Bollywood Dreams: Film Centers Get Closer

亞洲視點

寶萊塢、好萊塢攜手造夢

2008年06月19日16:55

寶

萊塢當年從好萊塢“借”了個名字。投桃報李﹐現在﹐它開始向好萊塢輸送金錢。

Associated Press

印度億萬富翁安尼爾•安巴尼（右）與斯蒂芬•
斯皮爾伯格（左）

印 度億萬富翁安尼爾•安巴尼(Anil Ambani)目前正與斯蒂芬•斯皮爾伯格(Steven Spielberg)的夢工廠(DreamWorks SKG)商談合作。這一潛在協議將是關係日漸密切的全球兩大電影製作基地之間的最新動作﹐也是雙方目前最大手筆的合作。它將有望給雙方同時帶來轉變。

對 好萊塢來說﹐印度意味著一個新的大金庫﹕憑借經濟的強勁增長和巨大的觀眾群﹐寶萊塢目前財力雄厚。通過合作﹐好萊塢還能進一步打開印度電影市場﹔這是好萊 塢尚未攻克的少數幾個主要電影市場之一。過去一年﹐華特-迪士尼公司(Walt Disney Co.)、索尼公司(Sony Corp.)旗下的Sony Pictures、維亞康姆(Viacom Inc.)、時代華納公司(Time Warner Inc.)旗下的華納兄弟娛樂公司(Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc.)都不約而同地提高了對印度境內媒體公司或電影製作活動的投資規模。

對寶萊塢來說﹐在洛杉磯佔據一席之地或許意味著印度電影多年來希望走出本國及鄰國、躋身全球頂級電影製作陣容的雄心壯志將得以實現。印度製片商還打算引進好萊塢較高的製片價值及寶萊塢歷來缺乏的好萊塢式的電影製作體系。

Reliance Big Entertainment總裁拉傑什•桑尼(Rajesh Sawhney)接受採訪時表示﹐不可否認﹐好萊塢是全球電影的源頭。桑尼說﹐任何打算在全球市場拓展的電影公司都不僅需要依託本地市場優勢﹐還要擁有好 萊塢的經營戰略。該公司總部位於孟買﹐是安巴尼旗下公司。

桑尼拒絕對Reliance 與夢工廠之間的談判發表評論。《華爾街日報》週三報導說﹐夢工廠高管正在與Reliance Big Entertainment商談合作﹐計劃組建一家新的電影製作公司。據知情人士透露﹐Reliance ADA Group旗下的Reliance Big Entertainment計劃在斯皮爾伯格及其在夢工廠的團隊今年晚些時候離開維亞康姆旗下派拉蒙影業(Paramount Pictures)後為他們提供5-6億美元的資金支持。

Reliance Big Entertainment上個月還宣佈﹐計劃出資贊助涉及金•凱瑞(Jim Carrey)、湯姆•漢克斯(Tom Hanks)、布拉德•彼特(Brad Pitt)等影星的電影。該公司還表示﹐未來18個月計劃斥資超過10億美元﹐擴張其娛樂帝國。

寶 萊塢其他公司也不甘落後地紛紛進軍好萊塢﹐只是規模較小。例如﹐美國眼下的熱門影片《破天荒》(The Happening)就是由印度的UTV Motion Pictures聯合製作的。該公司還聯合製作了其他兩部在美國成績不錯的影片﹕米拉•奈兒(Mira Nair)執導的《同名之人》(The Namesake)和克里斯•洛克(Chris Rock)出演的《我想我愛我老婆》(I Think I Love my Wife)。UTV Motion Pictures是印度媒體集團UTV Software Communications Ltd.旗下子公司﹐華特-迪士尼持有後者32%的股權。

UTV表示﹐其投資的每一部好萊塢電影都掙了錢。儘管UTV仍將印地語電影視為主要業務﹐但投資美國電影使其實現了收入多元化﹐還積累了適用於本地市場的電影營銷經驗。

UTV Motion Pictures首席執行長西達爾•羅伊•卡普爾(Siddharth Roy Kapur)近期接受採訪時表示﹐印度沒必要從西方尋找英雄或流行文化﹐“但我們能夠從西方電影行業的運營模式中學到很多東西。”

根 據普華永道(PricewaterhouseCoopers)的數據﹐印度電影業去年總收入為25億美元﹐不到好萊塢的十分之一。但過去三年印度電影收入 保持了大約17%的年增幅﹐而美國這一數字不到3%。總的來說﹐新興市場增長速度要快於美國與大多數其他發達市場﹕同期亞太與拉美地區電影收入年增幅也超 過了6%。

Associated Press

印度電影天後艾西瓦婭•巴克罕和
她的丈夫

此 外﹐好萊塢與寶萊塢也逐漸開始共享影星。印度電影天後艾西瓦婭•巴克罕(Aishwarya Rai-Bachchan)已參演一些西方電影。一家印度電影公司最近宣佈﹐西爾維斯特•史泰龍(Sylvester Stallone)將在其下一部影片中擔任角色。寶萊塢還有意通過與好萊塢加強聯繫﹐為印度歌舞片培養海外市場。

今年84歲的印度影星戴夫•安南(Dev Anand)近期接受採訪時表示﹐“我期待著新機遇。我希望為國際觀眾製作一部英語電影。”這位印度最受歡迎的影星兼有演員、作家、導演多個身份﹐還擁有自己的製片廠。

回 溯好萊塢的過往﹐外資公司前來淘金的歷史可謂久遠﹐成功者卻寥寥無幾。但Reliance Big Entertainment或許擁有更好的機會﹐該公司在印度與美國的電影業務都取得了迅猛發展。Reliance旗下影院擁有超過400個銀幕（其中在 美國有251個銀幕）﹔還計劃未來10個月在印度再增加170個銀幕。該公司首席執行長桑尼表示﹐公司的目標並不只是在好萊塢投資。

他表示﹐“我們並不打算只當財務上的投資者﹐而是想成為一個戰略夥伴。我們希望創造一個全新的電影生態系統並創造更多附加值﹐因為新興市場在全球相對重要的地位正在改變娛樂經濟的格局。”

Reliance 還能通過其在印度的銀幕、電視、有線電視、互聯網以及手機網絡推廣好萊塢電影﹐促使印度觀眾觀看更多的好萊塢電影。ICICI Securities駐孟買分析師維卡斯•曼特里(Vikas Mantri)認為﹐Reliance擁有如此多的渠道﹐該公司甚至可以通過手機和網絡傳播內容。

Bollywood Dreams: Film Centers Get Closer

2008年06月19日16:55

HOLLYWOOD gave Bollywood its name. Now, Bollywood is giving Hollywood its money.

