U.S. economy.
The United States has a good and urgent cause to argue for: strategic stability in cyberspace. To work toward that goal with China as an unavoidable partner, the United States will need to make arguments about cyberspying that fit more sensibly than they have so far into a vision of the interconnected, interdependent digital world.

Greg Austin is director of policy innovation at the EastWest Institute.

中國不會減少網絡間諜活動

格雷格·奧斯汀 2013年02月21日

倫敦——奧巴馬總統在2月12日的國情咨文演講中表達了他對網絡間諜活動的嚴重擔憂，稱這些活動是“我們的敵人”所為。就在他發表此次演講的兩天前，從一份美國情報評估報告泄露出的信息顯示，中國再次被稱為是網絡領域最嚴重的威脅。
奧巴馬的一些顧問建議採取嚴厲措施來向中國發出明確信號，要求它改變行事方式。但即使美國方面發起報復，中國也不太可能如他們所希望的那樣進行回應。不管美國做何行動，這種間諜活動還將持續，並有可能進一步增加。

對中國間諜活動最主要的兩大控訴之一便是，私人組織和政府組織都在大規模地竊取西方企業的設計機密。
這種竊取知識產權的行為違反了中國的法律和已經實行了十幾年的國際條約承諾。考慮到中國在其歷史上的大部分時期都沒有類似的法律，它最近做出的履行承諾的努力是巨大的。但是在中國有一個笑話，說美國企業到中國的法庭上打知識產權的官司都會以敗訴告終。
在這個極其令人不快的時期，美中在防禦網絡間諜活動上的雙邊合作，幾乎到了盡頭。
第二個主要控訴有別於知識產權竊取，它讓我們更清楚地看到，在這次關於網絡威脅的不斷激化的外交對峙中，中國面臨著怎樣的風險。美國指控，中國正在以充滿敵意的戰略意圖積極地滲入美國的重要信息基礎設施。
奧巴馬政府稱，中國通過多種網絡探測手段佔據了美國一些重要基礎設施信息網絡的內部位置，這樣一來，中國就能在兩國因台灣問題而將要產生軍事衝突時對這些機構進行干擾。
在中國的間諜活動策劃者看來，這樣的行動與美國對中國軍事和基礎設施進行的應急計劃以及網絡行動別無二致。在未經證實的關於美國1999年攻擊塞爾維亞供電系統和電話系統的報告浮出水面之後，中國軍事分析人士和領導人就一直在研究美國如何對重要基礎設施進行網絡攻擊。
中國方面的觀點還受到領導層的影響，中國領導人嚴重依賴情報機構和武裝部隊來維護政治穩定，這些人是間諜活動的主要實施者。
但中國不認為美國會指望中國方面從原則上放棄其軍方的網絡間諜活動。中方會爭辯，既然美國在這麼做，中國也應該這樣做。中國堅信這樣的理念，即在信 息時代的軍事準備方面，一個國家必須能夠在能力允許的情況下動用網絡資產來破壞敵方軍事活動所依靠的基礎設施。去年11月，中國領導層宣布，中國會加快以 軍事為目的的信息技術的發展。
對中國的軍事顧問來說，證明他們的觀點很容易。如今，美國自己都在積極推進針對基礎設施的攻擊性的網絡活動，為什麼中國要放棄它非破壞性的針對此類目標的應急行動？
他們會說，伊朗的重要基礎設施在和平年代遭到來自震網(Stuxnet)的直接、非法的蓄意攻擊，而美國就是行動的主要策劃者。中國自己的評估指出，它的網絡戰能力（和信息竊取不同）和美國相比簡直是小巫見大巫。一些美國軍方前高級官員也認同這種評估。
中國的軍事策劃者認為，只有在中美兩國因台灣問題而即將發生大規模的軍事衝突時，中方才會對美國的重要基礎設施發動網絡攻擊。美國沒有同等的自信，其擔憂也是合理的，中國的回應是形成自中國自己的這種認識。
美國混淆了知識產權竊取和國家安全威脅這兩個不同的控訴，這對美國的立場毫無助益。出現這一混淆是因為美國的一些人認為，中國有明確的政策來通過大規模的網絡間諜活動侵蝕美國的國家經濟實力。這被認為是經濟戰的一種形式——很多美國分析人士不同意這種觀點。
確實，中國有這樣一項政策，即不惜一切手段（包括秘密收集情報）來發展科技，從而增強其經濟實力。畢竟，中國還需應對美國針對中國的高科技出口禁令。但中國官方稱——大多數外國經濟學家也表示同意——中國能從穩定活躍的美國經濟中獲得大量既得利益。
美國方面有充分而迫切的原因來說：網絡空間需要戰略層面的穩定性。要和中國這位繞不開的合作夥伴一起實現這個目標，美國需要就網絡間諜活動提出比從前更合理的說法，與這樣一個互相連接、互相依存的數字世界的願景更為合拍。

格雷格·奧斯汀(Greg Austin)是東西方研究所(EastWest Institute)的政策創新主任。
翻譯：陶夢縈