2008年6月18日 星期三

幾篇"亞洲三強敵 Rivals"的書介

Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade

The three pillars of the new Asian continent The rise of Asia’s three great powers has a precedent in 19th-century Europe. Will it, too, result in devastating wars?

By J. Michael Cole
Sunday, May 25, 2008, Page 14

Rivals: How the power struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next decade

By Bill Emmott

342 pages


“The thing you have to understand,” a senior official at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said of China and India, “is that both of us think that the future belongs to us. We can’t both be right.” Nothing could be truer of the future struggle for power in Asia — except, perhaps, that in addition to India and China, Japan, which until recently had been the principal modernizer in the region, will also seek to regain its position of leadership.

In Rivals, Bill Emmott, a former reporter for the Economist in Japan and, until 2006, the editor in chief of the magazine, shows us that no other region will have as fundamental an impact, or play as crucial a role, on the international scene than Asia in the coming decades. From intensifying regional trade, economic development and their impact on the environment to spending on defense and nuclear nonproliferation, Asia — with China, Japan and India acting as pillars — is transforming at a stunning pace, and the variables involved in this complex relationship are such that predicting its future course is an impossible task, something Emmott himself admits.

Still, by looking at key regional aspects — economics, defense, domestic politics, the environment, and history as an active contemporary agent — Emmott sees certain trends emerging that could help us narrow down the possible futures to “plausible pessimism” and “credible optimism.”

What quickly becomes evident is that China is now the center of gravity in the region, both in terms of its economic might and as the shaper of politics. Emmott, as do a handful of other authors, maintains that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is here to stay and that it has the wherewithal to deal with the number of isolated challenges that may arise domestically. Aside from environmental degradation and its impact on human health, no other issue in China has the potential, he argues, to mobilize the population to the extent that it could threaten the regime; nationalism, such as in Tibet or Xinjiang, is too localized to spread throughout China, which thus makes it possible for the CCP to rely on force to put down disturbances. Its economy, meanwhile, has become solid and mature enough to withstand most shocks.

Japan, no so long ago the undisputed regional leader, has been supine since the 1990s, but Emmott sees signs that its government has launched reforms that, in the long term, could bring about its recovery. A certain sense of urgency, inspired by China’s rise, could also accelerate that process and encourage those within the Liberal Democratic Party (and in Washington) who seek to amend the country’s peaceful Constitution so that Japan could become a “normal” country once again and play the role it believes it should be playing in the region. In Emmott’s view, discarding Japan as a passe regional power would be a serious oversight, as would ignoring recent reporting that a majority of Japanese support their government taking a harder stance vis-a-vis China.

Last is India, the oft-forgotten emerging power whose role as a strategic counterweight on the balance-of-power chessboard could be the determining factor in the future course of the region. While India remains nowhere near as developed as China or Japan, it is nevertheless beginning to make its presence felt in some regional institutions, joint military exercises, and through the modernization of its forces. Furthermore, sensing its utility as a means to tie down China, the US and Japan have struck deals with India that could help buttress the modernization of the world’s largest democracy. In fact, Emmott opens his book by arguing that even if it meant blowing a hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, US President George W. Bush’s nuclear pact with Delhi in 2006 was a strategic tour de force, as it added a third leg to the regional balance and ensured that Delhi would side with the US and Japan should relations with China deteriorate. In response, Beijing has continually sought to exclude India from regional multilateral organizations. Shifting alliances notwithstanding, Emmott is optimistic that the regional powers and the smaller countries that gravitate around them see no advantage in compromising all the progress that has been made in the past decade by waging wars, an argument that pessimists would argue was also made when similar dynamics obtained in Europe at the turn of the 19th century — with two devastating world wars to follow. Why Emmott does not believe a repeat of the European fiasco is likely in Asia is partly the result of the somewhat benevolent, albeit not always welcome, presence of the US, which acts as a brake on those who would be inclined to use war as an instrument of foreign policy. However, how Beijing perceives that presence will have a direct impact on the future direction of China’s military; if the US, alone or through alliances, is seen to be seeking to contain it, conflict would be likelier, or China could actively pursue a closer alliance with Pakistan to counter India. Other tensions, which lurk close to the surface, could spark conflict. From the unresolved and poisonous issues of Japan’s responsibility in World War II to the flawed Tokyo Trials, post-Kim Jong-il North Korea to Islamic radicalism and nuclear weapons in Pakistan, instability in Myanmar, the Taiwan question, unresolved border disputes, Tibet after the Dalai Lama and disputed islands in the East China Sea, Emmott argues that the likeliest source of conflict — which could draw in other powers, such as the US — will be accidents and miscommunication, or, as he puts it, one side misjudging the cost of warfare in the modern world. Wars by proxy — a tool of the Cold War that remains relevant today — in places such as Myanmar, Tibet, North Korea and Pakistan — could also be launched as the three powers position themselves for the future. As demand grows, competition abroad over natural resources could also serve as a conflict accelerator between those three countries.