The potential deal between Indian billionaire Anil Ambani and Steven Spielberg's DreamWorks SKG is the latest -- and largest -- sign of a growing closeness between the world's two largest movie-making industries that promises to transform both.

For Hollywood, India promises a new and deep source of funding as Bollywood -- fueled by strong economic growth and a massive movie-going population -- throws off money. Hollywood also could gain greater access to one of the few major movie markets it has yet to crack. Walt Disney Co., Sony Corp.'s Sony Pictures, Viacom Inc. and Time Warner Inc.'s Warner Brothers Entertainment in the past year all have boosted their investments in media companies or making movies in India.

For Bollywood, a significant presence in Los Angeles would mark the fulfillment of years of ambition to extend beyond India and its neighbors and to crack the highest echelons of global film making. Indian movie makers also are looking to import Hollywood's higher production values and a Hollywood-style studio film-development system that Bollywood traditionally has lacked.

'It is irrefutable that Hollywood is the fountainhead of content for the world,' said Rajesh Sawhney, president of Reliance Big Entertainment, the Mumbai-based company controlled by Mr. Ambani, in an interview. 'Any company with global ambitions needs a home-market advantage and it also needs to have a Hollywood strategy.'

Mr. Sawhney declined comment on the discussions between Reliance and DreamWorks. The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that the principals of DreamWorks are negotiating a deal with Reliance Big Entertainment to form a new movie-making company. Reliance Big Entertainment, part of the Reliance ADA Group of companies, would put up between $500 million and $600 million to back Mr. Spielberg and his team at DreamWorks as they leave Viacom Inc.'s Paramount Pictures later this year, according to people familiar with the situation.

Reliance Big Entertainment also announced last month that it would finance movies by production houses connected to Jim Carrey, Tom Hanks, Brad Pitt and others. It also said it plans to spend more than $1 billion in the next 18 months to expand its entertainment empire.

Others in Bollywood are doing likewise, albeit on a smaller scale. The current U.S. box office hit 'The Happening,' for instance, was co-produced by India's UTV Motion Pictures. It also co-produced two other movies with wide U.S. release: 'The Namesake,' directed by Mira Nair and 'I Think I Love my Wife,' starring Chris Rock. UTV Motion Pictures is part of Indian media conglomerate UTV Software Communications Ltd., in which Disney owns a 32% stake.

UTV says it has made money on each of its Hollywood films. It still sees its main business as Hindi films. But backing films in the U.S. has diversified its revenue and provided lessons on how to market movies that it is applying at home.

'Indians don't have to look to the West for heroes or pop culture,' said Siddharth Roy Kapur, chief executive officer of UTV Motion Pictures, in a recent interview. 'Still, we have been able to learn a lot about the way the studio model works in the West.'

Total revenue in India's film industry was $2.5 billion last year, less than one-tenth the total made by Hollywood films, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers. But film revenue in India has been growing at around 17% a year for the past three years while growth in the U.S. has been less than 3%. Emerging markets in general have outpaced the U.S. and most other developed markets: Annual movie revenue has climbed more than 6% in the Asian-Pacific region and Latin America in the same period.

Hollywood and Bollywood are slowly starting to share their stars, too. The queen of Indian cinema, Aishwarya Rai-Bachchan, has appeared in a few Western films. One Indian film company recently announced that Sylvester Stallone will make a cameo in its next movie. Bollywood also sees an increasing market for its song and dance numbers overseas that closer links with Hollywood could foster.

'I'm looking for new horizons,' Dev Anand, 84 years old, the actor, writer, director, studio owner and one of India's most-beloved stars said in a recent interview. 'I want to do a film in English for the international audience.'

The history of foreign companies seeking to hit the big time in Hollywood is long and the successes few. Reliance Big Entertainment may stand a better chance because it already has been expanding rapidly in the movie business both in India and the U.S. It controls multiplexes with more than 400 movie screens, 251 of them in the U.S. It plans to add 170 more screens in India in the next 10 months. Mr. Sawhney, the chief executive, says the company intends to do more than just open its wallet in Hollywood.

'We are not looking to be just a financial investor, our aspiration is to be a strategic partner,' he said. 'We want to create a brand new ecosystem and add value as the relative importance of emerging markets is changing the dynamics of the entertainment economy.'

Reliance also may be able to persuade Indians to watch more Hollywood movies by promoting them through its movie screen, television, cable, Internet and cellphone networks in India. 'Because it has so many properties, Reliance can leverage the content even on mobiles and the Internet,' said Vikas Mantri, an analyst at ICICI Securities in Mumbai.

Beef for S. Korea 光化門一帶一望無際的燭光

Lee Jin-man/Associated Press

U.S. Said to Compromise on Beef for S. Korea

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

An agreement in which the U.S. would not export to South Korea beef from cattle under 30 months old is was sought to defuse South Korean furor over beef exports. Above, South Koreans protested against beef from the U.S.

【聯合報╱編譯張佑生／報導】 2008.06.20 02:18 am

南韓總統李明博19日舉行特別記者會，針對美國牛肉進口問題再度向南韓民眾道歉，保證不會讓30個月以上的美國牛肉進口。李明博並稱，他已對美國總統布希表明，如果不同意南韓的條件，無法同意美國牛肉進口。 這是李明博一個月來第二度為進口美國牛肉道歉。李明博表示要虛心接受國民的嚴厲指責，將以「從頭開始」的心態，大幅更換青瓦台幕僚，並進行內閣改組。李明 博對於競選支票之一的「朝鮮半島大運河」計畫也表示，如果民眾反對，就不會推動。南韓國土海洋部隨後決定解散運河計畫籌備小組，中止委託的相關研究。 李明博在電視轉播的演說中表示：「只要我們不想要，超過30個月的美國牛肉就不會出現在韓國人的餐桌上。我們將爭取美國政府的保證，相信美國也會尊重韓國國民的意願。」 李明博表示，本月稍早曾和美國總統布希通過電話，告知假如不能禁止感染狂牛症風險較高的較高齡牛肉，南韓將無法同意美國牛肉進口。2003年12月美國出 現第一起狂牛症病例後，美國牛肉輸往南韓遭到封殺。李明博四月訪美時宣布恢復進口，希望藉此加速雙邊自由貿易協定的簽署。 南韓與美國代表為此目前正在華府進行談判，18日沒有達成結論，19 日再議。李明博臨時附加禁運較高齡牛肉的條件，雖有違反承諾之嫌，但是上任四個月支持率已跌破20趴，十幾萬人走上街頭抗議，李明博對布希只好「硬」起來。 李明博以感性口吻表示：「6月10日晚間，我在青瓦台後山上看到了在光化門一帶一望無際的燭光，當獨自坐在漆黑的半山腰上，看到布滿街頭的燭光隊伍的瞬間，我為未能令國民安心而深深自責。」 李明博說：「即使是再緊要的國家問題，也應該充分考慮國民的意見。之前沒有充分了解國民對飲食安全的要求，也未能傾聽比自己更關心子女健康的母親們的心聲。」 南韓在野黨對李明博的演說反應普遍冷淡，首爾街頭19日晚間也照常上演反美國牛肉燭光示威。

