2015.08.16 17:37
香港—
在紀念抗戰勝利70週年之際，中國解放軍八一電影厂拍攝的“史詩式獻禮大片”《開羅宣言》，推出四張參與這一重大歷史事件的美英中蘇領導人的電影海報，引發外界質疑篡改歷史。海報中出現的不是當年參與開羅會議的中國戰區最高統帥蔣介石，而是與這個歷史事件毫無關係的中共領袖毛澤東。
北京大片海報以毛換蔣被批篡改歷史
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定於9月3日抗戰勝利紀念日及盛大閱兵當天公映的電影《開羅宣言》近日公佈的海報，除美國總統羅斯福、英國首相邱吉爾和前蘇聯領導人斯大林外，還有由著名演員唐國強飾演的毛澤東，而出席開羅會議的時任國民黨總裁、國民政府軍事委員會委員長蔣介石則無影無踪。海報一出，立即引發兩岸輿論、專家以及網友的砲轟，批評海報的內容與歷史不符。
台灣媒體報導，台灣國史館館長表示，中共一直堅持他們是抗戰的中流砥柱，但歷史資料顯示並非如此，而“說毛澤東參加開羅會議，任何人都覺得很荒謬”。還有台媒報導說，暗喻毛澤東代替蔣介石參加開羅會議，雖然不是手榴彈炸飛機的無厘頭神劇，但也讓多少懂歷史的民眾笑到噴飯。
中國近代史學者、政治評論人士章立凡星期天對美國之音表示，電影海報不尊重歷史，也不在乎是否會給當局帶來遭外人恥笑的尷尬。
他說：“我覺得臉皮都比較厚了，也不在乎別人怎麼說，他們不會感覺到尷尬，因為這些搞這些片子、宣傳的人，本身也不懂歷史，就是根據上邊的要求，然後他們還會盡量誇大一些。”
此外，許多中國大陸的網友也表示對海報感到不恥。有網友稱，“能拍出抗日神劇的導演已夠國人噁心了。我真的不懂開羅宣言與毛有半毛關係。我們雖然歷史觀差，你也不用這樣忽悠誤導我們吧。”， “丟人丟透了”，“不是大片，是大騙”, “貪天之功也不能這樣，太過分了”，“能不能正視一下歷史！無恥是怎麼寫的” ？還有人調侃海報說，“給人的第一感覺是：唐國強演的蔣介石一點都不像”。
1943年11月22至26日，羅斯福、丘吉爾及蔣介石在開羅舉行會議，斯大林因蔣介石出席沒有赴會，而在延安的毛澤東則與會議無關。會後中英美髮表開羅宣言，堅持對日作戰直到日本無條件投降，要求日本歸還自一戰以來在太平洋地區侵占的一切島嶼，並特別要求日本把在中國占領的所有領土，包括滿洲、台灣及澎湖群島歸還給中華民國。開羅會議塑造戰後東亞新局勢，確立中國成為世界四強的地位，對中國政治上意義重大。
中共的人民網星期五轉載環球網的一篇文章，稱電影《開羅宣言》海報，讓斯大林、羅斯福、丘吉爾、毛澤東四位國際舞台上的偉人悉數亮相，“鑄就歷史”，展現出了宏大的敘事格局，“一幅偉大的歷史長卷就此鋪開”。
據報導，電影製作方辯解稱，抗戰勝利是中華民族共同奮鬥犧牲的結果，毛澤東領導的中共是其中重要部分，開羅宣言的得來，離不開共產黨的貢獻，所發四張海報只是其中部分，後期還要發包括蔣介石的。
作為近代史獨立學者的章立凡表示，近兩年，中共為了對台統戰，特別是在台灣前行政院長、參謀總長郝柏村以抗戰老兵身份，參觀中國人民抗日戰爭紀念館和盧溝橋抗日戰爭遺址時嚴正抗議，指出是蔣中正委員長領導抗日，這個歷史不容否認後，中共官方的正式說法已經從原來的中共領導全民族抗戰的說法上後撤。
他說：“中共的二戰歷史，他們已經是多次修改。現在它的最低限度是國民黨領導了正面戰場，共產黨領導了敵後戰場，已經不太講中共領導了全民族抗戰。但是，在具體的宣傳上，他們又偷偷地回到他們習慣的那個立場，又把原來的那個什麼中流砥柱呀、中共領導抗戰呀，這些東西擺出來。”
此外，英國經濟學人雜誌最新一期發表圖片為中國國家主席習近平手握槍口是支筆的封面文章，標題是《習的歷史課》，副題是《中國如何改寫過去以控制未來》，批評中共在掠奪二戰歷史，為現時的雄心找藉口。
文章稱，習近平將於9月3日親自主持的抗戰勝利閱兵大典，不只是紀念有中國特色的歷史，也是為了未來。習近平的歷史邏輯是，中國人在戰胜日本帝國主義上發揮瞭如此重要的作用，中國不僅應該為其過去的英勇和苦難贏得遲來的敬重，也應對現在的亞洲事務擁有更大的話語權。此外，日本仍然是危險的，中國的學校、博物館和電視節目不斷地警告，侵略的幽靈仍然存在於大洋上，日本隨時可能再次危害亞洲，黨的喉舌也紛紛附和。於是，中國又再一次站起來面對這個威脅。
文章表示，這樣的說辭需要精心的扭曲歷史，但是事實是，正面抗擊日本的不是中共，而是其死敵，蔣介石的國民黨。此外，今天的日本已非當年發動南京大屠殺、強迫韓國和中國婦女做慰安婦、或利用平民活體測試生化武器的日本。儘管日本從未像德國那樣徹底懺悔戰爭罪行，但是，認為日本仍是有侵略性強國的觀點是荒謬的。日本的軍人自1945年以來從未因動怒而開過一槍；民主根深蒂固，對人權的尊重是深厚的，現今的日本人口老化、負增長、大多數信奉和平，由於廣島和長崎的災難，永遠不太可能獲取核武器。