Emmott’s “new” Asia is a dynamic one, filled with potentialities, whose global impact will only become greater as its economies continue to grow. Through economic exchanges and the birth of regional alliances like the East Asian Summit, the ill-defined geographical Asia of old is quickly turning into a more tightly knit polity that, for better or worse, will have a greater say in global affairs and whose participation in international bodies such as the UN Security Council and the G8 will be paramount if those organizations are to remain relevant.

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  此类书籍大多数断言未来属于中间王国(Middle Kingdom 中國)。甚至世界银行都曾预测中国将在不到二十年内超过美国成为世界卓越的经济体。然而,值得回顾的是,在八十年代也有很多关于日本将主导全球的书籍。

  《经济学人》前编辑、日本专家艾默特(Bill Emmott)关注中国与日本、印度的关系。他提出一种令人向往的可能性,“生机勃勃的商品、服务和资本单一市场延伸开去,从东京到德黑兰,无处不在。” 然而,《对手:中、印、日角力将如何塑造我们的未来十年(Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade)》一书指出亚洲“微笑外交”背后的三国演义,这种权力斗争可能破坏它们共同的成就。


  政治不信任催生了军备竞赛,三国都急于打造更大规模的海军。中国潜艇偷偷进入日本水域,而印度从欧洲购买两艘航母,而且在建造第三艘。艾默特支持(錯誤翻譯 注意到)中国去年军费增长近18%,达230亿英镑;政府热衷于让解放军获得新装备。


  日本也试图通过增强印度来抵消中国在地区日益增长的主导权。如今印度是日本最大的海外援助接收国。中国反过来伸张自己在印度洋的影响力,保障航 线的安全,它的船只从非洲运来石油和金属,并把它的廉价商品运往欧洲。中国主席胡锦涛定期访问拉美、非洲、甚至塞舌尔,展现中国到处攫取资源的战略。


  相反,卡纳(Parag Khanna)的《第二世界:帝国与新全球秩序的影响力(The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order)》则有很多来自五十个国家的第一手报道,他认为这些国家将决定我们的未来。这位30岁的伦敦经济学院博士生为一个智囊机构工作,实际上走遍了 他的“第二世界”:东欧、中亚、拉美、中东和亚洲。




  卡纳认为,尽管十年前亚洲忙于处理中国崛起,但如今有了不同的感觉。中国变得越自信,与邻国的合作就越多。他援引一位马来西亚战略家的话:“亚 洲国家渐渐不那么把中国视为威胁,特别是由于它的崛起给它们创造了重大经济机遇,而且已经变成亚洲文化自豪感的聚焦点。”(作者 Malcolm Moore,此文为书评,评论的是Bill Emmott的《Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade》以及Parag Khanna的《The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order》)



China: the new rulers of the world

Malcolm Moore reviews Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade by Bill Emmott and The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order by Parag Khanna

Deng Xiaoping would have never stood for this sort of publicity. The architect of modern China warned his disciples always to "keep a cool head and maintain a low profile". The Politburo has forgotten his advice.

With the Olympics approaching, China has never had a higher profile on the world stage. Barely a day passes without some startling and barely plausible fact: apparently a town the "size of London" is appearing on the Pearl River Delta every year.

Publishers have been unable to contain themselves over this sudden frenzy of information about how China is transforming the world. The piles of books about China seem to be growing at the same pace as those new megalopolises.

