王
郁琦前腳剛回來，連戰後腳就趕去晉見習近平。我們有一個問題希望請馬政府給予答覆。為什麼王、連都不再提「九二共識，一中各表」？這半年來國民黨和政府要
員都只提一中，拋棄各表，是這項屈服換來北京俯允王郁琦以官員身分到訪並稱他的官銜嗎？王去的代價是什麼，人民有知的權利。
屈服於北京壓力
連
戰2005年4月在和平之旅時，於北京舉行連胡會上首次提出「九二共識，一中各表」，之後4次連胡會都未公開表達「一中各表」。2013年2月25日，北
京連習會上，連提出16字原則，正式只提一中，刪除各表。昨天的連習會連再度只提一中，顯見台灣執政黨和政府已默默屈服於北京壓力，自己鑽進一中鳥籠，扮
演起鸚鵡，不斷重複學舌講「一中」了，至於「各表」當然就「按下不表」。但為了緩解台灣內部的抗拒與焦慮，連敦請習「正視中華民國」。北京從來就藐視、鄙
視、無視中華民國，多次堅稱中華民國已於1949年滅亡。「正視」云云，是連戰安撫台灣人民說的，不是講給北京和國民黨聽的。
當年馬政府費盡唇舌說服民眾和民進黨接受「九二共識，一中各表」，強調這是台灣內部藍綠和中國的「最大公約數」，不接受不行。
民進黨應該抗議
民進黨和很多台灣人民看在「各表」的份上，都勉強接受，當成共識；現在馬當局未經各界的同意就放棄各表，是不是毀棄諾言，背叛國家，欺騙國人呢？民進黨怎麼毫無反應？莫非也打算一頭鑽進鳥籠嗎？
王張會可有可無
堅
持一中各表，兩岸關係當然無法進展。馬政府只剩兩年多，不免心急，於是悄悄放棄各表，換來王郁琦的訪中機會並獲稱官銜。這是個吃了大虧的生意。一中各表意
涵國家定位的戰略高度，具有全國朝野共識的背書，交換的竟是空洞的一聲「王主委」稱號，以及可有可無的王張會。王張會並無實質收穫，僅象徵兩岸官方接觸的
開始，連習會獲得的實質收穫都比王張會多。為了取得官方接觸的空洞象徵和一聲主委，我們付出的是高位階的國家主權指標和難得的朝野共識，這筆夭壽蠢的買賣
虧慘了！
中國不是大陸
翻譯的政治學: 紐約時報把
中國都翻譯成
大陸
台灣的現狀還能維持多久
喬納森·沙利文 2014年02月19日
英格蘭諾丁漢——中國大陸和台灣的政府官員上周舉行了60多年來
首次官方層面的會談。會談平淡無奇，雙方就建立溝通渠道和其他操作性的安排達成了有限的共識。但是這番會談象徵著在台灣總統馬英九(Ma Ying-jeou)任內兩岸關係的增強。
自從2008年當選以來，馬英九就對中國大陸採取了和緩的
立場，推動了一系列合作政策，包括一項自由貿易協議。儘管多數台灣人強烈主張維持台灣事實上的獨立，但馬英九卻開啟了一個與北京建立更緊密聯繫、開展政治
談判的不可逆轉的趨勢。推動這種趨勢的力量是經濟往來，但趨勢本身卻更為複雜，並非僅僅出於經濟原因。
數十年來，台灣國民黨政府與大陸的共產黨之間存在的敵意，
促使台灣採取了「不接觸、不妥協、不談判」的政策。即使在中國大陸開放以後，台灣投資者和製造企業將兩個經濟體牽在了一起，政治關係也仍然處於僵局之中。
由於台灣前總統李登輝(Lee Teng-hui)和陳水扁(Chen
Shui-bian)採取了北京所說的「分裂」政策，上世紀90年代初試探性的接觸限於停頓。
馬英九在2008年擔任總統後宣布，與前任相反，他會接受北京的底線立場，即「一個中國、各自表述」。馬英九的明確保證，迅速使得兩岸的運輸聯繫得到增強，對外交盟友的爭奪暫時停止，在犯罪、食品安全、旅遊和教育方面也達成了協議。
然而台灣與大陸的分離，仍然會讓中國大陸的領導人回想起
19世紀末殖民者，尤其是日本的欺凌。新任的中國國家主席習近平將「中國夢」樹立成了其領導班子的口號，目標是重新奪回「百年民族恥辱」中失去的尊嚴，這
一目標的一個重要組成部分就是收復失去的領土，主要是台灣。在遭遇了一系列軍事上的挫敗和別國的入侵之後，中國在1895年將台灣割讓給日本，這些挫敗和
入侵之後不斷給中國人帶來不快。在內戰中負於共產黨之後，國民黨及其軍隊和支持者被迫逃到了台灣。國民黨統治台灣時，實行了40年的戒嚴，之後在上世紀
80年代末將台灣引向了民主。
習近平直到最近幾個月才有精力處理台灣問題。自從2012年末升任中共中央總書記以來，習近平一直在忙於鞏固勢力、推行雄心勃勃的計劃來改革經濟，同時還啟動了一場內部的反腐敗運動，並着手應對日益惡化的對日關係。
去年10月在巴厘島舉行的亞洲太平洋經濟合作組織(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)會議上，習近平顯示了着力推動政治對話的決心。當時他對一名台灣代表說，取得政治解決的進程必須加快。
習近平如今已將家裡的事務打理得更加有序，而此時對大陸態度友好的馬英九也進入了總統任期的最後兩年，雙方的陣營中都重新產生了一種緊迫感。