rare good news out of Burma

The New York Times leads with rare good news out of Burma, where relief workers are coming back from some of the areas devastated by Cyclone Nargis with reports that survivors aren't doing as badly as initially feared. Of course, this doesn't mean survivors aren't struggling to stay alive, but there's little evidence that the delay in reaching the Irrawaddy Delta led to large numbers of deaths or disease outbreaks.

幾篇"亞洲三強敵 Rivals"的書介

Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade


The three pillars of the new Asian continent The rise of Asia’s three great powers has a precedent in 19th-century Europe. Will it, too, result in devastating wars?

By J. Michael Cole
STAFF REPORTER
Sunday, May 25, 2008, Page 14

Rivals: How the power struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next decade By Bill Emmott 342 pages Harcourt

“The thing you have to understand,” a senior official at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said of China and India, “is that both of us think that the future belongs to us. We can’t both be right.” Nothing could be truer of the future struggle for power in Asia — except, perhaps, that in addition to India and China, Japan, which until recently had been the principal modernizer in the region, will also seek to regain its position of leadership.

In Rivals, Bill Emmott, a former reporter for the Economist in Japan and, until 2006, the editor in chief of the magazine, shows us that no other region will have as fundamental an impact, or play as crucial a role, on the international scene than Asia in the coming decades. From intensifying regional trade, economic development and their impact on the environment to spending on defense and nuclear nonproliferation, Asia — with China, Japan and India acting as pillars — is transforming at a stunning pace, and the variables involved in this complex relationship are such that predicting its future course is an impossible task, something Emmott himself admits.

Still, by looking at key regional aspects — economics, defense, domestic politics, the environment, and history as an active contemporary agent — Emmott sees certain trends emerging that could help us narrow down the possible futures to “plausible pessimism” and “credible optimism.”

What quickly becomes evident is that China is now the center of gravity in the region, both in terms of its economic might and as the shaper of politics. Emmott, as do a handful of other authors, maintains that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is here to stay and that it has the wherewithal to deal with the number of isolated challenges that may arise domestically. Aside from environmental degradation and its impact on human health, no other issue in China has the potential, he argues, to mobilize the population to the extent that it could threaten the regime; nationalism, such as in Tibet or Xinjiang, is too localized to spread throughout China, which thus makes it possible for the CCP to rely on force to put down disturbances. Its economy, meanwhile, has become solid and mature enough to withstand most shocks.

Japan, no so long ago the undisputed regional leader, has been supine since the 1990s, but Emmott sees signs that its government has launched reforms that, in the long term, could bring about its recovery. A certain sense of urgency, inspired by China’s rise, could also accelerate that process and encourage those within the Liberal Democratic Party (and in Washington) who seek to amend the country’s peaceful Constitution so that Japan could become a “normal” country once again and play the role it believes it should be playing in the region. In Emmott’s view, discarding Japan as a passe regional power would be a serious oversight, as would ignoring recent reporting that a majority of Japanese support their government taking a harder stance vis-a-vis China.

Last is India, the oft-forgotten emerging power whose role as a strategic counterweight on the balance-of-power chessboard could be the determining factor in the future course of the region. While India remains nowhere near as developed as China or Japan, it is nevertheless beginning to make its presence felt in some regional institutions, joint military exercises, and through the modernization of its forces. Furthermore, sensing its utility as a means to tie down China, the US and Japan have struck deals with India that could help buttress the modernization of the world’s largest democracy. In fact, Emmott opens his book by arguing that even if it meant blowing a hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, US President George W. Bush’s nuclear pact with Delhi in 2006 was a strategic tour de force, as it added a third leg to the regional balance and ensured that Delhi would side with the US and Japan should relations with China deteriorate. In response, Beijing has continually sought to exclude India from regional multilateral organizations. Shifting alliances notwithstanding, Emmott is optimistic that the regional powers and the smaller countries that gravitate around them see no advantage in compromising all the progress that has been made in the past decade by waging wars, an argument that pessimists would argue was also made when similar dynamics obtained in Europe at the turn of the 19th century — with two devastating world wars to follow. Why Emmott does not believe a repeat of the European fiasco is likely in Asia is partly the result of the somewhat benevolent, albeit not always welcome, presence of the US, which acts as a brake on those who would be inclined to use war as an instrument of foreign policy. However, how Beijing perceives that presence will have a direct impact on the future direction of China’s military; if the US, alone or through alliances, is seen to be seeking to contain it, conflict would be likelier, or China could actively pursue a closer alliance with Pakistan to counter India. Other tensions, which lurk close to the surface, could spark conflict. From the unresolved and poisonous issues of Japan’s responsibility in World War II to the flawed Tokyo Trials, post-Kim Jong-il North Korea to Islamic radicalism and nuclear weapons in Pakistan, instability in Myanmar, the Taiwan question, unresolved border disputes, Tibet after the Dalai Lama and disputed islands in the East China Sea, Emmott argues that the likeliest source of conflict — which could draw in other powers, such as the US — will be accidents and miscommunication, or, as he puts it, one side misjudging the cost of warfare in the modern world. Wars by proxy — a tool of the Cold War that remains relevant today — in places such as Myanmar, Tibet, North Korea and Pakistan — could also be launched as the three powers position themselves for the future. As demand grows, competition abroad over natural resources could also serve as a conflict accelerator between those three countries.

Emmott’s “new” Asia is a dynamic one, filled with potentialities, whose global impact will only become greater as its economies continue to grow. Through economic exchanges and the birth of regional alliances like the East Asian Summit, the ill-defined geographical Asia of old is quickly turning into a more tightly knit polity that, for better or worse, will have a greater say in global affairs and whose participation in international bodies such as the UN Security Council and the G8 will be paramount if those organizations are to remain relevant.


