國光生技表示，參與第 1劑 1-9歲及 10-17歲人體試驗的受試者已經完成抽血，並將於 11月 2日，將 18歲以下受試者的第 1劑人體臨床試驗結送交衛生署，由衛生署進行後續審查作業。
國光生技董事長詹啟賢表示，國人成功自製新流感疫苗，除了提高對國人的保障外，對於國內生物科技產業的發展也是極大的鼓舞。
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德国之声：辜学武教授，首先感谢您接受德国之声的采访。中国国家副总理李克强现在正在澳大利亚进行访问，他也是继中国和澳大利亚因为力拓案和热比娅∙卡德尔访问澳大利亚出现关系紧张之后访问澳大利亚的最高级别中国官员。而且这次李克强在澳大利亚签署了很多重要的协议。很多媒体表示，李克强访问澳大利亚就标志着中澳关系可能要回暖，冰期要结束。您觉得这个信号明显么？
辜学武：这个信号我觉得相当的明显，因为本身李克强副总理踏上澳大利亚的领土就基本上标志着冰期的结束。我们知道，今年8月份原本只是安排了非常低 级别的中国副外长访问澳大利亚就给取消了。现在中国以这么大的动作，派出中共中央政治局常委这样一个副总理级别的高层官员对澳大利亚进行旋风式的访问。所 以从某种意义上来讲，冰期正在结束。
德国之声：我们来回顾一下，当时造成澳大利亚和中国关系紧张的可以说是两个分歧点。两个事件，一个是力拓胡士泰被捕一案，另一个是热比亚∙卡德尔访问澳大利亚，在墨尔本电影节上播放一个关于她生平的纪录片。您认为这两个分歧现在解决了吗？
辜学武：这两个分歧点，热比亚访问澳大利亚和力拓案，目前还没有终结。但是现在李克强访问澳大利亚，从澳大利亚官方发表的言论和李克强目前在澳大利 亚发表的讲话看，双方采用的战略是，把一些包括热比亚和力拓案这种其实不是战略层次上的分歧，把它们放在一边，从长远的、战略的角度，来看待中澳关系的发 展。也就是说，双方通过将近半年到一年的感情用事之后，双方突然发现，如果在一些非常枝节的问题上纠缠下去的话，可能对于双方锁定的战略利益不是太有利。 因为我们知道，中澳之间的关系非常重要的特征就是结构上的不合理。一方面，双方经济上的互补性特别强；但是，同时政治上又缺乏互信。经济上的互补性决定了 两国应该是鼎力合作，但是政治上的缺乏互信又影响了两国在过去一年之中的一些正常的交流。所以，从李克强这次到澳大利亚访问，双方明显的感觉到，是不是打 了一场没有必要的战争。现在清醒过来，似乎要克服一些相对来说正常性的摩擦，把战略性的发展两国的关系放在重点和首要地位。这也是能够破冰的主要原因。
德国之声：您刚才也提到之前的一些摩擦，主要是因为有一些感情用事。那您觉得之前的这些摩擦，主要是中国在感情用事，还是澳大利亚在感情用事？
辜学武：双方都有原因。我觉得中国的感情用事就是，自从崛起之后低估了澳大利亚对中国崛起的警觉。所以在某些问题上往往采用非常粗暴的手段，对澳大 利亚进行说教式的外交。我们可以回顾一下，当时对中国有反感的并不是澳大利亚政府，而是澳大利亚的社会和舆论界。只是在舆论界和社会的强力压制之下，澳大 利亚的陆克文政府才采取了对中国北京强硬的政策，导致了双方的一些摩擦。
反过来看，澳大利亚其实本身也有一些问题。因为澳大利亚从历史的角度来看，它自认为是一个非常强有力的工业国家，属于西方的政治集团。但是中国的崛 起使澳大利亚承受了比其它西方国家更大的压力。所以前一段时间给人的印象就是，澳大利亚还没有完全接受中国的崛起。尤其是在经济领域里面，澳大利亚突然发 现自己成为中国的能源供应国这样一个地位，对此非常耿耿于怀。所以由于当时中国的一些做法导致澳方心理上的不满，形成了感情用事的一些做法。所以我觉得双 方现在是冷静下来了，发现实际上长远的合作更有利于双方前途更好的发展。但是实际上澳大利亚现在正在做的事情，已经是美国和日本早就开始做的事情。
德国之声：那您能不能谈一谈澳大利亚和中国从战略的角度上讲，各自在哪些方面需要对方？
辜学武：我觉得澳大利亚对中国的战略地位非常重要。中国的崛起必然会影响整个亚太地区安全结构的调整。我们现在知道，美国、日本和澳大利亚，到目前 为止的军事合作和安全政策一般是采用双边关系的模式。但是在最近一段时间以来形成一种呼声，即美、日、澳应该摆脱双边合作的趋势，能否形成一个多边的军事 合作和安全结构。这是学界和政界正在讨论的事情。在这样一个背景下面，中国似乎意识到，没有必要对澳大利亚采用更强硬的手段，把它推向一种以美国为主导地 位的多边合作外交机制或者说安全机制。所以中国应该意识到，对中国友好的、同中国不仅加强经济合作而且加强军事合作和安全合作的澳大利亚，对于中国来说是 至关重要的。所以从这个角度讲，中国有利益也有兴趣，必须同澳大利亚结束冰冷的关系，开拓新的未来。
反过来讲，澳大利亚也必须意识到，亚太地区因为中国的崛起也发生了非常微妙的变化。首先是东南亚地区更加强调搭中国经济的便车，同时比较冷淡美国在 东南亚地区的一些所作所为。还有一个非常明显的趋势，就是最近日本鸠山政府上台之后明显释放出来一个信息：日本准备在美、中之间搞一个所谓的等距离外交。 换句话说，就是要加强同中国的外交关系，同时要搞一个东亚共同体。当然，澳大利亚如果被排除在东亚共同体之外的话，那它边缘化的趋势就会非常强烈，所以它 必须要向亚太地区大国靠拢。
德国之声：您刚才谈的主要是地缘政治、战略方面。我们知道，之前澳大利亚和中国形成分歧的一个重要原因是在澳大利亚的矿产方面。中国的国有能 源企业对澳大利亚的矿产始终是十分有兴趣的。在一开始的阶段经历了很多挫折。而且关于力拓案，人们也猜测，逮捕胡士泰的做法也等于说是对澳大利亚的报复。 现在看来，中国对澳大利亚矿产投资的兴趣仍然是在，而且从今年夏天好像也陆续达成了一些交易。那么您认为，未来澳大利亚政府在向中国的投资敞开大门方面会 采取什么样的态度呢？
辜学武：我觉得会走向一种非常务实主义的、现实的态度。其实今天（10月30日）澳大利亚政府宣布了一则非常有趣的新闻：批准中国宝钢收购澳大利亚 铁矿19.9%的股份。澳大利亚政府选择在这个时候，在今天宣布批准宝钢收购案，实际上就是在释放出一种信息：澳大利亚准备在这个方面同中国加强合作。同 时意味着，慢慢地澳大利亚会接受这样一个现实。因为澳大利亚经济上主要的长处就是它非常丰富的矿产资源。矿产资源当然会出口向经济崛起非常强劲的国家，就 是中国和印度这两个国家。所以我觉得从未来的走势看，澳大利亚在结束了心理磨合之后，会慢慢意识到，这是一种双赢的局面。还是同中国进行合作，接受自己作 为中国能源供应国的地位，可能对自己的好处更大一点。
德国之声：最后我还想问的一个问题是，现在大家都谈到，中国和澳大利亚关系冰期结束这样一个信号已经非常明显了，那您认为这种关系逐渐回暖的趋势能够稳定地持续下去么？还是说，如果再出现一些新的问题，又会遭遇到挫折？
辜学武：问题肯定是会有的。从根本的角度来讲，李克强副总理这次访问澳大利亚，不可能通过这一次高层访问就能够结束双方政治上不太互信的局面。因为 政治上的不互相信任有很多原因，包括政治体制的问题、双方战略定位的问题、双方同其它国家外交层次的合作的问题，都会影响到双方之间的政治互信。
但是最主要的，我觉得中方可能会慢慢接受这样一个现实：澳大利亚陆克文政府虽然本身在上台的时候对中国表示强烈的友好信息。但是，澳大利亚社会的层 次是一个开放的、多元的社会，不会那么容易地形成对华舆论的一致性意见,很可能会进一步产生出很多使双方政府难堪的一些事情。比如说，热比亚这样类似的事 件还会发生。因为在这样一个开放性的社会，不可能阻止它邀请对中国政府持批评态度的人士或组织去访问澳大利亚。所以在出现这样一些事情的时候，中方如何做 出回应，是否会像以前一样以挥舞大棒的方式来施加压力，这也是一个非常难以判断的事情。包括力拓案我也是觉得，当时处理这个案件的时候，国家安全部门跟国 家外交部门根本就没有进行非常良好的、默契的配合。这也是造成当时中国政府非常尴尬的原因，从刚开始定为泄露国家机密，到最后降低为刑事案。从这个角度 讲，双方在未来的几年中很多摩擦会出现。但是，高层如何处理这样的问题，他们可能只能从战略的角度来把这些问题淡化。如果没有淡化的能力，那么还可能出现 一些双方不愿意看到的事情。
作者：雨涵
责编：石涛
節譯／葉興台
中國和平崛起的想法，總是想像多於事實，過去幾個月，中國的所做所為足以粉碎亞洲的和平希望。中國今年3月採取史無前例的行動，阻撓亞洲開發銀行貸款印度 29億美元，理由是部分貸款將用於印度東北部阿魯納查省（Arunachal Pradesh），中國聲稱該地區是其領土，中共喉舌《人民日報》還對印度猛烈抨擊。中國針對印度的領土完整和多原民族主義發動外交攻擊，支持軍事入侵印 度：中國駐印度大使開始對喀什米爾的印度人發簽證，試圖讓分離主義合法化，不久前，中國政府還正式譴責印度總理辛格走訪阿魯納查省。
印度政府仍聲稱，與中國仍維持良好關係。中國的挑釁只會引發印度的失望。辛格本週將在泰國舉行的東南亞國協高峰會上會見中國總理溫家寶，兩人預料會 表達雙方關係友好的談話，但陳腔濫調無法掩飾中國想要扼殺印度的事實。中國一手拿棍棒，一手拿胡蘿蔔，在印度四週劃了一個不友善的影響圈，這個圈圈始於西 北方的巴基斯坦（提供核子技術），經過東方的尼泊爾（輸出毛澤東主義）和緬甸（支持該國獨裁政權），結束於南方的斯里蘭卡（提供武力）。
中國對印度如此「念念不忘」有兩個原因。首先與歷史有關：中國是踩在印度背上爬上世界舞台。印度不僅是全球第二個承認毛澤東政府的非共黨國家，也成 為中國應在聯合國扮演一定角色的熱情辯護者，當美國總統艾森豪有意讓印度取代台灣的蔣介石政府，擔任聯合國安理會的常任理事國，印度前總理尼赫魯‧甘地婉 拒，還呼籲美國應把位置讓給中國。但過沒多久，中國就對支持該國不遺餘力的印度展現暴發戶的自大。毛澤東無法容忍一個多權力中心的亞洲，印度決定提供達賴 喇嘛政治庇護，挑戰北京，確定了印度的競爭者地位。中國在1962年對印度發起令人震驚的多波攻擊，佔領西藏高原大部分有爭議的領土，在美國軍援印度後， 中國才撤兵。今日，中國積極與印度在氣候變遷等利益相關的議題結盟，但仍視印度為競爭者。
第二個原因與中國當前形勢有關。西方的北京觀察家著迷於中國的浮華，已不再檢視中國共產黨的衰敗。很多西方人士辯稱，中國經濟繁榮是中國人政治自由 的前兆，但如卡內基國際和平基金會中國資深研究員裴敏欣（Minxin Pei）所言，這種理論忽略了重要的事實，即富有國家的獨裁政府較不可能放鬆控制，貧窮國家的獨裁政府更可能放棄控制。中國10月大肆慶祝建國60週年印 證了裴敏欣的看法：中國共產黨充滿了不安全感，正如章家敦（Gordon Chang）所觀察，中國在天安門廣場部署了一百萬人的部隊，禁止民眾觀看60週年慶祝典禮，可以眺望典禮過程的飯店旅館全被中國政府租下，廣場附近的居 民不得開窗觀看。
中國民族主義是服務中國的大魔神。由於中國共產黨的統治基礎相當脆弱，因此不時得乞靈於這個大魔神，以尋求民眾的支持。日本過去一直是中國民族主義 的目標，但今日的印度更讓中國頭痛。如果印度能在維持不下於中國的經濟成長率之際，仍能確保多種族民眾基本權利、媒體自由、定期選舉和獨立機構，很多人就 會問，中國為何做不到？
在未來幾年，中國可能對印度更具攻擊性，印度必須拋棄中國無敵迷思所可能生成的姑息政策，構思奠基於三個層面的中國政策。首先是，印度應繼續在中印 邊界加強防禦工事，升級基礎建設、派遣軍隊和建立空軍基地。其次，印度必須加強與澳洲和日本的關係，擴大與美國的軍事演習，與對中國戒慎恐懼的東南亞國家 建立聯盟。最後，印度必須讓達賴喇嘛的信眾從事政治活動，為了安撫中國而鎮壓西藏抗議人士根本沒有道理。