Most of these books pronounce that the future belongs to the Middle Kingdom. After all, even the World Bank has predicted that China will overtake America as the world's pre-eminent economy in less than two decades. It is worth remembering, however, that there were plenty of similar books about Japan's imminent global domination in the 1980s.

Bill Emmott, a former editor of The Economist and an expert on Japan, has looked at China in relation to Japan and India, the other emerging Asian powers. He raises the delicious possibility of "a single vibrant market for goods, services and capital, one that stretches all the way from Tokyo to Teheran".

advertisementHowever, Rivals points out that behind the "smile diplomacy" of Asia, a power struggle between the three could undermine their mutual success.

Emmott's argument is best illustrated when he does some basic reporting.

  Taro Aso, Japan's foreign minister, tells him: "China and India have hated each other for a thousand years. Why should things be different now?"

  Meanwhile, a "very senior" Indian official at the foreign ministry says: "The thing you have to understand is that both of us think that the future belongs to us. We can't both be right."

  This political distrust has given birth to an arms race, with all three countries rushing to build larger navies.

  Chinese submarines have sneaked into Japan's waters, while India has bought two aircraft carriers from Europe and is building a third. Emmott notes that China increased its defence spending by almost 18 per cent last year, to £23 billion; the government is keen to keep the plump generals of the People's Liberation Army on side with new toys.

  With obvious flashpoints becoming ever more apparent in Tibet, Taiwan and North Korea, Emmott worries that the channels of communication between the countries and the West are poor. There were better communication links "between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War".

  Japan is also trying to offset China's increasing dominance in the region by helping to strengthen India, which is now its largest recipient of overseas aid. Japan financed the building of the New Delhi Metro and is now paying for a freight route connecting Calcutta, Delhi and Bombay.

  In turn, China is imposing itself in the Indian Ocean, where it needs to secure safe routes for its tankers to bring in oil and metals from Africa and take its cheap trinkets to Europe.

  The news that the country's president, Hu Jintao, regularly tours Latin America, Africa and even the Seychelles rarely makes the papers, but it helps to illuminate China's strategy of grabbing resources wherever it can.

  But this sort of insight is rare. The problem with Emmott's book is that it is what journalists would call a "cuts job" - a thesis culled from secondary sources. It is elegantly written and strong on economic analysis, but it tells us little that we do not already know.

  By contrast, Second World by Parag Khanna is brimming with enthusiastic first-hand reportage from the 50 countries he says will determine our future. Khanna, a 30-year-old PhD student at the London School of Economics who works for a think tank, actually toured through his "second world": Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia.

  "I never left a country," he promises, "until I had developed a sense of its meaning on its own terms, until I had assimilated a blend of perspectives from cities, villages and landscapes, based on conversations with a wide variety of people, including officials, academics, journalists, entrepreneurs, taxi drivers and students."

  This is the sort of reporting that newspapers can no longer afford to send correspondents to do, and his book is compelling and exciting, even if his bold claims sometimes betray his inexperience.

  The thesis that emerges from his travels is that the world is being split into three empires, with the US, Europe and China seeking to extend their influence among developing countries.

  He points out how the expansion of the European Union is self-perpetuating, since new members, wary of being the furthermost border of the union, try to convert their neighbours to the cause. Ukraine, for example, "has even sent maps to Brussels showing Ukraine shaded European blue - Mitteleuropa, not Osteuropa".

  Even if his scattergun approach fails to cover any country in depth, his glancing blows often have greater impact than Emmott's considered analysis.

  While Asia may have been preoccupied with China's emergence 10 years ago, Khanna argues, today it feels differently. The more confident China becomes, he says, the more it will co-operate with its neighbours.

  He quotes a Malaysian strategist: "Asian nations are gradually perceiving China as less of a threat, especially since its rise creates major economic opportunities for each of them, and has become a rallying point of Asian cultural pride."