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英国《每日电讯报》:中国--世界新统治者(中/英)

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邓小平不曾支持这种宣传。这位现代中国建筑师警告弟子们要保持头脑冷静，保持低调。政治局忘了他的建议。随着奥运将至，中国在世界舞台上前所未有的高调。关于中国如何改变世界的信息突然狂热起来，出版商无法自控。

　　此类书籍大多数断言未来属于中间王国（Middle Kingdom 中國）。甚至世界银行都曾预测中国将在不到二十年内超过美国成为世界卓越的经济体。然而，值得回顾的是，在八十年代也有很多关于日本将主导全球的书籍。

　　《经济学人》前编辑、日本专家艾默特（Bill Emmott）关注中国与日本、印度的关系。他提出一种令人向往的可能性，“生机勃勃的商品、服务和资本单一市场延伸开去，从东京到德黑兰，无处不在。” 然而，《对手：中、印、日角力将如何塑造我们的未来十年（Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade）》一书指出亚洲“微笑外交”背后的三国演义，这种权力斗争可能破坏它们共同的成就。

　　日本前外相麻生太郎表示，“中国和印度互相憎恨了一千年，为何认为现在会有所不同？”印度外交部一位“非常高级”的官员表示，“你必须明白，我们（中国和印度）都认为未来是属于我们的。我们不可能都是对的。”

　　政治不信任催生了军备竞赛，三国都急于打造更大规模的海军。中国潜艇偷偷进入日本水域，而印度从欧洲购买两艘航母，而且在建造第三艘。艾默特支持(錯誤翻譯 注意到)中国去年军费增长近18%，达230亿英镑；政府热衷于让解放军获得新装备。

　　由于西藏、台湾和朝鲜这些明显的引火点变得更加明显，艾默特担心这些国家和西方之间的沟通渠道不足。“冷战时期，美国和苏联之间”由更好的沟通联系。

　　日本也试图通过增强印度来抵消中国在地区日益增长的主导权。如今印度是日本最大的海外援助接收国。中国反过来伸张自己在印度洋的影响力，保障航 线的安全，它的船只从非洲运来石油和金属，并把它的廉价商品运往欧洲。中国主席胡锦涛定期访问拉美、非洲、甚至塞舌尔，展现中国到处攫取资源的战略。

　　但这种洞悉不多。艾默特的书的问题在于二手资料。无法透露我们目前还不知道的事情。

　　相反，卡纳（Parag Khanna）的《第二世界：帝国与新全球秩序的影响力（The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order）》则有很多来自五十个国家的第一手报道，他认为这些国家将决定我们的未来。这位30岁的伦敦经济学院博士生为一个智囊机构工作，实际上走遍了 他的“第二世界”：东欧、中亚、拉美、中东和亚洲。

　　他在旅行中得出一个论点：世界正分裂成三个帝国，美国、欧洲和中国寻求拓展它们在发展中国家当中的影响力。

　　他指出欧盟扩张如何自我更新永存，因为新成员担心变成欧盟的遥远边界，试图把它们的邻国也拉进来。

　　尽管他的散射办法没能深度报道任何一个国家，但他的侧面冲击往往比艾默特的分析有更大的效果。

　　卡纳认为，尽管十年前亚洲忙于处理中国崛起，但如今有了不同的感觉。中国变得越自信，与邻国的合作就越多。他援引一位马来西亚战略家的话：“亚 洲国家渐渐不那么把中国视为威胁，特别是由于它的崛起给它们创造了重大经济机遇，而且已经变成亚洲文化自豪感的聚焦点。”（作者 Malcolm Moore，此文为书评，评论的是Bill Emmott的《Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade》以及Parag Khanna的《The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order》）

　　译文为摘译，英文原文：http://www.telegraph.co.uk/arts/mai...19/boemm119.xml

　　

China: the new rulers of the world

Malcolm Moore reviews Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade by Bill Emmott and The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order by Parag Khanna

Deng Xiaoping would have never stood for this sort of publicity. The architect of modern China warned his disciples always to "keep a cool head and maintain a low profile". The Politburo has forgotten his advice.

With the Olympics approaching, China has never had a higher profile on the world stage. Barely a day passes without some startling and barely plausible fact: apparently a town the "size of London" is appearing on the Pearl River Delta every year.

Publishers have been unable to contain themselves over this sudden frenzy of information about how China is transforming the world. The piles of books about China seem to be growing at the same pace as those new megalopolises.

Most of these books pronounce that the future belongs to the Middle Kingdom. After all, even the World Bank has predicted that China will overtake America as the world's pre-eminent economy in less than two decades. It is worth remembering, however, that there were plenty of similar books about Japan's imminent global domination in the 1980s.

Bill Emmott, a former editor of The Economist and an expert on Japan, has looked at China in relation to Japan and India, the other emerging Asian powers. He raises the delicious possibility of "a single vibrant market for goods, services and capital, one that stretches all the way from Tokyo to Teheran".

advertisementHowever, Rivals points out that behind the "smile diplomacy" of Asia, a power struggle between the three could undermine their mutual success.

Emmott's argument is best illustrated when he does some basic reporting.

　　Taro Aso, Japan's foreign minister, tells him: "China and India have hated each other for a thousand years. Why should things be different now?"

　　Meanwhile, a "very senior" Indian official at the foreign ministry says: "The thing you have to understand is that both of us think that the future belongs to us. We can't both be right."

　　This political distrust has given birth to an arms race, with all three countries rushing to build larger navies.

　　Chinese submarines have sneaked into Japan's waters, while India has bought two aircraft carriers from Europe and is building a third. Emmott notes that China increased its defence spending by almost 18 per cent last year, to £23 billion; the government is keen to keep the plump generals of the People's Liberation Army on side with new toys.

　　With obvious flashpoints becoming ever more apparent in Tibet, Taiwan and North Korea, Emmott worries that the channels of communication between the countries and the West are poor. There were better communication links "between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War".

　　Japan is also trying to offset China's increasing dominance in the region by helping to strengthen India, which is now its largest recipient of overseas aid. Japan financed the building of the New Delhi Metro and is now paying for a freight route connecting Calcutta, Delhi and Bombay.

　　In turn, China is imposing itself in the Indian Ocean, where it needs to secure safe routes for its tankers to bring in oil and metals from Africa and take its cheap trinkets to Europe.

　　The news that the country's president, Hu Jintao, regularly tours Latin America, Africa and even the Seychelles rarely makes the papers, but it helps to illuminate China's strategy of grabbing resources wherever it can.

　　But this sort of insight is rare. The problem with Emmott's book is that it is what journalists would call a "cuts job" - a thesis culled from secondary sources. It is elegantly written and strong on economic analysis, but it tells us little that we do not already know.

