Razeen Sally
(Editor's Note: Mr. Sally is director of the European Centre for International Political Economy in Brussels.)
'Regional integration' is again the buzz in Asia, with two new initiatives proposed at last weekend's East Asia Summit in Thailand: Japan's 'East Asian Community' and Australia's 'Asia-Pacific Community.' China wants a trade bloc to include itself, the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan and South Korea. Then there's talk of a free-trade agreement just for northeast Asia, a Japan-inspired 'Asean+6' trade deal that would add Australia, New Zealand and India to China's proposal, and, oh, plans for financial or monetary cooperation, too.
It's time to distinguish Asian hype from Asian reality. Regional-integration proponents argue that the global economic crisis has accelerated the United States's decline and the rise of emerging powers, notably China. The severe contraction of export demand in the West and the probability that it will not soon return to precrisis growth rates strengthens the argument that Asian economies should 'rebalance' to exploit domestic consumption or export markets closer to home. Proponents argue all this demands stronger regional agreements and institutions. An Asian regional bloc covering as much as half the world's population and one-third of global output would be the third pole in the global economy in addition to the U.S. and Europe; its collective power would transform global economics -- and politics.
But regional integration still is no substitute for Western markets as a driver of growth. Consider East Asia, where economic integration is most advanced on the continent and indeed among any group of developing economies in the world. Intraregional trade as a share of East Asia's total trade increased to 55% from 37% between 1980 and 2006, a degree of cooperation somewhere between that seen within the European Union (66%) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (44%). Intraregional foreign direct investment has also increased.
Yet a big chunk of intraregional trade and FDI, centered on information and communications technology (ICT) products, is in the form of production-sharing arrangements for the export of final goods to the West. One company, for example, may invest in several factories in different East Asian countries and then ship components between them to be eventually assembled into a final good for export to the U.S. or Europe. Thus East Asian integration is tightly linked to global integration.
And that's the success story. In other economic sectors -- swathes of manufacturing, and the bulk of services and agriculture -- East Asia remains highly fragmented, with high protectionist barriers still in place. South Asia is the most fragmented region in the world. Its intraregional trade is barely above 10% of its total trade, and intraregional trade is about 5% of regional GDP. India's trade with its neighbors is less than 3% of its total trade. High intraregional trade and foreign-investment barriers are to blame.
Meanwhile, regional monetary and financial cooperation is embryonic in East Asia and almost nonexistent in South Asia. Both regions are much less open to financial trade and free currency flows than they are to goods trade and FDI. Blame here lies with highly restrictive national policies. Asian countries are far more connected with global financial centers in the West than they are with each other. The Asian Development Bank estimates that Asia had less than 10% of its portfolio assets invested in the region in 2006, compared with 30% held in the U.S.
There are several East Asian initiatives on financial and monetary cooperation, including the Chiang Mai Initiative on currency swaps, the Asian Bond Fund and the Asian Bond Market Initiative. But realistically, cooperation can only firm up gradually through modest steps such as increasing regional liquidity arrangements, improving regional economic-policy dialogue and extending initiatives to India.
On trade, regional integration initiatives, whether now in progress or proposed, would do little to fix integration problems. Asia's web of free-trade agreements -- 54 at last count, with 78 in the pipeline -- are 'trade light.' They are largely limited to tariff cuts, but have barely tackled nontariff regulatory barriers in goods, services and investment. That applies to equity and other restrictions on FDI, all manner of domestic controls on foreign services suppliers, discriminatory government procurement contracts, trade-restricting product standards and red tape and corruption in customs administration. These are much bigger obstacles to regional commerce than tariffs per se. And these deals are bedevilled by complex rules-of-origin requirements that blunt the effect of tariff elimination by increasing compliance costs for exporters and importers who have to show they're eligible for the reduced tariffs under the agreement.
Nor are regionwide trade deals a panacea. An initiative in the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, known as the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, has gone nowhere thanks to manifold and intractable political and economic differences.
Regional trade deals limited to East Asia or East-plus-South Asia would not have more traction. Discrimination against countries outside such a deal would compromise regional production networks linked to global supply chains, especially where significant tariffs still exist. Such a deal would also restrict the expansion of global supply chains to other areas of manufacturing, services and agriculture. Moreover, huge economic gaps and enduring political differences -- notably nationalist rivalries between China, Japan and South Korea, and between India and Pakistan -- will stymie Asian regional integration for some time to come.
