Britain and Hong Kong
No panderers, please: this issue’s black and white
Time for Britain to rediscover its moral compass and confront China over Hong Kong
ON JULY 15th Hong Kong’s leader, Leung Chun-ying, presented a report to China’s leaders in Beijing on how to reform the territory’s electoral system. In it he suggested that most Hong Kongers were perfectly happy with a system under which a rigged committee of worthies weeds out anyone the mainland does not like, and did not want greater political freedom. The report angered many in the former British colony, who complain that China no longer respects the unique formula of “one country, two systems” under which Hong Kong is supposed to be governed and believe its actions so far suggest it will not keep its promise to allow universal suffrage in the election of the territory’s leader by 2017. Amid the uproar, however, one voice has been notably silent: that of Britain.
In 1984 Margaret Thatcher signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration with a Chinese leader, Zhao Ziyang. The document laid the groundwork for Hong Kong’s Basic Law, its post-handover constitution. For several years after Britain handed over power in 1997, China adhered scrupulously to the Basic Law. This week, amid growing concerns for Hong Kong’s autonomy, two senior Hong Kong politicians, Martin Lee Chu-ming and Anson Chan Fang On-sang, visited London hoping to meet David Cameron. They succeeded only in seeing Nick Clegg, the deputy prime minister, who told them that Britain “will not shy away from defending the principle of one country, two systems”. Yet that is precisely what Britain is doing.
As China has become more powerful, it has exerted increasing influence in Hong Kong—over the electoral process, by leaning on editors to tone down criticism of China (see
article), and through its pressure on religious groups, such as Falun Gong, that are banned on the mainland. A white paper written by the central government and published in June declared that Hong Kong’s autonomy was in the gift of Beijing. It also called on the territory’s judiciary to recognise that it has a duty to “be patriotic”—ie, mindful of China’s national interests—a contradiction of Hong Kong’s common-law English system and a threat to judicial independence.
A right royal welcome
The week after the white paper was issued, China’s prime minister, Li Keqiang, was being feted on a state visit to Britain. He got an audience with the queen—a privilege normally reserved for heads of state. The trip was billed as a rapprochement after a period in which China had kept Britain in the cold. Two years ago, Britain’s prime minister, David Cameron, met the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, whom Beijing labels a “splittist”. As a result, China shunned British leaders and businessmen. Signalling that China was willing to put the past behind it, Mr Li signed deals worth £14 billion ($24 billion). Nobody needed to spell out what from now on would be the terms of the relationship: deals would flow, but only for as long as Britain kept its nose out of Chinese affairs.
The consequences of that pact are now becoming clear. This month the British foreign secretary issued the latest of his twice-yearly reports on Hong Kong. He noted that some in Hong Kong had said that the white paper threatened the city’s autonomy. But it did not contain a word of criticism for the document itself, nor for the government in Beijing.
That is bad for Hong Kong. Its role as a global financial centre is based upon the freedom of its press, the independence of its judiciary and the rule of law. Hong Kong’s citizens risk seeing the autonomy guaranteed by the Basic Law eroded.
For British firms, the price of confronting China could be high. But in terms of the country’s broader interests, failing to do so would be costlier. Countries that renege on treaty commitments lose credibility. Moreover, Britain’s outsize diplomatic clout derives from its values as a democracy and its ability as a permanent member of the Security Council to galvanise coalitions. Its behaviour over Hong Kong suggests that either or both of those sources of strength are failing, for it seems unwilling to use its clout to defend its values.
Britain alone might not curb China’s behaviour. But other countries, including America, are alarmed at Chinese bullying in neighbouring seas and distant continents. If Britain were willing to stand by Hong Kong’s liberties, they would be prepared to do so too. If Britain kow-tows to China, why should they bother?
2014年07月18日 06:42 AM
FT社評：英國不應對香港沉默
英國《金融時報》
社評
1997年7月，飄揚在香港上空的英國國旗最後一次被降了下來，時任香港總督的彭定康(Chris Patten)宣告，這個前英國殖民地將由香港人民來治理。他在告別演講中說，“這是承諾，這是一個不可動搖的宿命”。
17年過去了，這個承諾帶給人們的希望漸漸暗淡，香港的政治未來處於不確定之中。根據中英兩國在1984年達成的香港移交條款，中國政府保證給予香港高度自治，其資本主義制度維持50年不變。中國還承諾允許香港保留多項政治自由，包括司法獨立。到目前為止，中國一直恪守這個協議。然而中國國家主席習近平最近似乎採取了更強硬的態度。
最讓香港人不安的有兩大問題。其一是關於香港行政長官選舉方式的分歧。香港行政長官實際上就是香港700萬人的市長，是由一個1200人的委員會推選出來的，這些委員多數是親北京人士。將1984年《中英聯合聲明》確立為法律的香港《基本法》聲明，普選是“最終目標”，中國中央政府也曾允諾會在2017年實現這個目標。但是，讓民主活動人士憤怒的是，現在中央政府堅稱要由其全權決定誰能參選。
中國政府對待香港的語調也更為尖銳。最近，中國政府發表了一份“白皮書”，宣稱香港並不享有“完全的自治”。白皮書聲明法官必須“愛國”，由此帶來司法政治化的威脅。這些舉動引發了兩周前的一次民主游行，一位中國的高級官員警告，可能出動解放軍在香港街上鎮壓抗議。
考慮到是1984年《英國聯合聲明》的簽署國，人們有理由期待英國在這些事務上有觀點。但是，在最近幾個星期，英國首相戴維•卡梅倫(David Cameron)刻意避免提及香港問題。中國總理李克強6月訪問倫敦時，卡梅倫完全沒有對李克強提起香港問題。本周香港的知名民主活動人士來到倫敦，卡梅倫及外交大臣威廉姆•黑格(William Hague)也拒絕接見他們。顯而易見的答案是，曾因會晤達賴喇嘛(Dalai Lama)遭到中國冷遇的卡梅倫，不會做任何破壞中英雙邊貿易關系的事情。
首相的緘默無法令人滿意。沒錯，香港《基本法》中沒有規定中國必須接受香港行政長官選舉提名的完全民主化。但英國與香港的歷史淵源意味著，英國政府一方面在道義上有義務維護香港的民主權利，另一方面有責任捍衛1984年條約文件中規定的自由。
英國應該提醒中國：香港《基本法》規定香港特別行政區享有獨立的司法權和終審權。英國應該清楚地向中國表明，讓香港保持一個繁榮的國際金融中心的地位，符合中國的經濟利益。只有維持政治穩定和法治，香港才能保持現有的地位。
卡梅倫應該想起，在與世界各國領導打交道的時候，中國政府尊敬實力，而非軟弱。介入香港事務或許會暫時威脅英國在中國的商業利益。然而，香港人民的自由是瑪格麗特•撒切爾(Margaret Thatcher)領導下的英國政府作出莊重承諾的一件事。
這不是一個英國應該聳聳肩、避而不談的問題。
譯者/何黎
