密松水電站遭擱置 中緬關係受挑戰
水電站工程對伊洛瓦底江的生態造成影響，也威脅到當地漁民的生存
上週五（9月30日），緬甸總統吳登勝出人意料地宣布本屆政府任內擱置有爭議的伊洛瓦底江密松水電站項目。合資方中國電力投資集團對此表示震驚和不解，要求找到一個合理的解決辦法。
密松水電站項目涉資36億美元，相關動議2006年由當時的緬甸軍政府提出。 2009年，緬甸軍方支持的亞洲世界公司（Asia World Company)和中國電力投資集團簽署了合作協議。 2010年，密松水電站在伊洛瓦底江上游開工興建。
密松水電站項目一直遭到緬甸環保組織和人權組織的反對。工程開始前，緬甸河流網絡組織曾公佈了一份中電投出資、中緬兩國科學家共同完成的環境評估報告，並稱報告建議取消密松電站建造計劃。但承建方中電集團則表示，報告認為該項目對環境的影響較小。批評者還指出，密松水電站建成後，大約90%的發電量都將出口到中國，而緬甸國內大部分居民缺電。
今年8月11日，緬甸民主運動領袖昂山素季發表聲明，指出密松水電站將加劇伊洛瓦底江面臨的生態威脅，由於當地的克欽族反對建壩，電站的修建必將加劇民族分裂和敵對。今年7月，克欽獨立軍剛剛與緬甸政府軍爆發了武裝衝突，導致三萬人流離失所。
能否智慧解決難題？
緬甸總統吳登勝宣布擱置密松水電站項目後，中國電力投資集團總經理陸啟洲對此表示震驚和不解，稱密松電站項目嚴格履行中緬雙方的法律程序，希望該項目能夠按期順利推進。中國外交部發言人洪磊表示，該項目"實施過程中的有關事宜，應由雙方通過友好協商妥善處理。"
國際河流組織中國全球項目協調員Grace Mang認為，中方可能承諾進行更多的環境影響研究，事情的結果不會是取消該項目這麼簡單。一名不願透露姓名的退休緬甸外交官認為，中國政府有足夠的智慧謹慎友好地處理這個事件，會考慮到其它的戰略利益，比如通過緬甸獲得進入印度洋的通道。他說："事實上，中方和那麼一個不合法的政府就這樣具有戰略意義的巨大工程進行秘密交易，本身就是一個很大的錯誤。"
政治衝擊波有多大？
對於受到西方國家大範圍制裁的緬甸來說，中國是其最重要的戰略和經濟盟友。除了水電站項目外，中國還在緬甸修建從印度洋通往中國的輸油管道。緬甸總統吳登盛叫停密松水電站項目這一事件可能將引起中國對在緬甸的其它投資項目的擔憂。雖然中緬經濟關係緊密，但也互存很深的疑慮。隨著中國在緬甸扮演越來越重要的經濟角色，緬甸民眾中的不滿也在增加。
擱置密松電站也將帶來著政治上的衝擊波。傳統上來講，緬甸從來就擔心受到一個比其大得多的鄰國的主導，而中國則擔心邊界地區的不穩定以及緬甸現任文職政府可能向美國靠攏，致使中國處於"敵對力量"的包圍之中。澳大利亞國立大學的緬甸問題專家克里斯多夫·羅伯茨（Christopher Roberts)認為，通過擱置密松電站項目，緬甸政府希望對內表明自己是一個負責任的政府，而且從它的角度看，擱置大壩並不像擱置修建天然氣廠或者輸油管道那麼有損於與中國的關係。羅伯茨認為，從戰略上講，這一事件不會對雙邊關係帶來重大挫折。
密松電站項目已導致1萬2000人被迫遷移。緬甸少數民族還認為中國在緬甸修建大壩是擴大在緬甸境內的軍事存在。一些分析人士認為，克欽族反叛武裝可能想拿大壩作為施壓手段，好從項目收益中分得一勺羹。泰國清邁大學瓦湖發展研究所(Vahu Development Institute)緬甸研究員吳梭（Zaw Oo）認為，通過這一事件，中國人應該意識到，在緬甸的投資和項目都必須有長遠的眼光，不能只考慮到短期利益。他說："從長遠來看，密松項目對緬甸的發展並不很有益。"
編譯：樂然（據路透社、美聯社）
Myanmar's surprising government
Dammed if they don't
Oct 4th 2011, 1:15 by The Economist online
OBSERVERS are still wrestling with the implications of a stunning piece of news out of Myanmar on September 30th. Thein Sein, the president, informed parliament that work on a huge $3.6 billion dam on a confluence of the Irrawaddy river in the north-east of the country would be suspended for the duration of his term in office, ie, until at least 2015.
