2024年4月30日 星期二

亞洲四小龍之首,新加坡 (王璞、《周有光百歲自述》).Opinion | Singapore’s Burnout Rate Shows the Price of Success

 The search for success can be elusive, and possibly nowhere more so than in Singapore, one of the most competitive and overworked places on the planet.

Opinion | Singapore’s Burnout Rate Shows the Price of Success
BLOOMBERG.COM
Opinion | Singapore’s Burnout Rate Shows the Price of Success
It’s time for one of the most stressed
報載新加坡如今越發得意,躍居亞洲四小龍之首,就想起以前發過的這篇小文,再發一次。
新加坡
讀《周有光百歲自述》,我還有一點感想,就是新加坡的獨立。
周先生說,他直到八十年代大陸開放,才得知新加坡獨立的故事。因為之前這事在國內是封鎖的。我比周先生更加孤陋寡聞,是看了他此書才知此一故事。大概新加坡在我頭腦裏亞洲四小龍的印象太深刻,還以為它早就是獨立國家。
原來新加坡是一九六五年才獨立的,而且并非有人搞「新獨」,而是被逼無奈之舉。現將周先生書中有關此事的文字照抄如下:
「新加坡也是有意思,不是自己要求獨立,它想參加馬來西亞,馬來西亞不要它,把它趕出来的。李光耀大哭,说:『我们又小又窮,要成立一个國家,怎麼辦?』這個事情在中國完全新聞封鎖,我們都不知道。我是八十年代在美國张充和家里,看到一點舊雜誌才知道的。為什麼要把新加坡趕出来,道理很簡單:一、新加坡大部分都是華人,如果參加馬來西亞,馬來西亞的華人就可能超過百分之五十,馬來人就不愿意;二、新加坡的華人共產主義思想弥漫,李光耀原來就是老共產黨。馬來西亞討厭中國人,把他們趕出來,新加坡只好獨立。 」
我還有點不信,懷疑周先生年紀太大記憶有誤,到网上查看,發現情況大致屬實。除了一點:新加坡并非「想參加」馬來西亞,而是一九五九年已經參加了進去,成為了馬來西亞一州,所以才有「新州」或「星州」之稱。後來馬來西亞國會以126票對零票將它趕了出去。結果把這個窮州逼成了個富國。十年生聚,經濟起飛。反令比它大五百多倍且資源豐富的馬來西亞瞠乎其後。
這個故事還有後話,那就是馬來西亞後來一見新加坡發達了,就想將它收入彀中,新加坡卻不肯回頭了。
仿照《伊索寓言》的結束句式結束拙文:這個故事告訴我們:不管家人多衰多窮多弱小都要善待他,等到他發達了再要他歸順,No way!

2024年4月24日 星期三

爭論: China Is Still Rising By Nicholas R. Lardy /Chong-Pin Lin 。習近平會成為解決氣候變遷的救世主嗎 ( 纽约时报中文网)

 

習近平會成為解決氣候變遷的救世主嗎

習近平的賭注是中國能夠主導全球向綠色能源的轉型,他的一黨制國家將以自由市場無法或不願的方式發揮推動作用。他是正確的嗎?

JACOB DREYER


乍看上去,習近平似乎已經茫然失措。

這位中國國家主席看起來正在扼殺使中國擺脫貧困,成為世界工廠的企業活力。他摒棄了鄧小平“致富光榮”的格言,轉而支持中央計劃和聽起來很共產黨的口號,比如“生態文明”和“ 新質生產力”,這讓人預測中國經濟奇蹟將會終結。

但事實上,習近平是在下一個長達數十年的賭注——中國能夠主導全球向綠色能源的轉型,他的一黨制國家將以自由市場無法或不願的方式發揮推動作用。他的最終目標不僅是解決人類最迫切的問題之一——氣候變化,還要在這個進程中讓中國成為全球救世主。

進程已經開始了。近年來,從化石燃料轉型已成為習近平的口頭禪,也成了中國產業政策一再提到的主題。它正在取得成果:中國現在是世界領先的氣候友善技術製造國,生產太陽能電池板、電動車電池電動車。去年,能源轉型成為中國整體投資和經濟成長的最大動力,使中國成為第一個實現這一目標的大型經濟體。.....

