華爾街日報：美承認「一個中國」是顯著虛偽
許銘洲/編譯 2015-11-30 01:00美國企業研究所（American Enterprise Institute , AEI）戰略安全研究部主任，加里·施密特（GARY SCHMITT），10月間於美國《華爾街日報》（WSJ）發表一篇名為「美國的中台關係魔術戲法」（America’s Taiwan-China Hocus Pocus），日本《雅虎新聞》也在11月29日轉譯該篇專文，內容批評指出，美國承認「一個中國」，根本是毫無實質作用的「顯著虛偽」，其目的只是為防守冷戰時代來自蘇聯所發動的側翼攻擊；然而，這個假想敵蘇聯早就不復存在了；更何況，中國根本不會因為美國附和其「一個中國」主張，轉而將美國視為結盟國（譯註：反之，中俄早就形成聯手態勢，伺機挑戰美國）。
施密特也在專文中破題指出，美國與古巴之間，逾半個世紀的敵對制裁關係，彼此之間的鐐銬束縛，都可以鬆綁解除，重建2國之間的雙邊關係，還致力於美洲的整體區域合作；那麼，同樣基於結盟合作理由，美國在「亞太區域」就早應該幫助台灣這個民主盟邦，打開國際參與空間，並跟台灣發展正常化的國際關係，才是最有益於美國的明智作為。
專文進一步指出，美國有能力徹底翻轉亞太區域動力，從而幫助台灣提昇其國際地位。其具體做法包括有：
1)邀請台灣參與聯合或多邊軍演；
2) 擴充台灣所需的防衛軍備；
3)台美2國內閣官員，進行經常性與實質性交流；
4)提供更多實質支持，提昇台灣的國際地位空間；
5)讓台灣簽署、加入跨太平洋夥伴關係協議（TPP）。
美國在中國、台灣之間，向來採取虛虛實實的「外交手腕式歌舞伎」（diplomatic kabuki，此為隱喻修辭，因為歌舞伎表演，全數由男性演出；縱使是女性角色，也由男人擔綱演出。引申為，外交形式做為與實際支持是兩回事，或可名為「外交迷陣」）。美國之所以這麼做，有其利益考量；美方認為跟北京維持關係仍是重要一環；然而，從東亞的區域實際利益而言，「承認台灣」有著戰略上的重大價值。從台灣向北直抵日本，往南則通往菲律賓；美國跟日菲2國早就簽署安保協定，而台灣剛好位在這個重大軍事、海上貿易的中心地帶。未來一旦美方允許中國得以恫嚇、孤立民主台灣，等同授予中國在亞太地區更多籌碼，得以要脅美國，並縱令中國為所為，藉以操控區域安危。
蔡英文今年6月訪美，於華盛頓智庫戰略與國際研究中心（CSIS）演說(資料圖片）
台灣總統大選
台灣跟中國的差異點在於，台灣只想把自己所屬的島嶼管理好；民進黨也清楚知道，台灣並非中國的一部份；另一方面，自認為中國人的台灣民眾，比率也相當小眾。以美國為例，有義大利裔美國人，愛爾蘭裔美國人；然而這些族裔明白，種族與國家是兩回事，不致混為一談；一些台灣人的部份祖先雖來自中國，這些人卻不會認為自己該被中國統治。
台灣人的國家認同自我追尋，隨著2016年1月的總統、立委選舉接近，日愈呈現迫切感。如果沒有意外的話，國民黨這個「親中政權」（原文為，同情一個中國政權），將踵繼去年11月的縣市長選舉頹勢，一路接續潰敗。
明年大選很可能當選總統的民進黨候選人蔡英文，早就明確表示，她不會企圖改變現狀，以致於挑起海峽水域的互相對立。不過，中共總書記習近平可不這麼看待中台關係，2013年間，他曾向台灣政府代表表示，統一台灣問題不能「一代傳一代」；習近平的專斷民族主義立場，的確對台灣未來發展帶來不安與威脅。
即將到來的台灣總統大選，對北京是個考驗，同時測試北京究竟是個良性崛起的現代國家，抑或只是個如同19世紀的土霸強權？如果，北京持續對台虎視耽耽；那麼華盛頓應該儘早擺脫「一個中國」政策；並從過往自我設限的思維窠臼解放出來；早日與台灣發展正常化關係，協助台北脫離（一中框架）的國際孤立困局。
America’s Taiwan-China Hocus Pocus
The U.S. ‘cut loose the shackles of the past’ with Cuba, but keeps its Taiwan policy rigid as ever.