文章最後表示，如果中國以現今行為的建設性，而不是以歷史依據尋求做地區領袖，對中國將會更好。如果習近平願意與鄰國通過多邊合作，維護地區的穩定，則證明他真正學到了歷史的教訓，將遠遠好過重蹈歷史的覆轍。
China, East Asia and history
Xi’s history lessons
The Communist Party is plundering history to justify its present-day ambitions
Aug 15th 2015
IN EARLY September President Xi Jinping will take the salute at a huge military parade in Beijing. It will be his most visible assertion of authority since he came to power in 2012: his first public appearance at such a display of missiles, tanks and goose-stepping troops. Officially the event will be all about the past, commemorating the end of the second world war in 1945 and remembering the 15m Chinese people who died in one of its bloodiest chapters: the Japanese invasion and occupation of China of 1937-45.
It will be a reminder of the bravery of China’s soldiers and their crucial role in confronting Asia’s monstrously aggressive imperial power. And rightly so: Chinese sacrifices during that hellish period deserve much wider recognition. Between 1937, when total war erupted in China, and late 1941, when the attack on Pearl Harbor brought America into the fray, China fought the Japanese alone. By the end of the war it had lost more people—soldiers and civilians—than any other country bar the
Yet next month’s parade is not just about remembrance; it is about the future, too. This is the first time that China is commemorating the war with a military show, rather than with solemn ceremony. The symbolism will not be lost on its neighbours. And it will unsettle them, for in East Asia today the rising, disruptive, undemocratic power is no longer a string of islands presided over by a god-emperor. It is the world’s most populous nation, led by a man whose vision for the future (a richer country with a stronger military arm) sounds a bit like one of Japan’s early imperial slogans. It would be wrong to press the parallel too far: China is not about to invade its neighbours. But there are reasons to worry about the way the Chinese Communist Party sees history—and massages it to justify its current ambitions.