****

-- 自1980年代起便受尊重的中國經濟學者Nicholas Lardy 最近在外交事務期刊發表研究"勿低估第二大經濟體"。
-- 2019 至2023 年,中國經濟增長了20%,美國經濟增長了8%。
-- 2023年, 中國家族企業增加 2,300萬家,雇用員工約3億人。
(習20大後調整,從控壓民營企業大亨,至拉抬民營企業)

China Is Still Rising

Don’t Underestimate the World’s Second-Biggest Economy


2024年4月19日 星期五

季風亞洲(書)

 季風亞洲:全球視野下的跨印度洋文化網路

作者: 謝侃侃 / 張忞煜 / 曹寅 編

出版社: 北京大學出版社

出版年: 2024-2

頁數: 219

定價: CNY49.0

裝幀: 平裝

ISBN: 9787301347096

內容簡介  · · · · · ·

      千百年來,季風氣候深刻地影響著南亞和東南亞的生產生活,也令沿海居民積累了跨海遠航的豐富經驗,建立起一張張連接甚 不同地理空間的巨大網路。

      本書跳出以中國或以西方為中心的觀察視角和敘事方式,借用“季風亞洲”這一概念,從“互聯”“中心—邊緣”“主義”三條線索切入,收錄11個國際學術界的前沿研究,對南亞和東南亞地區的文化和思想流動展開討論,幫助讀者構築一套對南亞和東南亞地區新穎而立體的認知。

目錄  · · · · · ·


序言


一、互聯:探索跨域區域邊界的思想流動

1 在孟加拉灣埋葬區域研究

2 文學網路:伊斯蘭在南亞和東南亞傳播的另一種途徑

3 印尼的伊斯蘭社會主義及其南亞起源


二、中心—邊緣:理解形塑季風亞洲的社會張力

4 “大印度”實驗:印度教徒民族性和印度東北地區

5 邊緣化與偏見之間:印度穆斯林的困境

6 不被統治的語言:印尼華人如何挑戰殖民 的政治管控

7 夜行軍:與印度革命遊擊隊同行的人類學調查


三、主義:重新審視季風亞洲在舞臺上的位置

8 互動與皈依:東南亞華人信仰體系構建中的三個時刻

9 混血的遊蕩者:·羅賓遜與荷印混血社群身份認同的塑造與流變

10 探索連接的:修士孫大信的個案研究

11 從歐洲的中心出發:波蘭視角下的南亞研究

2024年4月11日 星期四

越南房地产大亨张美兰周四(4月11日)因在过去11年间内掠夺该国其中一间最大的银行而被判处死刑。The court said her actions, which included bribes of millions of dollars to officials, had eroded the public’s trust in the leadership of the ruling Communist party, state media reported.

 The court said her actions, which included bribes of millions of dollars to officials, had eroded the public’s trust in the leadership of the ruling Communist party, state media reported. https://on.ft.com/3JhrWLU

越南房地产大亨张美兰周四(4月11日)因在过去11年间内掠夺该国其中一间最大的银行而被判处死刑。
这是一个罕见的判决,67岁的张美兰是极少数因白领犯罪而被判处死刑的女性之一。
这一判决反映了欺诈案规模令人眼花缭乱的程度。张美兰因从西贡商业银行提取440亿美元(350亿英镑)贷款而被定罪,该判决要求她返还270亿美元,检察官并称这笔钱可能永远无法追回。一些人认为,死刑判决是法院试图鼓励她归还部分失踪的数十亿美元的方式。
行事作风通常很保守的越共当局,却在这个案件上非同寻常地对媒体透露了详尽的细节。越南官方表示,他们传唤了2700人作证。还有10名国家检察官和约200名律师参与这次审判。
涉案证据放了104个箱子,总重达六吨。与张美兰一同受审的还有85名被告,张美兰否认了指控,并可以上诉。
所有被告均被判有罪。四人被判终身监禁。其余的人被判处不同刑期,包括20年有期徒刑,或3年有期徒刑,缓期执行。张美兰的丈夫和侄女分别被判入狱9年和17年。
阅读全文:https://bbc.in/49wc1UB

A new strategic concept could be useful in the US military’s defense of Taiwan BY MIKE POMPEO AND BRYAN CLARK,

 

