日本首相鸠山由纪夫在下院选举过后还重申过他的这一将美军普天间基地迁移的承诺。美国政府以不切实际为由断然拒绝了迁移方案。鸠山由 纪夫最终向美方压力低头，决定虽然将美军基地留在冲绳岛，但应该将其迁至人烟相对稀少的海湾地区边野古。日本首相的权利大打折扣，柏林经济及政治研究基金 会的蒂藤（Markus Tiedten)说："把他带入如此窘境的是他一贯作出的他'当然会履行这一承诺'的态度。一直到组成内阁后他还是这样说的。"
社民党离开执政联盟
鸠 山由纪夫早在上个星期五（5月28日）就已经解除了社民党领袖福岛瑞穗（Mizuho Fukushima）作为消费者行政担当大臣的职位，因为她不接受在冲绳岛内迁移美军基地的决定。社民党的退出是直接针对这一解职事件。党主席福岛瑞穗星 期日表示，她的政党决定退出执政联盟。社民党对此别无选择，德国汉堡全球以及地方研究所的克尔纳（Patrick Köllner）说："社民党成员现在态度顽固，因为他们是把和平议题以及减少美国在日本的军力作为唯一执政纲领的党派。"
社 民党多年来一直要面对选票的不断减少。克尔纳认为，如果这个党在美军基地迁移这一问题上也做出让步的话，那它就会失去选民对其所保留的最后一点信任。
日 本首相鸠山由纪夫的民主党可以抛开社民党继续执政。在下院，民主党继续拥有绝对多数席位。在上院，他们和第三执政联盟党，国民新党一起能够勉强达到多数。 现在的执政联盟在没有社民党的情况下是否会失去其社会福利性的一面？蒂藤否定说："鸠山由纪夫本身推出的政策也具有一定的吸引力，比方说提高儿童福利金， 减少社会福利保险金数额等提议。所以他自己的也有一套比较具有社会福利性的政策。"
日本首相失去本党以及选民的支持
日 本上院一半的议席，将于七月中旬举行重新选举。在民主党捐赠丑闻以及迁移美军基地问题的影响下，鸠山由纪夫在日本国民中的支持度大幅下降。日本共同通信社 星期天推出的民调结果显示，只有百分之十九的选民支持民主党。直到2009年大选前连续执政的自民党在此项民调中以微弱的优势超过民主党。百分之五十一点 二接受此项问卷调查的人认为，日本首相应该为迁移美军基地一事辞职。对于克尔纳来说，这不是没有可能。"我们现在可以观察民主党是否会在上院选举前逼迫其 退任。我可以想象民主党最后认为鸠山由纪夫是其在上院选举的一种负担。"
鸠 山由纪夫党内的反对派已经成为政治层面上的重要力量。在上个星期六的时候，民主党的老牌党员，渡部恒三（Kozo Watanabe）就已经提出了让鸠山由纪夫退任的要求。
作 者：Christoph Ricking / 任琛
责 编：洪沙
作者简介 目录 书摘插图
WORLD 
A security guard on Friday at a Honda manufacturing plant in Foshan, Guangdong Province, that was shut due to a labor dispute at a parts facility.
FOSHAN, China — After years of being pushed to work 12-hour days, six days a week on monotonous low-wage assembly line tasks, China’s workers are starting to push back.
A strike at an enormous Honda transmission factory here in southeastern China has suddenly and unexpectedly turned into a symbol of this nation’s struggle with income inequality, rising inflation and soaring property prices that have put home ownership beyond the reach of all but the most affluent.
And perhaps most remarkably, Chinese authorities let the strike happen — up to a point.
In the kind of scene that more often plays out at strikes in America than at labor actions in China, print and television reporters from state-controlled media across the country have started covering the walkout here, even waiting outside the nearly deserted front gate on Thursday and Friday in hope of any news. All the Chinese reporters disappeared on Saturday morning, however, as the government, apparently nervous, suddenly imposed without explanation a blanket ban on domestic media coverage of the strike.
A worker at a factory dormitory said on Saturday afternoon that the strike continued, and police were nowhere in sight at the factory or the dormitory. The authorities have been leery of letting the media report on labor disputes, fearing that it could encourage workers elsewhere to rebel. The new permissiveness, however temporary, coincides with growing sentiment among some officials and economists that Chinese workers deserve higher wages for their role in the country’s global export machine.
And without higher incomes, hundreds of millions of Chinese will be unable to play their part in the domestic consumer spending boom on which this nation hopes to base its next round of economic growth.
“This is all because there is a major political debate going on about how to deal with the nation’s growing income gap, and the need to do something about wages,” said Andreas Lauffs, a lawyer at Baker & McKenzie who specializes in Chinese labor issues.
If wages do rise, that could bring higher prices for Western consumers for goods as diverse as toys at Wal-Mart and iPads from Apple.
The Chinese media may also have found it a little easier, politically, to cover this strike because Honda is a Japanese company, and anti-Japanese sentiment still simmers in China as a legacy of World War II. Certainly, the strike is hitting Honda hard, as the resulting shortage of transmissions and other engine parts has forced the company to halt production at all four of its assembly plants in China.
Honda has an annual capacity of 650,000 cars and minivans in China, like Jazz subcompacts for export to Europe and Accord sedans for the Chinese market. Because Honda’s prices in China are similar to what it charges in the United States, the cars tend to be far out of reach financially for most of the workers who make them.
A Honda spokeswoman declined to discuss specific issues in the strike negotiations.
The intense media coverage may evoke historical memories of the 1980 shipyard strike in Gdansk, Poland, that gave rise to the Solidarity movement and paved the way for the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. But the reality here is much different.
Instead of tens of thousands of grizzled and angry shipyard workers, the Honda strike involves about 1,900 mostly cheerful young people. And the employees interviewed say their goal is more money, not a larger political agenda.
“If they give us 800 renminbi a month, we’ll go back to work right away,” said one young man, describing a pay increase that would add about $117 a month to an average pay that is now around $150 monthly. He said he had read on the Internet of considerably higher wages at other factories in China and expected Honda to match them with an immediate pay increase.
Many workers at other factories in southeastern China already earn $300 a month, but they do so only through considerable overtime. And even that higher income is not enough to embark on the middle-class dream in China of owning a small apartment and subcompact car. Officially, though, the government is discouraging heavy reliance on overtime, and workers here said that Honda was not assigning much.
The strikers said that Honda mainly hired recent graduates of high schools or vocational schools. And so, most are in their late teens or early 20s, representing a new generation of employees, many of whom had not been born when the Chinese authorities suppressed protests by students and workers in Tiananmen Square in 1989 — a watershed event whose 21st anniversary falls next Friday.
The profile of striking workers seems to run more along the lines of slightly bookish would-be engineers — perhaps without the grades or money to attend college — rather than political activists. Besides their low wages, the workers seem focused on issues like the factory’s air-conditioning not being cool enough, and the unfairness of having to rise from their dormitories as early as 5:30 for a 7 a.m. shift.
Workers said that in addition to their pay, they also received free lodging in rooms that slept four to six in bunk beds. They also get free lunches, subsidized breakfasts for the equivalent of 30 cents and dinners for about $1.50.
The striking employees said that some senior workers, known as team leaders, had allied themselves with management. But they insisted that the rank-and-file workers were solidly in favor of walkout — a claim impossible to verify.
Although China is run by the Communist Party and has state-controlled unions, the unions are largely charged with overseeing workers, not bargaining for higher wages or pressing for improved labor conditions. And they are not allowed to strike, although China’s laws do not have explicit prohibitions against doing so.
Workers at the Honda factory dormitory said that the official union at the factory was not representing them but was serving as an intermediary between them and management. Li Jianming, the national spokesman for the All China Federation of Trade Unions, declined to comment.
The workers here have been on strike since May 21, with no resolution in sight. But the strike did not come to broader notice until Thursday and Friday as Japanese media began reporting the shutdown of Honda assembly plants, and as Chinese media and Internet sites were allowed to report extensively on those activities.
The unusually permissive approach of the authorities toward media coverage of the strike follows a decision to tolerate extensive coverage this month of suicides by workers at the Taiwanese-owned Foxconn factory complex in nearby Shenzhen that supplies Apple and Hewlett-Packard.
The official China Daily newspaper ran a lead editorial on Friday that cited the Honda strike as evidence that government inaction on wages might be fueling tensions between workers and employers. The editorial criticized the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security for not moving faster to draft a promised amendment to current wage regulations because of what the newspaper described as opposition from employers.
Zheng Qiao, the associate director of the department of employment relations at the China Institute of Industrial Relations in Beijing, said the strike was a significant development in China’s labor relations history and that “such a large-scale, organized strike will force China’s labor union system to change, to adapt to the market economy.”
Busan, South Korea
ONE of the students at my university was killed in the attack that sank a South Korean naval vessel on March 26. A visual communications major, Mun Yeong-uk was only a few months from concluding his military service when a North Korean torpedo split the warship, the Cheonan, in half. His classmates loyally collected money for his family’s funeral expenses, but I was struck by how few people on our campus evinced any real anger toward the regime of Kim Jong-il.