For all these reasons, it is cloud-nine politics to expect strong, comprehensive trade deals in Asia any time soon. Rather the result is likely to be a very low common denominator -- more trade-light agreements that would add to the expanding 'noodle bowl' of overlapping bilateral trade deals.
Rather than pushing top-down, government-to-government integration methods, it would be better to focus on what works: market-led and bottom-up integration. Economies across East Asia -- Hong Kong and Singapore obviously, but also Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Southeast Asian countries, and indeed China -- have inserted themselves into global supply chains through unilateral opening to everyone, rather than negotiating trade deals with selected partners.
The key to future regional and global integration is renewed unilateral liberalization, this time going beyond the border to tackle behind-the-border regulatory barriers to imports, exports and FDI. These are necessary structural reforms to improve the domestic business climate. That, more than anything else, would extend multinational companies' regional supply chains and open up regional markets for domestic producers and consumers.
Asian regional institutions can be useful as 'chat forums' for policy dialogue and exchange of information, gradually improve mutual surveillance and transparency, promote trade facilitation and 'best-practice' measures, and at best cement unilateral liberalization and help to prevent its reversal in difficult times. But more ambitious regional initiatives are unachievable and inadvisable. Better to stick to what works.
“
區 域融合”再次成了亞洲的熱門詞匯。此前在泰國舉行的東亞峰會(East Asia Summit)出爐了兩個新的動議﹐它們分別是日本和澳大利亞提出東亞共同體(East Asia Summit)和亞太共同體(Asia-Pacific Community)。中國希望建立一個包括中國、東南亞國家聯盟(ASEAN)十國以及日韓在內的貿易區。然後還有其他說法﹐包括僅為東北亞設立自由貿 易協定、一個日本倡議的“ASEAN+6”貿易協議﹐即將澳大利亞、新西蘭和印度加入中國的提議﹔當然還其他財政金融合作計劃有待發佈。現 在是時候為亞洲在鬧劇和現實之間劃一分界了。倡導區域融合的人認為全球經濟危機加快了美國的沒落和新興經濟體的崛起﹐特別是中國。西方國家進口商品需求的 迅速萎縮以及無望很快恢復危機前水平的前景鞏固了如下觀點：即亞洲經濟體應該進行調整﹐以深化國內需求和開發週邊出口市場﹐因此﹐區域協議及機構應該得到 強化。亞洲地區的人口和產出分別佔據了全球二分之一和三分之一﹐它將成為美國和歐洲之外的“第三極”﹐其整體實力將改變全球經濟、乃至政治格局。