A new strategic concept could be useful in the US military’s defense of Taiwan
BY MIKE POMPEO AND BRYAN CLARK, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 04/02/24 4:00 PM ET
The Pentagon released its 2025 budget last week, and the implications for U.S. national security are sobering. Not because the Biden administration spends too little on defense, but because the budget shows a military reaching its limits. After a decade of optimizing it to stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, defense officials of both parties have rendered the U.S. force too expensive to grow and too small to meet the needs of America and its allies. The U.S. military needs a new approach to hedge against the worst-case scenarios China could impose.
How we got here is not a mystery. China has geographic, strategic and financial advantages over the United States that it could exploit in a fight over Taiwan. An invasion would happen in China’s backyard, allowing it to use homeland-based missiles and aircraft against Taiwan’s defenders. Without the U.S. military’s global responsibilities, China can focus its forces on the Western Pacific. And with younger ships and aircraft and a robust manufacturing base, China can grow its force at lower cost than the U.S.
Coming off successes in long-range precision strike warfare during the 1990s and 2000s, the Pentagon applied the same model to defending Taiwan. But China’s advantages increasingly make the tactics U.S. forces used in Kosovo or Iraq nearly impossible to execute at the scale needed to stop an invasion.
The result has been a shrinking U.S. force being boiled down to its most survivable and lethal elements—submarines, stealth bombers and long-range missiles—while everything else is sacrificed on the altar of defeating a Taiwan invasion. Last year, the U.S. Navy and Marines were unable to aid Turkey’s earthquake victims or evacuate U.S. citizens from South Sudan due to a shortage of amphibious warships. Today, destroyers designed to stop Soviet and Chinese submarines or supersonic missiles are being worn out to protect shipping against Houthi drones because there are no frigates to do the job.
The other contributor to the U.S. military’s growing inability to answer the call is defense officials’ insistence on a one-size-fits-all force. To allow units in one geographic region to surge to another and standardize training and equipment, defense officials avoid specialized forces. But with China as the Pentagon’s “pacing challenge,” everything it buys needs to be relevant in countering Beijing, which generally means in an invasion of Taiwan.
There is a way out of this strategic cul-de-sac. The U.S. military could break tradition and field specialized units designed to hedge against high-consequence but low-probability situations that would otherwise dominate its force planning.
Taking advantage of widely available aerial, naval and undersea drones, “hedge forces” could deny access to an aggressor. Ukraine used this approach to sink half Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and restore its maritime trade while Houthi drones under and above the water have upended worldwide shipping traffic with their attacks across the Red Sea. The U.S. military should exploit these same technologies to disrupt or slow a Chinese invasion. Tangled up in a hedge force’s drones, China’s troop transports and their escorts would also be easier targets for U.S. missiles.
The Defense Department is already pursuing elements of what could be a future hedge force for Taiwan through initiatives by the Defense Innovation Unit and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Expanding these efforts that tap today’s unmanned system and software technologies could allow the Pentagon to field a hedge force within a year, rather than waiting a decade or more for the next generation of missiles, submarines or bombers to arrive.
More important, a hedge force could help defense leaders arrest the continued morphing of the U.S. military into a “one-trick pony” optimized to fight a short invasion adjacent to a peer opponent’s homeland but without the capacity for other scenarios or crisis response elsewhere.
For example, China’s intensifying interference in Taiwan shipping traffic suggests that a blockade or quarantine is its most likely path to pressure Taiwan militarily. But already overstretched responding to threats in the Middle East, the U.S. fleet would be hard-pressed to protect Taiwan’s sea lanes.
The U.S. military has been the deterrent against great power war and global first responder for nearly a century. It is at risk of losing both roles unless defense officials embrace the idea that a general-purpose U.S. force can no longer dominate every situation. The Pentagon needs to build special tools for special situations. Otherwise, an already unstable world will only grow more chaotic.
Mike Pompeo served as secretary of State from 2018-2021 and is a distinguished fellow at Hudson Institute. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at Hudson Institute

2024年4月7日 星期日

台灣 中軌道的SES是盧森堡公司,低軌道的OneWeb是英國公司。將天災與戰時通訊分散於不同體系, 台灣藍

  中軌道的SES是盧森堡公司,低軌道的OneWeb是英國公司。將天災與戰時通訊分散於不同體系,

數位發展部不只弄了一種非同步衛星,還同時發展了中軌道(左)、低軌道(中)兩種衛星系統。本次花蓮地震中他們就同時出動了這兩個系統。
天災與戰爭時無基地台可通訊,基本上只能靠衛星。荒野離島山上如果沒基地台,要寬頻更要靠衛星。
一般說來,中軌道比以前用的同步衛星低,傳輸與遲滯時間較短,成本較低。但是要涵蓋整個地表也需要較多顆。對於導航或軍事定位這種慢個0.1秒根本沒差的行為就很合適,但拿來通訊還是會有點卡卡的。這時就要靠低軌道衛星,離地更近,傳輸與遲滯時間更短,成本更低,也更適合即時的觀測與通訊。只是跟大氣摩擦較明顯,3-5年就會掉回地球,要涵蓋整個地表也需要更多顆。(右)
目前中軌道衛星已經成功涵蓋馬祖,大幅增加了頻寬,預計四月底還會開通太平島。低軌道衛星系統也會在上半年開通。
當然,兩者可以混用,不用分那麼細。但重點是中軌道的SES是盧森堡公司,低軌道的OneWeb是英國公司。將天災與戰時通訊分散於不同體系,避免雞蛋放在同一個籃子,才是聰明的做法。
這就是數發部已經做的事,也是本次花蓮震災時他們一直出來幫忙,藉此驗證天災/戰時可靠度的目的。