China’s Ponzi Bicycle Is Running Into A Brick Wall
July 25, 2013
專欄作者
中國經濟的龐氏騙局就要撞南牆了
保羅·克魯格曼 2013年07月25日
在今天上午的這篇博文中，我用了各種比喻來解釋一些觀點，這些觀點和我今天專欄中說的差不多。
其中一個比喻是：從某種程度上說，中國的「低消費高投資」
經濟就是一種龐氏騙局。中國企業正在瘋狂投資，不是用來興建服務於消費者的產能，消費者購買的東西其實不多；這些投資是用來為投資品買家服務的 ——
實際上，現在這些投資是為了利用未來的投資，進一步擴大產能。所有這些產能可以生產出來的產品，是否會有最終買家呢？不清楚。所以說，這就是某種形式的龐
氏騙局。
- 檢視大圖
Fred R. Conrad/The New York Times保羅·克魯格曼
而且，我還擔心，中國不知道如何放慢速度 —— 其經濟就像單車一樣，如果不往前行，就會倒地。
當然，我還認為，農村勞動力的耗盡會形成一堵牆。
所以說，中國龐氏單車正在沖向一堵牆。而且，這隻法西斯章魚已經唱響了它的絕唱。（見下文）。但是，我也不知道這算不算是世界上最爛的句子。
「中國衝擊」會產生多大的影響？
假設我們這些擔心中國龐氏單車正在撞向一堵牆（或者，就像一些讀者建議的，「金磚四國」[BRIC]之牆）的人說對了。其他人應該為這種情況擔多大的心？為什麼？
我將把這個問題分三點討論：
1. 通過出口形成的「機械」傳導，影響程度小得驚人。
2. 大宗商品價格，這個問題可能更嚴重一些。
3. 政治和國際穩定，這方面存在一些重大風險。
所以，從第一點來說：很多人可能馬上就會想到這個。中國經濟出了問題，中國從世界各地購買的東西就會減少，這就會導致全球性的衰退。其實，事情可能沒有那麼嚴重。
快速、粗略地做個計算很有用：2011年，全球除中國之外的所有國家的國內生產總值(GDP)總和略多於60萬億美元。同時，中國進口了約2萬億美元的商品和服務，佔全球其他國家GDP的3％左右。
現在，假設中國的增長相對總體趨勢放緩5％。進口下降的比
例則會超過5%；進口「收入彈性」（GDP變化1％，其他條件不變，導致的百分比變化）的通常估計值約為2。因此，我們可以估計出中國的進口減少了10％
—— 對世界其他國家的影響就是GDP的3％的十分之一，即0.3％。這倒也不是說沒有影響，但確實算不上太嚴重。
這麼算甚至都誇張了一點，因為中國進口的很多東西都是其出口產品的組件，並不依賴於中國國內的需求。
正如我所說，貿易流量形成的機械傳導效果相對較小，雖然它給中國一些鄰國帶來的影響會更大（但對美國來說影響較小）。
大宗商品價格受到的影響可能更大一些。中國是一個主要的原
材料消費國，
比如說，全球石油消費量它佔了約11％。因為在短期內，大宗商品的供給和需求對價格的反應相對遲鈍，所以中國的需求驟降，可能會導致大宗商品價格的大幅下
挫。所以，相對於中國的出口商來說，出售原材料的國家受到中國龐氏單車的衝擊會更大，無論它們是否向中國出售原材料。
最後一條，政治和國際關係。顯然我不是這方面的專家。但首
先，很明顯的是，中國政權就其立場來說虛偽得驚人，甚至從歷史記錄來看也是如此：它的官方說法是它在建設社會主義的未來，實際上呢，它正在領導着一個裙帶
資本主義的鍍金時代(Gilded Age)。那麼，這個政權的合法性又從何而來呢？主要是來自於經濟上的成功。如果這個方面出了問題，會發生什麼？
如果你真想出點冷汗，就想想那些厚黑的政府，它們在試圖轉移民眾對國內問題的注意時做了些什麼。對某個地方的某些島嶼磨刀霍霍，怎麼樣？
這個問題沒有特定的結論，除非你想更多地側重在間接影響上，而不是直接的出口乘數上。
奧威爾、中國和我
我明白，一些評論者可能無法理解我的即興比喻，比如中國撞
牆的龐氏單車，法西斯章魚的絕唱等等。但是，那當然是來自喬治·奧威爾(George Orwell)的《政治和英語》(Politics and
the English Language)，任何關心政治或是寫作的人都應該把這本書銘記於心。
對我來說，這篇博文也跟我聽到的一些人的抱怨相關，有關於我對中國政權過於詆毀的態度。首先，我對許多政府充滿不屑，其中也包括我自己的政府 ——而且都是有理由的；任何人都無權在犯錯的時候免遭挖苦。
同時，目前的中國領導人可能並不是壞人 —— 我真的不知道 —— 但這是一個獨裁政權的事實並沒有改變，而且從各種事實來看，這個政權滋生了極度的腐敗。你可能會說，這沒錯，但是看看它取得的經濟成就吧；不過奧威爾早就說過：
「舉例來說，一些安逸舒適的英國教授們在為蘇俄的極權主義辯護時，他不能直白地說，『如果幹掉反對派可以讓你取得想要的結果，我支持你。』所以，他可能會採用這樣的說辭：
『直率地承認蘇聯體制展示了某些特徵時，儘管人道主義者更
傾向於譴責這些特徵，但我想我們必須同意這樣一種觀點：對人們表達政治反對意見權利的限制，是過渡時期不可避免會發生的事，而蘇聯政府號召人民正在經受的
嚴酷生活，將會在各種具體的成就中，被充分地證明是情有可原的。』」
令人高興的是，當前的中國政府沒有那麼壞，但是，「沒有斯大林那麼壞」也算不上是什麼振奮人心的口號。
翻譯： 土土
In this morning’s session, I found myself using various metaphors to explain pretty much the same points I made in today’s column.