　　By contrast, Second World by Parag Khanna is brimming with enthusiastic first-hand reportage from the 50 countries he says will determine our future. Khanna, a 30-year-old PhD student at the London School of Economics who works for a think tank, actually toured through his "second world": Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia.

　　"I never left a country," he promises, "until I had developed a sense of its meaning on its own terms, until I had assimilated a blend of perspectives from cities, villages and landscapes, based on conversations with a wide variety of people, including officials, academics, journalists, entrepreneurs, taxi drivers and students."

　　This is the sort of reporting that newspapers can no longer afford to send correspondents to do, and his book is compelling and exciting, even if his bold claims sometimes betray his inexperience.

　　The thesis that emerges from his travels is that the world is being split into three empires, with the US, Europe and China seeking to extend their influence among developing countries.

　　He points out how the expansion of the European Union is self-perpetuating, since new members, wary of being the furthermost border of the union, try to convert their neighbours to the cause. Ukraine, for example, "has even sent maps to Brussels showing Ukraine shaded European blue - Mitteleuropa, not Osteuropa".

　　Even if his scattergun approach fails to cover any country in depth, his glancing blows often have greater impact than Emmott's considered analysis.

　　While Asia may have been preoccupied with China's emergence 10 years ago, Khanna argues, today it feels differently. The more confident China becomes, he says, the more it will co-operate with its neighbours.

　　He quotes a Malaysian strategist: "Asian nations are gradually perceiving China as less of a threat, especially since its rise creates major economic opportunities for each of them, and has become a rallying point of Asian cultural pride."

誰是亞洲新霸主？

【聯合報╱吳凌遠／報導】 2008.06.15 02:24 am

中、印、日爭鋒 撼動全球大未來 印度崛起，高度經濟成長連帶將使鄰國巴基斯坦和孟加拉人民脫貧。 美聯社資料照片 次級房貸風暴外加油價狂飆，眼看拖垮二十世紀以來美國的全球霸主位置。十九世紀末日不落的大英帝國退位，世界舞台的聚光燈由歐洲位移到美洲，眼前洞見世局 的經貿專家，相繼大膽預告：二十一世紀是亞洲當家的時代。但亞洲（尤其是東亞、南亞）不像美國儼然睥睨群倫的超級航空母艦，中國／台灣、南／北韓、印度／ 巴基斯坦幾個鄰近政治體間的衝突、對立和猜忌，隨時有擦槍走火風險，是第三次世界大戰的準火藥庫。抽絲剝繭替亞洲的紛擾變局把脈，前《經濟學人》雜誌總編 輯比爾‧艾摩特（Bill Emmott）新近出版眾家矚目的《三雄爭霸》（Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade），自宏觀的歷史脈絡與經濟動線解析，剖述中國、印度和日本的權力競逐，對全球大未來有關鍵性影響。 亞洲政治高風險：中國 威脅日本，日本挑戰中國 艾摩特是知名「日本通」，1980年代出任《經濟學人》東京辦事處主任。他對經濟走勢的嗅覺敏銳，1989年全球看好日本暴衝的經濟表現，咸信會取代美國 成為經濟霸主，艾摩特獨排眾議以新書《太陽依舊西沉》（The Sun Also Sets）直指日本經濟發展將瞬時跌落如雲霄飛車，有如先知料事如神。去年首季，艾摩特又提出「未來十年是日本新黃金年代」觀點，強調日本企業的技術與生 產力，絕對能在高科技導向的全球趨勢中搶得優勢。 《三雄爭霸》數字說話：中國今年即將超越德國成為世界第三大經濟體；十年內，印度的經濟規模會超越殖民母國英國。十五年後，中國的經濟成長可望攻上高原 期，維持年增率百分之五；印度屆時仍可保有百分之十的高成長。2025年前，中國及印度「經濟生產成長三倍」的預估不容等閒視之，加上亞洲會「長時間持續 富有強盛」，共伴效應驚人。 但繁榮與安定不必然攜手出現，「經濟成長是過程，不是目的」，打造當今亞洲局勢的或許是經濟，但形塑明日亞洲的絕對是政治。「亞洲仍是高風險地區」，癥結 並非與西方的對抗，而是三個大國：日本、中國和印度爭霸主地位。中國崛起威脅日本，日本復甦挑戰中國；新興的印度成為經濟與政治的平衡勢力。 預估2025年前，中國經濟生產成長三倍。 美聯社資料照片 衝突熱點：台灣、西藏、 北韓，緊張態勢有增無減 艾摩特認為這是史上頭一遭亞洲同時出現三強鼎立，近似十九世紀歐洲的權力平衡政治，「他們彼此尊重或水乳交融就罷了，可惜不是，而且糟多了。」日本前外相 麻生太郎曾說：「中國和印度有千百年世仇，憑什麼會驟然改變？」印度外交部高層官員說得露骨：「中國和印度都認為自己是未來的領袖，顯然領袖只有一個。」 政治的不信任造成軍備競賽，眼前三強為競逐影響力、市場、資源和戰略利益早已鉤心鬥角：日本想藉拉抬印度來抵消中國日增的國力，中國極力擴展印度洋的勢 力，確保油輪和貨輪暢行無阻。 台灣、西藏和北韓等衝突熱點使緊張態勢有增無減，艾摩特擔心這些亞洲強國彼此間可能因缺乏溝通管道讓情勢一發不可收拾，「冷戰時期美蘇的溝通，恐怕還更暢 通」。他預料亞洲新興強權之間的緊張將持續，和歐美的既得利益霸權也有扞格，是否能冷靜處理，攸關本世紀的和平與繁榮。「經濟和商業競爭有極正面的效果， 但政治可不一定。」 未來十年是日本新黃金年代。 美聯社資料照片 光明面藍圖：由日本東京 到伊朗德黑蘭的單一市場 艾摩特替全球未來描繪出兩張藍圖：負面的是中國經濟轉型失敗、民族主義高漲，導致與美國和印度關係緊繃，甚至對台灣短暫「動武」；看光明面是中國成功轉 型，印度經濟成長連帶使巴基斯坦和孟加拉人民脫貧，印度、中國和日本緊密結合，與亞洲各國共創「由日本東京延伸到伊朗德黑蘭的貨物、服務與資金單一市 場」。 大好榮景中，「先知」艾摩特也看到面對的挑戰：中國必須調控經濟不過熱，也要妥善處理環境問題；印度要克服教育和基礎建設的積弱；第二大經濟體日本則有人 口老化的危機。艾摩特希望見到亞洲取法歐洲，建立歐盟及北約的經濟與軍事同盟模式，「亞洲也需要類似的分工」。種族、國家、信仰和認同都會引爆危機，最好 的牽制是避免一國獨大。艾摩特強調，亞洲的和平與繁榮關係人類的未來，亞洲大好是「二十一世紀最重要也最有利的發展」。

Investors Seek Asian Options to Costly China

Justin Mott for The New York Times

When it comes to multinational manufacturing, Vietnam is fast becoming the new China. The electronics maker Samsung is building a factory in Yenphong Industrial Park, in Yenphong, Vietnam.