This lack of indignation is mainstream here. Most people now accept North Korea’s responsibility for the sinking that killed Mr. Mun and 45 other sailors. A small but sizable minority suspect an elaborate government conspiracy of some sort. What almost all seem to share is the desire that South Korea put this unfortunate business behind it as soon as possible.
Support for military retaliation appears confined to those too old to fight. Even the rather mild measures that the South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, announced on Monday — which included the drastic reduction of inter-Korean trade and resumption of the propaganda war along the demilitarized zone — have caused widespread hand-wringing.
The general reluctance to take the North Koreans to task can be partly attributed to a rational apprehension of the military realities. No one here needs to be reminded that Kim Jong-il could bomb Seoul flat even without using his new nuclear capacity. And in a country where all fit young men must spend two years in the military, “chicken hawks” are much harder to come by than in America.
But historical and cultural factors are also at work. By this I do not mean only the collective memory of the Korean War and its manifold horrors. Up until the late 1980s, right-wing governments resorted to North Korea scares so often that many people now refuse to believe any stories about the regime, no matter how overwhelming the evidence. If President Lee thought he could allay doubts with an especially thorough investigation into the sinking, he was mistaken. Left-wing newspapers now accuse him of postponing the announcement of the investigation’s results to exert maximum influence on next week’s regional elections.
It would be unfair to characterize these skeptics as pro-Pyongyang, but there is more sympathy for North Korea here than foreigners commonly realize. As a university student in West Berlin in the 1980s, I had a hard time finding even a Marxist with anything nice to say about East Germany. In South Korea, however, the North’s human rights abuses are routinely shrugged off with reference to its supposedly superior nationalist credentials. One often hears, for example, the mistaken claim that Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Il-sung, purged his republic of former Japanese collaborators, in alleged contrast to the morally tainted South.
Sympathy for Pyongyang is especially widespread in the peninsula’s chronically disgruntled southwest, and not just because this farming region profits whenever food aid is sent to the North. Gwangju, the largest city in the region, just commemorated the 30th anniversary of a brutal government massacre of civilian demonstrators, many of whom were defamed in the official news media of the time as North Korean agents.
South Korean nationalism is something quite different from the patriotism toward the state that Americans feel. Identification with the Korean race is strong, while that with the Republic of Korea is weak. (Kim Jong-il has a distinct advantage here: his subjects are more likely to equate their state with the race itself.) Thus few South Koreans feel personally affected by the torpedo attack.
Besides, Koreans in both the North and the South tend to cherish the myth that of all peoples in the world, they are the least inclined to premeditated evil. The sinking of the Cheonan is widely viewed here as an almost spontaneous byproduct of inter-Korean tension — a regrettable aberration that should not be made too much of. The left attributes the recent increase of tension to President Lee’s rejection of his predecessors’ accommodationist Sunshine Policy. Yet even the conservative news media talk of the attack in terms of an “error” that the North should own up to, not a cold-blooded act. Students in my classes tend to refer to the sinking as an “accident.”
This urge to give the North Koreans the benefit of the doubt is in marked contrast to the public fury that erupted after the killings of two South Korean schoolgirls by an American military vehicle in 2002; it was widely claimed that the Yankees murdered them callously. During the street protests against American beef imports in the wake of a mad cow disease scare in 2008, posters of a child-poisoning Uncle Sam were all the rage. It is illuminating to compare those two anti-American frenzies with the small and geriatric protests against Pyongyang that have taken place in Seoul in recent weeks.
Such are the unique circumstances under which President Lee has tried to marshal a firm and unified response to the North’s latest provocation. So far he has done an excellent job, conveying just the right mixture of resolve and restraint. Where American presidents tend to personalize conflict with foreign powers, Mr. Lee refrained from explicitly blaming Kim Jong-il for the sinking; this may make it a little easier for the dictator to issue an apology without losing face.
Even as the North threatens “all-out war,” the Obama administration would do well to emulate the South Korean leader. It should be mindful enough of Korean nationalism to hold back on its own rhetoric. It would be counterproductive if Washington were to look more interested in punishing North Korea than the injured party is.
本田(Honda)已被迫暂停在华制造工厂的运营，原因是 一家供应商工厂罢工，打断了这家日本汽车制造商的供应链。
在广东南部制造业中心佛山，一家生产变速器的本田工厂1800多名工人已开始罢工，要求提高工资。
该公司证实，这一劳工行动打乱了本田在广东省会广州和华中武汉的整车装配厂的运营。
佛山工厂周一停工，本田的三家整车厂周三也相继停工。据该公司介绍，罢工可能持续到下周，目前政府正介入调停。
工人们似乎在独立行事，而并没有 得到该国唯一得到官方承认的工会——中华全国总工会(ACFTU)——的支持。
“他们自己组织了这次罢工，”佛山工厂工会办公室一位不愿透露姓名的行政人员说。
尽管中华全国总工会对于在沃尔玛(Walmart)等跨国公司建立工会一直较为积极，但它并不愿意与公司管理层直接对抗。该工会的网站上将“建设社 会主义和谐社会”列为其“主要任务”之一。
在华跨国公司中，罢工也非常罕见，因为相比香港、台湾及中国国内企业，跨国公司往往会支付更高的工资，提供更好的工作条件。
佛山的本田员工每月收入约为人民币1500元（合220美元），他们要求增加到每月2000至2500元人民币。
译者/功文
24日，台湾鸿海集团创办人郭台铭首度回应旗下公司富士康发生十连跳事件时称，"富士康绝对不是血汗工厂"。他表示，超过90万人的团队很 难管理，但有信心很快就会稳住。郭台铭的话音未落，富士康深圳厂区再次发生员工坠楼身亡事件。
关注中国劳工权益的香港民间机构"大学师生监察无良企业行动"组织，联合多家团体25日中午前往富士康香港办公室门前举行抗议活动。参加抗议活动的 人员携带纸扎公仔和纸钱祭奠坠楼死亡的9名富士康员工，并准备向富士康公司递交抗议书，但是富士康香港分部没有负责人员出来接受，也没有对抗议行动做出任 何回应。
不堪压力选择轻生
中国民工数量超过1亿人。他们为"世界工厂"不断地输送新的劳动力。这些涌入城市的年轻人往往只能找到收入很低，而且环境和条件都很差的工作。"大 学师生监察无良企业行动"组织项目干事郑依依介绍说，该组织一直监察调查中国大陆一些工厂的工作环境以及劳工生活条件。针对富士康公司，"大学师生监察无 良企业行动"也进行过相应的调查。
"富士康公司员工当中有人表示过，他们有精神压力。他们需要不断加班获得可以维持生活的工资，我们相信，他们在精神上和经济上都很有压力。另外住在 同一宿舍里的工友上下班时间都不一样，我们认为厂方故意这样安排，目的是避免员工之间有过多交流，或者组织起来。"
郑依依表示，相信是这两方面的管理令一些工友不堪压力，选择了轻生的道路。
按照中国劳动合同法中的规定，职工每个月加班时间不得超过32个小时。但是有自称为富士康员工的网民爆料称，在富士康平均每天加班近5个小时，一个 月算下来加班时间超过100小时。"大学师生监察无良企业行动"组织项目干事郑依依说，富士康的员工都要签一份自愿加班协议书，然后才能被分派工作：
"他们签了（自愿加班协议）之后，富士康就可以变相半强迫他们去加班。这可能也是法律无法为他们提供帮助的一个问题。"
NGO: 抵制iPhone血汗生产过程
"大学师生监察无良企业行动"组织还发起了抵制使用苹果iPhone手机的行动。郑依依说："我们希望iPhone的消费者知道，他们使用的 iPhone背后是一个血汗的生产过程。他们应该自己判断，是否要继续用这样生产出来的科技产品。我们相信品牌有力量去改变生产商的生产条件。"富士康是 苹果公司第四代iPhone的制造商。
作者：洪沙
责编：乐然
"亚洲人对欧洲的经济和联盟政策以及作为唯一合法国家形式的民主体制提出了疑问。过去是欧美向亚洲人解释世界，这不足为奇，因为他们带着大 把金钱来亚洲投资。欧美政治家要求尊重人权、加速民主化进程。经济界人士要求按西方规则办事、开放市场、消除官僚主义、腐败和裙带关系。直到今天，亚洲人 仍然把1997至1998年间的亚洲金融危机视为西方傲慢姿态的象征，因为当时国际货币基金组织向匍匐在地的亚洲小老虎国家发号施令。