China's aggressive stance is set to leave a deep mark on the century. India must stand firm against its expansionist neighbour
阅读中文 | Read this in Chinese
The idea of China's "peaceful rise" has always represented the triumph of imagination over reality. But over the last several months, Beijing has done enough to shatter every hope of peace in Asia. It began with an unprecedented attempt by Beijing in March this year to block a $2.9bn Asian Development Bank loan to India on the grounds that some of the cash was intended for use in the eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, a region China claims as its own. This was followed by a gratuitous broadside against India in the People's Daily, the Communist party's mouthpiece.
Military incursions into India by Chinese forces were backed up by Beijing's diplomatic assault on India's territorial integrity and pluralistic nationalism: the Chinese embassy in New Delhi began issuing irregular visas to Kashmiri Indians in an effort to legitimise separatism. And last week, Beijing officially condemned prime minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh.
Officially, India maintains that it is on good terms with Beijing. China's outrageous provocations manage only to elicit "disappointment" in New Delhi. This week, Dr Singh will even meet with his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, on the sidelines of the Asean summit in Thailand; warm words about friendship will be exchanged. But platitudes can no longer conceal the fact that China is strangulating India. Using a combination of aid and ammunition, Beijing has drawn a hostile circle of influence around India: beginning in Pakistan (to which Beijing supplied nuclear technology) in the north-west, it runs through Nepal (to which it exported Maoism) and Burma (where it shields a dictatorship) in the east, ending in Sri Lanka (where it armed a genocidal state) in the south.
Two reasons account for China's obsession with India. The first is historical: China crawled on to the world stage on India's back. India not only became the second non-communist country in the world to bestow recognition on Mao's pariah state; it was also, in Nehru's words, the most passionate pleader of China's "cause in the councils of the world". When President Eisenhower offered India the UN security council seat held by Taiwan, Nehru, ever the idealist, turned it down, urging the US to offer it to China instead.
But soon, Beijing developed the arriviste's disdain for its most forceful supporter. Mao could not abide an Asia with multiple centres of power. New Delhi's decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama in defiance of Beijing's bullying confirmed India as a contender. China initiated a surprise multi-pronged attack on India in 1962, occupying a substantial portion of contested territory on the Tibetan plateau. Beijing retreated just as American jumbo jets, flown to aid India's assault, began landing in West Bengal. Today, Beijing actively aligns itself with India where its interests are involved – on climate change, for instance – but on a bilateral level, it views India as inconvenient competition.
The second reason goes to the heart of China's current condition. Western observers of Beijing, enraptured by the glitz of China, have long stopped examining the decay of the party that runs it. Many in the west still argue that China's economic prosperity is a precursor to political freedom for its people. But this theory, as Minxin Pei has argued, ignores the important fact that an authoritarian state is less likely to loosen its grip on a wealthy country than it would be to forego the control of an impoverished one. Last month's celebrations in Beijing bore out Pei's point: so insecure was the Communist party that, as Gordon Chang reported, a security force more than a million strong force was put in place to keep ordinary people away from the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the "People's Republic"; hotel rooms overlooking the procession were booked by the government; and residents in nearby houses were barred from looking out of their windows.
Chinese nationalism is a genie that serves the state. With such a fragile hold on the country, the Communist party has to invoke monsters in order to rally support. Japan has been the traditional target, but today's India vexes Beijing even more. If India can guarantee fundamental rights to its diverse citizens while managing a growth rate not far from China's – and more than make up for the low numbers with a free press, regular elections, and independent institutions – why, someone is bound to ask, can China not do the same?
In the coming months and years, Beijing is going to become even more aggressive with India. New Delhi must now discard the myth of China's invincibility that has led it into appeasement, and devise a definitive China policy featuring at least three elements.