By KEITH BRADSHER

Published: June 18, 2008

HANOI — Canon is no longer building or expanding factories in China, but the company is doubling its work force at a printer factory outside Hanoi to 8,000.

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Investment and Concerns in Asia

Nearby, Nissan is expanding a vehicle engineering center. Hanesbrands, the underwear company based in Winston-Salem, N.C., is setting up two new factories here, as is the Texhong Textile Group from Shanghai.

China remains the most popular destination for foreign industrial investment in the world, attracting almost $83 billion last year. But a growing number of multinational corporations are pursuing a strategy that companies and analysts call “China plus one,” establishing or expanding Asian bases outside China, particularly in Vietnam.

A long list of concerns about China is feeding the trend: inflation, shortages of workers and energy, a strengthening currency, changing government policies, even the possibility of widespread civil unrest someday. But most important, wages in China are rising close to 25 percent a year in many industries, in dollar terms, and China is no longer such a bargain.

Even as companies seek other places to make their goods, they are stalked by overheated economies: in Vietnam, for example, inflation was 25.2 percent last month.

More than corporate profit margins are at stake. When the cost of making goods in Asia rises, American consumers inevitably feel pain. The Labor Department said Thursday that import prices were 4.6 percent higher in May than a year earlier for goods from China and 6.4 percent higher for goods from southeast Asia.

Companies are using the China-plus-one strategy to mitigate the risks of overdependence on factories in one country.

Multinational corporations are “thinking about all the world and keeping a balance” between China and other countries, said Edward Kang, the chief executive of Ever-Glory International, a sportswear manufacturer in Nanjing, China. Ever-Glory, which sells to Wal-Mart and Kohl’s, is building a factory in Vietnam.

Companies remaining in China are desperately seeking to control costs.

“We will maintain our capacity in China, but we will make it more automatic and reduce the number of employees,” said Laurence Shu, the chief financial officer of Shanghai-based Texhong, one of the world’s largest makers of cotton and spandex fabric.

To limit labor costs, Hanesbrands is building a largely automated factory in Nanjing. But the company is also building a factory in Vietnam, in addition to a factory it bought here, and two more in Thailand.

Gerald Evans, the president for global supply chain at Hanesbrands, said that compared with China, “we found more ready availability of both land and labor in both Vietnam and Thailand.” Hanesbrands will be shifting some manufacturing from Mexico and Central America to Asia.

In China, where rural villages are running low on able-bodied young workers to send to factories, wages are rising more than 10 percent a year for many assembly-line workers. And pay is rising even faster for skilled workers, like machinery repair technicians.

In coastal provinces with ready access to ports, even unskilled workers now earn $120 a month for a 40-hour workweek, and often considerably more; wages in inland provinces, where transport is costlier, are somewhat lower but also rising fast. While Chinese wages are still less than $1 an hour, factory workers in Vietnam earn as little as $50 a month for a 48-hour workweek, including Saturdays.

Texhong estimates that average labor costs for each textile worker in China will rise 16 percent this year, including increases in benefits costs — on top of a 12 percent increase last year. New regulations are making it harder for companies to avoid paying for benefits, like pensions, further increasing labor costs.

When those increases are combined with a currency rising against the dollar at an annual pace of up to 10 percent, labor costs in China are now climbing at 25 percent a year or more.

Inflation in China — more than 8 percent in February, March and April and 7.7 percent in May — raises the prospect that labor costs will soar even faster soon. That could push up prices for a wide range of goods exported to the United States.

China is also phasing out its practice of charging lower corporate tax rates for foreign-owned companies. By contrast, Vietnam still offers foreign investors a corporate tax rate of zero for the first four years, and half the usual rate of 10 percent for the next four years.

Foreign direct investment in China has grown by a third over the last three years. By contrast, foreign direct investment has more than doubled in this period in the Philippines, quintupled in India and soared more than eightfold in Vietnam.

Faster rates of increase in other Asian countries had partly reflected lower starting points. But investment is still growing quickly, and now it’s growing from high levels. For example, foreign investment in Vietnam reached nearly $18 billion last year.

A popular saying among Western investors is that Vietnam is the next China. Cambodia, with even lower wages attracting garment manufacturers, is called the next Vietnam.

But Vietnam has only 1/16th of China’s population and Cambodia has one-fifth of Vietnam’s. As foreign investors leap into each new country, they drive up the cost of workers and goods, a dynamic that makes it less likely that a shift in investment patterns will hold down inflation in American imports.

A recent survey by Grant Thornton, a global accounting and consulting firm, found that companies were more worried about attracting and retaining critical staff in Vietnam than anywhere else in the world. (China was a close second.)

“We trained them, we educated them and then they quit,” said Akira Akashi, the chairman of Nissan Techno, a division of Nissan that designs vehicles.

The company plans to expand to 1,400 engineers in Vietnam by 2010. Beginning engineers here still earn just $200 a month, less than half the salary in China and less than a tenth of American and Japanese salaries.

Even blue-collar labor is becoming harder to find. In addition to the size of the labor force, infrastructure is also likely to be a brake on how fast China plus one can expand. Most countries in Asia, including Vietnam, have not improved transportation links as quickly as China. Lengthy traffic jams slow down shipments and drive up costs.

Vietnam’s biggest selling point for many companies is its political stability. Like China, it has a nominally Communist one-party system that crushes dissent, keeps the military under tight control and changes government policies and leaders slowly.

“Communism means more stability,” Mr. Shu, the chief financial officer of Texhong, said, voicing a common view among Asian executives who make investment decisions. At least a few American executives agree, although they never say so on the record.

Democracies like those in Thailand and the Philippines have proved more vulnerable to military coups and instability. A military coup in Thailand in September 2006 was briefly followed by an attempt, never completed, to impose nationalistic legislation penalizing foreign companies.

“That sent the wrong signal that we would not welcome foreign investment — this has ruined the confidence of investors locally and internationally,” the finance minister Surapong Suebwonglee said in an interview in Bangkok.