今天，国际货币基金组织在帮助欧洲。与亚洲的通常做法一样，戴姆勒、西门子等西方公司集团同样也行贿。急需抢救的银行不在曼谷或雅加达，而是位于慕 尼黑或伦敦。所以，在气候保护、贸易或多边组织的资金分配问题上，亚洲现在开始显示自己的力量。
经过多年积累外汇储备和人为低估亚洲货币汇率，这一地区今天没有债务危机的威胁。最多只是热钱流入带动了物业价格上涨，存在着潜在危险。而欧洲则不 同：对欧元信任的消失也许能帮助德国出口厂家，但从长期来看，这是欧洲经济衰弱不可忽视的标志。"
欧洲人的新角色是伙伴
影响在减弱，欧洲成了新的危机地区。文章说，"指点教训人的时代已经过去，亚洲人不再接受这样的指点。欧洲人的新角色是伙伴、而不是教师爷的角 色"。但是，"应该谨慎对待这种角色转变"：
"尽管亚洲现在充满自信、有时甚至幸灾乐祸，但是它并非不依赖西方。没有西方对越南鞋、韩国电视机和中国电子产品及水果的需求，亚洲引以自豪的经济 增长率就会象热带阳光下的黄油一样消融。
亚洲必须减少对出口的依赖
与西方相比，即使现在亚洲的情况很好，但它并没有走出困境。这一地区必须减少对出口的依赖性，但只有提升国内需求，才能做到这一点。而亚洲的消费者 出自有道理的原因不这样做，他们为了一种虚假的安全感，宁可把30%的收入储蓄起来。只有在未来有保障的情况下，亚洲人才会把金钱投向市场。所以，亚洲需 要具有承受能力的医疗和养老保险体系，亚洲国家必须进行可持续经营、发展教育和基础设施，更公平地分配资源。
我们不需要象过去那样，以教师爷的身份告诫说，亚洲离救命的河岸还差得很远。有了这样的认识，亚洲与西方就完全能够成为伙伴。"
编译: 王羊
When Terry Gou opened a factory in Longhua, a town north of Shenzhen in southern China in 1988, he was ahead of most other electronics companies. | 1988年，郭台铭(Terry Gou)开始在深圳市北部的龙华镇开办工厂，他走在了大多数其它电子公司的前头。 |
Longhua was an expanse of hills and paddy fields when the founder and chairman of Hon Hai, a Taiwanese computer parts producer, set up shop there. The low wages and land prices allowed Mr Gou to make computers and handsets for the world's technology brands more cheaply and efficiently than his competitors. | 这位台湾电脑零部件制造商鸿海(Hon Hai)创始人兼总裁当初到龙华办厂时，这里还是一片广阔的丘陵与稻田。当地较低的工资水平与土地价格，使郭台铭能够以比竞争对手更低的成本、更为高效地 为全球科技品牌制造电脑与手机。 |
Like many other low-cost manufacturers in China, Hon Hai or Foxconn, the trade name the group goes by, took charge not just of its workers' labour but their entire lives. Migrant workers are housed and fed on campus. | 与其它许多在华低成本制造商一样，鸿海或富士康（Foxconn，该集团的商标名）不 仅负责员工的工作，还负责他们的整个生活。农民工们被安排在园区内吃住。 |
The plant – believed to be the largest in the world with 300,000 workers – helped Mr Gou transform Foxconn into the world's largest electronics contract manufacturer by a wide margin. | 凭借龙华园区的帮助，郭台铭将富士康变成了遥遥领先于竞争对手的全球最大合同电子制造 商。据信，这个拥有30万名工人的园区，规模居全球第一。 |
Today Foxconn – which normally maintains secrecy about the workings of its factories – makes the majority of iPhones and iPods for Apple as well as TVs, phones and digital cameras for a host of other big names including Dell, Sony and Nokia. | 如今，苹果(Apple)的大部分iPhone和iPod均由富士康制造，此外，它还 为包括戴尔(Dell)、索尼(Sony)和诺基亚(Nokia)在内的众多其它知名品牌生产电视、手机和数码相机。富士康通常对其工厂的运行情况保密。 |
“Ours is a factory most unlike a factory,” Liu Kun, spokesman at Foxconn's China headquarters, tells the Financial Times. “It is a plant and a town at the same time, but the basic unit here is the dorm, not the family.” | 在富士康中国总部，集团发言人刘坤告诉英国《金融时报》：“我们的工厂非常不像是一个 工厂。它既是一座工厂，同时也是一座城镇，但这里的基本单位是宿舍，而不是家庭。” |
But following a spate of suicides among workers, outsiders argue this operations model is no longer fit to deal with the pressures of modern Chinese society which seep in through the factory gates. | 但在一连串员工自杀事件发生后，外界人士开始辩称，这种运行模式，已不再适合应对已渗 入工厂内部的现代中国社会的压力。 |
And the doubts about the factory town model raise much broader questions about the way China's manufacturing sector works. | 而且，对工业园区模式的怀疑，已经引发了对中国制造业运行方式更广泛的疑虑。 |
“[The deaths] force us to question the future of the ‘factory of the world' and the new generation of migrant workers,” according to nine Chinese social sciences professors in an open letter to Foxconn last week. | 9位中国社会科学教授在上周致富士康的公开信中表示：“（自杀事件）迫使我们开始质疑 ‘世界工厂'及新一代农民工的未来。” |
The country outside Foxconn's factory gates has undergone stunning change over the past two decades. | 过去20年来，富士康工厂门外的乡村已发生了令人震惊的变化。 |
Viewed from the roof of the plant's newest dormitory, a 15-storey tower, Longhua is a sprawling urban area with factories, apartments and office blocks squeezing in between multiple highways. | 从富士康厂区最新一栋15层塔楼宿舍楼顶望去，龙华已经成为一个杂乱的城区，在几条主 要道路之间，密布着工厂、公寓与办公大楼。 |
There has been at least as big a change among the workforce. | 而劳动大军的变化可能更大。 |
“The monotonous work I do here is not in line with my idea of life, it doesn't make any sense,” says Lü Pengguo, a 22-year-old logistics worker at Longhua from the inland province of Henan. “My dad says I should keep the job. But as soon as I find something better, I'll leave.” | 吕鹏国（音译）今年22岁，来自河南，目前在龙华做物流工作。他表示：“我在这儿做的 工作十分单调，与我的生活理想不符，没有任何意义。我爸爸说我应该保住这份工作。但一旦我找到更好的工作，就会离开。” |
The new generation of workers is very different to the one that helped Mr Gou build his manufacturing machine. Twenty years ago workers would consider a factory job the chance of a lifetime and for many the food and accommodation offered at the plant would have been no worse than they would expect at home. | 新一代的工人，与那些帮助郭台铭建造起这台制造业机器的民工大不相同。二十年前，工人 把一份工厂工作视为千载难逢的机遇，而且对于许多人来说，工厂提供的食宿可能远远强于他们在家里的预期。 |
Now, 90 per cent of Foxconn's workforce are between 18 and 24 years old. Born after China started its economic reforms, most have much higher expectations. | 如今，富士康90%的员工都在18岁到24岁之间。他们在中国启动经济改革之后出生， 大多数人都拥有高得多的预期。 |
“The migrant workers nowadays want other things in life, they want fun,” says Mr Liu. | 刘坤表示：“如今的农民工希望生活中有些其它东西，他们希望有乐趣。” |
Foxconn has tried to adapt, building sports facilities, libraries and internet cafés on campus. With banks, post offices, retail and restaurant chains, the streets of the compound feel no different from those outside. | 富士康已经在尝试适应这一变化，在园区内修建了运动设施、图书馆和网吧。园区内的街道 两旁有银行、邮局、连锁零售店和餐馆，感觉与园区外的街道没有任何不同。 |
But while Foxconn is clearly not running a sweatshop, there is still little time and energy left for recreation. | 但尽管富士康无疑并非在运营一家血汗工厂，工人们还是几乎没有时间和精力用于娱乐放 松。 |
Production lines run on two 12-hour shifts. Each shift includes time for one meal and two hours of overtime. Several workers interviewed during a factory visit on Friday said they were also doing overtime each Saturday. | 富士康的流水线实行两班倒工作制，每班12个小时。每个班中间可以吃一顿饭，另外还要 加班两个小时。在上周五参观该工厂期间，一些接受我们采访的工人表示，他们每周六也要加班。 |
Mr Lü complains that the company agreed to raise wages since lunar new year in February, but had yet to follow up. | 吕鹏国抱怨称，公司此前答应自2月份春节起加薪，但迄今尚未兑现。 |
Liu Liping, a female worker at Foxconn, says she rarely ever leaves the Foxconn campus because things are too expensive outside. | 富士康一位女工人刘丽萍（音译）表示，她几乎从来不出园区，因为园区外的东西太贵。 |
But others struggle to get used to life inside. Mr Liu says that a newly installed helpline is spotting desperate and confused staff pondering suicide almost every day. | 但其他人则很难适应园区内的生活。刘坤表示，一条新安装的帮助热线，几乎每天都能发现 一些感到绝望、头脑混乱的员工在考虑自杀。 |
“There is certainly a strong copycat factor in the recent events,” says Michael Phillips, Director of the Suicide Research and Prevention Center at Shanghai Mental Health Center. | 上海市精神卫生中心心理危机干预中心研究室主任费立鹏(Michael Phillips)表示：“最近的事件中，显然存在明显的盲目模仿的因素。” |
Mr Phillips also points out that contrary to findings in western countries, almost half of all suicides among young people in China happen impulsively. | 费立鹏同时指出，与西方国家的调查结果不同，中国年轻人的自杀行为中，接近半数是出于 一时冲动。 |
This raises the risk of “infection”, especially on campus where everyone's lives resemble each other so closely. | 这造成了“传染”的风险，尤其是在所有人的生活都如此相似的工业园区内部。 |
译者/何黎 |
补选投票率回归后最低
补选结果，投票率仅为17%，创回归后最低，但五名先前辞职的议员却全部当选。