然 而﹐區域融合仍無法替代西方市場成為經濟增長的火車頭。以東亞為例﹐這裡的經濟融合度不僅在亞洲位列第一﹐在全球發展中經濟體中都無出其右。從1980年 至2006年﹐區域內貿易佔東亞整體貿易的比重已經從37%上升到了55%﹐可見東亞的合作程度已介於歐盟(European Union)的66%和北美自由貿易協定(North American Free Trade Agreement)的44%之間。該區域內的外商直接投資也有所增長。
然而﹐這些內貿和外商直接投資大多集中於信息和通訊技術產品﹐它們當中很多是以產量分成協議的形式將最終產品出口至西方市場。舉例來說﹐一家公司可以在多個東亞國家投資建廠﹐然後在它們之間運輸原料﹐並最終組裝成品出口至歐美市場。因此﹐東亞的融合與全球融合密切相關。
這 就是東亞的成功故事。在其他經濟領域中﹐例如製造業以及大﹞尷A務及農業領域中﹐東亞各國仍基本是各自為政的狀態﹐因為當地在這些領域依然高樹貿易保護主 義壁壘。南亞則是全球貿易融合度最低的地區。南亞區域內貿約佔當地整體貿易規模的10%﹐佔本地生產總值5%左右。印度與鄰國的貿易量佔整體貿易的比重尚 不足3%﹐這應歸咎於印度對區域內貿以及外商投資所設立諸多壁壘。
與此同時﹐貨幣及金融合作在東亞地區還在萌芽狀態﹐在南亞則幾乎無從談 起。這兩地對金融貿易和貨幣自由流動的開放程度遠不及對商品貿易和外商直接投資的開放。這是因為各國對此施加了嚴格的政策限制。亞洲各國與全球金融中心的 聯繫要比彼此之間的關聯緊密得多。亞洲開發銀行(ADB)估算﹐2006年時亞洲各國在進行投資時僅把不足10%的資產投於本地﹐而投向美國的則高達 30%。
東亞地區確有一些金融和貨幣合作動議﹐例如有關貨幣互換的清邁倡議(Chiang Mai Initiative)、亞洲債券基金(Asian Bond Fund)和亞洲債券市場倡議(Asian Bond Market Initiative)等。但是實際情況是﹐只有先逐步推行小規模協作﹐上述合作方有實現的可能﹐例如加大區域內流動性安排、增進區域經濟政策對話以及將 印度引入其中等。
就貿易領域而言﹐所有有關區域融合的提議﹐無論是進展當中的還是剛剛提出的﹐一概無助於解決當前問題。亞洲有一大堆的自 由貿易協議﹐已經敲定的有54個﹐談判當中的有78個﹐但它們都是避重就輕。這些協議大多僅侷限於下調關稅﹐但對於商品、服務和投資領域以非關稅形式存在 的監管壁壘卻幾乎未拿出解決之道。這些監管壁壘包括給外商直接投資設立股本和其他方面的限制、對外國服務供應商施加各類國內控制措施、在政府採購合同上區 別對待、設定貿易限制產品標準﹐而且在海關管理上還存在官僚腐敗等現象。從本質上來講﹐上述問題對區域商業的發展比關稅構成了嚴重得多的障礙。而且複雜的 原產地要求也弱化了關稅減免措施的效力﹐因為進出口商必須證明自己符合協議中標明的減稅資格﹐這會致使成本增加。
而且區域貿易協定也不是 什麼萬靈藥。一個在擁有21個成員國的亞洲太平洋經濟合作(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)論壇上提出的、名為亞太自由貿易區(Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific)的倡議已經不知所蹤﹐因為它面臨的政治經濟分歧實在是層出不窮、難以調和。
僅限於東亞或東南亞的區域貿易協定 也沒有好到那裡去。對非簽約國的歧視可能會給那些作為全球供應鏈一環的本地加工網絡構成威脅﹐如果涉及其他高關稅地區就更是如此。這樣的協議還會限制全球 供應鏈擴張至製造業、服務和農業的其他領域。此外﹐巨大的經濟鴻溝和持續的政治分歧（特別是中日韓三國以及印巴之間的民族主義爭端）都會不時給亞洲的融合 製造麻煩。
考慮到上述原因﹐期待亞洲能夠很快達成緊密而全面的貿易協議只是一種過於樂觀的觀點。其結果可能是大家勉強找到些貿易問題上的基本共同點﹐給本就不斷擴容的、內容重疊而又作用寥寥的雙邊貿易協議再添上一筆。
與 其推行一種自上而下、政府對政府的合作機制﹐還不如關注一些更為實際有效的方法﹐即市場為導向、自下而上的融合。東亞經濟體﹐特別是香港、新加坡、日本、 韓國、台灣、中國大陸以及東南亞國家通過向外界單邊敞開國門、而不是與選定的伙伴洽談貿易協議的辦法﹐已經將自己置身於全球供應鏈之中了。
未來區域和全球融合的關鍵是各個經濟體單邊開放的重啟﹐現在的重點是在關稅之外解決針對進出口和外商直接投資所設定的境內監管壁壘。有必要進行結構性改革來改善國內的商業環境。這將最為有效地延展跨國企業的區域供應鏈﹐並為本土生產商和消費者打開區域市場。
亞 洲區域合作機構可以被用作政策對話和信息交流的論壇﹐逐步改進相互監督、提高透明度﹐促進貿易便捷化以及最佳實務措施﹐其功效最多還能鞏固各經濟體的開放 ﹐防範他們在困難時期在政策上開倒車。但是﹐比這更有野心的區域融合倡議是無法實現和失策的。我們最好還是關注那些實際有效的方面。
（編者按：本文作者薩利(Razeen Sally)是布魯塞爾歐洲國際政治經濟中心主任。）
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