Yet, like China, Vietnam does not offer complete tranquillity either. For instance, workers are becoming more vocal and staging more strikes, despite a government ban on independent unions.

Nearly 20,000 workers walked out this spring at a Nike shoe factory run by a Taiwanese contractor. The workers went back to work only when given a 10 percent raise, to $55 a month, and a larger meal subsidy.

That restive pattern is also evident in India, which is expected to have more people than China within two decades.

But many companies are leery of poor roads and congested ports in India, as well as long sailing times for components that must be shipped from existing factories in China.

And even in India, demand for workers with industrial skills or the ability to speak English outstrips the supply — and their wages have been rising by 10 to 20 percent a year.

That has led to worries about India’s long-term competitiveness, even for those investing heavily there, like Ford Motor, which is planning to spend $500 million on factory expansion.

“I keep saying to our people, ‘How long will it be until we’re priced out of the market?’ ” said John Parker, Ford’s executive vice president for Asia, Pacific and Africa. “The impact of that some day is you’re no longer low-cost.”

Keith Bradsher reported in April from Vietnam and later from Bangkok, Beijing, Hong Kong, Manila and Guangzhou, China.

推理大师新作《中国人》撼动欧洲文坛

文学艺术 | 2008.06.16

推理大师新作《中国人》撼动欧洲文坛

Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: 《中国人》封面

欧洲首屈一指的推理大师贺宁•曼凯尔（Henning Mankell）新作《中国人》刚刚上架，就成为各大媒体的热评对象。小说一开头，就是一幕令人不寒而栗的恐怖画面：

赫蒂斯瓦尔（瑞典）的郊外有一座村庄，村里有十余间房子，疏疏落落的，白雪覆顶。可是没有一丝烟从烟囱里冒出。警察在这里发现了18具血肉模糊的尸体，有些甚至遭到了肢解。显而易见，凶手以各个击破的手法连环作案，行动之快，手段之狠实属罕见。

著有《韦兰德探案系列》（Wallander）的瑞典惊悚名家曼凯尔素有"悬念大师"之称。这一次，他以血洗山庄的屠杀规模从一开始就将刺激基调定得很高，随后的600页文字亦不失水准地充满张力，时刻牵动着读者的紧绷的神经。

全球化时代的探案文学作品

《中国人》显然并非一本通俗意义上的"侦探小说"。曼凯尔善于将人物命运放置于时代洪流之中，而在这股力道强大的激流冲刷之下，疑犯、警官纷纷退后到毫不起眼的二线位置，而将真正的历史舞台让位给久远的过去、遥远的异国。

时间上溯到19世纪下半叶，故事情节渐渐在三个逃亡广东的亲生兄弟之间铺展开来。然而，无情现实很快就将他们异地求生、脱贫致富的美梦击得粉碎。不 法黑帮将他们作为廉价苦力贩卖到北美，加入到修建铁路的劳工队伍之中，受尽来自欧洲--例如瑞典的白人工头的欺凌。最后，三兄弟只剩一人活着回到了中国。

至于这段百年世仇与赫村血案之间到底有什么关联？这成了女法官碧姬妲‧罗斯林的调查重点。这位来自赫尔辛堡的女子敏感、坚韧、机智，承受着不幸婚姻 的负荷。罗斯林母亲的养父母也在这起案件中遇害，这更激励了她稽查真凶的决心。随着这起跨国大案的层层深入，罗斯林横穿整个瑞典，又相继追踪来到哥本哈 根、北京、伦敦。部分章节甚至是以津巴布韦、莫桑比克为背景--可以毫不夸张地说，《中国人》是一部全球化时代的侦探文学作品。

现居莫桑比克的瑞典作家曼凯尔深谙国际竞争的地区不公及民众疾苦，他以一种清淡疏离的笔调不断将读者推向风云际会的斗争峰巅，比起一部白骨累累的殖 民血泪史，一桩18人的命案又算得了什么呢？许多震聋发聩的设问是没有答案的，例如："第一世界"国家究竟要对所属殖民地承担怎样的罪责？而作为一个经济 崛起的大国--中国，清偿历史旧账又会造成怎样的后果？

中国人真的要成为新殖民主义者？

Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: 贺宁•曼凯尔（Henning Mankell）1948 年出生于瑞典北部小镇的曼凯尔堪称当代欧洲最负盛名的作家之一，其著作已被译成35种語言，全球销量超过2400万本。代表作品《韦兰德探案系列》本本畅 销，蜚声世界，并被搬上银幕，备受好評。《无脸杀手》曾获1991年瑞典侦探奖和斯堪地那维亚侦探小说作家协会奖，《燃烧的傀儡》则摘取2001年英国侦 探小说作家协会"金匕首奖"。

日前在接受《法兰克福汇报》记者采访时，曼凯尔表示，创作《中国人》的最初动机源于六年前的一个报道。当时，中国政府决定出资帮助莫桑比克建造一间 工厂。他们带来了自己的施工队伍以及全部的建筑材料。当然，他们也雇佣本地工人。不久，有传闻说，非洲工人遭到中国工头的虐待甚至殴打。这则负面消息很快 就被政府摆平。然而，曼凯尔不禁自问："中国在同西方国家争夺非洲的原料之战中真的要扮演一个新殖民主义的角色吗？" 从那时起，曼凯尔就开始酝酿《中国人》的腹稿。

但另一方面，曼凯尔称赞中国在非洲建设方面发挥了积极作用，并对西方国家构成挑战。他说，西方媒体的谴责在一定程度上是出于嫉妒和伪善。他说,"他们总是关心非洲人的死。而我却要讲述非洲人的生。"

曼凯尔深信，"美国的头号经济大国地位一定会被中国取代，而这一变化将对每一个人的未来命运产生深刻影响"。纵观历史，人类社会总是在怨怨相报的过 程中重蹈以往的悲剧。许多早该被彻底清除的苦难反而以乘方倍形式迅速膨胀，并在高压政治体系之内产生危险的爆炸力。这是人类最大的犯罪。

Strait talking again 台海关系：复杂游戏刚开始

中国 | 2008.06.16

台海关系：一场复杂游戏还刚刚开始

Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: “重逢”

上周中国大陆海协会和台湾海基会在北京重开协商会谈，并签署有关周末包机和大陆游客赴台旅游的协议。这是两岸两会在中断9年后的首次对话，各地中文媒体予 以高度评价，称之为历史性的会谈，并对两岸关系的改善寄予极大期望。这样的期望是否现实？这次对话对台海关系的前景将产生怎样的影响？德国之声记者就此采 访了德国科隆大学台湾问题专家哈尔伯艾森。