对此，香港《明报》的报道写道："5区补选落幕了，由于建制派不参与，以及泛民有鹰鸽两条路线之争，所以，投票率低是意料中事。如果特区政府和建制派因而 沾沾自喜，继续在香港民主进程采取蜗牛慢步的策略，现在享受免费政治午餐的功能组别虽然可以受惠，但，社会的激进化和内耗必然加剧，香港整体及长远利益将 要付出更大代价。"
报道写道："选择不投票的人可分两大类：一是传统建制派的支持者，他们对民主的诉求与泛民有根本的分别；另一类则是泛民的支持者， 他们对民主有坚实的追求，只是不认同公社联盟的激进手法，因而选择不投票。因此，低投票率，一个解读是港人不认同「变相公投」这手段，但不可以解读为港人 不支持民主，甚或解读为港人支持特区政府的政改方案。港人对民主、对要求落实真普选，有坚定不移的诉求，北京不要错误解读。"
为对手着想
《明报》的一篇评论写道："鹰派推动的「变相公投」结束了，我们希望焦点重新落在鸽派与北京及建制派的接触。过去几个月，民主派的 鸽派（包括民主党多名立法会议员、学者和社会人士）组成了「终极普选联盟」，他们于今年3月13日公布了政改建议，这个「鸽派方案」是香港政制讨论的重要 范式转移，因为温和民主派采取一个全新的策略──从「保障对方的利益」出发。……这个方案的重点是「为对手着想」，看似匪夷所思，实则有其理论根据，香港 中文大学学者陈健民指出，在西班牙的民主进程中，「协议」（pact）起了关键的作用──「协议」就是政圈持份者为重订权力分配而达至的协议，其基础是参 与协议者的基本利益在新游戏规则下将得到保障。简言之，建制派与改革派要达成协议，就要确保新政制不会把对方赶尽杀绝，双方利益都得到保障。陈健民解释， 普选联的建议就是根据上述原则而成，目的是要体现双赢，安抚保守派，让放弃功能议席的议员较容易透过直选返回议会。"
评论写道："普选联或鸽派方案绝非完美，但用心良苦，为了实现普选，不惜在制度上自我约束，限制民主派的力量，确保对手获得一定比 例的议席。可惜，……建制派一方面高调打击激进民主派的「变相公投」，另一方面冷待温和民主派的双赢方案，如此取态，怎能叫人相信建制派是有诚意推动香港 政制向前走？如果鸽派被建制派拖至心灰意冷，认定沟通之路是虚假的话，只会益了鹰派，令激进之火愈烧愈烈，这决非香港之福。"
政改没有赢家
香港《信报》发表社论，题为《「公投」怎论成败 政改没有赢家》。社论写道："在泛民议员建议借议会补选搞「变相公投」开始，我们就持否定态度，主要原因是泛民在议会拥有二十三票，只要他们联手投反对 票，政改方案就无法通过，他们又何须再搞什么「公投」？香港人对普选的诉求已十分清晰，加快民主步伐以达到二〇一七和二〇二〇双普选得到落实，应是没有人 可以否认的「主流民意」，那么，「变相公投」作用何在？现在「公投」的结果以低投票率完成，泛民手上已无牌可打，原来也许有借「公投」反应热烈、以强大民 意压力作为跟政府讨价还价，如今此路不通，相信泛民很快就会重新走回二〇〇五的捆绑投票模式，利用议会内的二十多票否决政改方案。……如此看来，政府的政 改方案难逃再遭否决的命运。"
社论接着写道："其三，经过长期的争论、对峙，在普选议题上民意的分裂更深、对抗更激烈，泛民议员用尽各种方法逼政府早日落实双普选，但均不得要 领，他们的失望和沮丧情绪将不断上升，以他们在议会内的议席，足以否决政府任何重要议案，府会之间的对立持续升温，相信很快会从政改蔓延至其它民生议题； 而向来跟政府「合作无间」、同声同气的功能组别议员如果在其它议题上支持政府，势将成为泛民议员围攻的目标，议会内的分裂将会更加严重。……正如我们过去 的分析，政改走到这个地步，真的是前无去路，各方皆输-特区政府在中央「指导」下只能提出鸟笼式的政改方案，而政府又没有任何空间跟泛民议员讨价还价，方 案最终必会被否决；泛民用尽各种方法也不能改变现实，其取向必会趋于愈来愈激烈，社会对抗气氛只会更浓；北京以循序渐进为理由处处为普选设限，但换来的是 香港民意愈来愈不满；如此结果，对香港发展将是一个严重警号。"
摘编：李华
责编：叶宣
Wu Gan is known to most people as “the Butcher”, the internet name he uses for blogging, tweeting and uploading articles and videos to the web. | 对于吴淦其人，大多数人熟悉的是“屠夫”这个名号。吴淦用这个网名发表博文和推特，在 网络上发帖子和上传视频。 |
From his Beijing office, which he has dubbed “the Abattoir”, he spends most days scanning online newspaper and blog reports for hints of scandals, cover-ups and official misdeeds that he can investigate and expose to public scrutiny. | 在他称之为“屠宰场”的北京办公室里，他大部分时间都在网上浏览媒体报道和博客上的传 闻，从中寻觅丑闻、黑幕和官员违法行为的蛛丝马迹，随后亲自调查并向公众曝光，使其接受公众监督。 |
He is one of the most daring of a growing band of full-time, internet-savvy, Chinese social activists who are beginning to take their calls for justice and transparency from the virtual into the real world. | 中国正涌现出越来越多精通网络的全职社会维权人士，他们开始把要求公正和透明的呼声， 从虚拟世界传递现实生活中来，而吴淦是其中最勇敢无畏的一位。 |
With his shaved head, goatee beard, burly frame and wide, disarming smile this former aviation sector official and entrepreneur resembles a warrior monk, an impression that is heightened by the Buddhist prayer beads he carries with him at all times. | 光头、留着山羊胡子、体形壮硕、笑容灿烂率真，从事过航空业工作、也做过生意的吴淦， 看起来就像一位武僧，他时时戴在身上的佛珠更强化了这种印象。 |
His zealous defence of downtrodden citizens who take on the might of the Communist party has a religious tinge to it, as does his aura of impending martyrdom when discussing the government's response to him and his fellow “netizen” activists. | 他热衷于捍卫在中共执政下受到压制的公民权利，这种行为带有一种宗教色彩；谈到政府会 怎样对付他们这些维权“网民”时，他的话语中也透出一股准备以身相殉的意味。 |
“I'm not scared for myself but I do worry about my family, my child, relatives and friends who [the government or security services] might take revenge on,” the 37-year-old says. “With the case I'm working on now I think they might retaliate.” | 现年37岁的吴淦说道：“我自己没什么害怕的。但我的确担心家人、孩子和亲戚朋友可能 会遭到（政府）报复。就我目前介入的案子来说，我想他们可能会进行报复。” |
In a case the Butcher has helped publicise widely, fellow internet activists You Jingyou, Wu Huaying and Fan Yanqiong were sentenced in mid-April to between one and two years in prison for criminal defamation of police and government officials. | 在“屠夫”的推动下，这桩案子已经广为人知。在该案中，同为网络维权人士的游精佑、吴 华英、范燕琼三人在4月中旬被判诽谤警方和政府官员，分别判处一至两年有期徒刑。 |
The three had posted online interviews with Lin Xiuying, an impoverished, illiterate woman who believes police covered up the rape and murder of her daughter while she was working as a karaoke hostess in a town in the southern province of Fujian. | 这三人此前曾把对林秀英的采访发到网上。林秀英是福建一名目不识丁的贫困妇女，她坚信 警方故意掩盖她女儿在镇上卡拉OK厅当服务生时遭到强奸和谋杀的事实。 |
The local government and police say the woman's daughter died from an ectopic pregnancy and have rejected her requests for a new investigation. | 当地政府和警方称林秀英之女死于宫外孕，驳回了她重新展开调查的请求。 |
In a rare display of public defiance and solidarity, the Butcher and a few dozen other internet activists travelled from around the country to the provincial court in Fujian for the sentencing of the three netizens and held a peaceful protest that they filmed and then posted, blogged and twittered on the internet. | 对上述三名网民宣判时，“屠夫”等数十名网络维权人士从全国各地赶赴福建，旁观法庭审 理过程，并举行了一次和平抗议。他们把抗议过程拍摄下来，然后在网上发帖子、博文和推特。此次行动展现了颇为罕见的公开对抗与团结。 |
“I got involved in this case because it is closely related with every person's rights,” the Butcher says. “We are all ordinary netizens and if these three people are criminals, then any time we post an article online we could be committing a crime.” | 吴淦表示：“我介入了这起案件，因为它与每个人的权利紧密相关。我们都是普通网民。如 果这三人是罪犯，那么我们每次在网上发帖子，都有可能构成犯罪。” |
The Butcher first made his name last year with the case of Deng Yujiao, a nightclub employee who was held on murder charges and placed in a psychiatric hospital after fatally stabbing a government official who she said tried to sexually assault her. | “屠夫”是去年在邓玉娇一案中开始出名的。邓玉娇是一名夜总会员工，用刀刺死了一名政 府官员，因此被控谋杀，并被送进精神病院。邓玉娇本人称该官员企图强奸自己。 |
In response to overwhelming public condemnation whipped up by the efforts of netizens led by the Butcher, Ms Deng was convicted last June of intentionally causing bodily harm but was then set free. | 在以“屠夫”为首的网民们的努力下，民众对此案的谴责声浪势不可挡。在这种形势下，去 年6月被判故意伤人罪的邓玉娇随后被释放。 |
The Butcher dismisses criticism that the outcome of the case was tantamount to mob justice or trial by uninformed public opinion. | 对于此案结果等同于“暴民正义”或无知舆论左右审判的批评，吴淦不以为然。 |
But he admits there is an increasing danger of this as internet activism proliferates with the rapid spread of social networking services in China. | 但他承认，随着中国社交网络服务的快速发展，网络维权行为日益增多，出现上述情况的可 能性越来越大。 |
In tacit recognition of the threat it sees in these online services, Beijing has blocked all of the most popular foreign social media including YouTube, Facebook and Twitter over the past year, and closed down smaller local equivalents. | 中国政府似乎默认在这些网络服务中看到了威胁，在过去一年屏蔽了所有最受欢迎的外国社 交媒体，包括YouTube、Facebook和Twitter，并关闭了国内较小规模的同类网站。 |
The government is also installing new layers of control to help identify those who post content on the internet and, as in the case of the three netizens in Fujian, local officials have begun using criminal defamation charges to halt criticism of the government online. | 中国政府还在网上安装新的控制工具，以帮助找到那些在网上发帖子的人。而且，正如福建 三网民案件所显示出的那样，当地官员已开始使用诽谤罪来阻止网民对政府的批评。 |
Legal experts identify a peculiar feature in Chinese criminal law as one reason for the rise in such charges. | 法律专家认为，中国刑法的一种特质，是此类罪名增多的原因之一。 |