By
GARY SCHMITTOct. 19, 2015 1:05 p.m. ET
11 COMMENTS
When President Obama announced last year that the United States would normalize relations with Cuba, he said doing so would “cut loose the shackles of the past.” No longer would the U.S. be bound by the vestiges of a strategic era long past. In moving beyond a “rigid policy” that was “rooted in events that took place before most of us were born,” Washington and Havana would be writing a “new chapter” in bilateral relations not only between the two countries but also for the region as a whole.
Whatever the merits of Mr. Obama’s decision with respect to Cuba, it would seem his logic should apply equally, if not more so, to a democratic partner on the other side of the globe: Taiwan.
Taiwan, a self-governing, economically vibrant, strategically important country, has been denied recognition as a sovereign state by the U.S. based on the diplomatic hocus pocus that there is only “one China” and that upholding such a charade was necessary to flank the now nonexistent Soviet Union.
ENLARGEPresident Barack Obama and Tsai Ing-wen, a candidate in Taiwan’s January presidential election. The election will test Washington’s long-standing China policy. PHOTO: EARL GIBSON III/GETTY IMAGES
ENLARGEPHOTO: PICHI CHUANG/REUTERS
Of course, the real reason for this diplomatic kabuki was that when the U.S. began to open up relations with Beijing, both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China claimed sovereignty over the island of Taiwan and the mainland of China—in spite of the fact that the PRC’s rule was restricted to the latter and the ROC’s writ extended no farther than Taiwan and a few small islands.
Taiwan no longer claims or has any hope of governing anything but the islands. This is particularly true of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Party members are very clear about their belief that Taiwan is not part of China, a view supported by polls that consistently show only a very small percentage of Taiwanese think of themselves as Chinese for civic purposes. As with Italian-Americans or Irish-Americans, being ethnically Chinese doesn’t mean one wants to live in, or be ruled by, the country of your ancestors.
This isn’t a matter that’s likely to go away, and it will likely become more pressing in the months ahead. Polls in Taiwan point to a victory by the DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, in January’s presidential election, and a possible DPP majority in the elections for the national legislature. These elections come on the heels of last year’s local and municipal elections in which the other major party, the Nationalists, who are much more sympathetic to the idea of “one China,” suffered their worst-ever defeat.
Ms. Tsai and the DPP leadership have made it clear that they don’t intend to roil the cross-Strait waters by pushing for a dramatic change in the status quo. But China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013 told a Taiwanese government interlocutor that, when it comes to fulfilling Beijing’s “one China” goal of uniting the island with the mainland, “these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” Mr. Xi’s more assertive Chinese nationalism will rest uneasily with the new leadership in Taipei.
The coming election in Taiwan will be a test of whether Beijing is truly a rising power of the modern, benign sort—as it so often claims—or more akin to the rising, not-so-benign, powers of the 19th century. It will also be a test for Washington.
Relations with Beijing remain important. But anyone looking at a map of East Asia must recognize the strategic centrality of Taiwan. To its immediate north lies Japan. To its south, the Philippines. Both are allies with which the U.S. has security treaties. Taiwan’s surrounding waters are vital military and commercial sea lanes. Allowing China to bully democratic Taiwan into global isolation, or giving the leadership in Beijing the sense that it has leverage over U.S. policies toward the island, would create more instability, not less.
The U.S. can reverse this dynamic. It can start by inviting Taiwan’s military to participate in joint and multilateral exercises; by expanding the transfer of defense articles Taiwan needs; by allowing for more frequent and substantive visits by cabinet members from both countries; by sponsoring a more substantive role for Taiwan in international bodies; and by endorsing Taiwan’s bid to become a signatory to the Trans-Pacific Partnership once the trade pact is up and running.
In short, the U.S. should aim to normalize relations as much as possible, overturning the self-imposed strictures on relations that are required neither by domestic nor international law. Bringing democratic Taiwan in from the cold is as important as Washington’s opening to Cuba—arguably far more so.
Mr. Schmitt is director of the American Enterprise Institute’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies.
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