中、印、日爭鋒 撼動全球大未來

次級房貸風暴外加油價狂飆,眼看拖垮二十世紀以來美國的全球霸主位置。十九世紀末日不落的大英帝國退位,世界舞台的聚光燈由歐洲位移到美洲,眼前洞見世局 的經貿專家,相繼大膽預告:二十一世紀是亞洲當家的時代。但亞洲(尤其是東亞、南亞)不像美國儼然睥睨群倫的超級航空母艦,中國/台灣、南/北韓、印度/ 巴基斯坦幾個鄰近政治體間的衝突、對立和猜忌,隨時有擦槍走火風險,是第三次世界大戰的準火藥庫。抽絲剝繭替亞洲的紛擾變局把脈,前《經濟學人》雜誌總編 輯比爾‧艾摩特(Bill Emmott)新近出版眾家矚目的《三雄爭霸》(Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade),自宏觀的歷史脈絡與經濟動線解析,剖述中國、印度和日本的權力競逐,對全球大未來有關鍵性影響。



艾摩特是知名「日本通」,1980年代出任《經濟學人》東京辦事處主任。他對經濟走勢的嗅覺敏銳,1989年全球看好日本暴衝的經濟表現,咸信會取代美國 成為經濟霸主,艾摩特獨排眾議以新書《太陽依舊西沉》(The Sun Also Sets)直指日本經濟發展將瞬時跌落如雲霄飛車,有如先知料事如神。去年首季,艾摩特又提出「未來十年是日本新黃金年代」觀點,強調日本企業的技術與生 產力,絕對能在高科技導向的全球趨勢中搶得優勢。

《三雄爭霸》數字說話:中國今年即將超越德國成為世界第三大經濟體;十年內,印度的經濟規模會超越殖民母國英國。十五年後,中國的經濟成長可望攻上高原 期,維持年增率百分之五;印度屆時仍可保有百分之十的高成長。2025年前,中國及印度「經濟生產成長三倍」的預估不容等閒視之,加上亞洲會「長時間持續 富有強盛」,共伴效應驚人。

但繁榮與安定不必然攜手出現,「經濟成長是過程,不是目的」,打造當今亞洲局勢的或許是經濟,但形塑明日亞洲的絕對是政治。「亞洲仍是高風險地區」,癥結 並非與西方的對抗,而是三個大國:日本、中國和印度爭霸主地位。中國崛起威脅日本,日本復甦挑戰中國;新興的印度成為經濟與政治的平衡勢力。



艾摩特認為這是史上頭一遭亞洲同時出現三強鼎立,近似十九世紀歐洲的權力平衡政治,「他們彼此尊重或水乳交融就罷了,可惜不是,而且糟多了。」日本前外相 麻生太郎曾說:「中國和印度有千百年世仇,憑什麼會驟然改變?」印度外交部高層官員說得露骨:「中國和印度都認為自己是未來的領袖,顯然領袖只有一個。」 政治的不信任造成軍備競賽,眼前三強為競逐影響力、市場、資源和戰略利益早已鉤心鬥角:日本想藉拉抬印度來抵消中國日增的國力,中國極力擴展印度洋的勢 力,確保油輪和貨輪暢行無阻。

台灣、西藏和北韓等衝突熱點使緊張態勢有增無減,艾摩特擔心這些亞洲強國彼此間可能因缺乏溝通管道讓情勢一發不可收拾,「冷戰時期美蘇的溝通,恐怕還更暢 通」。他預料亞洲新興強權之間的緊張將持續,和歐美的既得利益霸權也有扞格,是否能冷靜處理,攸關本世紀的和平與繁榮。「經濟和商業競爭有極正面的效果, 但政治可不一定。」



艾摩特替全球未來描繪出兩張藍圖:負面的是中國經濟轉型失敗、民族主義高漲,導致與美國和印度關係緊繃,甚至對台灣短暫「動武」;看光明面是中國成功轉 型,印度經濟成長連帶使巴基斯坦和孟加拉人民脫貧,印度、中國和日本緊密結合,與亞洲各國共創「由日本東京延伸到伊朗德黑蘭的貨物、服務與資金單一市 場」。

大好榮景中,「先知」艾摩特也看到面對的挑戰:中國必須調控經濟不過熱,也要妥善處理環境問題;印度要克服教育和基礎建設的積弱;第二大經濟體日本則有人 口老化的危機。艾摩特希望見到亞洲取法歐洲,建立歐盟及北約的經濟與軍事同盟模式,「亞洲也需要類似的分工」。種族、國家、信仰和認同都會引爆危機,最好 的牽制是避免一國獨大。艾摩特強調,亞洲的和平與繁榮關係人類的未來,亞洲大好是「二十一世紀最重要也最有利的發展」。