If a defendant is found by the authorities to have “fabricated facts” in order to defame someone else and this led to “serious consequences”, a Chinese court can hand out a jail sentence of up to three years. | 那就是，如果有关部门发现被告人“捏造事实”，试图诽谤他人，就会导致“严重后果” ——中国的法院可至多判处3年有期徒刑。 |
“Under most circumstances, criminal prosecution on charges of defamation should follow a complaint by the aggrieved party made directly to the court. Only in cases involving ‘serious threats to social order or national interests' does the law authorise use of police power and public prosecution,” says Joshua Rosenzweig, a researcher with the Duihua Foundation in Hong Kong. He adds that this exception with its vague definition gives local officials the means to silence people who embarrass them. | 中美对话基金会(Dui Hua Foundation)驻香港研究员罗助华(Joshua Rosenzweig)表示：“在大多数情况下，应该由受害方直接向法院提起诽谤罪的刑事指控。只有在严重威胁社会秩序或国家利益的情况下，法律才授权警 方和公诉机关提起诉讼。”罗助华补充称，正是这种含糊的“例外”规定，让地方官员有办法让那些令他们困窘的人噤声。 |
“The government's purpose in this case in Fujian is very obvious, they want to kill the chicken to scare the monkey, to make an example of these three,” according to Wang Yong, a professor of law at the China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing. “This sentence sets a very bad precedent for the government to use this to stifle public opinion and free speech.” | 中国政法大学(China University of Political Science and Law)法学教授王勇表示：“政府在福建网民诬陷案中的意图非常明显，他们是想杀鸡给猴看。这一判决树立了一个非常坏的先例，将鼓励政府以此扼杀公共舆论 和言论自由。” |
In Fujian, the local government has gone further and cancelled the legal licence of Lin Hongnan, a lawyer for one of the jailed netizens, and tried to block reporting on the case or access to the accused by claiming the matter involves state secrets. | 福建地方政府其实走得更远——它们取消了为被拘网民之一进行辩护的律师林洪楠的执业资 格，并试图通过宣称该案涉及国家机密，阻止有关此案的报道，或让外界接触被告人。 |
“How can the death of this girl, whether it resulted from rape and murder or an ectopic pregnancy, have anything to do with state secrets?” asked Liu Xiaoyuan, a Beijing-based lawyer for another of the jailed netizens. “They just said that to try to deny these people independent legal representation.” | 另一位被拘网民的北京律师刘晓原质问：“不管这个女孩是死于强奸、谋杀还是宫外孕，这 怎么会扯上国家机密呢？他们这样说，只是为了让这些人无法进行独立的法律陈述。” |
In the wake of the three netizens being sentenced, the Butcher says his girlfriend dumped him after she was harassed at work by state security agents. | 在上述3位网民案宣判后，吴淦表示，自己的女友由于上班时间受到国家安全部门的骚扰， 已离他而去。 |
He has now turned his attention to helping Lin Xiuying, the woman who believes her daughter was raped and murdered. | 现在，吴淦将注意力转向了帮助林秀英，就是那个相信自己的女儿遭到了强奸和谋杀的妇 女。 |
“I have no idea whether her daughter was murdered or died from an ectopic pregnancy but my role is to stand on the side of the disadvantaged individual who goes up against the power of the state,” the Butcher says. | 吴淦表示：“我不知道她的女儿是死于谋杀，还是宫外孕，但我的角色，是站在反抗国家权 力的弱势个体的一边。” |
“Once I've finished this case maybe I'll take a break.” | “一旦此案了结，或许我会休息一段时间。” |
译者/何黎 |
China's current reputation for power benefits from projections about the future. Some young Chinese use these projections to demand a greater share of power now, and some Americans urge preparation for a coming conflict similar to that between Germany and Britain a century ago.
One should be sceptical about such projections. By 1900, Germany had surpassed Britain in industrial power, and the Kaiser was pursuing an adventurous foreign policy that was bound to bring about a clash with the other great powers. By contrast, China still lags far behind the US economically and militarily, and has focused its policies primarily on its region and on its economic development. While its “market Leninist” economic model (the so-called “Beijing Consensus”) provides soft power in authoritarian countries, it has the opposite effect in many democracies.
Even if Chinese gross domestic product passes that of the US in about 2030 (as Goldman Sachs projects), the two economies would be equivalent in size, but not equal in composition. China would still have a vast underdeveloped countryside and it will begin to face demographic problems from the delayed effects of its one-child policy. Moreover, as countries develop, there is a tendency for growth rates to slow. Assuming Chinese growth of 6 per cent and American growth of only 2 per cent after 2030, China would not equal the US in per capita income until sometime in the second half of the century.
Per capita income provides a measure of the sophistication of an economy. While China's impressive growth rate combined with the size of its population will surely lead it to pass the US economy in total size, that is not the same as equality. And since the US is unlikely to be standing still during that period, China is a long way from posing the kind of challenge to America that the Kaiser's Germany posed when it passed Britain at the start of the last century. Nonetheless, the rise of China recalls Thucydides' warning that belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes.
During the past decade, China moved from being the ninth-largest exporter to the largest in the world, but China's export-led development model will probably need to be adjusted as global trade and financial balances become more contentious in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Although China holds huge foreign currency reserves, it will have difficulty raising its financial leverage by lending overseas in its own currency until it has deep and open financial markets in which interest rates are set by the market, not the government.
Unlike India, which was born with a democratic constitution, China has not yet found a way to solve the problem of demands for political participation (if not democracy) that tend to accompany rising per capita income. The ideology of communism is long gone, and the legitimacy of the ruling party depends upon economic growth and ethnic Han nationalism. Some experts argue that the Chinese political system lacks legitimacy, suffers from a high level of corruption and is vulnerable to political unrest should the economy falter. Whether China can develop a formula that can manage an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality and resentment among ethnic minorities remains to be seen. The basic point is that no one, including Chinese leaders, knows how the country's political future will evolve and how that will affect its economic growth.
In 1974, Deng Xiaoping told the United Nations General Assembly: “China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be one.” The current generation of Chinese leaders, realising that rapid growth is the key to domestic political stability, has focused on economic development and what they call a “harmonious” international environment that will not disrupt their growth. But generations change, power often creates hubris and appetites sometimes grow with eating. Some analysts warn that rising powers invariably use their newfound economic strength for wider political, cultural and military ends.