One of them was that in a
way, China’s low-consumption high-investment economy was a kind of Ponzi
scheme. Chinese businesses were investing furiously, not to build
capacity to serve consumers, who weren’t buying much, but to serve
buyers of investment goods — in effect, investing to take advantage of
future investment, adding even more capacity. Would there ever be final
buyers for what all this capacity could produce? Unclear. So, a kind of
Ponzi scheme.
Also, my worries are that China doesn’t know how to
slow down — that it’s a bicycle economy that falls over if it stops
moving forward.
And of course I’ve argued that running out of peasants creates a wall.
So, the Chinese Ponzi
bicycle is running into a brick wall. Also, the fascist octopus has sung
its swan song. (See below.) Still not sure I’m living up to the world’s worst sentence, however.
How Much Should We Worry About A China Shock?
Suppose that those of us now worried that China’s Ponzi bicycle is hitting a brick wall (or, as some readers have suggested, a BRIC wall) are right. How much should the rest of the world worry, and why?
I’d group this under three headings:
1. “Mechanical” linkages via exports, which are surprisingly small.
2. Commodity prices, which could be a bigger deal.
3. Politics and international stability, which involves some serious risks.
So, on the first: this is
what many people immediately think of. China’s economy stumbles; China
therefore buys less from the rest of the world; and the result is a
global slump. Or, maybe not so much.
Some quick, rough, but I
think useful math: In 2011, the combined GDP of all the world’s
economies not including China was slightly over $60 trillion. Meanwhile,
Chinese imports of goods and services were about $2 trillion, or around
3 percent of the rest of the world’s GDP.
Now suppose that China has a
slowdown of 5 percent relative to trend. Imports would fall more than
this; typical estimates of the “income elasticity” of imports (the
percentage change from a 1 percent change in GDP, other things equal)
are around 2. So we could be looking at a 10 percent fall in Chinese
imports — an adverse shock to the rest of the world of one-tenth of 3
percent,or 0.3 percent of GDP. Not nothing, but not catastophic.
And even this is arguably
an exaggeration, because a significant part of China’s imports are
components for its exports,and don’t depend on Chinese domestic demand.
As I said, then, the
mechanical links through trade flows are relatively small, although they
could bulk much larger for some of China’s neighbors (but would be
smaller for the United States).
Commodity prices are a potentially bigger story. China is a major consumer of raw materials — for example, about 11 percent of world oil consumption.
And because the supply and demand of commodities tend to be relatively
unresponsive to prices in the short run, a sharp drop in Chinese demand
could lead to sharp falls in commodity prices. So the Ponzi bicycle
shock could be a bigger deal for countries that sell raw materials,
whether they sell to China or not, than it is to China exporters.
Finally, politics and
international relations. I am obviously no kind of expert here. But it’s
obvious, first, that China’s political regime is remarkable, even given
the annals of history, for the hypocrisy of its position: officially
it’s building the socialist future,in practice it’s presiding over a
crony capitalist Gilded Age. Where, then, does the regime’s legitimacy
come from? Mainly from economic success. Let that success falter,and
then what?
And if you really want to
get nervous, think about what cynical governments trying to distract
their populace from domestic failures have often done in the past.
Saber-rattling over some islands somewhere, anyone?
No particular bottom line
here, except that you probably want to focus much more on the indirect
effects than on the direct export multiplier.
Orwell, China, and Me
I saw that some commenters
were puzzled by my throwaway reference, in the context of the Chinese
Ponzi wall-hitting bicycle, to the fascist octopus singing its swan
song. But that came, of course, from George Orwell’s Politics and the English Language, which anyone who cares at all about either politics or writing should know by heart.
And it occurs to me that
the essay is also relevant to a complaint I’ve been getting from a few
people, to the effect that I’m being too snide about the Chinese regime.
Now first of all, I’m snide about lots of governments, very much
including my own — and with reason; nobody has the right to be exempt
from deserved ridicule.
But also, folks, while the
current leaders of China may not be bad men — I really have no idea —
the fact remains that we’re talking about a dictatorship, and one that
by all accounts enables epic corruption too. You may say that yes, but
look at the economic achievements; but Orwell got there first:
“Consider for instance some comfortable English professor defending Russian totalitarianism. He cannot say outright, ‘I believe in killing off your opponents when you can get good results by doing so.’ Probably, therefore, he will say something like this:‘While freely conceding that the Soviet regime exhibits certain features which the humanitarian may be inclined to deplore, we must, I think, agree that a certain curtailment of the right to political opposition is an unavoidable concomitant of transitional periods, and that the rigors which the Russian people have been called upon to undergo have been amply justified in the sphere of concrete achievement.’”
Happily, the current Chinese government isn’t that bad; but “not as bad as Stalin” is not, exactly, an inspiring slogan.
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