馬英九的很多反對者，包括國民黨內的那些，都指出他追求與
中國大陸建立聯繫的熱情，並不符合民意。過去20年中的民調顯示，絕大多數的台灣人一直都主張以某種形式維持現狀，去年開展的最近一次民調顯示超過80%
的受訪者持這種立場。支持立即統一或未來統一的比例不足12%。
到2016年，選民會走向投票點選擇馬英九的繼任者，屆時
馬英九的路線會面臨考驗。儘管有人表示馬英九過於順從迎合，但有充分的理由認為，如果總統仍由國民黨人擔任，台灣對大陸的這種政策仍會延續。相反，如果民
主進步黨(Democratic Progressive
Party)獲勝，可能會為台海關係帶來一段不確定的時期。長期堅定地捍衛台灣自主性的民進黨，也表現出了與大陸接觸的意願，但民進黨最近提出的，作為兩
岸關係基礎的政治綱領卻迅速遭到了北京的回絕。
然而即使民進黨的勝利會使進程放緩，但也並不會改變兩岸關係拉近的長期趨勢。
台灣經濟依賴於貿易，而中國大陸是其最大的出口目的地，也是台灣巨額貿易順差的來源。在台灣製造企業的供應鏈中，中國大陸處於中心地位。台灣的對外直接投資中，有80%流向中國大陸。自由貿易協議中一份針對服務和貿易的重要附屬協議仍在等待台灣立法院批准。
除了這種經濟上的互相依賴之外，中國大陸還在以許多其他方
式對台灣施加影響力，產生了難以長期抵禦的力量。大陸與台灣隔海相望的區域布滿了導彈。中國大陸施加的影響及其表達的反對，制約了台灣在國際社會的活動，
包括簽署其他雙邊和地區性經濟協議。中國大陸也對在大陸居住的數十萬的台灣商人施加這影響，而且也開始瞄準台灣政治，據稱會在選戰中做出捐助、鼓動有影響
力的支持者，並且投資台灣媒體。
面對這些強大的壓力，台灣可以動用的資源很有限。它最有力
的武器是茁壯的民主制度，台灣的治理模式為台灣在國際社會贏得了道義上的支持，這對中國是一個重要的制約。任何一個主政台北的領導人，在嘗試維持事實上獨
立的現狀時，都可以有理有據地指出，政府只是在遵從公眾的意見。
台灣民眾渴望與中國大陸的良好關係所帶來的和平和繁榮，但他們並不願意為了得到和平與繁榮，而放棄主權或民主。但北京的立場是無法動搖的，北京的勢力和影響也是無法迴避的。隨着中國大陸以不同的方式向台灣加大施壓力度，不可避免地會滑向中國大陸所渴望的統一。
喬納森·沙利文是諾丁漢大學副教授，以及諾丁漢大學中國政策研究中心的副主任。
翻譯：王童鶴
Op-Ed Contributor
Taiwan and China Edge Ever Closer
By JONATHAN SULLIVAN February 19, 2014
NOTTINGHAM, England
— Government officials from China and Taiwan met last week for the first
time in an official capacity in more than six decades. The talks were
uneventful — producing modest agreements to establish communication
channels and other practical arrangements — but they were symbolic of
the strengthening of cross-Strait ties under President Ma Ying-jeou of
Taiwan.
Since being elected in
2008, Mr. Ma has adopted a conciliatory approach toward China and pushed
through a number of cooperative policies, including a free-trade
agreement. While most Taiwanese strongly favor maintaining Taiwan’s
functional independence, Mr. Ma has started an irreversible trend toward
closer ties and political negotiation with Beijing.
Economic
interaction is the force that drives this trend, but it’s more
comprehensive than one based on economics alone.