First, India should continue fortifying its side of the border with China by upgrading infrastructure, deploying troops, setting up air bases; New Delhi must yield to the overwhelming patriotic sentiment in Arunachal Pradesh and allow the formation of a local military regiment.
Second, India must deepen its engagement with Australia and Japan, broaden its military exercises with the US, and build active alliances with south-east Asian countries wary of China.
Finally, India must allow the "Dalai clique" to engage in political activity. It makes no sense for New Delhi to suppress Tibetan protesters in order to mollify an expansionist monster that has sponsored anti-India insurgencies for at least 50 years. Tibet's restive population is a time bomb whose detonator, the Dalai Lama, is with India. New Delhi must stop gagging His Holiness.
The Sino-Indian conflict will define the 21st century in a more complicated manner than the Soviet-American conflict characterised the second half of the 20th. So far, this clash has received very little attention in the west. In the not-too-distant future, people everywhere are going to have to pick sides. The troubled peace of today is necessarily a prelude to the impending war.
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Tobacco-related deaths
Oct 29th 2009
From Economist.com
NEARLY one in five deaths in rich countries is caused by smoking, according to new data released this week by the World Health Organisation. In 2004, the latest year for which data are available, tobacco use killed an estimated 5.1m people worldwide, or one in every eight deaths of adults aged 30 and over. Residents of richer countries are suffering more now because they have been smoking longer: cancers and chronic respiratory diseases caused by tobacco smoke take a long time to develop. Deaths in poor countries, where many more people have taken on rich-world smoking habits in recent decades, are predicted to rise dramatically in the next 20 years.
《南德意志报》列举了一些女大学生求职难的实例后写道："这是中国多年来可以观察到的倾向。由于经济危机，现在情况看来更为严重。如果说中 国的大企业或部委还需要女性的话，顶多给她们安排工资低下的简单工作。没有说出口的共识是：年轻女职工不过是男职工的'结婚对象'而已。
中国法律明文禁止在就业问题上歧视女性，所以近几年来，公开发布的招聘启事不再含有性别限制的条款。但现在许多女大学生求职面谈时，首先就得到她们 不会被录用的明显暗示。全国妇联九月份进行的一项调查表明，90%的北京、上海、天津和西安的女大学生感到自己在劳动市场受到歧视。
妇女享有更多平等机遇本是毛泽东治下最为自豪的共产主义成就之一，今天许多中国妇女就业，越来越多的人也从事工资高的现代职业。但最近几年来，同时明显出现了倒退到性别歧视的倾向。像地球上大多数国家一样，中国领导岗位上女性越来越少，女性同工不同酬的现象早已是现实。
一段时间以来，年轻的中国妇女中流传着一句辛辣的说法：'干得好不如嫁得好'。一些失业妇女听从命运的摆布，她们在求职信中贴上自己袒胸露肩的照片，或者在履历中写上'喜爱晚上出去喝酒'。一名女性在争取一个办公室职位时特别注明，她是'天津选美比赛'的亚军。"
中国劳动市场的另一个问题是大批年轻人一门心思只想进入国家机关，当领取高薪水、享受高待遇的国家公务员。《世界报》报道说，"最近几星期，136万人报名参加全国考试，而国家提供的岗位只有15500个"：
"国家科学技术部欧洲处的一个职位最受欢迎，共有4080人竞争这个唯一的位置。但大多数考生，共七十万人，希望进入海关和税务部门，理由是工作不 紧张、福利高、有购房补贴。按照互联网流传的说法，还有划得来的'实惠'。海关人员这样的'实惠'意味着什么，不言自明。报界清醒地看到，尽管经济稳步发 展，但许多人还是不愿进入自由劳动市场，611万大学毕业生，只有一半在自由市场上找到了工作。《环球时报》说，如果大家都想当官员，'我们将永远不会成 为革新型社会'。
求职者一开始就回避一系列招聘单位，例如没有人愿意做天气预测工作或到事故频繁的山西、河北等地当煤矿检查员。不安定的少数民族地区新疆也很难招聘到人才，乌鲁木齐铁路公安局提供了30个岗位，但没有一人应聘。"
摘译：王羊
责编：叶宣
本文摘自或节译自其它媒体
不代表德国之声观点
London
THE highly decorated general sat opposite his commander in chief and explained the problems his army faced fighting in the hills around Kabul: “There is no piece of land in Afghanistan that has not been occupied by one of our soldiers at some time or another,” he said. “Nevertheless much of the territory stays in the hands of the terrorists. We control the provincial centers, but we cannot maintain political control over the territory we seize.
“Our soldiers are not to blame. They’ve fought incredibly bravely in adverse conditions. But to occupy towns and villages temporarily has little value in such a vast land where the insurgents can just disappear into the hills.” He went on to request extra troops and equipment. “Without them, without a lot more men, this war will continue for a very, very long time,” he said.
These sound as if they could be the words of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander in Afghanistan, to President Obama in recent days or weeks. In fact, they were spoken by Sergei Akhromeyev, the commander of the Soviet armed forces, to the Soviet Union’s Politburo on Nov. 13, 1986.
Soviet forces were then in the seventh year of their nine-year-long Afghan conflict, and Marshal Akhromeyev, a hero of the Leningrad siege in World War II, was trying to explain why a force of nearly 110,000 well-equipped soldiers from one of the world’s two superpowers was appearing to be humiliated by bands of “terrorists,” as the Soviets often called the mujahideen.
The minutes of Akhromeyev’s meeting with the Politburo were recently unearthed by American and Russian scholars of the cold war — these and other materials substantially expand our knowledge of the Soviet Union’s disastrous campaign. As President Obama contemplates America’s own future in Afghanistan, he would be well advised to read some of these revealing Politburo papers; he might also pick up a few riveting memoirs of Soviet generals who fought there. These sources show as many similarities between the two wars as differences — and may provide the administration with some valuable counsel.
Much of the fighting during the Soviet war in Afghanistan was in places that have grown familiar to us now, like Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. The Soviets’ main base of operations was Bagram, which is now the United States Army headquarters. Over the years, the Soviets changed their tactics frequently, but much of the time they were trying and failing to pacify the country’s problematic south and east, often conducting armed sweeps along the border with Pakistan, through which many of the guerrillas moved, as the Taliban do now.
That war was characterized by disputes between soldiers and politicians. As Russian documents show, the politicians ordered the invasion against the advice of the armed forces. The chief of the Soviet Defense Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, raised doubts shortly before Soviet forces were dispatched on Christmas Day 1979. He told Dmitri Ustinov — the long-serving defense minister who had been a favorite of Stalin — that experience from the British and czarist armies in the 19th century should encourage caution. Ustinov replied: “Are the generals now making policy in the Soviet Union? Your job is to plan specific operations and carry them out ... . Shut up and obey orders.”
Ogarkov went further up the chain of command to the Communist Party boss, Leonid Brezhnev. He warned that an invasion “could mire us in unfamiliar, difficult conditions and would align the entire Islamic East against us.” He was cut off mid-sentence: “Focus on military matters,” Brezhnev ordered. “Leave the policymaking to us.”
The Soviet leaders realized they had blundered soon after the invasion. Originally, the mission was simply to support the Communist government — the result of a coup Moscow had initially tried to prevent, and then had no choice but to back — and then get out within a few months. But the mujahideen’s jihad against the godless Communists had enormous popular support within the country, and from outside. Money and sophisticated weapons poured in from America and Saudi Arabia, through Pakistan.
The Soviets saw withdrawal as potentially fatal to their prestige in the cold war, so they became mired deeper and deeper in their failed occupation. For years, the Soviets heavily bombarded towns and villages, killing thousands of civilians and making themselves even more loathed by Afghans. Whatever tactics the Soviets adopted the result was the same: renewed aggression from their opponents. The mujahideen, for example, laid down thousands of anti-tank mines to attack Russian troop convoys, much as the Taliban are now using homemade bombs to strike at American soldiers on patrol, as well as Afghan civilians.
“About 99 percent of the battles and skirmishes that we fought in Afghanistan were won by our side,” Marshal Akhromeyev told his superiors in November 1986. “The problem is that the next morning there is the same situation as if there had been no battle. The terrorists are again in the village where they were — or we thought they were — destroyed a day or so before.” Listen to a coalition spokesman now explaining the difficulties its forces are facing in tough terrain, and it would be hard to hear a difference.
There are many in Washington now calling on President Obama to cut his losses and find an exit strategy from Afghanistan. Even if he agreed, it may not be an easy business. When Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader in March 1985 he called Afghanistan “our bleeding wound.” He declared that ending the war was his top priority. But he could not do it without losing face.