Even if this were an accurate assessment of Chinese intentions, it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this scenario possible. Asia has its own internal balance of powers and, in that context, many states welcome a US presence in the region. Chinese leaders will have to contend with the reactions of other countries as well as the constraints created by their own goal of growth and the need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a military posture could produce a countervailing coalition among its neighbours that would weaken both its hard and soft power. A recent Pew poll of 16 countries found a positive attitude towards China's economic rise, but not its military rise.
The fact that China is not likely to become a peer competitor to the US on a global basis does not mean that it could not challenge the US in Asia, and the dangers of conflict can never be ruled out. But Bill Clinton was basically right when he told Jiang Zemin in 1995 that the US has more to fear from a weak China than a strong China. Given the global challenges that China and the US face, they have much to gain from working together. But hubris and nationalism among some Chinese, and unnecessary fear of decline among some Americans make it difficult to assure this future.
The writer is University Distinguished Service professor at Harvard, and author of the forthcoming book The Future of Power in the 21st Century.
中国现在被誉为大国，得益于人们对未来的预期。如今，某些 中国年轻人正利用这种预期，要求世界给予中国更大的权力，有些美国人则敦促为一场将要到来的冲突做好准备——这场冲突将与一百年前英德两国间的冲突相似。
人 们有理由对这种预期表示怀疑。1900年时，德国的工业实力已超过英国，而且德国皇帝当时奉行的是一种冒险的外交政策，这种政策势必带来与其它大国的冲 突。相比之下，中国的经济和军事实力仍远远落后于美国，政策重心也主要放在本国范围内和本国经济发展上。尽管在威权国家中，中国的“市场列宁主义”经济模 式（即所谓的“北京共识”）带来了软实力，但它在不少民主国家产生了相反的效果。
即使如高盛(Goldman Sachs)所预期的，中国的国内生产总值(GDP)在2030年前后超过美国，这两个经济体也只会在规模方面旗鼓相当，在构成方面仍不可同日而语。届 时，中国仍将有大片农村地区处在欠发达状态，而且它还将开始面临独生子女政策的滞后效应所带来的人口结构问题。此外，随着各国不断发展，经济增速将出现减 缓的趋势。假设在2030年后，中国的经济增速为6%，而美国仅为2%，那么中国的人均收入要到本世纪下半叶的某个时候才能赶上美国。
人均 收入可作为衡量经济发达程度的一个指标。由于中国经济增速惊人且人口众多，其经济总规模超过美国是板上钉钉之事，但这并不意味着中国可与美国平起平坐。此 外，由于美国不太可能在此期间原地踏步，中国将很难像上世纪初德意志帝国对英国构成挑战那样，对美国构成同样的挑战。尽管如此，中国的崛起仍让我们想起修 昔底德(Thucydides)的警告：那种认为冲突将不可避免的想法，可能会成为导致冲突的一个主要原因。
在过去十年里，中国从全球第九大出口国成长为全球最大的出口国。但在本次金融危机之后，全球贸易和金融平衡引发的争议越来越大，中国可能必须要对其 出口导向型发展模式做出调整。虽然中国拥有巨额外汇储备，但在它建立有足够深度和开放度的金融市场、且让市场（而非政府）决定利率之前，它将很难通过向海 外放贷来扩大本国的金融影响力。
与建国之时即拥有民主宪法的印度不同，中国迄今仍未找到办法来满足人民对政治参与（如果还算不上民主制度的 话）的诉求，这种诉求往往随着人均收入的增长而增强。共产主义的意识形态早已成为过去，执政党的合法性建立在经济增长和汉族民族主义的基础上。有些专家认 为，中国的政治制度缺乏合法性，且饱受腐败横行的困扰，如果经济发生衰退，就很容易出现政治不稳定。中国能否找到一种模式，管理好不断扩大的城市中产阶 级、地区间的不平等以及少数民族的不满情绪，仍有待观察。根本的一点在于，包括中国领导人在内，没人知道中国的政治前景将会如何，也没人知道它将给中国的 经济增长带来怎样的影响。
1974年，邓小平在联合国大会上表示：“中国现在不是，将来也不做超级大国。”当前这代中国领导人意识到，快速 增长是保持国内政治稳定的关键，于是他们致力于经济发展，并努力营造他们所谓的“和谐”国际环境，以避免其干扰本国增长。但随着世代更替，实力往往滋生狂 妄，胃口有时会越吃越大。有些分析人士警告称，正在崛起的大国不可避免的会利用它们新获得的经济实力，去追求更广泛的政治、文化和军事目标。
在过去十年里，中国从全球第九大出口国成长为全球最大的出口国。但在本次金融危机之后，全球贸易和金融平衡引发的争议越来越大，中国可能必须要对其 出口导向型发展模式做出调整。虽然中国拥有巨额外汇储备，但在它建立有足够深度和开放度的金融市场、且让市场（而非政府）决定利率之前，它将很难通过向海 外放贷来扩大本国的金融影响力。
与建国之时即拥有民主宪法的印度不同，中国迄今仍未找到办法来满足人民对政治参与（如果还算不上民主制度的 话）的诉求，这种诉求往往随着人均收入的增长而增强。共产主义的意识形态早已成为过去，执政党的合法性建立在经济增长和汉族民族主义的基础上。有些专家认 为，中国的政治制度缺乏合法性，且饱受腐败横行的困扰，如果经济发生衰退，就很容易出现政治不稳定。中国能否找到一种模式，管理好不断扩大的城市中产阶 级、地区间的不平等以及少数民族的不满情绪，仍有待观察。根本的一点在于，包括中国领导人在内，没人知道中国的政治前景将会如何，也没人知道它将给中国的 经济增长带来怎样的影响。
1974年，邓小平在联合国大会上表示：“中国现在不是，将来也不做超级大国。”当前这代中国领导人意识到，快速 增长是保持国内政治稳定的关键，于是他们致力于经济发展，并努力营造他们所谓的“和谐”国际环境，以避免其干扰本国增长。但随着世代更替，实力往往滋生狂妄，胃口有时会越吃越大。有些分析人士警告称，正在崛起的大国不可避免的会利用它们新获得的经济实力，去追求更广泛的政治、文化和军事目标。
即使上述警告是对中国意图的准确评估，中国是否具备足够的 军事能力去实现上述目标也颇令人怀疑。亚洲有其内部的实力平衡，就这点而言，许多国家对美国在该地区的存在持欢迎态度。中国领导人将不得不应对其它国家的 反应，应对由本国增长目标和对外部市场及资源的需求带来的限制。采取过于强硬的军事姿态，可能促使邻国结成反制联盟，从而削弱自己的硬实力和软实力。皮尤 (Pew)近期对16个国家进行的一项调查发现，这些国家对中国的经济崛起持正面态度，对它的军事崛起则不然。
尽管中国不太可能在全球范围 内成为与美国平起平坐的竞争对手，但这并不意味着它不能在亚洲挑战美国。我们永远不能排除两国有爆发冲突的可能性。不过，比尔•克林顿(Bill Clinton)在1995年对江泽民所说的话大体上是正确的，即美国更担心一个羸弱的中国，而不是一个强大的中国。考虑到中美两国面临的全球挑战，双方 进行合作将获益颇多。但是，某些中国人的狂妄自大和民族主义情绪，以及某些美国人对本国衰落不必要的担心，为这一前景增添了许多变数。
本 文作者是美国哈佛大学“大学杰出服务”教授，他的新作《21世纪的实力展望》(The Future of Power in the 21st Century)即将出版
译者/汪洋
Despite a chorus of voices claiming otherwise, we aren’t Greece. We are, however, looking more and more like Japan.
Paul Krugman
Share your thoughts.
For the past few months, much commentary on the economy — some of it posing as reporting — has had one central theme: policy makers are doing too much. Governments need to stop spending, we’re told. Greece is held up as a cautionary tale, and every uptick in the interest rate on U.S. government bonds is treated as an indication that markets are turning on America over its deficits. Meanwhile, there are continual warnings that inflation is just around the corner, and that the Fed needs to pull back from its efforts to support the economy and get started on its “exit strategy,” tightening credit by selling off assets and raising interest rates.
And what about near-record unemployment, with long-term unemployment worse than at any time since the 1930s? What about the fact that the employment gains of the past few months, although welcome, have, so far, brought back fewer than 500,000 of the more than 8 million jobs lost in the wake of the financial crisis? Hey, worrying about the unemployed is just so 2009.
But the truth is that policy makers aren’t doing too much; they’re doing too little. Recent data don’t suggest that America is heading for a Greece-style collapse of investor confidence. Instead, they suggest that we may be heading for a Japan-style lost decade, trapped in a prolonged era of high unemployment and slow growth.
Let’s talk first about those interest rates. On several occasions over the past year, we’ve been told, after some modest rise in rates, that the bond vigilantes had arrived, that America had better slash its deficit right away or else. Each time, rates soon slid back down. Most recently, in March, there was much ado about the interest rate on U.S. 10-year bonds, which had risen from 3.6 percent to almost 4 percent. “Debt fears send rates up” was the headline at The Wall Street Journal, although there wasn’t actually any evidence that debt fears were responsible.