For decades, hostilities
between the Kuomintang (K.M.T.) government in Taiwan and the Chinese
Communist Party led to a policy on the Taiwan side of “no contact, no
compromise and no negotiation.” Even as China opened up and Taiwanese
investors and manufacturers brought the two economies together,
political relations remained deadlocked. Tentative contacts in the early
1990s were stalled by what Beijing called the “secessionist” policies
of former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.
When he became president in
2008, Mr. Ma announced that, contrary to his predecessor, he would
accept the idea of “one China, different interpretations” that is
Beijing’s bottom-line position. Mr. Ma’s unequivocal assurances soon led
to the expansion of transportation links, suspension of competition for
diplomatic allies and agreements on crime, food safety, tourism and
education.
But Taiwan’s separation
from the mainland continues to remind China’s leaders of colonial, in
particular Japanese, bullying at the end of the 19th century. The new
Chinese president, Xi Jinping, has held up the “Chinese Dream” as the
maxim for his leadership, aiming to recapture the prestige that was lost
during “100 years of national shame.” A major component of that goal is
restoring lost territory, chiefly Taiwan, which was ceded to Japan in
1895 following the first of a series of military defeats and invasions
that are the source of continuing Chinese antipathy. Defeat by the
Communists in the Chinese civil war forced the K.M.T., and its army and
supporters, to evacuate to Taiwan, where it ruled through martial law
for four decades before steering the island toward democracy in the late
1980s.
It is only in recent months
that Mr. Xi has been able to devote his energy to the Taiwan issue.
Since his rise to the top of the Communist Party in late 2012, Mr. Xi
has been preoccupied with consolidating power and setting out an
ambitious plan to reform the economy, while launching an internal
anticorruption campaign and managing deteriorating relations with Japan.
Mr. Xi showed his
determination to press for political talks at an Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation meeting in Bali last October, where he told a Taiwanese
representative that progress toward a political resolution must be
accelerated.
Now that Mr. Xi’s house is
in better order, and as the China-friendly Mr. Ma enters the final two
years of his presidency, there is a renewed sense of urgency in both
camps.
Mr. Ma’s many opponents,
including those in his own party, note that his enthusiasm for pursuing
links with China is not in line with public opinion. Surveys over the
past 20 years show a consistently large majority of Taiwanese, over 80
percent in the most recent poll late last year, support some version of
the status quo. Support for immediate or future unification was less
than 12 percent.
Mr. Ma’s approach will be
put to the test in 2016 when voters go to the polls to choose his
successor. Although some say that Mr. Ma has been overly accommodating,
there is every reason to expect continuity in Taiwan’s policy toward
China if the K.M.T. retains the presidency. A victory for the Democratic
Progressive Party, on the other hand, is likely to bring about a period
of uncertainty in China-Taiwan relations. Long a staunch defender of
Taiwan’s autonomy, the D.P.P. has shown a willingness to engage with
China, but the policy platform it recently put forward as a basis for
conducting cross-Strait relations was swiftly rejected by Beijing.
Still, a D.P.P. victory would slow down the process, but is unlikely to reverse the long-term trend toward closer ties.
Taiwan’s economy depends on
trade, and China is its biggest export destination and source of a huge
trade surplus. China is central to the supply chains of Taiwanese
manufacturers, and 80 percent of Taiwanese foreign direct investment
goes to China. A significant add-on to the free trade agreement in the
area of services and trade awaits ratification in Taiwan’s legislature.
Aside from this economic
interdependence, China imposes its power on Taiwan in many ways,
creating momentum that is difficult to withstand indefinitely. The area
across the strait from Taiwan is lined with Chinese missiles. Chinese
influence and opposition restricts Taiwan’s participation in
international society, including signing other bilateral and regional
economic agreements. China exerts influence on hundreds of thousands of
Taiwanese businesspeople residing in China, and has started to target
Taiwanese politics, allegedly contributing to election campaigns,
mobilizing influential supporters and investing in Taiwanese media.
Against these formidable
pressures, Taiwan has limited resources to call upon. Its most potent
weapon is its robust democracy. The moral support that Taiwan claims
from the international community for its mode of governance is an
important constraint on China. Any leader in Taipei who attempts to
preserve the status quo of functional independence can rightly say that
the government is merely following public opinion.
The Taiwanese people desire
the peace and prosperity that positive relations with China could
bring, yet they do not want to give up their sovereignty or democracy to
achieve it. But Beijing’s position is implacable, and its power and
influence is inescapable. As it ramps up the pressure on Taiwan in
different ways, there is an inevitable drift toward the unification that
China craves.
Jonathan Sullivan is associate professor and deputy director of the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham.