The Soviet leadership fatally prevaricated. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze wanted to pull out of Afghanistan immediately and blame Kremlin predecessors for the unpopular war. So too did Mr. Gorbachev’s most important adviser, the godfather of the perestroika and glasnost reforms, Aleksandr Yakovlev.
But Mr. Gorbachev dithered, searching for something he could call victory, or at least that other elusive prize for armies in trouble: peace with honor. “How to get out racks one’s brains,” Mr. Gorbachev complained in the spring of 1986, according to Politburo minutes. “We have been fighting there for six years. If we don’t start changing our approach we’ll be there another 20 or 30 years. We have not learned how to wage war there.”
Mr. Gorbachev was also haunted by the image of the last Americans leaving Saigon in panic: “We cannot leave in our underpants ... or without any,” he told his chief foreign policy aide, Anatoly Chernyayev, whose diaries have recently become available to scholars. Chernyayev himself called Afghanistan “our Vietnam. But worse.”
Withdrawal was a long, drawn-out agony. By the time the last troops left in February 1989, around 15,000 Soviet soldiers and 800,000 Afghans had died. “We must say that our people have not given their lives in vain,” Mr. Gorbachev told the Politburo. But even his masterful public relations skills could not mask the humiliation of defeat. Indeed, it marked the beginning of the end for the Soviet empire in Europe, as revolution swept through Eastern Europe in 1989, and of the Soviet Union itself two years later.
In 1988, Robert Gates, then the deputy director of the C.I.A., made a wager with Michael Armacost, then undersecretary of state. He bet $25 that the Soviet Army wouldn’t leave Afghanistan. The Soviets retreated in humiliation soon after. Mr. Gates, we can assume, paid up. But is there a gambling man out there who would lay money on the United States Army withdrawing in similarly humbling fashion? And would the defense secretary accept the bet?
中共建政60年的历史,就是对正义反复蹂躏践踏的历史。
如今,中共当局最骄傲的一点莫过于其经济改革的辉煌成就。据说取得如此成就的原因在于中国实行了一条不同于俄国东欧休克疗法的渐进路线。西方学者马 克.伦纳德(Mark Leonard)在他那本«中国怎么想？»(What Does China Think？2007)一书里,引用主流经济学家张维迎的一个关于斑马村的寓言来解释中国的渐进改革。
这个寓言讲的是:一个村庄原来主要依靠马来干活。过了一段时间后,村里的老人认识到邻村依靠斑马干活,效果更好。所以虽然多年来对马大唱赞歌,他们 还是决定拥抱斑马。唯一的障碍是说服那些已经接受了几十年崇尚马的洗脑教育的村民。老者制定了精巧的计划。每天晚上,在村民睡着的时候,他们就在白马身上 涂黑色条纹。村民醒来后,老者就向他们保证说这些动物不是真正的斑马,仍然是从前的马,不过上面画上了没有危害的条纹。经过了很长时间的间隔后,村里的领 袖开始用真斑马来取代涂上条纹的马了,这些庞大的动物改变了村里的财产所有权,提高了生产力,创造了财富。只是在所有的马都被斑马替换掉多年后,在村民已 经享受了多年的繁荣后,老者才召集村民开会宣布他们的村子已经成为斑马村,斑马好,马坏。
张维迎这个寓言最早是1993年讲出来的。去年,纪念改革开放30周年,张维迎发表文章和讲话又再次提到这个寓言。不错,中国的经济改革是一场偷天 换日,暗渡陈仓,也就是说,是在所谓"中国特色"的掩饰下,逐渐地用资本主义(斑马)取代原来的社会主义(马)。但是和寓言讲的相反,改革的障碍并非来自 村民。村里的长者们之所以要采取这种偷天换日,暗渡陈仓的办法,主要是为了掩盖自己的罪错,维护长者们自己继续对村民实行专制统治。
因为尽人皆知,这个村庄(中国)早先并不是依靠马(社会主义)干活的,而是依靠斑马(资本主义)干活的。只因为出了个马党(共产党),硬说斑马坏、 马好,用武力夺取了村里的大权,把斑马统统杀死,一律用从北方引进的马来代替,同时也把班马的主人统统消灭。可是在多年的实践之后,村长们不得不发现马并 不好使,马干活远远比不上斑马,因此不得不进行改革,重新引进斑马来代替马。但问题是,既然村长们本来就是靠着用马取代班马起家的,如今又反过来再用斑马 取代马,那不是等于承认他们原来做错了吗？既然现在改用斑马了,那他们这一伙马党还有什么理由赖在台上继续独揽大权呢？为了掩盖自己的罪错以及保住自己的 权力,于是,村长们对外宣称,他们现在用的并不是斑马,而是"有条纹的马"("有中国特色的社会主义")。
这就是中国的改革。想当年,中共夺取政权,高举"消灭私有制"的旗帜,用最残酷血腥的手段消灭了中国整整几代经济精英,摧毁了原有的市场经济(尽管 那时的市场经济也很不健全,不过至少比今天中国的市场经济要象样得多),把全体人民强行纳入共产体制,并且对任何所谓"自发的资本主义倾向"都予以无情的 专政。一直搞到山穷水尽的地步,中共高层统治者才大梦初醒,不得不改弦更张,放弃社会主义,重建资本主义。
照理说,从正义的原则出发,共产党就应该引咎辞职以谢天下,他们或许可以免于法律追究,但必须要向千千万万受害者赔礼道歉,并给予物质赔偿。最起码 的,它也应该放弃一党专政,开放自由民主。退一万步讲,就算他们之中的一些人认为中国的基础太差,民主不能一蹴而就,共产党虽然欠债累累,理当下台,但在 眼下的中国一时间还没有可以替代的力量;既然他们清楚地懂得自由民主的原则上是正确的,是合情合理的,因此,他们也应该明确地作出推行民主的庄严承诺,给 出实行民主的时间表,立即终止政治迫害,在民众的参与和监督下实行公正的经济改革。
问题就在这里,共产党本来是靠消灭私有制起家的,如今它又回过头来搞私有化,那无异于釜底抽薪,自己取消了自己统治的合法性。这就不可避免地会引出 要求结束共产党专政的民主化洪流。面对这股民主化洪流,稍有人性的共产党都不敢镇压,而不敢镇压的原因是不好意思镇压,是没脸镇压。因为他们自知理亏心 虚,他们知道他们对人民犯下了滔天的罪过,他们对自己的人民有强烈的负罪感。这就是为什么苏联东欧各国的共产党领导人,尽管重兵在握,但都能放下屠刀,接 受民主,与人民达成和解。唯有中共,竟然在光天化日之下,把坦克车开上街头,残酷镇压和平请愿的民众。我要强调的是,六四屠杀不但是十分残暴的,而且是极 其无耻的。六四屠杀是对人类正义的肆意践踏与公然蹂躏。
然而,事情还没有到此结束。我们知道,早在六四之前,中共就大搞官商官倒,借改革之机大发横财;在六四之后,谅老百姓不敢说个"不"字,更是加快了 化公为私的窃国步伐。一方面,中共把自己几十年错误决策的恶果转稼到民众身上,另一方面,它又把民众几十年创造的财富大规模地转移到自己名下。这无疑是对 正义的又一次公然蹂躏与践踏。中共先是以革命的名义抢劫,再是以改革的名义分赃。历史上,有的是专制者(例如印尼的苏哈托)巧取豪夺人民财产,但他们不曾 搞过消灭私产的共产制度;也有过专制者(例如俄国和东欧的共产党)实行过消灭私产的共产革命,但他们至少还不曾反过来又把公产据为己有。唯有中共却把这两 种相反的坏事--先是灭私充公,后是化公为私--全做了。这是双重的掠夺,双重的反正义。在这样反复的两次蹂躏践踏之后,正义在中国已经荡然无存。
不容否认的是,一个立足于如此伤天害理、不公不义的政权,它的存在就是对良知与正义的嘲讽;它的崛起必然是对自由与和平的威胁，如果我们还不能及时 地警觉起来,行动起来。我们必须意识到,今后一二十年,对于中国是极为关键的,对于世界也极为关键。如果在未来一二十年,我们还不能使中国走上自由民主之 路,那么,不但是中国自己,还有整个世界,都必将遭遇巨大的灾难。
作者简介：
胡平，1947年生于北京，毕业于北京大学哲学系。1985年进入社科院，1987年赴美国哈佛大学攻读博士。1988-1991年任中国民主团结联盟主席，先后在《中国之春》杂志和《北京之春》杂志主持笔政，现居纽约，任《北京之春》主编。
责编：叶宣
德国之声：中国大陆国台办主任王毅昨天(10月25日)表示,大陆已就两岸经济框架协议，也就是 ECFA这个议题做好了准备,并希望年内能在两岸两会框架下正式启动正式商谈。但此前9月底的时候，我们看到，大陆方面对该协议的商议进程还是有保留的态 度。请问您是怎么看大陆方面的态度从9月底的迟疑转变到如今的积极？
赖怡忠：大陆会从原先迟疑的态度转变到如今比较积极的态度应该跟10月1号胡锦涛讲话之后马英九连续的回应有 关。换句话说，对大陆来讲，它期待，它想要的是政治上的东西，而国民党，马英九想要的是ECFA。可是，当马英九在政治上的承诺还没有变成具体的大陆能接 受的东西时，那么大陆对ECFA的态度是会比较迟疑的。