Since then, however, rates have retraced that rise and then some. As of Thursday, the 10-year rate was below 3.3 percent. I wish I could say that falling interest rates reflect a surge of optimism about U.S. federal finances. What they actually reflect, however, is a surge of pessimism about the prospects for economic recovery, pessimism that has sent investors fleeing out of anything that looks risky — hence, the plunge in the stock market — into the perceived safety of U.S. government debt.
What’s behind this new pessimism? It partly reflects the troubles in Europe, which have less to do with government debt than you’ve heard; the real problem is that by creating the euro, Europe’s leaders imposed a single currency on economies that weren’t ready for such a move. But there are also warning signs at home, most recently Wednesday’s report on consumer prices, which showed a key measure of inflation falling below 1 percent, bringing it to a 44-year low.
This isn’t really surprising: you expect inflation to fall in the face of mass unemployment and excess capacity. But it is nonetheless really bad news. Low inflation, or worse yet deflation, tends to perpetuate an economic slump, because it encourages people to hoard cash rather than spend, which keeps the economy depressed, which leads to more deflation. That vicious circle isn’t hypothetical: just ask the Japanese, who entered a deflationary trap in the 1990s and, despite occasional episodes of growth, still can’t get out. And it could happen here.
So what we should really be asking right now isn’t whether we’re about to turn into Greece. We should, instead, be asking what we’re doing to avoid turning Japanese. And the answer is, nothing.
It’s not that nobody understands the risk. I strongly suspect that some officials at the Fed see the Japan parallels all too clearly and wish they could do more to support the economy. But in practice it’s all they can do to contain the tightening impulses of their colleagues, who (like central bankers in the 1930s) remain desperately afraid of inflation despite the absence of any evidence of rising prices. I also suspect that Obama administration economists would very much like to see another stimulus plan. But they know that such a plan would have no chance of getting through a Congress that has been spooked by the deficit hawks.
In short, fear of imaginary threats has prevented any effective response to the real danger facing our economy.
Will the worst happen? Not necessarily. Maybe the economic measures already taken will end up doing the trick, jump-starting a self-sustaining recovery. Certainly, that’s what we’re all hoping. But hope is not a plan.
对于中国来说，解读李光耀是一件非常困难的事情。李光耀有 很多的层次，中国网民和中国领袖，以及中国的学者，就有三种不同的解读。
中国网民对李光耀明言美国不应该把东亚主导权拱手让给中国一说，耿 耿于怀，骂他是吃里爬外，数典忘祖，挟洋自重；但是，胡锦涛、温家宝并没有受制于民粹主义的批判，高调会见李光耀，称他是中国人民的老朋友，为中国的改革 开放提供了好的意见，也为东盟与中国的合作奠定了基础；而中国的学者，则高度赞扬李光耀在强敌环绕下建设新加坡这个都市国家的成就，他创建的自由市场与威 权主义的结合也是对中国具有相当参考作用的模式，而他与美国即合作又斗争的关系充满智慧，不用说，他还是最早看好中国崛起的著名政客，苏州的高科技园区更 是开了中国国际硅谷的先河。
有时候，李光耀确实有两面周旋，好处全拿的投机倾向。以两岸关系为例来看，李光耀是两岸领袖都信任的“传话 者”，一九九三年史无前例的两岸辜汪会谈，就是在李光耀斡旋下于新加坡举行的，他之后也批评李登辉过于媚日，但同时，李光耀与民进党高层的接触也没有中断 过，他还让儿子李显龙在就职新加坡总理前旋风访问台湾，引发争议；民进党最有可能角逐2012年总统大位的苏贞昌，四月底就走访新加坡与李光耀密谈。由此 可见，李光耀反对台独玩弄战争边缘游戏，因为新加坡需要这个地区的和平稳定，但是，李光耀显然也不愿意看到两岸快速统一，担心中美日平衡被打破。
不 过，必须承认，李光耀对亚太地区政治平衡的把握，对中美国情的把握，都有相当过人之处，说他是西化论的代表者，但他却是“亚洲价值”的最早提倡者之一；说 他是亚洲本位论者，他却是主张亚洲应该拥抱西方的政治精英；说他崇拜美国，但他又是与美国主流媒体较量最多、甚至大打官司、同时也冲撞西方民主人权（鞭刑 就是一例）的强硬派；说他主张拉美国来“平衡”中国（李光耀拒绝用“制衡”这个词），但他恰恰是东盟中率先强调中国发展对该地区没有威胁只会带来机会的政 治家。解读李光耀的矛盾之处或曰复杂立场的一个关键，或者一把钥匙，就是要认识到：李光耀是完全站在新加坡这个他亲手创建的都市小国的国家利益上思考问题 的，因为不同战略利益的大国集团在这个地区的平衡存在，是新加坡左右逢源的基础。
李光耀不会因为别人说什么而闭嘴。五月十五日，日本朝日新闻英文版刊载了他对该报总编辑船桥洋一的专访，他胸有成竹，却又口无遮拦，恣意点评美日中 三国，这势必会引发新的争论。
李光耀以未来将近一个世纪的时间段来评论美中力量的消长。上半个世纪，李光耀断言美国仍然是这个世界尤其是亚 太地区的主导力量，中国占据下风。理由很简单，中国人口太多，人均生产总值远远低于美国，中国需要美国市场甚于美国需要中国市场；中文难学，而美国有英语 优势，世界人才仍然流往美国，导致美国具备革新与科技突破能力。一直要到下半个世纪，中国的优势才能与美国并驾齐驱。
李光耀批评鸠山内阁短 视，在冲绳美军基地上与美国唱反调，最终会牺牲日本国家利益，李光耀要日本放弃与中国争锋的想法，因为未来的亚太地区不是多极世界，而是只有两级，美国与 中国，日本要么投向美国集团，要么投向中国集团，不可能与美中平起平坐，因为日本太小。
东盟十加三是亚洲和世界最大的自由贸易区，但是，李光耀直 言，东盟目前仍然倾向美国，而未来依赖中国市场越来越多的中南半岛成员国，包括缅甸、老挝、柬埔寨、甚至泰国，会向中国倾斜，东盟内部会发生变化。不过， 东盟国家还是在中美势力平衡的大环境中，最自由自在。
说来说去，李光耀不相信中国会在可见的将来，取代美国的地位，出现“后美国时代”，所 以，中美共治才是最好的平衡。
或许李光耀的话，仍然会让不少中国人伤心甚至不满，但却是值得中国认真思考的“真话、实话”。 中国应该好好发展，做好自己的事情，不必要为了“第一”的虚名，而遭致各方的攻击，那样并不值得。当然，中国没有美国强，并非要怕美国，在维护自己核心利 益的问题上，中国应摆明底线，决不让步，其余的事情，则以负责任的合作姿态与美国打交道。总而言之，中国在提升实力的同时，也应该在体制上、文化思想上、 教育上、科技创新上、人才网罗上、国际义务承担上，在所有软实力的领域里，不断改进，准备好成为世界第一，而且是与美国不同的世界第一。
（注： 本文仅代表作者本人观点。）
德国馆馆长向上海世博会组织方递交抗议信
上海世博会刚刚开幕的几天里就发生了几起不愉快事件。人们在德国馆外一等就是数小时,其中包括一些坐轮椅的参观者，显然，这一点让一些火气大的人感 到特别愤怒。一些人从花坛里拔出花卉，扔向德国馆。还有一些人则合声喊道"纳粹"。据德国馆新闻发言人孔拉迪（Marion Conrady）说，一名工作人员被人故意踩了脚， 她对此很是生气。
"我们能做的不多，我也只能摇头说，好吧，如果你不能自控的话。我们的工作人员态度都很友好。"
5月2日，德国馆馆长施密茨（Dietmar Schmitz）已就该事件向上海世博会组织方递交了抗议信。《南德意志报》周一报道说，施密茨对一些参观者"不可忍受的举止表示抗议，其中包括人格侮辱 和人身攻击。"他向世博组织者提出加强治安措施要求。
在施密茨看来，展示德国形象的工程受到威胁。他说："所有参加者都是受到中方邀请的，被邀请者就是客人。在我们德国，客人或者客户就是上帝。我们也 期待有这样的待遇，而不像是在幼儿园，幼儿园的规则都由园长，也就是中方来制定。这样做是不对的。因为，世博会是向公众展示形象，组织方和参展方都必须付 出努力，在公众面前有一个良好的亮相。"
瑞士馆发言人: 参观者人数太多
其他国家的展馆也遇到问题。据南德意志报周一报道，英国馆甚至一度短时间关闭。奥地利和瑞士展馆前也发生冲突。但是瑞士馆发言人克雷丽娅·卡耐 (Clelia Kanai)则认为，相比之下，个别人情绪失控算不了什么，导致许多问题发生的原因主要是参观者人数太多。上海世博会从开馆至今已吸引了300万参观者， 只是预估数字的一半，尽管如此，却已出现了诸多问题。她说："发生一些小摩擦只是个别情况。这些人中，有的在展馆前排队等候长达2小时，烦躁情绪自然会增 加。"
捷克馆馆长:希望组织方立即取消所有可笑的规定
捷克馆的馆长也向世博会组织方提出了抗议。他说，"各馆的工作人员每天都浪费大量时间进馆，这是不能接受的事实。工作人员进馆的时间必需缩短。我们 希望组织方立即取消所有可笑的规定。"
德国馆专门为坐轮椅的残疾人设置了绿色通道。展馆内的布局也处处为坐轮椅者提供了方便。尽管如此，坐轮椅的参观者仍然要在展馆前长时间排队等候。孔 拉迪说：.