The decision has provoked China, which has been building the Myitsone dam and would buy almost all of the electricity generated by the associated 6,000MW hydropower plant, into a rare public rebuke of a friendly neighbour. And critics at home and abroad have been taken aback by the reason Mr Thein Sein gave for the suspension: that it was “contrary to the will of the people”. That has not, in the past, been a consideration for Myanmar’s rulers.
Like many members of his government, Mr Thein Sein is a former general. But the “civilian” regime that succeeded the military junta after rigged elections last year is trying hard to look different. The suspension of the dam comes after a series of conciliatory gestures, notably a meeting in August between the president and Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto leader of Myanmar’s opposition, who was freed from house arrest last November, just after the election.
That the new regime seems willing to antagonise China is the latest sign that things may really be different. Shunned by the West, Myanmar had been falling ever more closely into China’s orbit. China is Myanmar's biggest foreign investor, followed by Thailand. A Chinese foreign-ministry spokesman has condemned the suspension of the dam and called on Myanmar to protect the rights of the Chinese companies involved.
Myitsone is one of the most important of China’s many projects in Myanmar. The main investor is the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation, whose construction arm had already started work. On a visit to the site this year, The Economist’s correspondent found that it had built supply roads and large pre-fabricated living quarters for the Chinese workers, cleared hillsides and moved the population to a resettlement village (pictured to the right).
Of a series of seven Chinese-built dams planned on the Irrawaddy, the Myitsone was to be the largest, and at about 150 metres (458 feet), one of the highest in the world. If completed, the dam’s reservoir would flood an area the size of Singapore and drive more than 10,000 people, mainly from the Kachin ethnic group, from their ancestral lands. The area straddles territory controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), one of Myanmar’s myriad insurgencies. Last May the KIO warned China that building the dam would lead to “civil war”. Since then fighting between government forces and the KIO’s armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army, has increased markedly. Thousands of villagers caught up in the clashes have fled the area.
Hitherto suppressed environmental NGOs spoke out against the project. They were backed by Miss Suu Kyi, who in August wrote an open letter calling for a reassessment of the project. She has welcomed the suspension because “every government should listen carefully to people's voices.”
It is not just concerns about the environment or the people displaced that have raised hackles. There is widespread popular resentment against Chinese economic expansion within Myanmar, and against the large-scale immigration of Chinese nationals into northern Myanmar—estimates range from 1m to 2m—that has accompanied it. Many Burmese complain that Myanmar’s states have become like provinces of China.
The government’s decision to suspend the dam comes at a time when it is also showing more willingness to engage with the West. Barack Obama’s special envoy to Myanmar was there in September. The regime has even been hinting that it might release at least some of its 2,000 political prisoners. Their continued detention makes it hard for Miss Suu Kyi to advocate the lifting of Western sanctions, and her support for sanctions makes it hard for Western governments to drop them. In an interview this week with the BBC, she urged caution in assessing the government’s intentions, but expressed at least moderate optimism: “We are beginning to see the beginning of change.”
Among the many signals the regime is sending by suspending the dam is that it does not want to be dependent solely on its neighbours, especially China. The regime is trying to build bridges with both its opponents at home and its critics overseas. The danger is that the changes it is making may not be fast enough or fundamental enough to win big concessions from the West. And in the past, when engagement has failed, there has been no shortage of vengeful hardliners waiting to come out of the woodwork.
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