很明显可以看到，从10月18号马英九把一中各表解释成一中原则后，他所讲的是双方都同意一个中国的原则，但是对其内涵各自表达看法。这和90年代 国民党的一中各表的说法是完全不一样的。马英九从这退到一中原则上面，同时又在10月19号提到，愿意在2011年跟胡锦涛进行会面，他后面的意思就是表 示说，马英九心中已经同意和胡锦涛进行政治谈判。那么，大陆现在在ECFA方面愿意跟台湾进行商谈，应该就是发现马英九在政治方面愿意启动与胡锦涛进行谈 判而带来的相应的结果。
德国之声：您刚才也谈到，ECFA主要是经济谈判，大陆方面其实可能更期待的还有后面的政治谈判，但是它眼前看到的可以展开的是一个经济谈判。既然关于ECFA的谈判即将提上议事日程，那么您认为我们对于政治谈判也能有所期待呢？
赖怡忠：我的感觉是大陆认为马英九已经同意在2011年会面之前就开始启动政治协商。大陆在过去对ECFA时采 取迟疑的态度，但等到马英九两次回应之后，觉得他在表达对ECFA比较正面的看法。我认为两岸政治谈判的速度绝对会加快。江陈会可能在年底会讨论 ECFA，但从明年开始包括国共论坛，包括两岸论坛以及以后的江陈会，绝对都会去谈政治上的议题。
德国之声：据台湾政府经济部和劳委会的预测，ECFA，也就是两岸经济合作框架协议的签订，将可能会带动台湾经济增长。但也有人认为，政府夸大了ECFA的效果，并指ECFA的签订可能会给台湾的低阶劳工的工作机会上造成严重冲击。您是如何看待该协议所带来的经济效果的呢？
赖怡忠：我想有关ECFA给劳工带来的冲击，国民党现在还没有怎么把ECFA跟大家提过。所以很多我们得到的信 息，都是现在准备签ECFA的时候对它进行的评估情况。国民党自己是认为这个方案会使劳工受惠，但是民进党这边发现，会有１４７万的劳工会受到伤害。那我 觉得要根本性地知道这一点，国民党应该要把自己的一个ECFA版本弄出来，不然的话这个争议会一直持续。
德国之声：我们看到现在两岸双方对ECFA的签订都抱有比较积极的态度，那么您预测一下ECFA的签订是否能够像双方期待的那样会尽快完成呢？
赖怡忠：估计很快。因为国民党它表示希望在明年初。中国大陆已经有一个附案了。我觉得速度会很快。
采访：月洋
责编：叶宣
立法院23日三讀通過「公務人員保障暨培訓委員會組織法」和「國家文官培訓所組織條例」修正案，賦予「文官培訓所」升格成立「國家文官學院」的法源。未來高階文官的中長期培訓計畫，將交由國家文官學院執行，而一般訓練、在職訓練等，則由行政院人事行政局辦理。
考試院推動修法，希望將「國家文官培訓所」改制為「國家文官學院」，立法院三讀通過「公務人員保障暨培訓委員會組織法」和「國家文官培訓所組織條例」修 正案，明定保訓會基於國家文官培訓需要，設立國家文官學院，司法法制委員會召集委員潘維剛表示，希望藉此加強公務員的培訓機制。潘維剛說：『(原音)我們 希望文官體制，不斷學習進修，讓他們將來在工作上更能發揮所長，能夠透過一個更有力量的方式，讓他們得到相關應有的現代化知識，』
院 會並通過附帶決議，為了因應高階文官中長期培訓的需要，保訓會應成立協調會報，由考試院、行政院派員組成，共同研商高階文官的中長期訓練計畫，交由國家文 官學院執行；行政院各部會的培訓機關現行職掌內容和業務都不變，行政院所屬公務人員的專業訓練、在職訓練和一般管理訓練，則由人事行政局繼續辦理，潘維剛 說：『(原音)整個體制上，由考試院所做的文官培訓，比較屬於長時間的，短期的由人事行政局來做，等於實際上做一個區隔。』
法案明定由保訓會主委兼任文官學院院長，並增設副院長1名。此外，為了配合政府組織再造，院會通過附帶決議要求文官學院在成立一年內，完成「行政法人化」的可行性評估。
《南德意志报》接着写道："人民确实持类似的看法，至少今年夏季在对黑社会及其在警界、司法界和行政部门的网络发起大型攻击前是这样。周 一，法院开庭审理案件。据中国国家电视台报道，二千多名涉嫌人员、包括'一百多名警官'即将送上法庭。像以往一样，我们应该谨慎看待中国官方公布的数字， 但这次的数字毫无疑义地说明，这是中华人民共和国六十年历史中最重大的刑事案件之一。
中国民间把当地的这次行动称为'打黑'，人人都知道，行动的后面站着一位政界人物：雄心勃勃的重庆市委书记薄熙来。今年六十岁的薄熙来已担任过许多 职务，作为大连市市长和商务部长，他树立了雷厉风行、正直的改革派形象。他是政治局委员，但与另一位'红色太子'习近平相反，薄至今未能进入权力核心。
在共产党内无数次路线斗争中，薄熙来抽到的总是二等奖，现在他又在下面省市进行第二个十年的奋斗。但他以打击腐败和犯罪的行动再次表现自己，要给人 民、也要给北京的党中央领导人一个好印象。最晚到2012年党召开十八大时，北京将重新洗牌，薄熙来希望届时手中能握有一些王牌。"
与重庆的黑社会成员和腐败官员一样，全国各地的超级富豪中也一再有人落马。《胡润富豪榜》上曾经赫赫有名的三十多名中国超级富豪现在要么因行贿受到 起诉，要么正在接受警方调查。1330名高踞榜上的商人中，19人正在监狱服刑。《南德意志报》列举了黄光裕等人的例子后写道：
"中国共产党现在允许商人入党，以此作为继续进行经济改革的政治信号。自从已故的共产党高级人物邓小平号召'让一小部分人先富起来'之后，发财致富 不再被人唾弃，但人们仍然十分嫉妒富人。中国约0.4%的家庭拥有70%以上的财富，而数亿农民只能仅仅维持略高于贫困线的生活，甚至生活在贫困线之下。 在灯红酒绿的城市之外，人民的不满在增长，所以逮捕超级富豪时，往往记者的闪光灯闪成一片。
一些富人现在尽力不要引人注目。胡润对《新闻周刊》说，'几乎所有我遇到的银行经理都说，许多富人我们还没有查找到。'许多人不想让税务局、也不想 让亲戚知道自己在银行开有大笔帐号。周四，河南省一名居民博彩中奖，赢得三亿五千九百九十万元人民币。此后，他消失得无影无踪。"
摘译：王羊
责编：乐然
本文摘自或节译自其它媒体
不代表德国之声观点
10月14日早上10点整，在法兰克福书展论坛一展厅是本届书展主宾国中国主办的一场研讨活动，由中国人民文学出版社和德国蒂森基金会共同 主办，讨论主题为"全球一体化中文学的独创性和融合性"。主持和参与讨论的有人民文学出版社的负责人、北大德语系的资深教授、中国作家以及德国汉学专家、 作家和蒂森基金会的代表。一个小时的讨论内容主要围绕如何通过翻译文学作品，促进不同国家作家和读者之间的交流。即使深受另一种文化文学的影响，也同样不 妨碍保持本国文学独创性等。也许是因为探讨的话题过于专业，因此台下旁听研讨的人远不如展馆里参观和拍照留念的人多。讨论没有过半，已有不少听众退席。
14日上午11点，在3号展厅一个不足20平米的展台前已经聚满了德国媒体的工作人员以及书展访客。这个展台就是德国笔会PEN的展台。德国笔会和 独立中文笔会共同举办一个主题为"文学与权力"的讨论会。由于听众将展台及过道围得水泄不通，以至于讨论会主持人、独立中文笔会主席廖天琪女士也费了一番 周折才走到主讲台前。参加讨论的嘉宾有中国异议作家、环保人士戴晴，撰写《民以何食为天》的周勍，以及旅英作家、刚刚完成新作《北京植物人》的马建。
Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: 中国作家戴晴
戴晴在讲话时开门见山地说：“我很高兴今天有机会在这里表达原本我想在我的故乡北京表达的话。开幕式上习近平说代表13亿中国人参加书展，我并不觉 得我和我的一些作家朋友被他代表了，因为我们的书被禁止，我们出国受到限制。而习近平在讲话时只字不提中国的新闻管制，只字不提中国的书号还是由国家发 放，只字不提被大家要求了多年的迟迟没有出台的新闻法和出版法，也只字不提赫尔塔•穆勒获诺贝尔文学奖。穆勒在作品中反专制。我倒觉得，穆勒代表我们的地 方更多一些。”
正在德国为新书搜集素材的作家周勍更是明确指出："现在在中国分成了'你们'和'我们'，你要是不属于'我们'这派，那你就享受不了许多优厚的待遇，受不到重视和保护。"
周勍还讲述了他因为创作《民以何食为天》而在北京遭不明身份人士殴打受重伤，在警察局报案时，警察问他的第一句话是："你是作协的么？"在得知周勍不是作协成员也不是任何官员时，警察说："那就没办法了，你不是我们的人。"
独立中文笔会会长廖天琪女士在讨论会结束后表示："看到今天展台前挤了这么多媒体，我心里感到特别欣慰。因为这表示德国公众非常注意到这个问题：中国作为主宾国财大气粗，可以做这样那样的事情。但是德国公众界也希望听到另一种声音，一种不被中国官方代表的声音。"
廖天琪同时以独立中文笔会会长的身份，明确要求中国政府释放刘晓波。廖天琪说，刘晓波只是做了一个公民应该做的事，没有任何受到惩罚的理由。
法兰克福书展才开始第一天就似乎形成了两个中国展览阵营，双方都表现的自信而且有备而来。当然，所谓"两个中国"在此指的只是中国的两个或多个方 面，并非政治意义上的中国和台湾。但是，两岸议题在法兰克福书展上也确实有所体现。为了体现"台湾是祖国不可分割的一部分"，中国参展方特别设立了"台湾 地区图书"展台，并且在每一本书上，（即使是科普性读物、装潢设计类书籍也不例外），贴上了一个醒目的绿色标签，上面注明："本书中任何违反一个中国的立 场和词句一律不予承认。"
作者：谢菲
责编：石涛
| 鳩山重視亞洲 推動中韓實質關係面臨考驗 | |
| 20091012 05:02:41 | |
| （中央社記者張芳明東京特稿）日相鳩山由紀夫9日起訪問南韓和中國並出席日中韓三邊領袖會談，一連串會談顯示出三國在總體合作問題和氣融融，但對個別具體 問題則少有進展，日本和中韓實質關係進展面臨考驗。 鳩山在贏取政權的眾院選舉之前就強調重視亞洲外交，特別是中韓兩個鄰國。他在九月下旬出席聯合國有關會議及二十國集團（G20）金融會議，但這次訪問南韓和中國則是就任後首次出訪外國，展現重視亞洲外交的態度。 九月中旬才開始執政的鳩山，訪問中韓是有意建立領袖間的信賴關係，以全面著手處理日本和這兩個鄰國之間存在的懸案。鳩山對日本過去侵略行為積極反省的態度贏得肯定，但是，初步交鋒就反映出，懸案問題的解決將不容易。 鳩山於10日晚上和中國總理溫家寶會談，溫家寶在會談一開始就指出，擔任總理以來已和4位日本現職首相交往過，日中關係雖有困難，但步入一個新的階段，發言中對鳩山新政權表示期待。 鳩山在會談針對日中最大懸案之一的東海油田共同開發問題指出，中方出現恢復單獨開發「白樺（中方稱春曉）油田」的動向而對此表示憂慮，提議把東海變成合作 開發的友好之海，溫家寶表示，基本上贊成鳩山的看法，但指出存在著國民感情的問題，使得這個問題的進展不明朗化。 鳩山要求中方早日查明去年造成日本民眾中毒住院的毒水餃事件真相，指出中毒事件源自中國的可能性高，成為日中增進友好的障礙，希望中方以誠意回應，溫家寶表示事件還在調查之中。將達2年的這項懸案停擺而未有前進，不過，雙方就食品安全進行大臣級的會談達成協議。 有關地球暖化問題，中日同意共同努力使預定12月在哥本哈根召開的聯合國氣候變遷基礎公約第15屆簽約國會議（COP15）邁向成功。但是，針對鳩山要求中方就減少二氧化碳排放量對國際作出承諾，溫家寶只表示中國將盡力協助達成全球協議，避開承諾問題。 鳩山在9日首先訪韓，和南韓總統李明博進行高峰會談，面對明年日本併吞朝半島一百周年紀念的敏感時刻，鳩山的訪問被認為有助營造良好的氣氛。日韓兩國的懸案比較不像日中那樣的急迫和尖銳，但是，問題仍不易解決。 李明博要求日本提供包括南韓旅日人士在內的在日本具有永住權的外國人士能夠享有參政權，鳩山表示將積極地作出結論，但也指出國民的感情和看法未必統一，政府也須討論，將費時間。 南韓也要求日本能夠建設國立追悼設施，取代由於供奉二次大戰甲級戰犯而成為國內外爭議問題的靖國神社。這個問題在日本很敏感，反對者和贊成者對立尖銳，要實現恐怕相當困難。 對於南韓邀請日皇明仁明年訪問一事，鳩山以明仁高齡及日程等問題為由表示慎重的態度，有可能是顧慮到明年是日本併吞南韓一百周年，時機未必良好，也反映出兩國歷史性問題的敏感度，若不留意，隨時可能重燃歷史創傷。 