History with Chinese characteristics
Under Mr Xi, the logic of history goes something like this. China played such an important role in vanquishing Japanese imperialism that not only does it deserve belated recognition for past valour and suffering, but also a greater say in how Asia is run today. Also, Japan is still dangerous. Chinese schools, museums and TV programmes constantly warn that the spirit of aggression still lurks across the water. A Chinese diplomat has implied that Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is a new Voldemort, the epitome of evil in the “Harry Potter” series. At any moment Japan could menace Asia once more, party newspapers intone. China, again, is standing up to the threat.
As our essay on the ghosts of the war that ended 70 years ago this week explains, this narrative requires exquisite contortions. For one thing, it was not the Chinese communists who bore the brunt of the fighting against Japan, but their sworn enemies, the nationalists (or Kuomintang) under Chiang Kai-shek. For another, today’s Japan is nothing like the country that slaughtered the inhabitants of Nanjing, forced Korean and Chinese women into military brothels or tested biological weapons on civilians.
Granted, Japan never repented of its war record as full-throatedly as Germany did. Even today a small but vocal group of Japanese ultra-nationalists deny their country’s war crimes, and Mr Abe, shamefully, sometimes panders to them. Yet the idea that Japan remains an aggressive power is absurd. Its soldiers have not fired a shot in anger since 1945. Its democracy is deeply entrenched; its respect for human rights profound. Most Japanese acknowledge their country’s war guilt. Successive governments have apologised, and Mr Abe is expected to do the same (see article). Today Japan is ageing, shrinking, largely pacifist and, because of the trauma of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, unlikely ever to possess nuclear weapons. Some threat.
The dangers of demonisation
China’s demonisation of Japan is not only unfair; it is also risky. Governments that stoke up nationalist animosity cannot always control it. So far, China’s big show of challenging Japan’s control of the Senkaku (or Diaoyu) islands has involved only sabre-rattling, not bloodshed. But there is always a danger that a miscalculation could lead to something worse.
East Asia’s old war wounds have not yet healed. The Korean peninsula remains sundered, China and Taiwan are separate, and even Japan can be said to be split, for since 1945 America has used the southern island of Okinawa as its main military stronghold in the western Pacific. The Taiwan Strait and the border between North and South Korea continue to be potential flashpoints; whether they one day turn violent depends largely on China’s behaviour, for better or worse. It is naive to assume America will always be able to keep a lid on things.
On the contrary, many Asians worry that China’s ambitions set it on a collision course with the superpower and the smaller nations that shelter under its security umbrella. When China picks fights with Japan in the East China Sea, or builds airstrips on historically disputed reefs in the South China Sea, it feeds those fears. It also risks sucking America into its territorial disputes, and raises the chances of eventual conflict.
Post-war East Asia is not like western Europe. No NATO or European Union binds former foes together. France’s determination to promote lasting peace by uniting under a common set of rules with Germany, its old invader, has no Asian equivalent. East Asia is therefore less stable than western Europe: a fissile mix of countries both rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, with far less agreement on common values or even where their borders lie. Small wonder Asians are skittish when the regional giant, ruled by a single party that draws little distinction between itself and the Chinese nation, plays up themes of historical victimhood and the need to correct for it.
How much better it would be if China sought regional leadership not on the basis of the past, but on how constructive its behaviour is today. If Mr Xi were to commit China to multilateral efforts to foster regional stability, he would show that he has truly learned the lessons of history. That would be far, far better than repeating it.
IN EARLY September President Xi Jinping will take the salute at a huge military parade in Beijing. It will be his most visible assertion of authority since he came to power in 2012: his first public appearance at such a display of missiles, tanks and goose-stepping troops. Officially the event will be all about the past, commemorating the end of the second world war in 1945 and remembering the 15m Chinese people who died in one of its bloodiest chapters: the Japanese invasion and occupation of China of 1937-45.