"世博会为所有70岁以上的老年人提供轮椅。这当然会引起一些麻烦。因为我们的能力有限。我们不可能每天接纳2万名坐轮椅的参观者。现在我们只能通 过发放相应门票的方式来进行限制。"
作者：Christoph Ricking/ARD/李京慧
责编: 乐然
《柏林日报》写道："德国和其它西方国家想促使中国人承担更多国际责任，而北京不愿被迫担任并非自己挑选的角色。"该报接着写道：
"但是，克勒作为国家的最高代表、而不是作为政治决策者前往中国，所以他的五天访问主要是为了两国人民的友谊。他将用一天半的时间参观上海世博会， 其中星期三是'德国馆日'。对世博会的组织者来说，德国总统的访问来得正是时候：头三个星期，参观世博会的人数仅仅勉强为预期的一半，组织者现在想借助媒 体的宣传在国内外掀起世博热。
作为经济专家，这位国际货币基金组织前总裁尤其得到中国政界会谈伙伴的信任。例如，两国国家元首会晤时，金融政策的话题占了很大篇幅。胡锦涛在会谈 时强调，中国认为金融市场急需改革，北京要求在二十国集团的框架下更严格地控制国际资本的流动。同时，中国争取在国际货币基金组织和世界银行等机构中获得 更多决策参与权。"
就在德国总统前往上海为"德国馆日"揭幕前夕，上海世博园德国、英国和瑞士等国展馆前传来了不和谐的噪音。《南德意志报》做了如下报道：
"德国馆前，有人呼喊'纳粹'辱骂德国，几个国家展馆前，发生了推搡和斗殴事件，这是上海世博经历的猛烈序曲。此前，排队数小时之久的中国游客一再 试图以暴力进入展馆。德国馆的经营人向中国世博领导发出抗议信，要求增加保安人员。世博会刚开始的几天就发生了事件：暴怒的人群开始扯下花朵，投掷德国 馆，一些人大声呼喊'纳粹、纳粹'。
世博观众发火的问题不仅限于德国馆。英国馆曾一度闭馆，因为观众有失控的危险。瑞士馆也出现了'一些事件'，目击者称，排队的人群中发生斗殴、还有 人侮辱瑞士馆的中国工作人员。
德国新闻发言人康拉迪说，德国馆工作人员不得不多次拨打报警电话'110'，身着制服的人员随即赶到，'几分钟内'就控制了形势。最近几天，除了世 博维持秩序的人员和便衣警察外，中国武警也在世博园内巡逻。
德国为这次在上海引为自豪的展出花费了五千万欧元。德国想在中国展现自己最好的一面，所以当一些中国人同声呼喊'纳粹、纳粹！'时，也许可以把此看 作德国的一大挫折。德国馆主管施密特推测，'我相信，这些中国人根本不知道自己呼喊的是什么。'德国和瑞士的世博发言人都强调，大多数中国观众表现平 和。"
编译: 王羊
责编: 乐然
本文摘自或节译自其它媒体
不代表德国之声观点
Five days of clashes with troops have seen 38 people killed and reduced parts of Bangkok to battle zones, with columns of smoke billowing overhead from piles of tyres set ablaze by the "Red Shirt" protesters occupying the city's main shopping district.
As the United Nations urged Thailand to "step back from the brink", some 60 senators sent a letter to the government and the Reds Shirts, urging them to halt the violence and enter into talks organised by the upper house.
"The Reds agree to accept the proposal by the senate speaker who wants to mediate the talks, and are ready to join from now," said the protest leader Nattawut Saikuar. "We will not go with any conditions, the senator is free to offer any proposals and we are willing to consider them."
However, the government then refused to go ahead with peace talks saying they would not negotiate until the protesters had dispersed.
The cabinet minister Satit Wonghnongtaey quoted the prime minister as saying that "the situation will end only when the protest stops."
The government announced three more public holidays for government agencies in Bangkok, in a move to keep civilians off the violence-wracked streets until the end of the week.
Government offices were already closed Monday and Tuesday, and schools have been ordered to delay their return from holidays for a week until next Monday.
The capital's two main train systems, the underground and the overhead monorail, have been closed for four days. Two previous rounds of negotiations have raised hopes for a peaceful resolution but then collapsed, and the government has not responded to the latest proposal.
Thailand's chief negotiator accused exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who is supported by the Red Shirts, of standing in the way of a deal by insisting his corruption conviction be overturned.
"He wants amnesty for himself, which we can't do," Korbsak Sabhavasu, an aide to Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. "No government can accept that. It would mean another coup and amnesty for everybody." Mr Thaksin, who was ousted by the Thai army in 2006, said in a statement that he wanted both sides in the conflict to "step back from this terrible abyss." Police said casualties around Bangkok have declined as the government and protesters seek talks to end six days of gun battles. "There should be good news," said police spokesman Prawut Thavornsiri. "That means tensions may ease or protests will probably end." The military meanwhile defended its use of deadly but limited force, saying troops only fired to protect themselves and Bangkok citizens and did not pursue pre-emptive attacks.
"If they don't move close to us, there won't be any losses," army spokesman Col Sansern Kaewkamnerd said. He also accused the Red Shirts of using a child of about three years as a human shield, holding him up above a barricade in the streets.
The government also announced that a two-day public holiday was being extended to Friday.
Red Shirt protest leaders had previously set conditions for any talks.
The government had rejected earlier offers for talks that included demands to withdraw troops and submit to UN mediation.
The Red Shirts have occupied 1 square mile of downtown Bangkok, camping in the streets next to shuttered five-star hotels and shopping centres.
*****TAIPEI — Taiwan's former security chief has confirmed for the first time that Taipei and Beijing used secret communications channels from 2008 as they worked to thaw glacial ties, it was reported Sunday.
Su Chi, who was chief of the National Security Council until earlier this year, said in an interview with the Taipei-based United Daily News that the sensitive channels helped build trust between the longtime foes.
He said the National Security Council did not talk directly to authorities on the mainland, but declined to provide details of the secret channels.
"In my office, there were no hotlines. I did not contact them directly. It would have been too risky."
Taiwan's ties with its giant neighbour have improved markedly since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, pledging to boost trade links and allowing in more Chinese tourists.
Taiwan has governed itself since 1949 at the end of a civil war. However, Beijing still considers Taiwan part of its territory and maintains its right to use force should the island move to declare formal independence.
MIAMI — A Taiwanese national pleaded guilty Thursday to attempting to export thousands of missile components to Iran in violation of a US embargo, and faces up to 20 years in prison, the US Department of Justice said.
Yi-Lan Chen, age 40 and also known by the name Kevin Chen, pleaded guilty to three charges of conspiring to illegally export dual-use commodities to Iran, namely 120 hermetic connectors and 8,500 glass-to-metal seals, according to the department.
"While the goods or technologies have commercial application, they also could make a significant contribution to the military or nuclear potential of other nations and could be detrimental to the foreign policy or national security of the United States," the Justice Department said in a statement.
Chen's Taiwanese corporation, Landstar Tech Company Limited, where he worked at the time of the actions, was also charged with one count of criminal information and, like Chen, faces a maximum fine of one million dollars.
Chen is accused of taking requests and payments for the US manufactured goods from clients in Iran, purchasing the goods and then planning to bring them back to Taiwan for transport on to Iran.
Undercover US Department of Commerce agents intercepted Chen in the US Pacific island territory of Guam where he intended to take possession of the material.
The case comes in the midst of an international crisis over Iran's nuclear enrichment program, and a Washington-led push for new United Nations sanctions on the Islamic republic.
The United States and other western nations say Iran is working to acquire atomic weapons, but Tehran insists its enrichment efforts are purely for peaceful nuclear energy.
Chen's sentencing is set for July 30.
*****
TOKYO — Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni arrived in Tokyo Sunday for his first state visit to Japan, where he will meet the Japanese royals and the prime minister.
Sihamoni will meet Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko on Monday at the start of his five-day visit, Cambodian foreign ministry spokesman Koy Kuong told AFP.
"The state visit by the king to Japan will strengthen the relationship and cooperation between the two countries," he said.
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama will hold talks with Sihamoni on Tuesday.
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King Norodom Sihamoni is greeted by well-wishers upon his arrival at Tokyo's Haneda Airport |