10日在北京召開的日中韓三邊領袖會談，是這次鳩山外訪的重頭戲。三國針對共同合作促成北韓早日恢復六方會談、確認鳩山提倡的東亞共同體構想是長期目標、以及合作使得將在哥本哈根召開的COP15邁向成功等達成一致看法。 三國會後發表「中日韓合作10週年聯合聲明」和「中日韓可持續發展聯合聲明」，表明將增進政治互信，利用現有區域組織，深化互利合作，持續參與地區合作和 東亞共同體的建構，加強安全對話，促進軍方人士交流合作、增進青少年交流、共同追求朝鮮半島非核化和六方會談早日恢復及加強在科技、農業和環保等領域的合 作。 鳩山在這次會談上全力推銷東亞共同體構想，強調重視亞洲的立場。他在三邊峰會指出，日本過去稍有過於依賴美國」。美日同盟關係很重要，日本一方面重視美日同盟，另一方面也將制訂比過去更重視亞洲的政策。 「產經新聞」報導分析，中國顯然歡迎鳩山的重視亞洲政策，期待美日同盟關係會因此而弱化而有助於形成日美中等距外交的情勢，而且共同體基本上是互惠關係，有助於中國取得日本的科技，今後隨著構想的具體化，中國料將選擇有利自己取得科技的戰略來參與構想。 「讀賣新聞」報導分析，鳩山的東亞共同體構想內容尚非常含糊，連政府內部都還看法分歧，他表示不會排除美國，但是，外相岡田克也日前在演說中表示，美國不 包括在共同體之內，由於區域內國家政治體制的不同，共同體的具體化將非易事，視今後的進展有成為美日關係不安的重要因素。 日中韓三邊會談有助於確定三國未來合作的方向和原則，加強合作交流關係，但是，鳩山有意主導的東亞共同體構想前途未卜，加上日本和中韓兩國的懸案若不能妥善處理，將成為推動實質關係的障礙，也是鳩山新政權推動亞洲外交將面對的考驗。981011 | |
《东方日报》发表文章，题为《十‧一大庆过后大考至，答卷如何待检验》。文章认为：“大庆之后的中国其实面临很多严峻考验，人为渲染的热闹 不能减缓现实考验的严峻。如何应对这些考验，直接影响能否保持过去六十年形成的良好发展势头。最大的考验当属经济能否真正实现复甦，保持发展势头，这是近 一年来中国面临的最重要问题。虽然目前很多资料都显示，中国经济正在走出低谷，但事实上前景依然满布荆棘，未来走向根本无从断定。”
文章接着写道：“社会安全稳定对中国政府又是另一个严峻考验。「十‧一」期间，当局充分利用政治体制优势，调动大批警力，不惜牺牲部分经济利益，举 国上下全力维护「十‧一」盛典安全，但这种超常规手段不可能长期使用下去，社会生活及秩序终将恢复正常状态。然而各种威胁社会安全稳定的因素，并未随 「十‧一」结束而消失，特别是疆独、藏独分子，「十‧一」期间只是暂时停止挑衅活动，但他们在此前发动的一系列恐怖活动中已经尝到甜头，绝不可能就此轻易 罢手，一旦有机可乘，必将跳出来为患社会。”
中日韩峰会北京峰会
另外，中日韩峰会周六在北京举行。此次中日韩峰会的焦点之一，就是日本首相鸠山将向中韩两国游说他的东亚共同体方案。在这之前，美国对这一概念颇有疑虑。香港《文汇报》本周发表专栏文章认为，美国不必为东亚共同体吃醋。
文章写道：“实现全球事务的多极化，世界经济的多元化，是中国，也是东亚三国，以及全球多数国家的追求。……长期以来，美国在国际事务推行单边主 义，引起国际大家庭诸多不满。而美元为本的国际货币和经济体系，也在这一轮金融海啸中弊端尽露。当年，欧盟的建立，就是对美国霸权的反动；而欧元的建立， 更是打破美元体系的一统天下。东亚共同体按照欧盟的模式建立，当然也必然在这两个方面发挥功能。这是毫无疑问的。就算未来邀请美国以某种形式加入，也不会 改变这两个主要功能，否则这个东亚共同体就没有存在的必要。也许，这个建议不是更多出自美国的盟国日本之口，美国会好受一点。但是，事实上，长期受制于美 国的日本，有更多的要求“解放”的冲动。”
中国知识界15人发表《网络人权宣言》
在中国国内，据《明报》报道，中国知识界15人在互联网上发表《网络人权宣言》，呼吁尊重公民网络言论自由、采访发表权及编辑权，强调公民发表意见应有“免于恐惧的自由和权利”。同时建议将推翻帝制的10月10日定为每年中国网络人权日。
《明报》的报道写道：“有关宣言由北京资深传媒人凌沧洲执笔，并由15名律师、学者及传媒人联署。联署人之一的成都作家冉云飞对本报表示，网络是内 地民众言论自由的一个突破口，但过去一年当局对网络的控制收得相当紧，杀一儆百的事件也频频出现。……‘中共最大的问题是让民众没有真相，在专制制度下， 人为地造成很多信息不对称。’冉说，在传统纸媒仍被有效控制情下，网络传播更具伸展力，对人们追求真相起重要的作用。他认为，‘网络已经而且也将对中国 社会带来巨大的变化’”。
李华 摘编
责编：石涛China's roaring economy
Oct 8th 2009 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
EARLY this year, many China-watchers warned that the government’s stimulus was not enough to save the economy from a deep downturn. With indecent haste, they have now switched to worrying that overly lax policies have created a gigantic bubble in shares and house prices.
Figures due later this month are likely to show that China’s real GDP grew by around 9% in the year to the third quarter—a period over which output in most other economies probably fell. A recent flurry of bearish reports has warned that sooner or later the markets will crash, excessive borrowing and investment will cause banks’ bad loans to surge, and China’s growth will collapse.
If the government does not act soon to tighten liquidity, share and house prices will become seriously overvalued. But it is much too early to use the “B” word. Start with China’s stockmarket, described by Andy Xie, an independent economist, as a “giant Ponzi scheme”. Despite a recent slide, Shanghai’s A-share index is still up by over 60% since its trough last November. Yet this is only a fraction of the gain during China’s previous bubble in 2006-07, when the price/earnings ratio jumped to an eye-popping 70. Today the p/e ratio stands at 24. That is high compared with developed markets but well below China’s long-term average of 37 (see left-hand chart). China’s faster trend pace of growth also means that the outlook for corporate profits is rosier than elsewhere. They are already bouncing back: in the three months to August industrial profits were 7% higher than a year ago, after falling by 37% in the year to February.
Bubble suspect number two is the housing market. Average Chinese home prices are nine times average annual household income. In the rich world a ratio of more than four would sound alarm bells; in other Asian countries prices are typically 5-7 times income. The volume of property sales has surged by 85% over the past year and prices of new apartments in Shanghai have risen by nearly 30%. Some conclude that prices have been pumped up by imprudent bank lending and that the market is at risk of crashing.
However, average nationwide house prices have risen by only 2% over the past year, after falling in 2008. The official price index may understate the true average gain but figures for central Shanghai will overstate it. Either way, house prices are rising nowhere near as fast as they did during the previous boom in 2004-07 (see right-hand chart). And in relation to income, average house prices in China have fallen slightly over the past decade (although they have risen in some big cities).
Arthur Kroeber, an economist at Dragonomics, a research firm in Beijing, argues that the high level of prices relative to income is partly explained by hidden subsidies. A high proportion of households live in apartments purchased at a fraction of their value from the government a decade ago (when the housing market was privatised) or have upgraded to apartments financed by the sale of such properties.