德国之声：海协会和海基会此次会谈签署了有关周末包机和大陆游客赴台旅游的协议，这是不是这次会谈最重要的成果？

哈尔伯艾森：会谈最主要的成果是，双方在中断相当长一段时间后，重新开启了对话。此外，这两个协议为进一步的谈判开了个头，使 双方触及两岸关系中更具难度的实质性问题成为可能，对话将向什么方向发展，还有待观察。

德国之声：您认为哪些问题更有难度？

哈尔伯艾森：根本问题是确定台海两岸的长期关系。现在达成的两个协议只是一种谨慎的开放措施。尤其是包机的做法，如果我们看得远一些的话，更是对台 湾主体性的一种保护。因为如果包机的目的是将来实现定期直航，这就让台商有可能把家人留在台湾，自己往返于大陆和台湾，而不是在大陆定居。

德国之声：海协会和海基会在会谈中还谈到了在台北和北京互设办事机构。台湾和海外媒体对这一规划十分重视。您认为这是一个关键的步骤吗？

哈尔伯艾森：据我掌握的信息，目前这一规划的具体内容还不是很清楚。这两个民间或半官方的组织能互设代表机构当然是个进步。但目前看来，办事处的目 的仅仅是为了方便旅游者的往来，而并非具有完整功能的代表机构，也不是台海之间建立的第一条沟通渠道。尽管有种种矛盾和紧张气氛，这样的渠道在陈水扁政府 和北京之间仍然存在，而且得到了充分的利用。

德国之声：人们很关心的一个问题是，台海之间能否建立定期协商会谈的机制，您认为双方离这一目标还有多远？

哈尔伯艾森：现在双方只是迈出了第一步，真正复杂困难的问题还在后面。双方现在做的，是通往建立互信的第一个步骤。迄今为止，台湾和中国大陆之间还缺乏相互信任，在某些方面甚至连理解都谈不上。现在通过对话和互动交往就是为了建立这样的互信。

德国之声：台湾民众对大陆的确缺乏信任。在江丙坤来大陆之前就有人担心他会对北京做出太大让步，要求他不要丢掉台湾的尊严。江丙坤这次有没有让台湾人失望？

哈尔伯艾森：这要看是哪一部份台湾人。从今年一月的立委选举到三月的总统大选，并没有改变台湾人对两岸问题的基本立场。仍有很大一部分台湾人对大陆 抱批评态度，他们大多是民进党的选民。我们不能忘记，民进党的支持率仍在40%以上，这一部分人是不容忽视的，他们对复谈，对两岸关系的接近持疑虑甚至拒 绝的态度。所以两岸之间任何进一步接近的举措，台湾民众，尤其是民进党的支持者都会密切注视。

德国之声：您认为两岸相互接近的前景如何？

哈尔伯艾森：我目前对此并不乐观。上周会谈的结果无关主权，只是解决了一些技术性问题。关键还要看北京是否愿意做出进一步妥协。不久前我在中国大陆 参加了一个会议，有一些国台办的官员出席，按他们的话说，大陆方面已经表明了最大的可能性，已经没有多少回旋的余地。不过，由北京政治领导层的两位重要人 物出任国台办主任和海协会主席，至少显示了一定的灵活态度，但更大的挑战还在后头。只要看一看中国在与台湾恢复对话的同时，加大对华盛顿的压力，要求美国 停止对台军售，就不难发现，一场复杂艰难的游戏才刚刚开始，其结果还难以预料。

德国之声：德国前总理施密特不久前在一次报告中说，他认为台湾将在20到30年的时间里完成同大陆的统一。您也许不同意这种说法。

哈尔伯艾森：这样的预测完全不能让我信服。马英九本人就曾说过，他们这一辈人无法经历两岸的统一。此外，尽管台湾很大一部分民众希望缓和与大陆的关 系，但只要中国不实现民主，不能证明大陆的政治和社会能长期保持稳定，台湾人就不会自愿成为中华人民共和国的一部份。因此任何对统一的预测和时间表都是缺 乏依据和为时过早的。

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叶宣

China and Taiwan

Strait talking again

Jun 12th 2008 | BEIJING AND TAIPEI
From The Economist print edition

Picking up where they left off in 1999

THE previous attempt by China and Taiwan to end their decades of official acrimony ended in a mutual huff. But now they are talking to each other again as if nothing had happened. At their first formal negotiations in nearly a decade, which began in Beijing on June 12th, the two sides are ignoring political differences and focusing on air services and tourism.

The two teams appeared on track to sign an agreement on June 14th that would allow Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan without, as at present, having to go through third countries (visitors to the Taiwan-controlled outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu can already go directly). The new tourism arrangement is expected to start in July, along with the launch of weekend charter passenger flights. On their first day of talks, the two sides agreed to set up representative offices to handle visas in each other's territories.

Talks between China and Taiwan have always been couched in coded language, to gloss over their opposing views of Taiwan's status. The negotiators are from organisations whose think-tank-style titles are meant to camouflage their official identities. (In China's view there is no Taiwan government, just an uppity local authority.) China broke off talks in 1999 because of Taiwan's decision to end the pretence and call for country-to-country ties. The election in 2000 of a president, Chen Shui-bian, whose Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was implacably opposed to any hint of overlapping sovereignties, made China dig its heels in further.

But since the inauguration in May of a new president, Ma Ying-jeou of the China-leaning Kuomintang party (KMT), ambiguity has been back in vogue. The two sides have agreed to talk on the basis of what they call the “1992 consensus”. This formula agrees that there is “one China” but reserves each side's right to define this in its own way. This pleases China immensely but is politically more sensitive in Taiwan. The KMT soundly defeated the DPP in the presidential elections in March and in legislative polls in January, but suspicion of China remains widespread.

Mr Ma is calculating that the economic benefits of a flood of Chinese tourists to the island will help allay such fears. He aims to receive 3,000 a day, which would be a useful boost to Taiwan's lacklustre economy. Critics, however, say that his rush to attract China's big spenders is giving Beijing the upper hand at the negotiating table. Taiwan has quietly swallowed China's refusal to allow an early launch of charter cargo flights. China, it is thought, wants to protect its air-cargo industry from Taiwanese competition.

Taiwanese officials have shown their sensitivity to public opinion. Earlier this month the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed its overseas offices not to use the word Taiwan in official documents to avoid upsetting China. Instead they were to use the island's official name, Republic of China. But the ministry quickly backtracked amid a political uproar.