It will be a reminder of the bravery of China’s soldiers and their crucial role in confronting Asia’s monstrously aggressive imperial power. And rightly so: Chinese sacrifices during that hellish period deserve much wider recognition. Between 1937, when total war erupted in China, and late 1941, when the attack on Pearl Harbor brought America into the fray, China fought the Japanese alone. By the end of the war it had lost more people—soldiers and civilians—than any other country bar the
Yet next month’s parade is not just about remembrance; it is about the future, too. This is the first time that China is commemorating the war with a military show, rather than with solemn ceremony. The symbolism will not be lost on its neighbours. And it will unsettle them, for in East Asia today the rising, disruptive, undemocratic power is no longer a string of islands presided over by a god-emperor. It is the world’s most populous nation, led by a man whose vision for the future (a richer country with a stronger military arm) sounds a bit like one of Japan’s early imperial slogans. It would be wrong to press the parallel too far: China is not about to invade its neighbours. But there are reasons to worry about the way the Chinese Communist Party sees history—and massages it to justify its current ambitions.
History with Chinese characteristics
Under Mr Xi, the logic of history goes something like this. China played such an important role in vanquishing Japanese imperialism that not only does it deserve belated recognition for past valour and suffering, but also a greater say in how Asia is run today. Also, Japan is still dangerous. Chinese schools, museums and TV programmes constantly warn that the spirit of aggression still lurks across the water. A Chinese diplomat has implied that Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is a new Voldemort, the epitome of evil in the “Harry Potter” series. At any moment Japan could menace Asia once more, party newspapers intone. China, again, is standing up to the threat.
As our essay on the ghosts of the war that ended 70 years ago this week explains, this narrative requires exquisite contortions. For one thing, it was not the Chinese communists who bore the brunt of the fighting against Japan, but their sworn enemies, the nationalists (or Kuomintang) under Chiang Kai-shek. For another, today’s Japan is nothing like the country that slaughtered the inhabitants of Nanjing, forced Korean and Chinese women into military brothels or tested biological weapons on civilians.
Granted, Japan never repented of its war record as full-throatedly as Germany did. Even today a small but vocal group of Japanese ultra-nationalists deny their country’s war crimes, and Mr Abe, shamefully, sometimes panders to them. Yet the idea that Japan remains an aggressive power is absurd. Its soldiers have not fired a shot in anger since 1945. Its democracy is deeply entrenched; its respect for human rights profound. Most Japanese acknowledge their country’s war guilt. Successive governments have apologised, and Mr Abe is expected to do the same (see article). Today Japan is ageing, shrinking, largely pacifist and, because of the trauma of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, unlikely ever to possess nuclear weapons. Some threat.
The dangers of demonisation
China’s demonisation of Japan is not only unfair; it is also risky. Governments that stoke up nationalist animosity cannot always control it. So far, China’s big show of challenging Japan’s control of the Senkaku (or Diaoyu) islands has involved only sabre-rattling, not bloodshed. But there is always a danger that a miscalculation could lead to something worse.
East Asia’s old war wounds have not yet healed. The Korean peninsula remains sundered, China and Taiwan are separate, and even Japan can be said to be split, for since 1945 America has used the southern island of Okinawa as its main military stronghold in the western Pacific. The Taiwan Strait and the border between North and South Korea continue to be potential flashpoints; whether they one day turn violent depends largely on China’s behaviour, for better or worse. It is naive to assume America will always be able to keep a lid on things.
On the contrary, many Asians worry that China’s ambitions set it on a collision course with the superpower and the smaller nations that shelter under its security umbrella. When China picks fights with Japan in the East China Sea, or builds airstrips on historically disputed reefs in the South China Sea, it feeds those fears. It also risks sucking America into its territorial disputes, and raises the chances of eventual conflict.
Post-war East Asia is not like western Europe. No NATO or European Union binds former foes together. France’s determination to promote lasting peace by uniting under a common set of rules with Germany, its old invader, has no Asian equivalent. East Asia is therefore less stable than western Europe: a fissile mix of countries both rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, with far less agreement on common values or even where their borders lie. Small wonder Asians are skittish when the regional giant, ruled by a single party that draws little distinction between itself and the Chinese nation, plays up themes of historical victimhood and the need to correct for it.
How much better it would be if China sought regional leadership not on the basis of the past, but on how constructive its behaviour is today. If Mr Xi were to commit China to multilateral efforts to foster regional stability, he would show that he has truly learned the lessons of history. That would be far, far better than repeating it.
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