The leap in property sales follows a deep slump last year after the government deliberately cooled the market. The level of transactions in August was less than half its level in 2005 or 2006. More important, China’s housing market is much less dependent on credit than those in places like America, so its economy would be less vulnerable to any sharp fall in prices. Andy Rothman, an economist at CLSA, a broker, estimates that only one-quarter of middle-class homeowners have a mortgage and their average loan is only 46% of the property’s value, compared with 76% in America. Homeowners have to put down a minimum deposit of 20%. Speculators buying property as an investment have to put down 40%.
Rising home prices are not an accidental consequence of government easing but one of its goals. The government needs a lively housing market to support the economy when its fiscal stimulus fades. It creates a lot of jobs, spurs private-sector investment in construction and encourages new homebuyers to spend more on furniture and electrical goods. Until recently China’s recovery was driven largely by state spending but thanks to a rebound in construction, private-sector investment rose by 30% in the year to August, double its growth rate in December.
But even if China’s stockmarkets and housing markets do not look particularly overvalued now, there is a clear risk that they could become so. Mingchun Sun, an economist at Nomura, points to some big differences between the recent sell-off in shares and the previous one in November 2007. Inflation was then 6.9% and rising, so policymakers were forced to slam on the monetary brakes. Today consumer prices are falling. In 2007 liquidity was tight, with the M2 measure of money supply growing more slowly than nominal GDP. Today excess liquidity (money growth minus GDP growth) is growing at its fastest pace on record. Low inflation, lashings of liquidity and strong growth are the ideal environment for asset-price inflation. Mr Sun concludes that equity and housing bubbles are inevitable and may grow even bigger than those in 2007.
The third alleged threat to China’s recovery is overinvestment. It is widely argued that the recent investment boom has simply exacerbated China’s overcapacity, which will reduce the return on capital and eventually drag down its growth rate. Yet analysis by BCA Research, a Canadian research firm, finds surprisingly little evidence of wasteful overinvestment to date.
One yardstick of the efficiency of capital is the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR)—the investment needed to generate an additional unit of output (ie, annual investment divided by the annual increase in GDP). The higher the ICOR, the less efficient the investment. China’s ICOR has been fairly stable over the past three decades. This year it will shoot up because investment surged and growth slowed, but the ICOR is meaningless in a recession. America’s ICOR, for example, will be infinite because GDP fell. In general, BCA finds that China’s ICOR is lower than that in many other places, suggesting that its capital spending is more, not less, efficient.
But what about this year’s state-directed investment boom? The good news is that little new investment has gone into industries which already had excess supply, such as steel. Three-fifths of new lending this year went into infrastructure projects. Some of this money will inevitably be wasted and banks’ non-performing loans will rise in future years as payments come due. But much of the new infrastructure, especially railways and roads, should help improve future productivity.
As for bank lending, which grew by a thumping 34% in the year to August, the government has repeatedly signalled that it will maintain its easy monetary policy because it is still concerned about the sustainability of the recovery. But it is also trying to curb speculative excesses and to tighten bank supervision. The banking regulator strengthened the rules on mortgages for investment properties this summer, and has told banks to raise their capital ratios to 10% and to hold provisions equal to 150% of projected loan losses by the end of the year.
China does not yet have dangerous bubbles in housing and shares that could threaten its recovery. Indeed, rising asset prices will help boost consumer spending over the next year, which will in turn help broaden China’s recovery. But to minimise the risk that China is starting to inflate its biggest bubble ever, the government does need to curb excessive liquidity. That means allowing the yuan to appreciate. With interest rates likely to remain close to zero in America for some time, China cannot significantly tighten its own rates unless it allows its currency to rise. If China’s growth has decoupled from America, then so must its monetary policy.
"1976年毛死后，邓小平以巧妙手段掌了权，他完全有理由把毛从党的神庙中驱逐出去，但他知道，他需要用毛维系党的合法性。此后，他对毛做出了70%正确、30%错误的评价。
这是一个听起来难以捉摸、但实际上很聪明的提法。这样，党可以把毛的荣誉据为己有，同时又与他的不齿行为保持距离，党无须进行详尽的调查，自己不会因此陷入窘境。历史书干脆删除了毛的一部分所作所为。"
九十年代初期，人民又请出了毛。歌厅里响起了歌颂毛的歌曲，出租汽车司机在反光镜上挂上了毛的肖像，以求一路平安，农村甚至建起了供奉毛的庙宇。《时代周报》进行比较后注意到，今天毛的形象除了仍然用于商业目的外，但也出现在为自己权益抗争的"群体事件"中：
"农民和退休人员示威时，手持毛的肖像。他们表达的信息很清楚：凡是拥护毛的人，必然反对实行改革的政治家。后者做出了走资本主义道路的决策，挽救了党的统治。手持毛肖像的人指责党的新统治集团没有履行毛当年做出的人人平等的诺言。
党以神奇般的经济增长稳固了自己的地位，但这个国家越富裕，就越不平等。而且这样的不平等早已不只是经济上的不平等，它已触及生活的方方面面，从医 疗卫生直到司法。很大程度上告别了社会主义口号的党找到了一个表达自己想法的儒家精神概念：这就是'和谐社会'。与平等的口号相反，和谐社会的提法具有无 须做出具体承诺的优点。只要没有人表示强烈的不满情绪，党可以对和谐做出各种解释。"
《时代周报》的文章最后写道，"毛的中国曾使世界上许多人感到惊慌，后毛时代的新中国则要求世界尊重其成就。这并非没有道理，过去几十年，中国人做出了令人难以置信的成绩。"文章接着笔锋一转，提出了两个问题：
"难道因为有这些成绩，我们就可以象现在法兰克福书展开始前一些人所要求的那样，以中国正在走上自由和公正之路为理由，原谅那些镇压手段和不公正的 做法吗？就可以对农民工、少数民族和农民控诉遭受不公的事听而不闻吗？反对种族隔离政策的南非大主教图图说过：'如果有人看见大象踩踏老鼠时却宣扬中立， 他实际上是站在大象一边。'"
摘译：王羊
责编：达扬
以上文字系节译自其它媒体，不代表德国之声观点
CHANGCHUN, China — Unlike in other cities taken by the People’s Liberation Army during China’s civil war, there were no crowds to greet the victors as they made their triumphant march through the streets of this industrial city in the heart of Manchuria.
Meng Qinghua said he ate corncobs and bark to survive the famine. More Photos »
As a soldier, Wang Junru had to drive back hungry civilians. More Photos >
At least 160,000 civilians died in the Communist siege of Changchun in 1948. Many starved. Zhang Yinghua said the famine killed her siblings and neighbors. More Photos >
Even if relieved to learn that hostilities with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Army had come to an end, most residents — the ones who had not died during the five-month siege — were simply too weak to go outdoors. “We were just lying in bed starving to death,” said Zhang Yinghua, now 86, as she recalled the famine that claimed the lives of her brother, her sister and most of her neighbors. “We couldn’t even crawl.”
In what China’s history books hail as one of the war’s decisive victories, Mao’s troops starved out the formidable Nationalist garrison that occupied Changchun with nary a shot fired. What the official story line does not reveal is that at least 160,000 civilians also died during the siege of the northeastern city, which lasted from June to October of 1948.
The People’s Republic of China basked in its 60th anniversary on Thursday with jaw-dropping pageantry, but there were no solemn pauses for the lives lost during the Communist Party’s rise to power — not for the estimated tens of millions who died during the civil war, nor the millions of landlords, Nationalist sympathizers and other perceived enemies who were eradicated during Mao’s drive to consolidate power.
“Changchun was like Hiroshima,” wrote Zhang Zhenglu, a lieutenant colonel in the People’s Liberation Army who documented the siege in “White Snow, Red Blood,” a book that was immediately banned after publication in 1989. “The casualties were about the same. Hiroshima took nine seconds; Changchun took five months.”
The 40,000 who survived did so by eating insects, leather belts and, in some cases, the bodies that littered the streets. By the time Communist troops took over the city, every leaf and blade of grass had been consumed during the final desperate months.
There are no monuments or markers recalling the events that decimated Changchun’s populace. Most young people have no knowledge of the darker aspects of the siege, and the survivors, now in their 70s and 80s, are reluctant to give voice to long-buried trauma. “I’ve always heard that Changchun was captured without bloodshed,” Li Jiaqi, a 17-year-old high school student, said as she sat on the steps in front of the city’s Liberation Memorial.
Chinese scholars have largely steered clear of the subject. Several historians, when asked about the episode, declined to be interviewed. Zhou Jiewen, a retired nuclear physicist in Changchun who has become a self-taught expert on the siege, explained that many key details, if widely disseminated, would tarnish the army’s reputation as defenders of the common man. Those include shooting civilians who tried to escape the city and ignoring the pleas of mothers holding aloft starving children on the other side of the barbed-wire barricades. “To cause so many civilians to die was a great blunder by the P.L.A. and tragedy unparalleled in the civil war,” Mr. Zhou said.
While history is often written by the victors, the Communist Party has never been shy about shaping the past to serve its central narrative. Textbooks portray the revolution as the inevitable outcome of a popular uprising; the patriotic films that have flooded television in recent months are not subtle in their glorification of Mao’s troops as munificent liberators. The unpleasant aspects of the revolution, including innocents caught in the cross-fire, are often omitted.
“The party has no use for objective history,” said Bao Pu, a Hong Kong publisher who infuriated party leaders last spring by printing the memoir of Zhao Ziyang, the deposed Communist Party leader who spent 15 years under house arrest after opposing the violent crackdown on democracy protesters in 1989. “The basic idea is that history can be rewritten and used as a tool of the state. But this requires constant censorship. And it has a destructive effect on society.”
Other unintended consequences of suppressing the truth are hard to quantify. Many Chinese, especially those who grew up during the tumultuous decades of war, famine and political persecution, carry psychic wounds that are seldom expressed, let alone healed.
Lung Ying-tai, a University of Hong Kong professor who studied the siege of Changchun, said nearly every elderly army officer she interviewed for her book about the civil war, “Big River, Big Sea — Untold Stories of 1949,” broke down when recounting what he experienced. “It’s an unspeakable national trauma that has not once been opened up and gently treated for 60 years,” she said.
The book, which was published last month in Taiwan and promptly banned on the mainland, seeks to portray the horror of the civil war through the stories of those who survived. “There are not too many left who can clearly remember,” she said.
The elderly survivors who gather in Changchun’s Labor Park most days are not eager to tell their tales. But after some prompting, the details spill out. They describe babies too weak to cry, brides sold for a morsel of food and the milewide no man’s land where thousands perished in full view of troops under orders from Gen. Lin Biao to turn Changchun into a “dead city.”
In the first few months of the siege, food could be purchased, albeit at exorbitant prices. By the end of the summer, people were trading thick gold rings for a biscuit.
“At first we ate rotten sorghum, then corncobs and then the bark off the trees,” said Meng Qinghua, 85. “After a week of not eating you’d get very sleepy. Once that happened, you would start to die.”
The few airdrops of aid, delivered by American planes, were quickly gobbled up by Nationalist troops. When those stopped, the soldiers stole food from civilians at gunpoint. In the poorer quarters of the city, according to “White Snow, Red Blood,” 9 of 10 families were wiped out.
Although her family was relatively well off, Zhang Yinghua said there was nothing to be bought by the end of summer. They opened their pillows and consumed the corn husk filling. Later they boiled and ate leather.
Then 25, Ms. Zhang understood that swallowing such unpalatable matter was the only way to survive. “Every day we would eat a spoonful, just enough to maintain the flicker of life, but the children would not,” she said. When her 6-year-old sister and her 9-year-old brother finally died, her parents, barely able to stand, dragged their bodies to the street.
Some of those charged with enforcing the blockade have come to regret their participation. Wang Junru said he was 15 when the Communists forced him to join a militia for teenagers. Later, he joined 170,000 other soldiers ordered to drive back hungry civilians. “We were told they were the enemy and they had to die,” he said.
Whatever zeal he had for the revolution was extinguished by the 23 years he spent in a labor camp — punishment, he said, for insulting the relative of a party official when he was a college student. After his release, he spent the rest of his working life hauling logs.
Now 76 and embittered, he said young people should learn about what happened in Changchun — and during the rest of the civil war. “They only know the propaganda,” he said. “Maybe if they know how horrible war is, they can try to avoid it in the future.”
